A ‘breakthrough’ with Syria?

It has become a fixture in American diplomacy: When the going gets tough, try to buy the tough off. No matter the cause — whether it is an attempt to modify the Kremlin’s behavior, a "denuclearization" accord with North Korea or "breakthroughs" in negotiations with Middle Eastern totalitarians — Washington has been willing to lubricate the deal-making with U.S. tax dollars and other resources.

With the announcement of Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s latest diplomatic "breakthrough" — producing Syrian agreement to resume face-to-face negotiations with Israel and perhaps clearing the way for a deal between these two historic enemies — Americans are entitled to know: How will we pay for this achievement? Let us count the ways:

 

1. Removal of Syria from the list of terrorist-sponsoring and drug-trafficking nations. Never mind that such a step cannot be justified on the merits. The Syrians continue to be the hosts, backers, logistical supporters and protectors of most of the world’s terrorist organizations. Damascus is also still actively involved in the international drug trade.

The administration clearly appreciates that it must, nonetheless, stop stigmatizing Damascus for ongoing, malevolent Syrian behavior if the United States is to take other steps on Hafez Assad’s behalf. According to a report circulated by COMPASS-Middle East Wire Service on March 15, President Clinton authorized Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal, during a recent Washington meeting, to communicate to Mr. Assad Mr. Clinton’s "personal promise" to "help remove Syria from the State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism and involved in drug trafficking." He reportedly did so despite efforts by his Middle East coordinator, Dennis Ross, to hedge on that point.

It goes without saying that — in the absence of a genuine end to Syrian sponsorship of terrorism and the drug-trade — such a step would represent a new and potentially quite dangerous corruption of the standards by which the United States maintains relations with foreign governments. As Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms recently observed: "The Syrian government has American blood on its hands. Tell me how peace with Israel will cleanse those hands?"

 

2. Deployment of U.S. "monitors" on the Golan Heights: The parties refuse to disclose the details of the proposed deployment, simply noting that such an arrangement has a precedent in the U.S. monitors posted in the Sinai after the Camp David accords between Israel and Syria. This posture allows them to argue that it is "premature" to discuss the initiative — and, even more disingenuously, to deny that any such commitment has yet been made.

The reason the three governments hope to postpone informed public and congressional scrutiny of this idea until after an agreement is reached — and it becomes, as a practical matter, too late to do anything about it — is self-evident. Such a deployment will be fraught with serious risks: for the Americans who will likely be the targets of terrorist attacks on the Golan; for Israelis who may, wrongly, be induced by the presence of those personnel to believe that the danger associated with surrendering the Golan to Mr. Assad’s Syria has been alleviated; and for the U.S.-Israeli relationship if the deployment has the effect of transforming the United States from Israel’s closest and strongest ally into a "neutral" party.

 

3. Aiding Syria’s arms buildup: On the face of it, it seems preposterous that the United States would even consider helping a dangerous actor like Mr. Assad to upgrade the lethality of his arsenal. And yet, such a step would also be consistent with the Egypt-Israeli model. Generous sales of advanced U.S. weaponry, technology transfers, co-production arrangements and military training have flowed to Cairo in the wake of Camp David.

More recently, along with debt-relief, Mr. Clinton promised Jordan last October that "We will meet Jordan’s legitimate defense requirements." At a minimum, given the fungibility of money, American cash infusions to Syria will free up other resources. They will, therefore, effectively help Mr. Assad continue his efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and other offensive arms.

 

4. Providing Syria with actual financial assistance: Just how much money Mr. Clinton is prepared to promise Mr. Assad as a lubricant to the peace process is not clear at this point. That he is expected to do so, however, is not in doubt. After all, Cairo netted tens of billions of dollars from signing up to the Camp David accords. Syria has made clear that it expects to profit no less than Egypt has from the peace process.

Mr. Clinton evidently hopes to repeat the Bush administration’s hat-trick of dunning the Saudis for a cash contribution to Syria.

Mr. Clinton may be promising that at least hundreds of millions, if not billions, of U.S. taxpayer dollars will flow to Syria. This could come in the form of indirect assistance (e.g., via multilateral financial institutions), if not directly from the U.S. Treasury. There is, however, little realistic prospect that American financial assistance will be forthcoming for Syria.

According to the Associated Press, on March 15, Rep. Sonny Callahan, the chairman of the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, "warned the Clinton administration that he would oppose providing any aid to Syria as part of a future peace agreement with Israel. … He is concerned that Syria would seek the ‘annual entitlement’ of foreign aid that Egypt and Israel have received since they signed a peace treaty in 1979. ‘There is no money,’ Mr. Callahan said."

Those who hope to promote a just and durable peace between Israel and Syria have a responsibility to ensure that an agreement between the parties is not based on an unsustainable foundation. If these and perhaps other American commitments made in the hope of procuring Syrian agreement to a deal with Israel will not enjoy congressional support, all the parties are better off knowing that now. That reality can then be taken into account in the negotiations and alternative security and other arrangements made accordingly, with minimum disruption caused to the peace process.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is the director of the Center for Security Policy and a columnist for The Washington Times.