Out with the old nukes, in the with new

by J. Michael Waller
The Washington Times, June 10, 1996

Russia’s hard -line military leaders must
have cheered when Senate allies of the Clinton
administration killed a bill that would have required
deployment of a national defense system against incoming
nuclear missiles.

For the revanchists who earned their generals’ stars
in the Red Army, the Cold War is far from over. As
command and control of Russia’s nuclear arsenal
deteriorates in the country’s prolonged crisis, military
leaders state that their top priority is to modernize
their nuclear forces.

The White House has swept under the rug what top
Russian officers admit freely: Strategic nuclear missiles
directed at the United States remain on alert and the
obsolete systems being dismantled (some with U.S. aid)
will be replaced by more high-tech weapons.

Why is Russia channeling its scarce resources into
strategic modernization if the Cold War is over and the
country can’t maintain the forces it has? Strategic
Rocket Forces Commander in Chief Igor Sergeyev provided
the answer in a briefing to the Duma last July.
“Strategic offensive arms,” he explained in
remarks summarized by a Russian government publication,
“are the main component of Russia’s defense might.
They include at most 10 percent of the entire army
personnel and take up only 5 to 6 percent of the
country’s defense budget. They are not only the most
reliable but also the cheapest component of our defense
might. And they have a high level of combat readiness and
combat capability.”

Since Bill Clinton has been president, the Russian
military has conducted several major strategic weapons
exercises, at least one of which included a mock nuclear
attack on the United States, in 1993, on June 22, 1994,
and from October 4-10, 1995. The White House has said
nothing.

Deep spending cuts and the deteriorated state of its
conventional forces have caused Moscow to increase
political and military reliance on strategic weapons.
President Yeltsin signed a military doctrine in 1993 that
reverses the “Gorbachev doctrine” of civilian
pre-eminence over the military and renounces the
Andropov-era “no first use” nuclear pledge,
propagandistic as it may have been. Even veterans of old
Communist Party think tanks became alarmed. “A first
strike strategy,” reform-mined military analyst
Aleksei G. Arbatov commented at the time in Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, “presupposes the unleashing of nuclear
war.” All this happened when Russian-American
relations were at their best. In 1994, the Russian navy
began retrofitting its Typhoons to house the new
SS-N-24/26 ballistic missile. In early 1995, it tested a
submarine-launched ballistic missile, concealing the
technical characteristics in violation of an arms
agreement with the United States. U.S. Navy intelligence
estimates that Russia spent as much as $7.2 billion on
submarine construction and modernization in 1994, and $9
billion in 1995. Shipyards are building hard-to-detect
nuclear attack subs, including the Akula II and the
completely new Severodvinsk class, according to Russian
military leaders.

In open hearings last July, the general staff informed
the Duma of development of a new ballistic missile
submarine class to succeed the Typhoon, with capabilities
superior to the American Ohio-class (Trident) subs; the
keels have already been laid, but lack of funds has
stalled the projects. Covering the hearings, Kommersant
Daily reported that with economic recovery, construction
will resume: “Russia plans for more than one day
ahead despite the unprecedented cuts for military
R&D.”

Why such subs when the rest of the navy is rusting
away? “Our strategic forces are the most important
part of the fleet,” explained Russian First Deputy
Navy Commander Igor Kasatonov at a London naval
conference in April. “We are now trying to improve
our logistics so we can supply them properly.” Asked
about the next decade’s procurement priorities. Adm.
Kasatonov was unequivocal: “Our priority is the new
generation of more accurate strategic nuclear missiles of
the kind which can be launched from submarines.”

The West has looked on hopefully as Russia
decommissions part of its ground-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM) fleet. But reform and arms
control have little to do with reductions. According to
First Deputy Chief of Staff Vladimir Zhurbenko, the
missiles, with aging electronic and highly corrosive
fuel, “are at the end of their useful life.”
The defense ministry newspaper Red Star – the name hasn’t
changed – argues that the giant, 10-warhead SS-18s need
to be dismantled “because of their age, irrespective
of the [START] treaty.”

Neither is U.S. “Cooperative Threat
Reduction” aid a motivator. Three years ago, well
before any such assistance went through the pipeline,
Gen. Sergeyev told Russian journalists that while certain
ICBMs would be scrapped, “the combat readiness of
strategic missiles will not decline in any way. The
obsolete systems will be replaced with up-to-date
ones.” One of the replacements is the TOPOL-M, a
three-stage variant of the SS-25. On Sept. 5, just hours
before the U.S. Senate voted to build a national
ballistic missile defense system by 2003, the military
test-launched a TOPOL-M prototype at the Plesetsk
cosmodrome 600 miles north of Moscow.

Announcing the launch, Military Space Forces spokesman
Igor Safronov told TASS that 90 of the 154 SS-18 silos on
Russian territory will be converted to house the TOPOL-M.
The missiles will also be based on eight-axeled mobile
launchers to conceal them from detection. Mr. Safronov
echoed the rest of the military, “Russia hopes to
replace all its outdated missiles in the coming
years.”

As stopgap measure until aviation upgrading is
possible, Russia is purchasing a fleet of Soviet-era
strategic bombers and hundreds of air-launched cruise
missiles (plus nearly three dozen ICBMs) from Ukraine.
With no apparent concern form Washington and various
incentives from Moscow, Kiev agreed to the sale after two
years of negotiations. According to Gen. Sergeyev, the
deal, now in its final stages, will transfer to Russia 25
Tu-95M “Bear-H” strategic bombers, 19
supersonic Tu-160 “Blackjack” strategic bomber,
and several hundred cruise missiles (in addition to 32
ICBMs). Gen. Sergeyev said the weapons will help Russia
“maintain its nuclear potential at an appropriate
level until 2009,” presumably in time for the
country to rebuild its economy and military industry.

The General Staff briefed the Duma that a
new-generation of air-launched cruise missile is in
production. The next-generation multi-role strategic
“stealth” bomber, the Sukhoi-T60S, is
reportedly under development.

Advanced nuclear warheads are also in the works,
according to Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov, who
disclosed continuing weapons programs a year ago. Tests
may have begun. In January, as this newspaper revealed
and Defense Secretary William Perry confirmed, the
Pentagon detected seismic activity consistent with a
low-yield nuclear blast at the underground arctic nuclear
test center at Novaya Zemlya, even though Moscow had
pledged in 1992 to stop such detonation.

The public still doesn’t know the truth about the
alleged test. The administration has been dismissive of
serious reports of across-the-board Russian arms-control
violations as it has been silent about Russian strategic
modernization. We have come to expect such behavior from
the Clinton administration. The mystery is why so few of
its opponents in Congress have made it an issue.