No Security, No Peace

By By Limor Livnat
The New York

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

A summit meeting that brings about a real termination of the Arab-Israeli conflict would command the broadest backing in the state of Israel. Such a long-term quest certainly motivated Menachem Begin, when he sat with Anwar Sadat of Egypt and President Jimmy Carter at the first Camp David summit more than 20 years ago. The peace they made removed Egypt from the circle of conflict with Israel and marked the first step in ending the generations-long conflict between Arabs and Jews.

Sadat stood in the Knesset in 1977 and declared “no more wars.” While he was a tough negotiator, he refused to use violence or the threat of violence to advance his position.

Unfortunately, today’s Camp David summit is very different. Yasir Arafat has never made any such conciliatory move toward peace. Since the signing of the 1993 Oslo accords, Mr. Arafat’s language and actions have provided evidence that his intentions remain hostile.

“We remind the Israelis of al-Karameh battle, the Beirut battle and the seven years of intifada,” he said last month, referring to violent Palestinian actions against Israel. “If they don’t like it, we will scratch the past and begin anew. Palestine is ours, ours, ours!”

The summit this week is being held with dire predictions of violence should it fail. “We are warning the Israeli generals that Palestinian blood is not cheap,” said Freih Abu Medein, the justice minister of the Palestinian Authority. “If Israel wishes that the Middle East be destroyed so be it.” This is not a way to negotiate peace.

At the first Camp David summit, Israel gave up Sinai, but it remained protected by a 120-mile demilitarized zone should Egypt ever change its mind about peace.

At the current summit, Israel is being called upon to concede its vital strategic buffer, especially in the Jordan Valley, and to withdraw from 90 percent of the West Bank, precisely at a time in which the Western alliance has failed to maintain the monitoring of Iraq, which is only 250 miles to the east and has engaged Israel in four wars.

What security protections will Israel receive in return? Its “compensation” will be billions of dollars in American military aid, which will only leave Israel more dependent on the United States than ever, and more beholden to the wishes of the White House and Congress.

Finally, the most glaring difference between the sets of two Camp David peace talks relates to Jerusalem. There are certain values on which a nation is built that are simply not for sale. Menachem Begin would not have put Jerusalem on the negotiating table; he would not have traded a few neighborhoods for more tanks and missiles from his superpower ally. Yet Prime Minister Ehud Barak has already turned neighborhoods in Jerusalem over to Palestinian rule and has indicated in negotiations leading up to Camp David that much more would be forthcoming.

Overall, Mr. Barak’s singular purpose should not be to reach an agreement for its own sake. This only erodes Israel’s negotiating position. Nor should he be seduced by American offers of increased aid. Israel needs a unified Jerusalem and defensible borders far more than its needs more foreign money.

Most important, Mr. Barak must preserve Israel’s internal cohesion. Thomas Jefferson said that “large initiatives cannot rest upon slender majorities.” Menachem Begin took consensus-building into account. When he departed for Camp David, he had the support of the overwhelming majority of the Knesset. Mr. Barak left for Camp David as the head of a minority government, having barely survived a no-confidence vote in parliament.

Yet Mr. Barak continues to glibly ignore the opposition, contending that his election last year is enough of a mandate to sign a peace accord on his nation’s behalf. The Clinton Administration has supported Mr. Barak’s stance. Yet dismissing the Knesset is like dismissing the United States Congress on the grounds that the president is directly elected by the American people.

In the end, peace must be built on national consensus, which includes the preservation of Israel’s core values. Even this sort of peace involves risk, but it is the only kind of risk that Israel should take.

Limor Livnat is a Likud Party member of the Israeli parliament and served in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet from 1996 to 1999.

Center for Security Policy

Please Share:

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *