Yakuza: A tough mess to clean up

This is the third of a five-part series on the yakuza’s still wide reach in Japan. Part one is here; part 2, here.

Lacking such tools as a specific RICO statute (directed against “racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations”), prohibitions on wiretapping and – until recently – plea-bargaining, Japanese law enforcement is often said to be hamstrung in dealing with the yakuza.

But the truth is, even if yakuza organizations themselves are not on their face illegal, the country has always had plenty of laws available to take on gangsters and their activities.The fundamental problem is that there has been and is now little or no political support for a concerted, serious move against organized crime.

That could be seen with much hyped and tightly written yakuza exclusionary laws, enacted with National Police Agency backing around 2010-2012, which prohibited any financial or business dealings with organized crime. While those laws were lauded as placing a death-grip on the yakuza, this has proved not to be the case. They had some effect at the margins of yakuza society, but overall the yakuza have adapted.

Upon his release after a lengthy prison term in 2011, Shinobu Tsukasa, top boss of the largest underworld syndicate, the Yamaguchi-gumi, offered this comment on the new Japanese police and government efforts to crack down on the yakuza:“We will adjust.”

Pro forma

And, it appears that at most, only a tiny number of companies have been cautioned – not punished, just cautioned – for violating the prohibitions. It might be argued that Japan’s enacting of anti-yakuza statutes without a concomitant effort to seriously enforce them reflects the preference for the pro forma that long-term observers of Japan have seen throughout many parts of the Japanese society.

Among several reasons, yakuza are a reliable source of political contributions and a reliable voting bloc – sort of like political action committees in the United States. They also provide “services” such as protection against blackmail or embarrassing rumors – while also being a source of exploitable information about political rivals.

In return, yakuza get public works projects and other considerations – including protection from forceful crackdowns. Indeed, prior to the Democratic Party of Japan’s successful campaign in the late 2000s to defeat the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the DPJ reportedly reached a deal with the Yamaguchi-gumi: In exchange for yakuza support in the election, the DPJ promised that no RICO-type statutes would be enacted while it was in power.

Such quid pro quo is further compounded by the difficulties in establishing winnable legal cases, as well as the simple fact that it is embarrassing for Japanese officialdom to admit the full extent of yakuza involvement in all parts of society, and even more so in the highly regulated financial markets.

Indeed, in certain quarters within Japan’s political, social and business elite (collectively, the ruling class), yakuza are viewed as a necessary pillar stabilizing Japanese society – in much the same way as the mayor of a large city in the northeastern United States circa 1950 might have viewed the Sicilian Mafia.

Click HERE to read more.

Author
Recent Posts

Grant Newsham

Senior Fellow

Please Share:

Tags: Japan, Yakuza

Trending

Products

Departments

Regions

Please Share: