Neither Isolationists Nor Fools, By Richard PerleThe New York Times, 19 October 1999

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"Isolationism" and "partisanship" were the names, "reckless" and "dangerous" the characterizations with which a stunned Clinton Administration and much of the press greeted the Senate’s rejection last week of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Vice President Al Gore, whose TV commercial attacking the Republicans was broadcast almost immediately after the roll call, declared the vote "the single most reckless action that I have seen the Senate take . . . in my lifetime."

Having spent 11 years working for a Senator who more often voted with the opposition than with his own party on national security issues — and who was instrumental in getting the atmospheric nuclear test ban through the Senate in 1963 — I know partisanship when I see it. My old boss, Scoop Jackson, for four decades a leader of the now much-diminished internationalist wing of the Democratic Party, had a plaque in his office that read: "In matters of national security, the best politics is no politics." And I had that slogan posted in my Pentagon office when, as a Democrat, I served in the Reagan Administration. Working for Senator Jackson, you learned about isolationism, too. I recall the Senate debates over the withdrawal of American troops from Europe during the cold war, when Democratic Senators Mike Mansfield and William Fulbright argued that we had unmet needs at home and the Europeans should defend themselves. Indeed, my candidate for the "single most reckless action that I have seen the Senate take" would be the day in the mid-70’s when a Senate majority actually voted to withdraw American forces from Europe — a vote that was quickly reversed. A close runner-up might be the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, or the day 47 Senators voted against leading an international coalition into battle against Saddam Hussein.

I would be deeply troubled by the emergence of an isolationist, partisan bloc in either party in the Senate. But try as I might, I can’t find one. The idea that rejection of the treaty proves such a bloc exists is based on two arguments, both of which are wrong.

The first is that the benefits of ratifying the treaty were so self-evidently greater than the costs that only crass partisanship or unthinking isolationism could explain a vote against ratification. This view, which reflects a breathtaking certitude on a variety of complex judgments, assumes away the substance of the controversy. It ignores the six former Defense Secretaries who opposed the treaty, along with John Deutch and James Woolsey, former heads of the Central Intelligence Agency who were appointed by President Clinton. It takes no notice of Richard Lugar, Thad Cochran and Olympia Snowe, Republican Senators who have always supported arms control treaties in the past but who opposed this one and made thoughtful speeches explaining why.

Like a majority of the Senate, I believe the treaty is deeply flawed. Compliance can’t be verified or enforced, nor can the treaty deliver on its proponents’ promise of halting the spread of nuclear weapons or even of impeding it. Indeed, the argument that ratification would discourage North Korea, Iraq, Iran, India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons produced laughter in the Senate cloakroom. Imprecise and badly drafted, the treaty leaves critical terms like "nuclear explosion" undefined. But most important, it raised serious concerns about the long-term viability of the American nuclear deterrent. Confidence in our nuclear weapons could decline over time if we could not test them, and we might be unable to fix future problems in those weapons without tests to insure their validity. And, contrary to the claim that the Senate could have fixed its deficiencies, the treaty, by its terms, is not subject to unilateral amendment or reservation.

The second argument of the treaty’s proponents is that the timing of the debate proves Republicans were simply being partisan. "They must have been motivated by partisan isolationism," the argument runs, "or the Republicans would have agreed to delay the vote."

But for Senators who were persuaded that the treaty is inimical to American security interests, delaying its consideration while the Clinton Administration sought to neutralize their opposition and gain the votes for ratification would not have been sensible.

Presidents normally have a wide variety of means, some of them coercive, for obtaining votes on issues important to them, and all of these methods are familiar to the Senate opponents. A Senate agreement to delay the vote would have been rather like an agreement by the Yankees to postpone the American League playoffs until the Red Sox could send a rested Pedro Martinez back to the mound again. Most opponents of the treaty were not partisans or isolationists — nor were they fools.

Many treaty supporters are looking for ways to bring an improved version before the Senate in the future. The Clinton Administration argues that the Senate’s refusal to ratify the treaty as it now stands will weaken American influence and make renegotiation more difficult.

But the opposite is true. As our diplomats seek to improve the treaty by better drafting, by eliminating unverifiable prohibitions and by providing for minimal safety and security testing, they will have a powerful new argument to make to other countries: They will be able to say they cannot muster the votes to ratify the treaty until it is fixed.

Center for Security Policy

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