Castaneda’s Legacy for US-Mexico Relations

By Fredo Arias-King.  Mr. Arias-King is a Harvard-trained businessman and scholar of contemporary Russia , was advisor of international affairs to the National Action Party (PAN) and to the Vicente Fox campaign, handling most of the relation with Washington during the campaign together with Dr. Carlos Salazar. His research focuses on the post-communist transitions. He is also the founder of the Washington-based Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization.

How should Washington deal an openly aggressive and hostile Mexican Foreign Policy?  With Jorge Castaeda’s anti-American agitation again a distinct possiblity if he is appointed by president-elect Felipe Calderon this question must be asked.

This question poses a dilemma since, after all, he was appointed the foreign minister of Mexico’s first democratic and legitimate government in over seven decades, and his reappointment by Caldern would confirm that Mexico’s ruling class indeed prefers an assertive foreign policy towards Washington.

An openly aggressive response by the United States to Castaeda’s provocations would ultimately be interpreted as an affront to Mexico itself. It may also vindicate the foreign Castaeda’s Legacy for U.S.-Mexico Relations minister’s (and the illiberal Left’s) rhetoric of victimization, or be interpreted as U.S. discomfort towards Mexico’s newfound sense of international activism. (Whereas Castaeda was widely unpopular as foreign secretary, the perception of Mexico’s more active foreign policy is popular.)

On the other hand, an appeasement of Castaeda by Washington and the acceptance of his agenda may strengthen the foreign minister politically, and may serve as a precedent for future Mexican foreign ministers and even for other countries to follow in their dealings with Washington. Other Latin American countries may be observing the results of Castaeda’s brinkmanship with the United States. A favorable and accommodating U.S. policy of course may benefit Mexico in the short run, but it may unnecessarily complicate relations in the medium and long term, since a precedent would have been set on how to deal with Washington.

Mexico’s strategic importance in the Hemisphere has increased due to the tide of countries governed by leaders hostile to Washington, namely in Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and to a lesser extent also Argentina and Brazil. As Castaeda has been perceived to have broken with this network, there will be an impulse in Washington to accommodate Mexico, and Castaeda may extract high costs for his “cooperation” against Washington’s enemies in the Hemisphere.

With his presidential ambitions in mind, that cost will most certainly entail a comprehensive package of immigration reform. Should Washington adopt a “peace in our time” approach in its dealings with a Castaeda-style Mexican foreign policy, however, it is likely to produce ever-more-unreasonable demands from the government in Mexico City which is attempting to pass-the-buck for its lackluster economic performance these past six years. A polite but firm rebuke from Washington would likely provoke a heated condemnation from the Mexican elites in the short run. In the medium-term, though, it would encourage the latter finally to pass needed reforms in Mexico and not shift the blame northward.

View full paper (Web)

View full paper (PDF)