AT LAST, CONGRESS GETS READ-IN ON ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS: NOW WILL THE PUBLIC BE TOLD ABOUT THEIR COSTS TO THE U.S.?

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(Washington, D.C.): Tomorrow at 2:00 p.m. members of the
House International Relations Committee will finally be briefed
by senior Clinton Administration officials about the status —
and implications — of ongoing negotiations between Israel and
Syria. The briefers will be the Administration’s point-men on
these talks: Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff,
Special Middle East Envoy Dennis Ross and General
Daniel Christman
, the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

Such “consultations,” while welcome, are long
overdue and wholly inadequate. To the extent that these
negotiations will oblige the United States to assume significant
new, costly and possibly ominous responsibilities, the
American
people should be consulted
as well. At the very least, they
must be informed before formal commitments are undertaken,
particularly if those commitments could result in the loss of
American lives and/or material changes in the vital U.S.-Israeli
relationship.

Hearings on this issue have been publicly promised for nearly
a year by the Committee’s chairman, Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-NY).
With the Administration now acknowledging (at least implicitly)
that it is no longer “premature” to discuss the
Israeli-Syrian negotiations, congressional hearings must be held at
once.

How Does the Administration Respond?

There are ample grounds for concern about the emerging peace
agreement between Israel and Syria. Especially troublesome is the
notion that American personnel will be deployed on the Golan
Heights in support of this accord. The dangers of such a
deployment were the subject of a major study authored last fall
by eleven former senior military and civilian U.S. government
officials — including four former members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff — under the sponsorship of the Center for Security Policy.
Entitled U.S. Forces on the Golan Heights: An Assessment of
the Benefits and Costs
, this
study
arrived at (among others) the following conclusions,
none of which has to date been directly addressed let alone
been analytically rebutted by the Administration:

  • A Minimal Contribution to the Parties’ Early Warning
    Requirements:
    U.S. troops on the Golan are not
    required — and would, in any event, not be relied upon
    — to provide the parties’ with military intelligence and
    early warning of military activity.
  • The Dubious Role of U.S. Forces in Treaty Compliance: There
    is no need for the United States to undertake and
    expensive, risky and open-ended commitment of troops to
    carry out the relatively minor (and not inherently
    military) task of serving occasionally as a third-party
    referee on compliance issues. Furthermore, as a general
    proposition, it is not sensible for the United States to
    make a commitment of indefinite duration to put American
    troops on the Golan for purely symbolic purposes, when
    the necessary symbolism can (and undoubtedly will) be
    supplied amply be other means. Given the dangers of
    terrorism in the region, and the political instabilities
    and risks of war, it would be very irresponsible to
    deploy those troops as symbols.
  • Real Dangers to U.S. Troops: Because of the Golan’s
    compact area and terrain, U.S. troops would be operating
    close to a substantial and potentially hostile
    population. They would be within range of Hezballah and
    other terrorist organizations based in south Lebanon.
    Placing U.S. forces in proximity to Syrian population
    centers and to the south Lebanon base areas of various
    terrorist organizations would enable hostile forces to
    attack those forces without Syria having to take
    responsibility. When U.S. Marine Lt. Col. Rich Higgins
    serving in a U.N. peacekeeping force in Lebanon, was
    killed in 1988 by terrorists there, the U.S. was unable
    to hold anyone in particular responsible — a point not
    lost on those who might threaten U.S. personnel deployed
    to the region in the future.
  • Damage to U.S. Public Support of Israel: If U.S.
    forces on the Golan suffer casualties — from terrorism,
    for example — there will be U.S. public pressure to end
    the Golan mission. Israel’s image as a self-reliant ally
    would also be tarnished. Israeli anxieties about the
    reliability of the U.S. as a “peacekeeper” on
    the Golan would intensify, with good reason. American
    credibility would clearly be at stake.
  • Misleading Comparisons Between the Sinai and the Golan
    Heights:
    It has been suggested that U.S. peacekeeping
    forces on the Golan mission would experience no more
    difficulties than the American contingent in the
    Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) has in the Sinai.
    However, risks of a Golan deployment are significantly
    greater than those attending the Sinai mission. The Sinai
    is approximately 120 miles wide and has no appreciable
    population. The much narrower Golan Heights could, by
    contrast, be rapidly remilitarized by Syrian forces. In
    any event, the risks of terrorism abound on the Golan
    Heights but are virtually nonexistent in the Sinai. In
    addition, the Golan abuts south Lebanon, a major base for
    terrorist groups hostile to the United States, with no
    analogous threat in the Sinai. And, finally, the
    political relationship between Israel and Egypt is of a
    much different nature from what exists now — or can be
    foreseen to exist — between Israel and Syria.
  • Conclusion: The net effect of stationing U.S.
    troops on the Golan Heights could be negative for
    Israel’s security and regional stability. The
    consequences could, moreover, include the loss of U.S.
    lives and, possibly, a credibility-damaging retreat of
    the U.S. forces under terrorist fire. In any event, such
    a deployment would increase the danger of direct U.S.
    involvement in a future Middle East war and undermine
    Israel’s standing with the U.S. public as a self-reliant
    ally.

Concerns Affirmed by Distinguished American and Israeli
Generals

These conclusions were broadly confirmed in an important
panel discussion held yesterday at the National Press Club in
Washington under the sponsorship of the Jewish Institute for
National Security Affairs (JINSA). It featured eight American and
Israeli high-ranking retired officers with a broad range of
experience bearing on Syrian military capabilities, combat and
peacekeeping operations and the U.S.-Israeli strategic
partnership. A transcript of this proceeding should be required
reading for both legislators and executive branch officials prior
to completion of any agreement between Israel and Syria.

The Bottom Line

The Center for Security Policy encourages other relevant
committees of the Congress to join the International Relations
Committee in formal inquiries into the emerging Israeli-Syrian
deal and its implications for the United States. The latter
include not only those associated with a troop deployment on the
Golan but also the possibility that U.S. tax-dollars will be
pledged to Syria (either directly or through multilateral
sources). Such a step would likely require the Administration to
remove Syria from the lists of terrorist-sponsoring and
drug-trafficking nations, even though it continues to engage
in both of these heinous activities.

The words of the authors of the Center’s blue-ribbon study
are as true today as when they were first published last October:

“If the subject is debated now and Congress and the
executive branch decide to oppose a deployment of U.S. troops
on the Golan, Israel and Syria could take this into account
in their negotiations and devise alternative security
arrangements accordingly. Such a decision would be far less
disruptive if made now than if deferred until after a
Syrian-Israeli deal is concluded.”

Center for Security Policy

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