US-Soviet Relations

Testimony of

FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR.,
Director of the Center for Security Policy

Before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

18 May 1989

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is a distinct privilege to address with you some of the most important issues of our time, namely the future course of U.S.-Soviet relations. This is especially true insofar as you have provided me the opportunity to do so in the company of two distinguished former colleagues and authorities in the field, Ambassadors Paul Nitze and Max Kampleman.

I believe it is no longer possible — and certainly not constructive — to consider the security dimension of our relationship with the Soviet Union exclusively from the standpoint of relative military forces or arms control. Accordingly, while my remarks will address throughout the implications of change in the USSR and our policy toward that country for our defense interests, I will do so in a larger context.

Specifically, I would like to discuss with you some of the thinking my associates at the Center for Security Policy and I have done in recent weeks on the opportunity now present to transform the Soviet Union and the threat it continues to pose to our vital interests. In so doing, I will draw upon a recent Center analysis entitled An Alternative "National Strategy Review" which I would ask to have inserted in the record in its entirety at the conclusion of my remarks.

The Context

We believe one cannot properly assess contemporary events in the USSR — or chart a suitable course for our relations with that country — unless we are mindful of the larger context. As members of this Committee are well aware there is around the globe today a seemingly irrepressible demand for the rule of law to replace that of dictators; for basic human freedoms to be protected, not trampled, by those who govern; and for free choice in economic as well as political matters.

This demand is giving rise to powerful popular forces — forces that are seeking and, with varying degrees of success, achieving dramatic changes throughout the non-democratic world. The result has been the creation, from Chile to China, of a highly dynamic international environment replete with exciting new opportunities, and potential perils, for the United States and other Western powers.

Nowhere are the manifestations of this phenomenon producing greater opportunities — and more serious potential perils — for Western security than in Soviet Union. The USSR has not been immune to the popular demand for change; in fact, under the current Soviet policy of glasnost, there has been more evidence of the deep-seated dissatisfaction of the Soviet people with the ruling communist regime and their lot in life than at any time since the 1917 Russian Revolution.

What is Gorbachev’s Response?

A central question for contemporary Western security policy is: How will the Soviet leadership respond to this phenomenon? Does it recognize that the growing evidence of failure on the part of totalitarian communism’s political and economic systems can only be addressed by radical change in both?

To the extent that the regime of Mikhail Gorbachev really accepts this reality and is willing to effect a fundamental transformation of its political, economic, and military structures, there is the possibility of genuine reform in the Soviet Union that can substantially alter the threat posed by that nation and its allies to the West.

On the other hand, if — as has been the case in the past –the Soviet regime remains unwilling to cede real power and determined to prevent fundamental systemic change, its current, highly publicized efforts at "reform" may amount to nothing more than temporizing measures, calculated to stave off rather than effect the necessary transformation. Under such circumstances, undisciplined Western economic and financial assistance to Gorbachev could reduce, not increase, the prospects for democracy, private enterprise and liberty in the Soviet Union. The result could also be to improve the USSR’s present, prodigious capacity to threaten American interests and those of its allies.

U.S. Policy at a Crossroads

Recent events suggest that the Bush Administration has adopted a bifurcated — if not schizophrenic — policy. On the one hand, much of the Administration’s rhetoric reflects a healthy, and justified, skepticism about the genuineness of the Soviet government’s commitment to systemic reform (e.g., Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, who wrote on April 30th, "We can hope for such change, but all of Russian and Soviet history tells us to be skeptical and cautious").

On the other, to the extent they have been spelled out, the Bush Administration’s policy initiatives toward the Soviet Union and its empire seem predicated on the belief that the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev is committed to a course that will radically transform the character of the Soviet political, economic and military systems. With apologies to Teddy Roosevelt, the five month-long "National Strategy Review" (NSR) — ordered by President Bush, among other things, to assess U.S.-Soviet relations — has evidently concluded that, as long as one speaks cautiously, one can sell the Soviets the West’s "big stick."

For example, the Administration has: encouraged joint business ventures financed by Western capital like those of the American Trade Consortium; approved a new, taxpayer-subsidized wheat deal for the USSR (at a time of serious wheat shortfalls in the United States); proposed a major economic package for Poland; indicated an imminent easing of restrictions on the transfer of advanced, militarily relevant technologies to the Soviet bloc; and invited the USSR to become further integrated into the world economy.

An Alternative Assessment of Gorbachev’s Agenda

We at the Center for Security Policy believe a rather different assessment of the character and objectives of Soviet "reform" policies under Gorbachev is in order. Our Alternative "NSR" provides considerable evidence that the Gorbachev program does not, in fact, represent a commitment to the kind of fundamental transformation of the Soviet system that would radically alter the character of the threat it continues to pose to the West.

Permit me to highlight a few of the Center’s findings before turning to a more in-depth look at the military and arms control aspects of Gorbachev’s agenda:

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    • Arms Control
    • The Soviet Union has been found by the U.S. government to have engaged — under Gorbachev’s regime and those of his predecessors — in a pattern of violations of major arms control agreements. These include the ABM Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty and chemical weapons conventions as well as other international agreements such as the Helsinki Final Act. And yet, even as it proceeds with such violations of existing agreements and sustains a relentless military buildup (N.B. the United States is in its fifth consecutive year of declining defense investment), the Soviet Union is promoting a bewildering array of arms control proposals. These include proposals affecting forces and activities involving nuclear, conventional, and chemical arms and strategic defenses.

      Such Soviet proposals appear to make major concessions in several areas, notably in their acceptance of the principles of on-site verification and asymmetric reductions. A number of the suggested agreements, however, involve limitations (e.g., those on mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles) and bans (e.g., chemical, anti-satellite and nuclear testing) that simply cannot be verified effectively. The Soviet-proposed asymmetric reductions become far less impressive when one notes (as in the INF Treaty) that other new Soviet systems being deployed (e.g., the SS-24 and SS-25 mobile ICBMs) can readily fulfill the missions of the forces being reduced. What is more, given the intractable verification problems associated with monitoring some of the forces to be reduced, it is impossible to have great confidence that the promised benefits of such agreements will actually be realized.

      It should be noted that, simply by tabling their proposals, and without having to effect actual reductions in their military spending or their weapons production, the Soviets have already had considerable successes under Gorbachev in interfering with U.S. and NATO defense programs. For example, even though Soviet violations have long ago broken the ABM Treaty, Soviet arms control proposals and diplomatic pressures have succeeded in encouraging restrictions on U.S. strategic defense activities by claiming the need to preserve the Treaty. Similarly, following the INF Treaty, the Soviets have pushed hard to build public support in the West for delaying — if not preventing — important NATO modernization programs.

    • Defense Budget
    • The West has been particularly dazzled by Gorbachev’s announced intention to effect dramatic, unilateral reductions in the size and character of the Soviet military. His stated intention to remove 500,000 men and 10,000 tanks from Eastern Europe is frequently treated as an accomplished fact — one which has already reduced the threat to the West. What is more, this action has been widely viewed as obligating allied nations to respond in kind by making their own dramatic and unilateral budget cuts and/or exercising restraint in vital weapons modernization programs.

      In reality, there is no evidence that the USSR has yet embarked upon the kind of massive reallocation of resources away from the bloated military sector to the starving civilian economy promised by perestroika. Totalitarian communism remains the only system capable of sustaining peacetime military expenditures on the order of 20-25% of Gross National Product. The cost of doing so is real and clearly contributes greatly to the incalculable hardship inflicted daily on Soviet citizens. For example, the magnitude of the loss of life caused by the recent earthquake in Armenia was in large measure attributable to the fact that civilian construction in the USSR is systematically denied the steel prudent building techniques require in such a seismically active region. At the same time, there is no such shortage when it comes to the construction of tanks which continue to be produced at a rate of over 3,500 per year.

      There are reports that military factories have been ordered to produce civilian goods — but only in addition to meeting their planned production for the armed forces. One can detect no indications in Soviet stores that military production has actually been diverted. To the contrary, if anything, the unavailability of basic consumer goods is worse than ever. Butter, meat and even soap are rationed all over the country — an astonishing indictment of the deplorable living standards in a nation that prides itself on being a global superpower.

      Interestingly, when Khrushchev made his own reductions in the Soviet military (cuts that were vastly larger than those announced by Gorbachev), former army officers became available to the civilian employment market; there was similarly a boom in the civilian housing market and a noticeable increase in consumer goods. None of these manifestations of true resource reallocation are noticeable thus far as a result of Gorbachev’s announced defense reductions.

       

    • Military Glasnost
    • As noted above in connection with the Soviet Union’s current stance on verification of arms control agreements — namely its apparent commitment to intrusive on-site inspection — the Soviet military has been at pains to appear less secretive than in the past. Visits for Western dignitaries to inspect military installations and modern armaments, exchanges between senior students at military academies and candid accounts of the shortcomings of Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan — all convey an impression of unprecedented openness, seemingly incompatible with hostile intent or threatening capabilities.

      In fact, the Soviet military remains secretive and fully capable of holding vital Western security interests at risk. Its budget continues to be a closely held secret — making it impossible to assess the implementation of Gorbachev’s commitment to reduce defense spending by 14 percent. Publications released in 1989 for the ideological training of the armed forces contrast sharply with the official rhetoric about the adoption of a "defensive defense" strategy and the end of the adversarial relationship with the United States. Programs, including the use of outright deception, aimed at concealing the character and magnitude of Soviet weapons programs continue apace. What is more, the USSR’s espionage, thefts of Western technology and subversive activities — and those of Soviet proxies — show no signs of slackening.

      The principal result of Soviet military "reform" efforts to date appears instead to be that Western governments, media and publics have become convinced that the threat posed by the USSR’s armed forces is diminished when, in actuality, little has changed in the Soviet ability to threaten the West’s strategic interests. This perception has had several practical and beneficial effects for the Soviet national security apparatus: First, it has greatly attenuated support for Western military preparedness, providing "a breathing space" (peredyshka) vitally needed if the Soviet Union is to restore a favorable correlation of forces.

      Second — and closely related to the first — is the opportunity such a changed perception affords for access to Western high technology. As the West’s guard has dropped, sensitivity about selling militarily-relevant equipment and manufacturing know-how to the USSR has also given way to a feverish competition to sell the Soviet Union virtually whatever it wishes to buy, often on excessively generous credit terms to boot.

      Third, Soviet efforts to penetrate American and other advanced countries’ industries and institutions for intelligence collection and other purposes has grown markedly. A senior French official recently estimated that such activities had grown four-fold during Gorbachev’s tenure. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Webster, remarked in a similar vein on the growing challenge to U.S. counter-espionage capabilities by Soviet military and KGB operations under Gorbachev.

  • Domestic Politics: Such liberalization as is occurring is taking place firmly within the existing, totalitarian political system. All of the levers of power remain in the hands of the regime. There has been no change in the ability of the population to influence basic decisions that affect its future well-being. For all their novelty, the March 1989 elections did not alter this reality.

    Foreign Affairs: The highly publicized changes in Soviet foreign policy, including their flagship — the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan — is typical of Gorbachev’s apparent, wholesale adaptation in foreign affairs of the Leninist doctrine of "reculer pour mieux sauter," tactical retreat in order to advance strategic objectives. Evidence of assiduous Soviet exploitation of divisions within the Western alliance (notably those relating to its defense) is particularly troubling in this regard.

    Human Rights: While there have been numerous improvements made in the treatment of Soviet citizens by their government, the Gorbachev regime has made no move to change the legal relationship between the two. In particular, no firm basis for the exercise of political and human rights has been created; the Soviet Union has granted somewhat greater permission for individuals to emigrate, dissent, worship, and possess property but not entitled them to the right to do so.

    Economic Policy: Just as political liberalization of the Soviet Union is intended to take place within the context of the existing structure, the economic reforms being introduced are designed to decentralize and introduce private enterprise only within politically controllable parameters. Optimism about the effect of economic reforms in the Soviet Union is, therefore, unwarranted.

    Military Affairs and Arms Control: Let me turn now to a few remarks about the area of Gorbachev’s "reforms" that has most dramatically affected Western attitudes about, and support for, his regime. Remarkably, this is the area in which the least material change has taken place to date. Consider the following:

An Alternative Approach to U.S.-Soviet Relations

It is against this backdrop that American policy toward the Soviet Union must be developed. We ignore at our peril the Soviet leadership’s commitment to preserve the USSR’s political and economic systems, even though the efforts to make such systems more efficient — even, to some extent, more humane — will be lauded in certain quarters.

Historically, the best guarantor of peace is democracy, since democracies do not use arms to wage war on each other. Wherever a government of checks and balances subject to the popular will — as opposed to the dictates of undemocratic regimes — has determined the allocation of national resources and the direction of foreign policy, military forces are maintained at modest levels and the peace is not threatened by territorial or ideological ambitions.

In contrast, where it has held sway, totalitarian communism has given rise to powerful military establishments vastly in excess of legitimate national defense requirements and with a propensity to employ arms in pursuit of aggressive foreign policy ends. Such capabilities concentrated in the hands of undemocratic regimes pose the only real threat to the physical security of the United States and its allies.

Accordingly, it is in the interest of the United States to encourage fully the growing, worldwide movement toward self-governance — the institutionalization of human rights and legally protected freedoms and the growth of free enterprise.

This principle should above all govern U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Nothing could do more to reduce the Soviet military threat to our interests than would its rigorous implementation.

Toward this end, we recommend in the Alternative "National Strategy Review" a different approach to U.S.-Soviet relations. In contrast to a strategy that principally entails subsidizing and otherwise propping up Gorbachev and his vision of perestroika, this strategy would involve seizing the historical initiative by applying available Western resources and leverage so as to transform the totalitarian Soviet system. The concept behind such a strategy would be to make such assistance available to the Soviet bloc in ways and on terms designed to produce maximum structural change in the Soviet bloc.

While sensible Western military and arms control postures will play an essential role in the implementation of this approach, so will a host of other policies, many of which have not previously been treated as important tools for advancing national security interests. Notably, this strategy will require Western governments and companies to work concertedly with private, non-communist groups in the Soviet Union and the East bloc (not simply the ruling regimes’ leaders) with a view to stimulating and supporting forces that will inevitably lead to new economic and political structures, and hence a greatly diminished military threat.

Such a conditioned approach to Western assistance to the Soviet Union and East bloc, like a step-by-step loan disbursement arrangements predicated on Moscow’s performance toward publicly identified economic and political milestones, will not be unduly onerous if the Soviets are genuinely interested in promoting non-strategic commercial activity and similar developments within the civilian economy. On the other hand, if the Soviets and their allies really have an ulterior motive in mind — not the salvation of their economies and countries through radical structural reform but the shoring up of the existing regimes and the preservation of their threatening military establishments — such an arrangement would be a "show-stopper." In the latter case, however, the West would presumably not be interested in helping bring about such an outcome anyway.

The main elements of a new initiative, aimed at "helping" democracy in the USSR and not just Gorbachev would include the following:

 

  • Economic Policy
    • Financial Tools
      • Massive privatization of the Soviet bloc economies, including key heavy industries and agriculture;
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      • The systematic reallocation of priority resources away from the military sectors to the destitute civilian economies; an important and visible feature of this reallocation process would be the conversion of extensive military infrastructure to civilian production — particularly weapons production dedicated to supplying Soviet end-users;
      •  

      • Sharp reductions in the size of the bloated government bureaucracies and the expensive privileges enjoyed exclusively by the nomenklatura — as opposed to reducing further the living standards of ordinary citizens.
    • The two key elements in Western official and commercial bank lending to the USSR, Eastern Europe and other Soviet client states must be greater discipline and transparency. Regrettably, this is certainly not the case today. All loans should be tied to specific projects or trade transactions through the use of established lending techniques and expanded reporting requirements. Untied, "general purpose" loans only serve to postpone the need for tough resource allocation decisions and provide greater flexibility to divert the proceeds of Western loans to finance activities potentially inimical to vital Western security interests.

      Continuing present, undisciplined lending practices increases the likelihood of deepening the East bloc’s debt crisis and recruiting new victims — possibly even the USSR itself. Adding this burden to those already imposed on American taxpayers by the international debt crisis, the U.S. savings and loan industry, and potentially precarious leveraged buy-outs, would represent intolerable budgetary strains during this period of austerity.

      The conditions for any Western lending (either direct or guaranteed) to the Soviet bloc should be:

      If and when Soviet bloc authorities demonstrate the political will to implement such market-oriented reforms, the alliance should publicly agree on specific goals — and specific milestones for achieving these goals — upon which all disbursements of funds from various sources (e.g., bilateral and multilateral government loans and credit lines, IMF disbursements, commercial bank credits, World Bank co-financing, etc.) will be made contingent.

       

    • Trade
    • Expanded flows of technology with dual-use applications to the Soviet bloc should be predicated upon the end of a military threat to Western interests from this quarter. Otherwise, such transfers simply constitute a subsidy to the West’s adversaries potentially worth billions of dollars in avoided research and development costs and enhanced military capabilities. This circumstance, in turn, is costing the American people billions of dollars annually in the form of additional defense spending to counter the consequences of Soviet technology theft. To the extent there is such trade, the emphasis should be on the sale of end-products, as opposed to turn-key manufacturing and processing capabilities.

      Moreover, trade should emphasize the creation of private enterprise in the Soviet bloc; accordingly, Western businesses should seek to work with non-governmental entities in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Similarly, principles like those developed by Alexander Slepak should be observed by any Western company operating within the Soviet bloc in the interest of advancing human rights (much as the Sullivan principles seek to advance greater equality and human rights in South Africa). I heartily endorse the initiative of Senators John Heinz and Dennis DeConcini (as well as 22 cosponsors in the House) aimed at giving the Slepak principles legal standing.

       

  • The economic and financial crises confronting the Soviet bloc offers the West unprecedented opportunities to stimulate genuine economic and political reform with palpable benefits for American security and other interests. There are numerous ways in which constructive leverage can be brought to bear:

  • The Mosbacher Principles

      Why are these government guarantees important? First, they are just like any other subsidy. Because the financing is backed by the full faith and credit of the lender’s government, the borrower gets better terms. Second, they insulate lenders from the full extent of the risk of doing business in the USSR and pass that risk onto the taxpayers. Third, the data on the extent and magnitude of insurance and guarantees is quite sketchy. Western governments are apparently reluctant to let voters and taxpayers know just what good deals the Soviets are getting.

  • It is noteworthy that we have just seen one encouraging indication that, in this area at least, the Bush Administration intends to bring its policies toward the Soviet Union into line with its rhetoric. I am referring to Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher’s enunciation of five general principles quite consistent with the approach I have just outlined. Their announcement as Administration policy was all the more dramatic, coming as it did in the course of a speech Tuesday before an organization utterly hostile to such prudent U.S. policies — the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC).

    These sound Mosbacher principles are: (1) When it comes to trade and export controls, U.S. national security needs will remain paramount. (2) The United States will not engage in a subsidized credit war to force an unhealthy growth of East-West trade which would be inconsistent with economic realities. (3) Joint ventures can play a role in the development of U.S.-Soviet trade relations, but investment decisions should be made on a strictly commercial basis. (4) Our willingness to make fundamental improvements in trade remains related to progress in human rights and emigration. And (5) For economic relations to increase, the Soviet Union must become more open (i.e., greater transparency). The Mosbacher principles provide a much-needed road map to establish clearly defined milestones against which Soviet behavior can be judged and appropriate steps by the West calibrated.

    In the context of U.S. national security interests, two points addressed in Secretary Mosbacher’s remarks seem to me to warrant special emphasis. First, at a time of shrinking resources available for national defense, it is insane for the West to be dismantling its existing mechanisms, namely COCOM’s "no-exceptions" policy, for controlling the flow of technologies to the USSR. This is especially true with respect to the hemorrhage of technologies well suited to military applications and that will certainly be supplied to the East in the absence of such a mechanism. Such transfers will simply exacerbate the security problems attending already inadequate defense spending. We at the Center welcome Mr. Mosbacher’s statement that "We will never trade security for profits. The export controls which we and our allies must have in place for our national security are not and cannot be on the table for negotiations." Abandoning the "no-exceptions" policy would certainly contravene the principles espoused by Secretary Mosbacher.

    Second, we also applaud Secretary Mosbacher’s statement that the United States will not engage in a subsidized credit war with our allies favoring Moscow. Any direct government loans to the Soviet Union or credit guarantees (such as the $5 billion in government-guaranteed credits provided last fall by European nations to Moscow) are subsidies. This point was made forcefully a few months ago by your colleague, Senator Bill Bradley. He said:

    Such Western subsidies have adverse and unavoidable security implications. They augment Soviet resources and permit the USSR to avoid the hard choices its dire economic straits would otherwise entail. This is particularly true to the extent that such resources are not tied or otherwise conditioned. For this reason, we at the Center agree with Senator Bradley and many other Senators that government-guaranteed and direct credits, are subsidies which must be eliminated multilaterally. We urge Members of this distinguished Committee to impress upon the Administration once again the necessity of working toward allied agreement in this specific related areas at the upcoming NATO and Paris economic summits.

     

  • Military Posture and Arms Control
  • In addition to such steps which will, if adopted, will serve to underpin our national security, these should be complemented by other measures more traditionally associated with prudent defense policies.

    First, the continued investment by the West in highly capable deterrent forces is necessary to ensure that no military advantage accrues to the USSR and its allies as a result of the latter simply adopting the rhetoric of restraint. Under such circumstances, the Soviets would be foolish actually to reduce the high priority presently given to the military. In particular, U.S. investment in such highly leveraged technologies as those involved in the Strategic Defense Initiative and "Stealth" programs can greatly diminish the value of major Soviet military investments (e.g., those in ballistic missiles and air defenses) and provide powerful incentives to the USSR to deemphasize outlays for weapons and related hardware.

    Second, in the event the Soviet Union does not reorder its traditional priorities, as Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney has predicted, and the West is obliged to contend once more with the full panoply of expansionist Soviet ambitions, the United States and its allies will be far better able to do so if they have kept their guard up in the meantime. The central elements of such a deterrent posture would be modern nuclear arms and deployed strategic defenses; these must be accompanied by a revised approach to the negotiation of strategic arms reductions and a real policy for dealing with Soviet non-compliance. A detailed description of a package of strategic force modernization and arms control initiatives recommended by the Center for Security Policy can be found in its recently released paper, "An Assessment of Future Requirements for U.S. Strategic Forces and Strategic Arms Control," which in the interest of time I will not summarize here but simply ask to have it inserted in the record.

In the Center’s Alternative "National Strategy Review" we identify specific actions that should also be taken in several other areas, i.e., human rights, regional policy, public information and leadership, etc. I will only highlight one of particular relevance to your responsibilities — the need for reliable intelligence.

  • Sound Intelligence
  • In times of uncertainty and change, policy-makers are particularly dependent upon effective intelligence collection and analysis, which must seek to identify threats to American security as well as opportunities to advance U.S. interests.

    Fast-moving events in the Soviet Union make the demands upon U.S. intelligence extraordinarily severe, particularly in light of continuing Soviet denial and deception practices. Moreover, when — as at present — American policies are being reconsidered in light of assessed changes in the threat, the potential is high for the objectivity of the analysis to be compromised in order to justify certain policy approaches.

    Under such circumstances, it is vital for the integrity of the intelligence process that competitive, "opportunities-oriented" analysis be institutionalized. Accordingly, we believe the Bush Administration should immediately reconstitute the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), a senior-level panel that plays a crucial quality-control role for the U.S. intelligence community by reviewing and, where necessary, second-guessing the quality of its judgments.

    What is more, the approach utilized in 1976 by then-CIA Director George Bush to challenge the assumptions and analysis of the official estimates of Soviet military activities should be institutionalized. With hindsight, it is apparent that this so-called "Team B" proved more accurate than its official counterparts when it came to projecting the character of Soviet policy and programmatic activities in the heyday of the 1970’s detente. Should such a competitive approach be pursued henceforth, the result will be to invigorate and improve the quality of formal intelligence community estimates and their usefulness to policy-makers and to help insulate such analyses from undue political influence aimed at eliciting a desired answer. I hope the Committee will actively encourage these initiatives.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this is no time for a passive, reactive or paralyzed American foreign policy. Now more than ever, U.S. initiative and leadership are required if the West is to define Gorbachev’s success in terms consistent with democratic interests — rather than his own. Both will be required in quantity if the present impulse to accede to Gorbachev’s efforts aimed at sowing discord within the Western alliance and obtaining massive economic, financial and technology bail-outs is to be resisted and the conditions for lasting peace and prosperity created.

Now — as the West is faced with the tantalizing prospect of triumphing over the ideals, values and institutions long associated with communist totalitarianism — is not the time to shrink from the challenge. Instead, the United States and its allies must seize this momentous opportunity to press their considerable advantages toward the end of enabling the peoples of the Soviet Union and other nations of the East bloc to express and fulfill the same basic aspiration increasingly evidenced elsewhere: the right to live in a society of laws made by a free citizenry.

If the policy prescriptions I have described here are implemented, the United States may come to know a more certain security and the world to realize an era of peace and prosperity without historical precedent. We at the Center for Security Policy believe the choice is, to a remarkable degree, ours to make. I hope this testimony will be helpful to you and your colleagues in playing the important role you must in such a choice.

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