Center Roundtable Takes Stock: Sdi Can Be Done — If Only Clinton Will Let It Proceed

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(Washington, D.C.): An extraordinary roundtable discussion involving past and present senior officials responsible for the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative illuminated an ominous discrepancy between President Clinton’s stated position on SDI and the budget he is requesting in support of it. The Clinton Administration proposes to proceed with theater missile defenses and deployment of a single ABM site in the United States, yet its FY94 budget of $3.8 billion for strategic defense — a reduction of 40 percent from the Bush request — will not be sufficient to accomplish either objective.

The roundtable took place on 23 March 1993, the tenth anniversary of President Ronald Reagan’s announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, and was hosted by the Center for Security Policy. In its course, former SDIO Director Henry Cooper said that $3.8 billion can provide "only theater defense and minimal research activity and is inadequate to defend the United States." Questioned on this point by Rep. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Acting SDIO Director Maj. Gen. Malcolm O’Neill confirmed that the $3.8 billion figure is "not enough" and is "not workable" to field both a national missile defense and a theater defense capability. "People have to understand how much [these] systems cost," he said.

The meeting featured videotaped remarks by President Reagan and a keynote address by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. President Reagan underscored the importance of moving forward with deployment of effective defenses against ballistic missile attack: "Now more than ever it is vital that the United States not back down from its efforts to develop and deploy strategic defenses. It is technologically feasible, strategically necessary and morally imperative."

The danger of emerging ballistic missile threats was underscored by Dr. Larry Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs at the Central Intelligence Agency. In particular, Gershwin noted the possibility of short-cuts that might permit developing countries to acquire long-range missiles far more quickly than if they were obliged to develop them indigenously. For example, Gershwin expressed concern over the reliability of command and control of the former Soviet nuclear forces given the political turmoil in Moscow. He noted that:

 

"These…conditions might lead to transfers of weapons, weapons material, or weapons technologies….Current safeguards alone will not be sufficient to guarantee the security of the thousands of warheads and tons of fissile material extracted from dismantled warheads from falling into the wrong hands."

 

Among the topics addressed were: the strategic circumstances that gave rise to the SDI program; technological progress made to date and the program’s current status; intelligence assessments of the status of various countries’ missile acquisition efforts and the strategic considerations driving them; and the prospects for missile defense in light of present — and projected — attitudes in Moscow, on Capitol Hill and in the Clinton Administration.

Center for Security Policy

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