Gaffney To Congress: Clinton’s De Facto Nuclear Freeze Threatens ‘Big Chill’ For US Security

At a symposium organized by the Library of Congress’ Congressional Research Service today, the director of the Center for Security Policy expressed deep concern about the future of U.S. deterrence in light of President Clinton’s announcement to forego testing of the nation’s nuclear arsenal and other actions.

In the company of Robert Bell, Special Assistant to the President for Arms Control and Defense Policy at the National Security Council Staff, and David Culp, a proponent of the Administration’s anti-nuclear agenda, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. warned that the Administration was effectively embracing the unilateral nuclear freeze posture proposed — and rejected — a decade ago. (Excerpts of Gaffney’s remarks are attached.)

To be sure, such a posture is the result of more than just Mr. Clinton’s decision not to conduct nuclear tests through September 1994, and thereafter if a Comprehensive Test Ban can be negotiated. As a result of this decision, however, and a number of other actions taken during this presidency and the preceding one, the United States neither produces nuclear weapons nor the special nuclear materials that are required for them to work. Worse yet, the industrial infrastructure and skilled workforce required to do so are being permitted to attrit severely.

Against this backdrop, Gaffney contended, the Clinton test ban initiative can be seen for what it is — a long and dangerous step in the direction of what Charles Krauthammer in his Washington Post column last Friday called "denuclearization" (see attached).

Before the United States moves any further down this perilous road, the Center for Security Policy urges, as Gaffney put it, that:

"[The nation] engage in a fundamental debate about whether we still need anuclear deterrent: If we do still require such capabilities — and I am confident that a majority of Americans and a majority in Congress believe we do — we are going to need to test weapons, to produce them and the materials that go into them and to preserve the infrastructure and personnel that permit such activities to be conducted safely and effectively.

 

"If, on the other hand, an informed decision is made that we no longer need to worry about nuclear deterrence, then we can continue down the path we are already well along. Even then, however, we should recognize that the rest of the world is more likely to exploit than emulate this policy approach."