Congress Must Preserve A Vital Strategic Reconnaissance Capability — The SR-71

(Washington, D.C.): Action is expected to be completed today on the FY1990 Defense Authorization bill. One of the few remaining and, arguably, most significant issues to be resolved is the fate of the SR-71, the United States preeminent manned reconnaissance aircraft.

Citing budgetary constraints and the availability of other collection assets, the Bush Administration elected not to request the $250 million needed to continue operations of the SR-71, designated the "Blackbird." The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Larry D. Welch, added that another consideration was the relatively greater survivability of satellites and the vulnerability of the Blackbird to Soviet SAM-5 missiles.

Three of the four congressional committees⁽¹⁾ concerned rejected these arguments and approved the required funding. The issue is now at issue in conference because the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which has exclusive jurisdiction over intelligence authorization matters in the House of Representatives, has chosen to press for retirement of the SR-71.

The Center for Security Policy strongly believes that the Defense Authorization conferees should insist upon the continued operation of the SR-71 until such time as a replacement aircraft — one with at least equivalent capabilities — is in operation. The Center’s recommendation is based on the following considerations:

• The SR-71 is the most flexible reconnaissance asset in the United States inventory. Its capabilities simply cannot be replicated by satellites whose flight paths are fixed to a large degree; as a result, potential adversaries are able to predict the reconnaissance coverage of such assets — and take steps to conceal sensitive activities from U.S. intelligence.
  • It is difficult to overstate the value of being able to bring a high-performance collection system like the SR-71 rapidly to bear virtually anywhere in the world, without regard to daylight or weather conditions.

   

  • This flexibility has prompted the principal users of the SR-71 — the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department — to argue for retention of the SR-71.

   

  • A further consideration has to do with public confidence in security policy decisions taken in light of perceived threats. In the past, the United States government has been willing to declassify the high-resolution photographs taken by the SR-71 when it felt constrained from revealing the products of satellite collection systems.

 

 

• While the SR-71 cannot be said to be invulnerable — as a practical matter, nothing is — its survivability in most theaters of operation is substantial. Arguably, the Blackbird has greater survivability than most U.S. space-based reconnaissance systems.
  • In addition to the advantage a piloted aircraft can have in taking evasive action against unexpected threats, the Blackbird is equipped with the most advanced counter-measure features yet designed.

   

  • Combined with its inherent "Stealthy" characteristics, these countermeasures have permitted the SR-71 to survive hundreds of reported attempts by the North Koreans, for example, to destroy it with a variety of advanced surface-to-air missiles.

   

  • By contrast, low earth orbiting satellites of the type used for most U.S. reconnaissance functions are extremely susceptible to a variety of techniques designed to degrade their performance or destroy them.

 

 

• The SR-71 has proven its value as a complementary system to U.S. space-based reconnaissance assets during the prolonged period from 1985 to 1987 when the United States was unable to place new satellites in orbit.
  • With its flexible flight time, Mach 3 speed, and ability to fly at altitudes above 80,000 feet, the SR-71 is able to photograph more than 100,000 square miles of territory in a single hour.

   

  • This is a capability that, in the absence of other, comparable reconnaissance resources can be absolutely decisive to accurate threat estimation in peacetime and for crisis management purposes –to say nothing of its value in wartime.

 

 

• At this point, the SR-71 is simply irreplaceable. While the United States may introduce systems with comparable capabilities in the future, it will be years before they are on-line.
  • It is imprudent in the extreme to eliminate such a valuable asset without replacement.

 

 

• It is particularly ironic that the United States is pursuing an "Open Skies" initiative with the Soviet Union at the very moment that it is considering abandoning its foremost system for exploiting the opportunities afforded by such an arrangement.

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1. The Senate Armed Services, Senate Appropriations, and House Appropriations Committees.