Defense Scorecard #3: An Assessment of Congressional Actions on Key FY1991 Defense Issues

Introduction

As part of its continuing effort to
monitor the adequacy of spending on
national defense, the Center for Security
Policy has produced several
“scorecards.” These papers are
designed to highlight key programs, to
track their status as various relevant
pieces of legislation progress through
the Congress and to provide
recommendations concerning such programs.

Today, the House of Representatives
begins debate on the version of the
FY1991 Defense authorization bill
reported out by the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC). The Committee’s mark-up
occurred prior to Iraq’s aggression
against Kuwait and the U.S. force
build-up in response thereto.
Consequently, it reflects the prevailing
sentiment on the HASC and in the full
House at that time, namely that the
defense budget could serve as a
“bill-payer” for other spending
priorities.

The Center believes that, both
in terms of total budget authority
(HASC: $283 billion vs. the
Administration’s amended request: $306.9
billion and the Senate version passed on
4 August 1990: $289 billion) and in terms
of its specific programmatic
recommendations, the
House Armed Services Committee mark-up is
entirely inadequate.
Fortunately, it is widely expected that
the full House — sobered by the reality
that dangerous aggression can still occur
in the so-called Post Cold-War world and
braced by the prospect of imminent
hostilities involving armed forces of the
United States — is unlikely to enact the
present legislation.

The present Scorecard href=”#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾
is offered as a tool for illuminating
areas where the HASC recommendations must
be revisited and/or other changes made in
the Administration’s or the Senate’s
proposals. In making its recommendations,
the Center has been principally guided by
the need to emphasize those systems and
capabilities which have in common three
characteristics: the flexibility
to perform multiple missions;
the utilization of advanced
technology — an area of
competitive advantage for the United
States; and the ability to
project power over long distances.
Notably, systems frequently dismissed as
“strategic” and irrelevant to
the present environment (e.g., the B-2
bomber and the Strategic Defense
Initiative) involve these qualities and
are strongly recommended.

I. STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

MX ICBM

• Admin: $1,300m for procurement of
  rail-garrison MX trains; $230m
  Military Construction (MilCon);
  $548m for R&D

• Senate: $ 0 proc; $ 0 MilCon:
  $548m R&D

• HASC: $ 0 proc; $ 0 MilCon; $610m
  R&D (to be split among MX and
  SICBM)

The Center recommends maintaining the
force of fifty Mxs in Minuteman II silos,
and defending them with strategic
defenses, but terminating work on
rail-garrison and other mobile modes.
The Center believes the Administration
should revisit its recent decision no
longer to insist upon a total ban on all
mobile ICBMs in START. Instead, the
United States should press for rapid
deployment of strategic defenses as both
more cost-effective and more desirable
for strategic deterrence than mobile
ICBMs. In any case, the latter are not
likely to be fielded effectively by the
United States, and arms control
limitations intended to control sizeable
and highly capable Soviet mobile missile
forces cannot be verified with
confidence.

Midgetman SICBM

• Admin: $202m R&D for road
  mobile mode

• Senate: $202m R&D for road
  mobile mode

• HASC: $610m R&D (to be
  divided with MX; Administration
  to choose allocation between MX
  and Midgetman)

The Center recommends that work continue
to develop the Small ICBM (SICBM) as an
eventual replacement for the Minuteman
II. As with the rail-mobile deployment
scheme for the MX, however, the Center
believes that the United States
should forgo the road-mobile program for
Midgetman, relying instead on
multi-purpose defenses, among other
things, to provide increased
survivability. As noted above, the United
States should insist in START — for
verification reasons as well as strategic
ones — on a ban on all mobile ICBMs, including
single-warhead systems, like the SICBM.

B-2 Bomber

• Admin: $2,700m to procure 2
  aircraft; $1,567m R&D

• Senate: $2,700m to procure 2
  aircraft; $1,751m R&D

• HASC: Cancel procurement; provide
  $1,560m R&D, preserve
  production facilities and tooling
  as hedge against need to procure
  system in the future.

The Center strongly supports the B-2
program. The B-2 uniquely meets future
global requirements for a flexible,
dual-capable long-range bomber against
all targets. The importance of
having such a capability even in a
world of lessened U.S.-Soviet tensions
has been underscored by the Iraqi
conflict.

The Center is
concerned, however, that the
Administration’s revised request — with
its cut in FY1991 procurement from five
aircraft to just two per year — is
radically driving up the unit cost. If,
as it should, the House rejects the
Committee’s recommendation to terminate
the B-2, serious consideration should be
given to returning this program to an
efficient ramp-up to full rate
production. The slightly higher up-front
costs involved in doing so will be more
than offset by lower overall costs.

II. STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND
SPACE

SDI

• Admin: $4,466m overall

• Senate: $3,570m (a cut of $887m,
  compounded by the effects of the
  Bingaman-Shelby amendment,
  programmatic redirection aimed at
  slowing near-term space-based
  elements in general and crippling
  Brilliant Pebbles (-$200m).

• HASC: $2,900m (-$l,670m); cancel
  Nuclear Directed Energy Weapons
  (NDEW) part of SDI program (-
  $192m); deny $265m request for
  full scale development of Boost
  Phase Surveillance and Tracking
  System (BSTS) but approve
  requested $137m for advanced
  development and ask shift of this
  program to Air Force account.
  Imposes restrictions on tests.

The Center believes that global
developments — including growing
instabilities in the Soviet Union and the
proliferation of ballistic missile
capabilities among radical Third World
regimes — make the accelerated
development and early deployment
of SDI technologies more imperative than
ever. This high priority program
should be accomplished with maximum
flexibility and speed, committing to full
testing and deployment unconstrained by
congressional “fencing” or arms
control limitations.

Accordingly, the
House should reject efforts to reduce
further the funding for the SDI program
or to impose restrictions akin to those
attached to the Senate version by
Senators Bingaman and Shelby.
Moreover, an SDI deployment is an
essential hedge against cheating and/or
instabilities arising from a START
Treaty; a commitment to such a deployment
should be made by the executive and
legislative branches as a prerequisite
for START reductions.

MILSTAR

• Admin: $281m for procurement;
  $768m R&D

• Senate: Cancel (-$1,063m); add
  $20m to study alternative

• HASC: $281m for procurement:
  $768m R&D

The Center supports the Administration’s
request for this vital C3 (command,
control and communications) satellite
system. The Iraqi incursion makes clear
that this country still faces conflict
with formidable adversaries far from home
and equipped with modern military
capabilities. It should also put to rest
arguments made by some (notably the
Democratic majority on the Senate Armed
Services Committee) that since such
conflicts are things of the past,
sophisticated, jam-resistant C³
systems like MILSTAR are no longer
necessary.

In fact, the need for the assured
ability to provide 24-hour-a-day, secure,
two-way and world-wide communications —
offered only by MILSTAR — is
more obvious now than ever. The massive
investment in virtually every other
weapon system will be significantly
degraded if the United States fails to
field effective means of commanding and
controlling those forces.

Anti-Satellite (ASAT)

• Admin: $208m for kinetic and
  directed energy programs

• Senate: $208m

• HASC: $100m; prohibits
  Mid-Infrared Chemical Laser
  (MIRACL) testing against an
  object in space; adds $8m for
  DARPA verification programs

The Center supports the full
Administration request, including the
promising MIRACL program. It believes
that correcting the current, dangerous
U.S. deficiencies in terms of both
deterrence and space defense
requirements, the nation must move
swiftly to field a credible ASAT system.
For these reasons — as well as the utter
futility of monitoring any significant
arms control limitation on ASATs, the
United States should reject legislated
and/or negotiated constraints on testing
or deployments of such weapons.

National
Aerospace Plane (NASP)

• Admin: $280m for procurement;
  $158m for R&D

• Senate: $ 0; remove from defense
  bill

• HASC: $280m for procurement;
  $158m for R&D

The Center supports the NASP program as
an essential investment in maintaining
the United States position at the cutting
edge of aerospace technology. The NASP
demonstration program has significant
military and commercial applications, and
has the potential greatly to make
America’s vital space launch capabilities
far more robust and cost-effective.

III.
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

SRAM-T
(Short-Range Attack Missile-Tactical
Missile)

• Admin: $119m for R&D for test
  units and F-15E adaptor hardware;
  $19m DoE

• Senate: $119m

• HASC: Cancel program. Provide $2m
  for termination costs.

A stand-off nuclear air-to-surface
missile (formerly designated TASM),
SRAM-T significantly extends the range of
U.S. and NATO dual-capable aircraft
against high-value targets while
minimizing exposure to air defenses. The
Center supports this tactical application
of the strategic SRAM II missile,
especially in view of the
Administration’s cancellation of the
Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) program.

IV. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION
AND TESTING

Nuclear Materials

• Admin: Request includes funds for
  a four-part program to restore
  nuclear materials production.
  These would permit: restart of
  the Savannah River tritium
  production reactor; development
  of a mid-term replacement
  reactor; research into
  alternative production reactor
  designs for the longer term; and
  construction of a plutonium
  recovery facility at Rocky Flats
  to enable the United States to
  produce highly enriched plutonium
  after 26 year pause.

• Senate: Shifts production funding
  to environmental cleanup;
  requests report

• HASC: Rejects Rocky Flats
  funding; notes significant number
  of Soviet reactors producing
  weapons-grade plutonium and urges
  US-Soviet negotiations on halting
  production of fissile materials;
  adds $150m to RD&T program to
  improve safety of U.S. nuclear
  weapons.

The Center believes it is imperative that
the United States take steps rapidly to
restore a viable national tritium and
plutonium production capacity and to
invest adequate resources in nuclear
weapons R&D. In view of the continued
requirements for maintaining effective
nuclear deterrent forces for the
foreseeable future, the Center also
opposes further limitations on nuclear
testing (notably, limits that would make
nuclear testing more difficult and/or
more expensive than is already the case
under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty).

V.
GENERAL PURPOSE & MOBILITY FORCES

Aircraft Carrier and
Battleship Groups

• Admin: 14 carrier battle groups;
  2 battleship groups

• Senate: funded the request
  although the Senate Armed
  Services Committee wrote in its
  report accompanying the
  Committee’s version of the
  defense authorization bill that
  10-12 carriers were the
  sufficient to meet the Navy’s
  future needs.

• HASC: funded the request

The Iraqi crisis has once again vividly
demonstrated the value of flexible,
highly mobile naval assets. The present
surge deployment of as many as four
carrier battle groups to the Arabian and
Red Seas are placing a tremendous strain
on the Navy’s existing force structure;
it would be highly problematic with a
fleet of fewer than fourteen carriers.
Accordingly, the Center believes that
cuts envisioned for the out-years in
carrier and deployed battleship battle
groups are ill-advised.

Fast
Sealift Ships

• Admin: Transfers Congressionally
  mandated funds (- $592m)

• Senate: Adds $30m to continue
  R&D on fast sea lift
  alternatives

• HASC: Recommends $375m available
  from FY90 funds be used to design
  hatchless, convertible container
  ships

The dramatic logistic challenge involved
in responding to Iraq’s aggression has
demonstrated the urgent need for greater
fast sealift. The Center recommends that
the Administration’s plan to transfer
these funds be denied. Instead, Congress
should direct the Defense Department to
acquire additional SL-7 type roll-on,
roll-off fast sealift ships as well as
those favored by the House Armed Services
Committee.

C-17 Airlifter

• Admin: $1,246m for procurement of
  6 a/c out of a total buy of 120
  a/c

• Senate: Defer procurement

• HASC: $350m for procurement of 2
  a/c (if first flight of
  production aircraft can be
  achieved by September 1991)

As the need for greater quantities of
fast sealift, the need for more — and
more flexible — airlift is self-evident
in the wake of Operation Desert Shield.
Accordingly, the Center strongly urges
the House of Representatives to: reverse
the action taken by the its House Armed
Services Committee concerning the C-17;
support the Administration request for
this system; and send a strong signal to
the Senate conferees that postponing
procurement of this vital airlifter is
unacceptable.

V-22 (Osprey)
Tiltrotor Aircraft

• Admin: Cancel (- $1,396m)

• Senate: $ 0 procurement; diverted
  $238m from prior year advance
  procurement to fund R&D
  flight testing

• HASC: $165m for advance
  procurement (plus $200m from FY
  1989); $238m R&D

The Center believes that the Bush
Administration has seriously erred in its
decision to terminate the V-22
program. The V-22’s multiple defense
roles, cutting-edge technologies and high
commercial promise make it an
exceptionally cost-effective national
investment. The Center fully supports the
HASC decision to provide procurement as
well as research and development funds;
this position should be sustained by the
House and should prevail in conference.

F-14D
(Tomcat) Air Superiority Fighter

• Admin: Cancel new production
  (-$469m); $780m to upgrade 12
  existing a/c

• Senate: $781m for modifications
  to existing a/c

• HASC: $790m for modifications to
  existing a/c

The prospect of combat attrition arising
from the Persian Gulf crisis adds new
urgency to arguments that this production
line must not be closed until a follow-on
aircraft is in production (either the ATF
or a new version F-14). To do otherwise
is to invite a dangerous reduction in the
combat capability of U.S. carrier battle
groups — an action at cross-purposes
with the foregoing recommendation (and,
apparently, rising congressional
sentiment) concerning the need to retain
a large and capable fleet of aircraft
carriers.

VI – OTHER ISSUES

Personnel End Strengths

The Administration, the Senate and the
HASC all contemplate rapid and steep
reductions in United States military
personnel during the next five years as
follows:

	Service		 Admin	Senate	 HASC

	Army		17,000	40,000	68,000

	Navy		 6,000	22,000	20,000

	Air Force	15,000	35,000	36,500

	Mar. Corps	  225	 3,000	 4,500

The Center is concerned that such cuts
— particularly those proposed by
Congress — are being made precipitously
in view of persistent global
instabilities. The impact of such large
and hasty cuts on the readiness and
morale of U.S. forces appears to have
been seriously underestimated; the Center
fears that the costs of reducing an all
volunteer force may similarly be greater
than is appreciated on Capitol Hill.

Maintaining Technology
Superiority

Both the Senate and the HASC added
substantial funds above those requested
by the Administration technology base and
advanced technology programs, particular
for U.S. conventional forces. The Center
supports such steps, and would, in this
connection, reiterate its view that their
contribution to the national technology
base is just one more reason for
supporting systems like the V-22, B-2,
and SDI.

Conclusion

This list is not all-inclusive — nor
is it intended to be. Indeed, there are
any number of military systems and forces
that current events in the Middle East,
among other factors, suggest the United
States must retain, should acquire or
ought to improve. The foregoing are,
however, in the view of the Center among
the most important of such programs and
capabilities. They are also among those
most immediately jeopardized by
Congressional actions.

While implementing the Center’s
recommendations would require somewhat
higher funding than is provided for in
the Senate bill, the Center believes that
the national defense investments entailed
will represent money well spent indeed if
they serve to deter — or at least
mitigate — costly military conflicts
around the world in the future.

1. Unless otherwise
indicated, all dollar figures in this Scorecard
are in millions.