What To Do About North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: Execute The ‘Osirak’ Remedy

An ominous new milestone in the passivity and disengagement of American foreign policy under the Clinton Administration is being established on the Korean peninsula. It now appears that even the most dangerous pariah state on the globe — North Korea — can flout its acquisition of nuclear weapons, abrogate international commitments and threaten U.S. allies and forces in the region with impunity.

Pyongyang, like a number of other malevolent actors on the world stage, appears to have concluded that the Clinton Administration will remain effectively indifferent to such major strategic developments. Worse yet, Washington seems to be signalling its willingness to offer concessions to North Korea if Pyongyang will just agree to return to "the family of civilized nations" by revoking its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. These might include: an upgrading of bilateral relations; an increase in the $1.2 billion in U.S. exports approved in 1991 — despite prohibitions on such exports mandated by the Trading With The Enemy Act and legislation concerning state sponsors of terrorism; or even further extensions in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection deadline.

The Threat From North Korean Nuclear Weapons

There is, consequently, a serious risk that Kim Il-Sung — the North Korean despot who launched an invasion of South Korea four decades ago amidst questions about America’s commitment to its ally on the peninsula — or his son and designated successor, Kim Jong-Il, will be tempted to undertake another war of conquest. This time, however, a North Korea armed with ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons against Japan poses a risk to much of northeast Asia. Make no mistake about it: Unless this threat is liquidated, South Korea, Japan and possibly Taiwan will feel compelled to join the "club" of nuclear powers — particularly if the United States, as planned, continues to reduce its presence and its deterrent power in the region.

What is more, the threat posed by North Korean weapons of mass destruction now extends well beyond the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang has, after all, become a principal supplier of advanced military hardware — notably ballistic missile technology — to radical nations in the Middle East. Recipients include Iran, Syria and Libya all of whom are, as a result, substantially more capable of conducting devastating, no-warning attacks against Israel and pro-Western Arab states.

In addition, it must be expected that the North Koreans would be delighted to offer such buyers a nuclear option for the front-end of their missiles. As the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey, put it on 25 February 1993: "[North Korea] is willing to sell to any country with the cash to pay."

The Bottom Line

With so much at stake, the Center for Security Policy believes that the United States cannot afford to ignore or otherwise accommodate North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. As with Iraq, there are risks associated with taking forceful action — but they pale by comparison with those sure to arise if Pyongyang can wield "The Bomb."

Accordingly, the Center recommends that the Clinton Administration urgently take the following steps:

• Suspend the withdrawal of the nearly 14,000 troops recently dispatched to participate in just-concluded annual U.S.-South Korean military exercises code-named "Team Spirit."

 

• Immediately augment those forces and the 36,000 U.S. troops permanently stationed in South Korea with airborne, naval and air force elements sufficient to contend with near-term contingencies.

 

• Stipulate that international inspectors must be permitted unfettered access to all North Korean facilities suspected of housing nuclear weapons-related activities by 1 April — the latest deadline established by the IAEA (which must be the last extension).

 

• Ensure that a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to liquidate such uninspected facilities is in place by that time.
  • Notice should be served, however, that if China — which on 12 March 1993 vetoed a first resolution condemning Pyongyang — blocks adoption of this resolution, the international community will not be prevented from acting in its self-defense.

     

   

  • It goes without saying that severe penalties in trade and political relations with the People’s Republic of China must follow any such Chinese veto.

     

 

• Either way, act to prevent North Korea from obtaining and threatening the use of nuclear weapons.
  • At the very least, selected military strikes designed to neutralize those facilities associated with Pyongyang’s covert nuclear weapons program must be prepared. Israel’s brilliant preemptive strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak should serve as a model for this form of "assertive arms control."

     

   

  • In this connection, urgent steps must be taken to improve the United States’ ability to attack and destroy deeply buried assets — one approach taken by the North Koreans to conceal and harden some of their nuclear weapons-related manufacturing sites.

     

 

• Launch urgent consultations with U.S. partners in the North Asian/Pacific Basin about reinvigorating regional security arrangements.
  • The purpose of such consultations should be to demonstrate tangibly the United States’ continued resolve to remain a presence and a power in the area and to collaborate actively with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, in particular, for the common defense.

     

 

As the Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Rep. John Murtha (D-PA), recently observed in calling for destruction of the North Korean nuclear facilities, taking such steps means that "There is no question we would have to be prepared to go to war." The Center believes, however, that the choice — as with Iraq two-and-a-half years ago — is not between possibly going to war with North Korea and not going to war. Rather, it is a question of risking going to war now, when U.S. military capabilities are relatively strong and North Korean nuclear forces are minimal (or not yet completed), rather than later when such advantageous conditions will almost surely not exist.