Does the killing of top Al Qaeda officials help Islamic State expansion?

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The US conducted airstrikes in eastern Libya over the weekend targeting Mokhtar Belmokhtar. A US official said that multiple 500-pound bombs were used, and the Libyan government said that Belmokhtar was one of many killed in the strikes. No definitive proof has been released yet by either the US or by Libya that Belmokhtar has died.

Belmokhtar left his home in Algeria at the age of nineteen to train with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and was very close to Osama Bin Laden. He helped found the Al Qaeda-affiliated group, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and remained one of its leaders, until he split from the group in August 2013 to form a new group, Al-Murabitoun. He was often considered “a thorn in the side of AQIM’s leadership” due to his tendency to act “as a loose cannon.” Rather than acting in the local interests of AQIM, which has more localized goals than Al Qaeda Central, Belmokhtar declared his allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda Central’s leadership. He committed attacks, like the kidnapping of Canadian diplomat Robbie Fowler, without their guidance, even while he still remained a member of the organization and acted in its name.

He gained international notoriety amongst intelligence and security officials after he led an attack against the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria in January 2013 that lasted for four days and killed almost forty people, including three Americans. He also led two separate attacks in Niger a few months later; one targeted the French-run uranium production facility in Arlit and the other was against a French military base. The attacks were conducted in response to Niger’s general relationship and cooperation with France. Both his ability to easily travel around Africa and due to poorly-guarded borders and his interest in attacking Western targets have presented issues in the past. They have given him the ability to contribute to Islamic militancy throughout much of northern and Saharan Africa.

Belmokhtar has been proclaimed dead several times in the past. Last April, an Algerian newspaper announced his death, and in 2013, the Chadian Army said it killed him in Mali, and his death would be a huge victory for US counterterrorism efforts in western Africa.

Belmokhtar and Al-Murabitoun are responsible for several recent attacks in the region, including an April bombing of a UN peacekeeper camp. In May, part of Al-Murabitoun pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), although Belmokhtar remained loyal to Al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, leaving the question of whether or not the remainder of his group will join IS if he has actually died. Should the entire group pledge loyalty to IS, its location nestled between current IS holdings in Libya and Boko Haram in Nigeria could create a huge swath of area in northern Africa under IS rule and could force Al-Murabitoun to adjust its tactics to operate more like a state. It would no longer be able to operate in as much secrecy as it would begin to rule over its territory, but it would gain significant power because it would be able to draw from the resources of the people and the land falling under its control. It would also have the ability to return to terrorist tactics if it were to cede control to an invading military force. This makes the group much more difficult to defeat, because it has, essentially, a multiple-contingency plan.

Other groups previously loyal to Al Qaeda have retracted their affiliation and instead pledged allegiance to IS. As senior Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda-affiliated officials are killed, those fighters loyal to their leader but not their organization may be increasingly incentivized to join the ranks of the ever-expanding IS, drawn in by its size and power. The US and its allies must consider the potential that airstrikes, while they can be effective, can lead to unpredictable effects. While the decapitation of Al Qaeda’s older, experienced leadership is good for counterterrorism efforts, it is not a long-term solution in the fight against the organization. The actions of the remainder of Al-Murabitoun that remained loyal to Belmokhtar will be telling.

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