Tag Archives: AQAP

US drone attacks are not slowing down AQAP

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has released a video eulogizing Nasir al Wuhayshi, the leader of AQAP and second in command for al-Qaeda, who was killed in a US drone strike earlier this month. Wuhayshi, born in Yemen, was named al-Qaeda’s general manager in 2013. Before he assumed the #2 position, he was a close associate and personal secretary of Osama bin Laden, and led one of al-Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan. While imprisoned with 22 other al-Qaeda militants, Wuhayshi successfully developed and executed a plan to escape from the prison through a tunnel. After bin Laden’s death, Wuhayshi was quick to openly support Ayman al-Zawahiri, who eventually named Wuhayshi general manager in 2013.

AQAP was quick to emphasize the speediness of its Shura council’s selection of new leader Qasim al Raymi. Raymi has an extensive resume with AQAP, serving as the group’s military commander since 2009. Raymi, who has been one of the State Department’s most wanted terrorists since 2010, also has links to various attacks by the group, including a 2007 suicide bombing in the Yemen that killed ten people, and the 2009 “underwear bomb” plot in which an al-Qaeda militant hid explosives in his underwear with hopes of bringing down a plane over Detroit. The US’s hunt for Raymi has been long lasting, with rumors of his death arising multiple times since 2007.

The most recent strike is just one of a number of recent US drone strike that have killed various AQAP leaders. In April, Ibrahim al-Rubaish, AQAP’s ideological leader and Islamic law interpreter was killed in Yemen by a US drone strike. Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi, a senior AQAP leader and al-Qaeda’s global deputy general manager, was also killed in April by a US drone strike. On June 17, al-Qaeda militants publically executed two Saudi men accused of assisting the US to find AQAP leaders who have recently been killed in drone attacks. After the men were shot to death, their bodies were hung from a bridge with a banner that read, “The House of Saud directs American planes to bomb the holy warriors.” Al-Qaeda reportedly charged the two men with planting tracking devices that signaled the locations of AQAP leaders. Despite the deaths of multiple of its senior leaders, AQAP is showing no signs of slowing down its operations, being the most successful branch of al-Qaeda in recent years. In March, Saudi Arabia launched a coalition to fight Houthi rebels in Yemen which AQAP has used the choas in Yemen to its advantage by seizing lawless areas in eastern parts of the nation. It is likely AQAP will continue to take advantage of the war in Yemen, and will continue its operations as it has shown how quickly the group can rebound from US drone attacks killing it’s top leaders.

The Secret Expansion in Yemen of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

Yemen is currently in the midst of a civil war between the Houthi rebels, who forced internationally recognized President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia in February, and the forces loyal to Hadi. Many other countries have gotten involved, with a coalition led by Saudi Arabia supporting pro-Hadi troops and Iran supporting the Houthis.

In the confusion caused by all of the fighting, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has quietly been expanding its own holdings in Yemen. AQAP is regarded as one of the most dangerous Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organizations; it is responsible for the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris this past January and has also been connected to several different bomb plots in the United States.

In the past few years, the Yemeni military has fought AQAP. However, the military has now split between pro-Houthi and pro-Hadi forces, and the pro-Hadi forces are too focused on fighting the Houthis to pay attention to AQAP’s movements. The Saudi coalition has also refrained from attacking AQAP, despite Saudi Arabia’s own history of cracking down on Al Qaeda, because the Sunni AQAP provides an ideological ally against the Shiite Houthis.

While the world has focused on the conflict between the Houthi rebels and the pro-Hadi forces, AQAP has been taking control of entire regions in Yemen, such as Hadramaut, where no Houthi presence exists. It has been making huge territorial gains in the southeast, took over an airport and oil terminal in Mukalla, and freed approximately 300 prisoners (including its senior commander Khaled Saeed Batafi) in April. The group has also been helping in the fight against the Houthis in provinces like Bayda to gain the support of locals. In a country that is approximately 65% Sunni and 35% Shia, AQAP is trying to present itself as a more legitimate power than the Houthis and AQAP is following the general Al Qaeda strategy of not alienating the population to help itself gain popular support.

AQAP’s actions in Yemen essentially mirror those of Jabhat al-Nusra, the Al Qaeda affiliate operating in Syria. In an interview with Al Jazeera on May 27, al-Nusra’s leader, Abu Muhammed al-Joulani, described the organization as a local group with a local cause. Al-Nusra enjoys a great deal of popular support in Syria, and AQAP is trying to portray itself in the same light – as a group of Yemeni fighters with goals of overthrowing a Shiite uprising in a predominately Sunni country.

AQAP’s current strategy in Yemen appears to be working. By helping Sunni forces fight against the Houthi rebels and by not imposing itself harshly in the areas it controls, it has succeeded in gaining territory and winning local support. However, the Saudi coalition involved in the fight in Yemen, which includes the US, must not forget that AQAP’s goals are not merely local. It is still one of Al Qaeda’s most violent and volatile affiliates, and it has a very recent history of attacking Western targets. Even while the coalition continues to battle the Houthis, it must remember to stop AQAP’s expansion as well.

AQAP Leader Who Claimed Charlie Hebdo Attack Killed By US Drone

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemen-based regional branch of the global jihadist group, confirmed on Thursday that Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi, one of its senior leaders and an al-Qaeda global deputy general manager, the latter of which gave him authority well beyond Yemen, was killed last month by a United States drone strike.

Al-Ansi was targeted overnight on April 21-22 along with his eldest son and other fighters when, according to witnesses in Mukalla, the capital of Yemen’s Hadhramaut coastal region, a drone struck a parked vehicle near the city’s presidential palace, killing six in an operation that resulted in no civilian deaths.

White House spokesman Eric Schultz and Secretary of Defense Ash Carter both refused to comment on the drone strike.

Al-Ansi has made high-profile announcements but really came into the pubic eye on January 14th when he gave a lengthy statement claiming that AQAP was responsible for the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, which occurred on January 7th when two French-born gunmen of Algerian descent stormed into the satirical magazine’s office and slaughtered 12 people for publishing cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed. This was part of three days of violence in Paris where jihadists also killed a police officer and four people in a Jewish deli.

In the same message, al-Ansi called on Muslims in the West to carryout their own terrorist attacks because they are “better and more harmful.”

Born in Yemen, al-Ansi enrolled in Imam University in 1993, which is run by Sheikh Abdul Majid al Zindani, a leading Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood scholar, and an ally of Osama bin Laden. After serving in the El-Mudžahid detachment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina military during the Bosnian War in 1995, al-Ansi sought to fight in Kashmir. Pakistani officials stopped him, though, so he traveled to Afghanistan and met several high level al-Qaeda officials.

Al-Ansi then worked his way through the ranks to become an influential al-Qaeda member working closely with bin Laden and was considered an important ideologue in the terror network. According to a translation of Khalid Saeed Batarfi’s eulogy for al-Ansi, he was considered one of bin Laden’s “special ones” and “took courage and wisdom from” bin Laden, “as well as the jurisprudence of jihad, movement, and the call.”

Al-Ansi is not the only senior al-Qaeda leader in Yemen to be killed recently. Last month, AQAP announced that Ibrahim al-Rubaish, the group’s mufti (interpreter of Islamic law), was killed by another U.S. drone strike. These successes indicate that U.S. counterterrorism strategy is still operational in Yemen despite America withdrawing all personnel from there after the Houthi takeover, although America’s ability to fight AQAP has been greatly compromised since then.

AQAP has been able to capitalize on chaos in Yemen with international attention and resources focused on the Houthis and Saudi-led airstrikes. Al-Qaeda managed to capture Mukalla and release 300 al-Qaeda jihadists, including Batarfi, in a jailbreak, both of which strengthen their position, especially in the southeast. The U.S. must be cognizant of these movements and remember that AQAP is constantly plotting to attack western targets.

Beyond Yemen, al-Qaeda remains a threat to American national security despite the death of bin Laden and other setbacks. In fact, al-Qaeda has actually been growing, even “close to doubling,” according to Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

With so much attention (rightfully) being paid to Iran and Islamic State, there is a risk that al-Qaeda may be set aside as less of a priority, but this would be an error. U.S. strategy should target global jihadist organizations based on their ideology,which commits them to attack America and harm American interests, regardless of any specific group’s identity or location.

Al-Qaeda Capitalizes on Strategic Opportunities in Yemen

As the heavy Saudi-led airstrikes continue against the Shiite rebels loyal to President Hadi, the chaos has allowed Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to continue its major offensive with the capture of the Riyan airport, a sea port, and an oil terminal on Thursday just outside the city of al-Mukalla.

Military officials close to the situation said that AQAP extremists clashed with Yemen security officials outside the city of Al-Mukalla for a brief time before the eventual takeover. AQAP has strategically exploited the chaos in Yemen, most notably in the early April prison break to free over 300 loyalists and extremists, including senior AQAP commander Khaleed Saeed Batarfi.

Mukalla is the capital of Yemen’s largest province, Hadrawawt, and has been under United States drone strikes and counterterrorism actions since AQAP’s presence in the region. Not only is AQAP’s presence in the region ensuring more conflict, but Houthi rebels had seized the capital earlier in the month and exiled President Hadi.

Al-Qaeda has sat back and tactically capitalized on the Shiite-Saudi and Houthis-Hadi battles and has mapped out its own territory within the battlefield known as Yemen. The military units of Al-Qaeda’s opponents are quickly shrinking and the advancement of AQAP is going under the radar. It is important to point out that AQAP does not appear to be the target of Saudi led airstrikes, and this precise move is what is helping facilitate Al-Qaeda advancement.

In Washington, Defense Secretary Carter and Joint Chief of Staff Chairman acknowledged the American-backed Saudi  General Martin E. Dempsey faced questions as to the growing conflict in Yemen and if the conflict created a growing environment for Al-Qaeda to expand:

AQAP provides opportunity in the environment created by the turmoil in Yemen. AQAP, just to remind you, is a branch of Al Qaida that has shown a particular determination to attack us and our homeland, and is therefore of serious concern to us. We continue to watch them and take action against AQAP.

You know, it’s obvious that it’s easier to do our counter-terrorism operations against AQAP when there’s a settled government in Yemen. There is not that now. We, for that reason and other reasons, hope that there will be and are trying to work with others in that direction.

It is being reported that AQAP took control of the 27th Merchandised Brigade’s camp and seized heavy weapons, artillery, and tanks.

Peace initiatives have been called upon by Yemen’s exiled Vice President Bahah, saying that ground operations must cease for peace talks. Unfortunately, the United Nations special envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, resigned early Thursday morning due to “interests in moving to another assignment”. Pressure was mounting as the Moroccan diplomat had seen a surge in Houthi operations.

APAP is still widely considered Al-Qaeda’s strongest terroristic branch, with its size and operational capacity the greatest threat to United States homeland security. With no end to the conflict in sight, a strategy to minimize the conflict in Yemen is all we can hope for now.

Gitmo “Poet” Who Became Leading AQAP Cleric Killed in Drone Strike

On Tuesday, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) confirmed that Ibrahim al-Rubaish, one of the group’s top leaders and its mufti (interpreter of Islamic law), was killed by a drone strike. It is uncertain who launched the air strike, but the United States has carried out several such offensives against al-Qaeda’s most dangerous branch, which is located in Yemen.

Originally from Saudi Arabia, al-Rubaish traveled to Afghanistan with the intent to train for jihad in Chechnya. He ended up fighting in Tora Bora before being captured near the Pakistan-Afghan border and sent to Guantanamo Bay. The Joint Task Force Guantanamo classified al-Rubaish as a medium risk because “he may pose a threat to the U.S., its interests and allies.”

Al-Rubaish was one of the detainees who sued the George W. Bush administration to challenge the legality of their confinements. Meanwhile, certain terrorist-apologists sympathized with his case. Andy Worthington wrote on his website that one of al-Rubaish’s poems was published in a book edited by Marc Falkoff, an associate professor of law at Northern Illinois University. Both Worthington and Falkoff paint a sympathetic picture of al-Rubaish, who was captured while fighting for a terrorist group.

The Saudi national was released in 2006 and sent to a “Saudi rehabilitation program for jihadists.” When Al-Rubaish escaped and traveled to Yemen to rejoin al-Qaeda, the U.S. government placed a $5 million reward for information that brings him to justice. He became a top leader of AQAP, calling for violence against infidels and the revival of assassination.

When Islamic State seized large portions of Iraq and Syria, al-Rubaish declared, “I ask God that efforts are united to target the enemies of the religion.” Furthermore, in 2013, he announced it was his duty to get Muslims to kill Americans and attack Shia Iran. Al-Rubaish is evidently an example of the flawed notion of releasing captured terrorists in Guantanamo, especially to the Middle East, when they may rejoin the fight against the West.

Al-Rubaish’s death comes at a time when America’s counterterrorism strategy in Yemen, which mainly consists of drone strikes against AQAP personnel, is greatly compromised due to the civil war in Yemen. Ever since Iranian-backed Shiite Houthis took over Yemen in January, ousting U.S.-supported Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the country has been in chaos. Saudi Arabia is leading a Sunni Arab coalition to carry out an airstrike campaign against the Houthis and Iranian expansion.

With the conflict in Yemen diverting international attention and resources, AQAP has continued its operations in the southern part of the country, including the seizure of Mukallah, the capital of Yemen’s eastern province of Hadramout. Despite Al-Rubaish’s demise, such drone strikes are harder to conduct with less intelligence on the ground. It is a reminder that al-Qaeda is still a great threat that needs to be countered, even while fighting other enemies.

Top AQAP Commander Freed Amid Yemen Unrest

The Saudi-led airstrikes continue all across Yemen against Iranian-backed Shiite Houthi rebels while the terrorist group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was able to capture the port city of Al-Mukalla. The capture of Al-Mukalla also led to the release of about 300 AQAP militants from the Central Prison, including Khaleed Saeed Batarfi.

Batarfi is an al-Qaeda senior commander in charge of the southeastern province of Yemen, a former member of the militant’s shura council, and is responsible for al-Qaeda’s social media propaganda. Batarfi was arrested while traveling to Taiz, Yemen in 2011. At the time he was found possessing a computer, grenades, an automatic weapon, a GSM phone chip and instructions on how to build explosives.

Khaled Saeed Batafi’s true name is Ayman Saeed Abdullah Batarfi. Batarfi was a detainee of Guantanamo Bay since his capture in Afghanistan in 2002 until April 2009 when President Obama’s questionable new procedures were put in place to review and analyze current GITMO prisoners. The decision for release also came days before Mr. Batarfi’s habeas corpus hearing was scheduled challenging his imprisonment.

According to his GITMO Assessment, Batarfi has a mental history of paranoid schizophrenia.  Before his imprisonment, he was a chief medical examiner for the al-Wafa NGO, an Al-Qaeda and Taliban linked medical organization which operated out of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Batarfi provided extensive assistance to Yazid Sufaat, one of al-Qaeda’s anthrax researchers in Afghanistan who also participated in the planning behind the September 11th attacks. Batarfi’s intelligence value was marked as “HIGH” by GITMO officials possibly due to the fact that he had distinct knowledge of Usama bin-Laden and information regarding Al Qaeda’s anthrax program.

Terrorists groups like AQAP use prison breaks to free loyalists, as well as force common criminals to join the ranks as foot soldiers in exchange for their release. Abdullah al Sharafi, a Yemeni defense ministry official, said that about one-third of the extremists who were freed were AQAP militants.   During the assault, four prison guards, five prisoners, and three extremists were killed in the crossfire.

Al-Mukalla is the capital city of the eastern province Hadramaut and had been under the control of Yemeni security forces that still remained loyal to exiled President Hadi. The fall of President Hadi’s government can be seen as a major loss in President Obama’s counterterrorism effort against AQAP. AQAP is still widely considered Al Qaeda’s strongest branch, with the greatest ability to target the United States’ homeland, despite the Islamic State’s monopolization of media attention.

Saudi-led airstrikes are now focusing on Aden in the hope that they can repel the Houthis in order for Yemeni President Hadi to make a possible return.

Hadi had fled the capital city of Sana’a when Houthis announced their formal takeover in February and installed a government to be led by 5 executive Houthi members.  The United States evacuated Yemen on March 20th after AQAP fighters launched an attack on the city of al-Houta. With the United States emergency evacuation, they have lost all of their intelligence capabilities to monitor AQAP along with their capacity to monitor the power struggle in Yemen.

Houthi Coup In Yemen

As of January 20th, Houthi rebels have seized the Yemeni presidential palace in addition to the Yemeni government media offices. The Yemeni Minister of Information, Nadia Sakkaf, also states that the Prime Minister’s residence is under attack by the rebels. Houthi rebels demand talks with the president for changes in the constitution and national authority in exchange for the safe return of the Yemeni chief of staff, Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, who was kidnapped Saturday. Thus far, it appears that the Yemeni president has lost control of the situation in Sana’a, merely a day after a ceasefire was signed between government forces and the Houthi rebels. At this time, the fate of President Abed Mansour Hadi is unknown.

The Yemeni government, formally an ally of the United States, has been beset by attacks from both Al-Qaeda and the Iranian-backed Shia Houthi rebels. Iran has given extensive support to the Houthi rebels. The current round of attacks, a continuation of the Houthi conquest of Sana’a back in September, were precipitated by the Houthis’ rejection of a draft constitution to divide Yemen into six regions. Houthis, which make up around 30% of Yemen’s population, wish for Yemen to be divided into two regions. Such a move would allow for the Houthis to consolidate their political power. It has been speculated that the Houthis are allied with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was deposed during the 2012 Arab Spring revolt.

A collapse of the current government could lead to a power vacuum that would be to the benefit of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penisula (AQAP), which has attempted to position itself as a defender of the Sunnis against the Shia rebels. Such recognition could help AQAP push back against the appearance of having been upstaged by The Islamic State, particularly on the heels of AQ’s successful terror attacks in Paris. Yet at the same time, if the Houthis emerge victorious from the attempted coup, it would be to the vast benefit of Iran. Yemen is a critical outpost for Iran, who would likely use the Gulf nation as a base to threaten Saudi interests. Iran also wishes to extend their presence on the Red Sea in order to facilitate contact with Africa (as mentioned in the Center for Security Policy’s Iran in Africa report), and the transshipment of arms to the Middle East and Europe.

Why Paris attacks signal collaboration not competition between Al Qaeda groups

Originally published at Fox News

Some experts interpreted initial reports that the attacks last week by jihadi gunmen in Paris were conducted on behalf of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as a sign of competition between officially sanctioned Al Qaeda groups and a break-away Al Qaeda franchise, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS and ISIL).  A video released Wednesday, by the head of AQAP, claiming that it ordered, planned and funded the attack will be interpreted by these experts as consistent with this assessment.

However other information suggests the Paris attacks may actually represent a new and dangerous collaboration between radical Islamist groups.

Two of the gunmen were heard saying said they attacked the Charlie Hebdo magazine on behalf of AQAP.  One gunman, Cherif Kouachi, told a French news network that Yemeni-American AQAP official Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed by a U.S. drone strike in 2011, sent him to France and financed his trip.  An AQAP official also made this claim in a video released overnight.

According to CNN, Said Kouachi, another gunman and Cherif’s brother, spent several months in Yemen in 2011 receiving training from AQAP.

The link to Awlaki is significant since he influenced or directed at least a dozen terrorist attacks and plots, including the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, the 2010 printer cartridge bomb plot, and the Boston Marathon bombing.

Awlaki recruited and trained terrorist operatives, including Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the “underwear bomber” who attempted to blow up a civilian airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.  According to the Wall Street Journal, Said Kouachi befriended Abdulmutallab in Yemen and the two lived in the same dormitory.

The links between AQAP and the attack on the Charlie Hebdo office has led some experts to conclude that the Paris attacks were an attempt by Al Qaeda to reclaim the international spotlight from the Islamic State and could reflect a continuing feud between these terrorist groups.  One terrorism analyst said the Paris attacks were a sort of “jihadist olympics” in which Al Qaeda was attempting a “comeback tour” to regain recognition as the world’s radical Islamist “top dog.”

This story became more complicated late last week when one of the Paris gunmen, Amedy Coulilbaly, claimed in a video released after he was killed that he acted on behalf of the Islamic State.  Reports have also surfaced that Cherif and Said Kouachi visited Syria last summer.  Coulilbaly’s wife, Hayat Boumeddiene, who is a suspect in the Paris shootings, fled to Syria early this month.

I believe the conflicting information on the Paris assailants’ terrorist group ties confirms reports of growing collaboration between Al Qaeda groups and the Islamic State and strongly suggests the Paris attacks were not evidence of competition between these groups.

The feud that caused a break between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda began in the spring of 2013 when the al-Nusra Front (the official Al Qaeda franchise in Syria) and Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan opposed an attempt by the Islamic State to merge its organization with al-Nusra.  Some experts believe this was because Al Qaeda and al-Nusra leaders objected to the Islamic State’s brutal tactics.  There appears to be some truth to this explanation since the al-Nusra Front at the time was working closely with and trying to co-opt non-Islamist Syrian rebel fighters.  Moreover, an AQAP leader condemned Islamic State beheadings as un-Islamic.

However, the Islamic State/Al Qaeda split was also driven by personality differences and a struggle for power since Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi refused to take orders from Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan.

Despite their differences, the Associated Press reported that the al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State agreed during a meeting in November to stop fighting each other and work together against common enemies in Syria.  Jund al-Aqsa, an Islamic State affiliate and the Khorosan Group, an Al Qaeda affiliate, also attended the meeting.  There were some reports that the cooperation agreement was in response to U.S. airstrikes in northern Syria.

Al-Nusra attacks on moderate rebels in northern Syria last November may have been a sign of shifting alliances due to this reported Al Qaeda/Islamic State rapprochement.

I believe collaboration between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliated groups probably has been growing over the last year as the Islamic State became known as the world’s most effective and best funded radical Islamist group. There have been reports of Islamist groups in Syria, north Africa, Libya and other areas swearing allegiance to the Islamic State over the last year as well as probable Islamist State-inspired terrorist plots in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Algeria, Lebanon, and other countries.

So if there is cooperation between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State to attack Western targets, why would AQAP claim sole responsibility for the Paris attacks?  The most likely reasons are to appeal to Gulf state donors and because Al Qaeda still has a difficult relationship with the Islamic State.

I believe this adds up to a more dangerous threat than rival radical Islamist groups striving to make headlines by staging competing terrorist attacks.  By cooperating, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State can more effectively prepare Islamist terrorists for attacks against Western targets by utilizing multiple training sites, sources of weapons and funding.  Such a wide terrorist support structure may produce better trained terrorists who will be harder to detect Western security services.

The likelihood that the Paris attacks indicate collaboration, not competition, between the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and possibly other radical Islamist groups requires an urgent and coordinated response by the United States and its allies. This response must start with President Obama acknowledging that radical Islam is at war with the West and has redoubled its efforts to use violence to impose its violent Sharia ideology worldwide.

“Like One Body”: Putting Aside Differences to Wage Jihad

Counter-terrorism experts appear to find themselves befuddled yet again by revelations that while the Kouachi brothers, who massacred twelve at the offices of the Charlie Hebdo Magazine declared themselves operating on behalf of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and reportedly trained in Yemen for the attack,  their apparent partner in jihad, Ahmed Coulibaly issued a video statement recorded some time before the attack, declaring responsibility for the Islamic State (ISIS) and pledging allegiance (bayat) to it’s leader AbuBakr Al-Baghdadi. His common-law wife Hayat Boumeddiene , believed by French intelligence to have played a role in the attack, has apparently fled to Turkey, before making a beeline for the Syrian border, and the would-be Caliphate’s territory.

The Islamic State and Al Qaeda have been at odds with each other since AbuBakr Al-Baghdadi declaration of authority over Al Qaeda activities in both Iraq as well as Syria was rebuffed by AQ leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

How is it that these two groups, who are in dispute with one another, manage to work together to carry out a coordinated attack? Firstly, of course, the Kouachi brothers and Ahmed Coulibaly knew each other personally, and had history together, including the older Kouachi spending time in prison with Coulibaly. Obviously this would play a role. But secondly, and importantly, Jihad doctrine emphasizes cooperation, rather than competition, and the goal, of fighting in the cause of Allah (Jihad Fisabillah), as a religious obligation, is viewed as above inter-group rivalries. See for example, Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif (aka Sheikh Abul Qadir Abdul Aziz, a major Al Qaeda ideologue, who would eventually recant in Egyptian prison)’s essay, “Jihad and the effects of intention upon it”, taken from the larger jihadist work “al-‘Umda fi I’dad al-‘Udda (“The Essentials of Making Ready [for Jihad]”) which was taught in Al Qaeda training camps. In it Al-Sharif writes:

“And the Muslim should not train or perform Jihad with the aim of supporting as specific Jam’ah or party, so that if the jihad is with other than his group he abandons it. So this one is not fighting so that the word of Allah will be the highest, rather so that the banner of the party or the Jama’ah will be the highest, and thus is the asabiyyah of Jahiliyyah, about which the Messenger of Allah  said, “What is the matter with the call of Jahiliyyah. Abandon it, as it is rotten. And then he said, “whoever is killed beneath a blind banner, becoming angry for the group and fighting for the group, then he is not from my Ummah.”

This concept of fighting for the Ummah representing all Muslims everywhere, is a powerful driver of unity of action, and helps to explain how Islamist terror groups come together to cooperate, even in the face of seemingly insurmountable differences (such as Shia-Iran supporting aggressively anti-Shia Al Qaeda in Iraq, during the insurgency against the U.S.). It’s often illustrated by the hadith, “This Ummah is like one body, if one part is hurt then whole body suffers.”

For Shariah-adherent Muslims who insist on upholding classical interpretations of Islamic blasphemy, the publication of the Charlie Hebdo cartoons “defaming” Mohammed represented an injury to the entire Ummah. As a result the need to cooperate in order to avenge the insult could easily be placed above inter-group rivalries. This is not to say that studying in granular detail the individual personalities and group dynamics among various Jihad organizations is unnecessary or irrelevant.  Even jihadists are people and suffer from the same sorts of personal rivalries and disagreements that any organization does. However it is just as important to understand the ideological bonds the act as a force for cooperation, as it is to study disagreements if we wish to have strategic comprehension of those engaged in jihad.



Paris, Yemen, and Drones

Reports on Friday indicated that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed to have “directed” the jihadist January 7th attacks on the offices of the French magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris in which twelve people were killed.  Since AQAP operates out of Yemen, where it appears that the United States has not used drones to target jihadists since early November, it would not be surprising to see an uptick in U.S. drone strikes on targets in that country during the course of the next few weeks.

If that is indeed what is coming, the Obama administration should consider two things to make its drone operations more effective in Yemen, and elsewhere if needed:

1. Resource manpower as well as hardware. According to recent reporting, the U.S. Air Force is deeply concerned that the service is suffering from a major lack of drone fleet operators, jeopardizing its ability to meet growing Pentagon demand for combat air patrols (CAP) – and the strain is taking its toll.  Dave Majumdar at the Daily Beast notes:

The Air Force has enough MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones. It just doesn’t have the manpower to operate those machines. The Air Force’s situation is so dire that Air Combat Command (ACC), which trains and equips the service’s combat forces, is balking at filling the Pentagon’s ever increasing demands for more drone flights…

The Air Force has been forced to raid its schools for drone operators to man the operational squadrons that are flying combat missions over places like Iraq and Syria. As a result, training squadrons—called Formal Training Units (FTU)—are being staffed with less than half the people they need. Even the Air Force’s elite Weapons School—the service’s much more extensive and in-depth version of the Navy’s famous Top Gun school—course for drone pilots was suspended in an effort to train new rookie operators.

Overworked drone crews have had their leaves canceled and suffered damage to their careers because they could not attend required professional military education courses.

The result is that drone operators are leaving the Air Force in droves…

The White House recently stated it intends to release its FY 2016 budget request on February 2nd.  The budget request should reflect recognition of this problem and offer any necessary funding adjustments to ensure that we have not only the requisite number of drones for the missions that lie ahead, but also the requisite number of pilots, intelligence analysts, and support crews necessary to operate these platforms without creating irrecoverable burnout amongst these critical personnel.

2. Reassess unnecessary, counterproductive constraints on drone strikes. In May of 2013, President Obama gave an address at National Defense University in which he articulated a policy that severely limits the circumstances in which a drone strike is permissible: “…and before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured — the highest standard we can set.”

As I commented at the time, this standard goes above and beyond what have historically been the proportionality requirements of the international law of armed conflict.  Proportionality doctrine does not demand that there be zero civilian casualties resulting from striking a military target – rather, it requires that any civilian casualties anticipated to result from such a strike not be excessive relative to the military advantage expected to be gained from it.

Aside from being legally unnecessary, this constraint is counterproductive as well.  Announcing a policy of refusing drone strikes unless there is a “near certainty” of zero civilian casualties only guarantees that AQAP operatives will surround themselves with civilians whenever possible to avoid being fired upon by drones.  President Obama needs to reverse course on this approach and pursue terrorist organizations consistent with the law of armed conflict and the needs of U.S. national security, not the dictates of his base.