Castro Inconvertible

By Charles Lane
New Republic, 09 February 1998

Whatever its political impact on Cuba, John Paul II’s tour of the island may well bolster
opposition to the U.S. ban on trade with Fidel Castro’s Communist redoubt. The Pope was blunt
in his condemnation of the embargo, adding the Vatican’s voice to an already growing chorus of
opposition. Critics now include not only perennial liberal advocates of engagement with Castro,
but also the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Lloyd Bentsen, whose old job as treasury secretary
included enforcing the ban.

The case against the embargo comes in various styles. Liberals (and the Pope) emphasize the
hardships it imposes on the Cuban people; free-marketeers, the senselessness of restraining trade.
Foreign-policy types love any opportunity to draw a dictator out of his shell. But the basic
contentions are that the embargo may actually have strengthened Castro by giving him a
scapegoat; that any justification for the embargo vanished with the Soviet Union; and that lifting it
now would liberate Cuba, because Castro would lose the last excuse for his failures, and because
democracy and Pepsi flow together. “No Sanctions, No Castro,” reasons columnist James K.
Glassman; end the embargo, he writes, and “the result, before very long, will be a thriving,
Castro-less Cuba, a diamond crescent glistening in the blue Caribbean Sea….”

Wow! The one concession Fidel Castro most fervently demands from the United States is also
the
one policy change that would bring him down. If you think this sounds too good to be true, I
agree. The U.S. embargo is indeed an unsatisfactory policy, one which imposes costs on both the
Cuban people and the United States. But it is easy to overstate those costs, and the policy is not
without benefits–even 37 years after President Eisenhower adopted it in response to Castro’s
confiscation of U.S. businesses on the island.

For every anti-embargo argument, there is a pro-embargo rejoinder. Does the embargo hurt
the
Cuban people? A bit, though far less than communism itself. And since the end of Cuba’s Soviet
subsidy, the U.S. has licensed donations of more than $227 million in medical supplies, plus $1
billion in humanitarian aid–mainly in the form of cash remittances from Cuban exiles to family
back home. Is it hypocritical of Miami Cubans to back the embargo while sending dollars that
prop up Cuba’s economy? Yes, but at least their cash goes to those who really need it. (Actually,
Castro’s government benefits, too. U.S. phone companies pay Cuba tens of millions of dollars
annually for connecting long-distance calls between the U.S. and the island.)

Does the embargo provide Castro with a political self-justification? Yes, but most of the
people
I’ve met in Cuba treated Castro’s embargo-bashing as just another official lie. Lifting the embargo
would also legitimize him by allowing him to claim victory over the Yanquis.

Does the Helms-Burton Act create diplomatic hassles with our Canadian and European
friends?
Yes, but basically the allies’ complaints are phony. Ostensibly, they objected to the
“extraterritoriality” of the law’s provision permitting Americans to sue foreign firms that use
nationalized U.S. property in Cuba. Their real motives, though, were anti-American posturing and
a fear of similar laws aimed at trade with Iran. Anyway, the provision has never been enforced;
Clinton suspended it in exchange for European condemnations of Castro’s human rights abuses.
Not a bad result.

Isn’t it hypocritical to trade with China while stiffing Cuba? Yes, but the results of our
dealings
with Beijing hardly support the view that trade leads to the spontaneous generation of freedom.
True, Cuba is much smaller and closer to the United States and thus more susceptible to
American penetration. But it also has a far less open economy than China’s, one in which Fidel
Castro controls the minutest of decisions. Repeating a common misconception, Glassman says the
U.S. embargo prohibits Americans from “buying things from [Cubans].” But “Cubans” aren’t
allowed to sell; by law, foreign trade is a state monopoly in Cuba. Trading with Cuba means
trading with Castro. Canadian businesses in Cuba may hire only state-selected workers; most of
their wages are remitted to Castro. Would American companies agree to work under those terms?
Should they?

Forecasts of a glittering post-embargo Cuba reflect wishful thinking, not a tough-minded
assessment of the economic realities of the island. Cuba long ago defaulted on billions of dollars in
loans from European and Canadian banks–money it borrowed despite the embargo, then frittered
away. Its reserves depleted, Cuba has recently been forced to finance critical imports through
short-term loans at double-digit interest rates. Restarting trade between Cuba and the U.S. would
require a huge bailout from multilateral financial institutions. Cuba is not yet a member of those
instruments of American imperialism, but even if it joined, would Castro agree to restructure his
island according to the dictates of the World Bank? He didn’t listen to his last patron, Mikhail
Gorbachev. Indeed, Castro has jailed (or shot) people rather than take their sensible economic
advice. The modest market reforms Castro has grudgingly allowed of late are the exception that
proves the rule.

The cleverest variant of the anti-embargo argument holds that the U.S. should offer a partial
lifting of the sanctions in return for the step-by-step granting of political and economic freedoms
to Cuba. The Clinton administration flirted with this notion, but the Cuban-American lobby
snuffed it. In theory, it’s a good idea; in practice, it has the fatal flaw of depending on Castro’s
acquiescence in his own gradual ouster.

Embargo-lifters believe the myth that trade and “engagement” with the West brought down
the
Soviet Union. Actually, the Soviets were undone by a good cop, bad cop routine. Europe and
Canada plied them with economic goodies, while Ronald Reagan’s stern anti-communism forced
them into ruinous defense spending and deprived them of international legitimacy. Castro faces a
version of this now. In any case, the notion that democratic reform in Cuba should depend on a
gesture from the United States seems odd. Even if the embargo is bloody-minded and atavistic,
Castro’s position–“Socialism or Death”–is many times crazier. Given that the end of the cold war
discredited Castro and his worldview, why should America make the first move? What would help
the Cuban people more: Additional hand-wringing by American pundits about U.S. policy, or an
unequivocal demand from those same elites for free elections now?

The embargo may be a futile gesture, but it is not an empty gesture. It sends a message: the
United States will have nothing to do with the tyranny 90 miles from its shores. A definitive
verdict on the hard line must await Castro’s inevitable passing. My hunch, to paraphrase Castro
himself, is that history will absolve it.