Tag Archives: Bolivia

Snatching defeat?

Decision Brief                        No. 06-D 53                                          2006-10-16


(Washington, D.C.): America’s preoccupation with the crises du jour – the rising terrorist menace to the liberation of Iraq, the Iranian regime’s determination to acquire the means to act on its genocidal threats against Israel and the United States and, most recently, North Korea’s nuclear coming-out party – has left Washington ill-prepared to deal with one of tomorrow’s major security challenges: the rise of the radical anti-American left in Latin America.

Losing Latin America

The emergence of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez as the oil-rich heir to Fidel Castro‘s revolutionary ambitions has translated into a mortal threat to liberal democracy, freedom and economic opportunity in much of the hemisphere. With Chavez’s money and Castro’s coaching, the two have adapted the longstanding Cuban revolutionary program of violent overthrow of elected governments to meet present circumstances. Today, virulent leftists are seeking, and frequently succeeding at, obtaining power through the ballot box – then using it to destroy their government’s constitutional processes and any checks on that power.

The United States government has paid scant attention as Bolivia and Argentina have moved squarely into the Chavez-Castro orbit. A similar disastrous outcome was narrowly averted in Peru but may well be in the offing at this writing in Ecuador.

The region’s largest country, Brazil, is in the hands of a long-time Castro ally, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Despite his differences with Chavez and generally moderate approach to economic policy, Lula can be expected to make renewed common cause with the leftist agenda if he is reelected on October 29.

Particularly appalling, the region’s Axis of Evil is poised, all other things being equal, to return Nicaragua – the country Ronald Reagan did so much to help free from the Sandinistas’ communist rule – to the tender mercies of their long-time authoritarian comandante, Daniel Ortega.

The (Unexpected) Return of Mexico’s Left

Washington’s inattention may also encourage the most strategically important reversal sustained to date by the Chavez-Castro axis to be substantially undone. Despite its concerted and well-heeled efforts to ensure the election as president of Mexico of an ideological soul-mate, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, the results of a remarkably clean election gave the victory to a pro-American conservative, Felipe Calderon. There is, as a result, an unprecedented opportunity for constructive relations between the U.S. and Mexican governments.

Unfortunately, this opportunity – with all it portends for economic prosperity, sensible immigration policies and a common front against the hemisphere’s radical Left – could be squandered if Mr. Calderon yields to pressure to make the same mistake as his predecessor, Vicente Fox. That will be the effect if the new president of Mexico restores to office Mr. Fox’s first Foreign Minister, Jorge Castaneda.

As a new analysis by Fredo Arias-King just released by the Center for Security Policy makes clear, Castaneda and his team (including such figures as Mexico’s former consul in New York, Arturo Sarukhan, Castaneda’s controversial half-brother Andres Rozental and Ricardo Pascoe, former Mexican ambassador to Cuba) are themselves radical leftists who did grave harm to U.S.-Mexico relations the last time around – and will surely do so again if given the chance.

For example, they were instrumental in withdrawing Mexico from the decades-old mutual defense pact known as the Treaty of Rio, a decision announced ironically just days before the 9/11 attacks in 2001. They seemed determined to find occasions to work at cross-purposes with the United States – notably, in connection with our effort to hold Saddam Hussein accountable to various Security Council resolutions.

Most troubling, however, was the Castaneda cabal’s efforts to convert the initially pro-U.S. Fox and his government into friends of the hard left throughout Latin America. Castaneda personally engineered closer ties to the Castro apparatus in Cuba, encouraged the narco-terrorist FARC in Colombia and strove to rehabilitate Danny Ortega and his Sandinista Party in Nicaragua. It is not hard to assign responsibility for these initiatives since they were abandoned immediately after Castaneda left the foreign ministry.

As a result not only of their ideological bent but their incompetence, Castaneda and his team blew the opportunity afforded when the newly inaugurated George Bush assigned top priority to what he called a “special relationship” with Mexico and traveled there as his symbolic first trip abroad. Mexico dropped in the priority list for Washington, even before 9/11, and has never recovered since.

The Bottom Line

The possibility that the likes of Jorge Castaneda might return to power is especially dangerous for both Mexico and the United States at a moment when Ortega may triumph over a divided democratic-right in Nicaragua and the Chavez-Castro axis is making inroads in so many other places. Under Castaneda or his cabal, it is unimaginable that the Mexican government would play the constructive role it might otherwise perform in the post-Castro transition in Cuba.

It would be a tragedy if, at this critical juncture – and despite the preferences a majority of Mexicans expressed at the ballot box, Felipe Calderon were to squander the chance for Mexico to serve as a bulwark against the combined dangers of Chavismo and Fidelismo and to enjoy a strong, constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the United States. It is in the interests of both of our countries that President Calderon’s vision of a freedom-loving and -supporting Mexico be represented at the Foreign Ministry, not that of Hugo Chavez, Fidel Castro and Jorge Castaneda.

Castañeda’s Legacy for U.S.-Mexico Relations

by Fredo Arias-King

Two years into Jorge Castañeda’s tenure as Mexico’s foreign secretary, I wrote a paper for the Hudson Institute which was circulated privately among some officials in the Bush administration and others in Washingtoninterested in an alternative point of view and lesser-known facts about Castañeda. As is known, most of the U.S. mainstream media, academics and members of the Democratic Party admire Castañeda and portray him in largely a positive light, though some Republican officials mostly associate him with his long history of anti-American agitation.

Though the presidency of Vicente Fox was largely perceived as a disappointment,[i] with few tangible results in both domestic and foreign policies, there are reports in the Mexican press that president-elect Felipe Calderón may reassign Castañeda to the top diplomatic post or another Cabinet-level position. In light of this, the old 2002 paper has been updated here as it may be of interest to those following not only Mexican politics and U.S.-Mexico relations, but also Hemispheric security issues.

 

Background

Mexico’s election in July of 2000 ended 71 years of a one-party dictatorship. Countries in transition also tend to redefine their foreign policies, often dramatically, and Mexico was no exception. The new president, Vicente Fox, of the pro-democracy and pro-economic freedom National Action Party (PAN), surprised some by appointing a former communist with a long history of virulent anti-Americanism to the post of foreign minister, Jorge G. Castañeda, who served in that office until his resignation in January of 2003.

At the time of his appointment in late 2000, there was a view in Washington circles that Castañeda continued to harbor anti-American feelings and would strive to create problems for the United States. Others argued that his conversion to democracy, as with his fellow communists in Eastern Europe, was genuine and he represented no threat to theUnited Statesor its interests. An example of the former could be found in a memorandum written shortly after Fox’s election victory by a then-staffer to Senator Jesse Helms who was soon-to-become the Assistant Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs Roger Noriega.  Unlike most of official Washington, Noriega had openly sympathized with Vicente Fox and the PAN but felt constrained to raise concerns about the future of the bilateral relationship under Castañeda’s influence:

U.S.-Mexico relations—which already are on a stable, institutionalized footing—should improve systematically with Fox’s victory. However, this opportunity may be squandered because Fox has designated two leftist intellectuals with distinctly anti-U.S. instincts to manage his international relations.

U.S. observers who hoped that a Fox victory promised warmer relations with the United States and that foreign affairs would no longer be the “sandbox” for Mexico’s left will be disappointed by Fox’s choice of two anti-U.S. archetypes to lay the foundations of his foreign policy. Fox has designated intellectual and writer Jorge G. Castañeda and independent Senator Adolfo Aguilar Zinser to head his foreign relations transition. Both are relentless critics ofU.S.foreign policy.

This paper is based on Castañeda’s original writings and his conduct as foreign minister.  It is also informed by the opinions Castañeda expressed to candidate Vicente Fox and other campaign officials between early 1999 and July of 2000. This author, along with the PAN’s director for international relations, Dr. Carlos Salazar, had broad responsibility for relations withWashingtonin the Fox campaign between March of 1999 and July of 2000, working both out of the PAN as well as the Fox campaign headquarters. Visiting the United States 17 times during the campaign and also being exposed to Castañeda at campaign headquarters gives this essay perhaps a unique perspective.

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Castaneda’s Legacy for US-Mexico Relations

By Fredo Arias-King.  Mr. Arias-King is a Harvard-trained businessman and scholar of contemporary Russia , was advisor of international affairs to the National Action Party (PAN) and to the Vicente Fox campaign, handling most of the relation with Washington during the campaign together with Dr. Carlos Salazar. His research focuses on the post-communist transitions. He is also the founder of the Washington-based Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization.

 

How should Washington deal an openly aggressive and hostile Mexican Foreign Policy?  With Jorge Castaeda’s anti-American agitation again a distinct possiblity if he is appointed by president-elect Felipe Calderon this question must be asked.

 

This question poses a dilemma since, after all, he was appointed the foreign minister of Mexico’s first democratic and legitimate government in over seven decades, and his reappointment by Caldern would confirm that Mexico’s ruling class indeed prefers an assertive foreign policy towards Washington.

 

An openly aggressive response by the United States to Castaeda’s provocations would ultimately be interpreted as an affront to Mexico itself. It may also vindicate the foreign Castaeda’s Legacy for U.S.-Mexico Relations minister’s (and the illiberal Left’s) rhetoric of victimization, or be interpreted as U.S. discomfort towards Mexico’s newfound sense of international activism. (Whereas Castaeda was widely unpopular as foreign secretary, the perception of Mexico’s more active foreign policy is popular.)

 

On the other hand, an appeasement of Castaeda by Washington and the acceptance of his agenda may strengthen the foreign minister politically, and may serve as a precedent for future Mexican foreign ministers and even for other countries to follow in their dealings with Washington. Other Latin American countries may be observing the results of Castaeda’s brinkmanship with the United States. A favorable and accommodating U.S. policy of course may benefit Mexico in the short run, but it may unnecessarily complicate relations in the medium and long term, since a precedent would have been set on how to deal with Washington.

 

Mexico’s strategic importance in the Hemisphere has increased due to the tide of countries governed by leaders hostile to Washington, namely in Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and to a lesser extent also Argentina and Brazil. As Castaeda has been perceived to have broken with this network, there will be an impulse in Washington to accommodate Mexico, and Castaeda may extract high costs for his “cooperation” against Washington’s enemies in the Hemisphere.

 

With his presidential ambitions in mind, that cost will most certainly entail a comprehensive package of immigration reform. Should Washington adopt a “peace in our time” approach in its dealings with a Castaeda-style Mexican foreign policy, however, it is likely to produce ever-more-unreasonable demands from the government in Mexico City which is attempting to pass-the-buck for its lackluster economic performance these past six years. A polite but firm rebuke from Washington would likely provoke a heated condemnation from the Mexican elites in the short run. In the medium-term, though, it would encourage the latter finally to pass needed reforms in Mexico and not shift the blame northward.

 

View full paper (Web)

View full paper (PDF)

 

 

7-Eleven cuts off Chavez; it’s about time

Were it not for his vitriolic speech at the United Nations earlier this month, the problem of Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez might have passed unnoticed in Washington. The fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, leaks about the war in Iraq, and hurried attempts by Congress to wind up business prior to campaign season had all but obscured the troubling developments in our hemisphere – and our government’s seeming inability to cope with them.

The good news is that the convenience store chain 7-Eleven yesterday announced they were no longer going to support Chavez’s virulent anti-American agenda, by ceasing to sell oil-products at its 2,100 stations from Venezuela’s state-owned company Citgo. This sets the stage for a vigorous effort on the part of the U.S. government to attend to the metastasizing problem of Venezuelan regime’s agenda in the Western hemisphere and beyond.

The Danger Posed by Chavez

Unfortunately, neither the White House nor Congress has offered a strategy to deal with the rising threat to the stability of the Western Hemisphere and to the security of some of our most important energy supplies. That threat, posed by the Venezuelan regime and the Cuban security services that prop it up, has included:

 

  • the dismantling of democratic institutions in Venezuela and the construction of a dictatorship built around the cult of personality of Chavez;

     

  • the overthrow of the democratically elected president of Bolivia and his successor, and their replacement with the Caracas-backed head of the coca growers’ union;

     

  • other subversion in the region that has caused Mexico and Peru to all but break relations with Venezuela;

     

  • open use of oil as a weapon against the United States and its allies;

     

  • systematic alliance-building with all the countries on the State Department’s list of state-sponsors of terrorism, including Iran and North Korea;

     

  • new militarization that includes building factories to manufacture Russian-designed assault rifles, destined to arm pro-Chavez mobs at home and violent groups in other parts of Latin America; and

     

  • an unprecedented buildup of military aircraft supplied by the Russian Sukhoi warplane manufacturer and the French-German-Spanish-Russian EADS aerospace giant.

    Washington has wanted to wish away the Venezuela problem, but the actions of the regime are so alarming that the United States dare not risk ignoring the problem any further.

    Important First Steps

    To its credit, the Bush administration has made some efforts concerning the regime in Caracas. They include:

     

  • Ditching the Jimmy Carter approach. The administration finally did away with its Jimmy Carter approach to Venezuela, which was to let Chavez have his way on the grounds that he was democratically elected, even as the U.S. kept an eye on what Chavez was doing.

     

  • Attempt to stop European sale of military planes. In January, the administration invoked a nonproliferation law to stop the European Defense, Aerospace and Space Company (EADS) from selling its C-295 troop transport aircraft to Caracas, citing the planes’ many American-made components. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) allow the president to ban foreign sales of military products and services if he deems it in the national interest. ITAR restrictions cover U.S. technology in defense products manufactured abroad, providing the president power to ban the sale of other countries’ military exports if they contain American-made components. EADS has circumvented the restrictions by seeking non-U.S. replacement parts for the C-295s. Administration action might have killed the deal.

     

  • Ban on sale of U.S. replacement parts and services. As Chavez pushed further away from the United States and toward practically any American adversary, the administration imposed a ban on the sale of military parts and services to Venezuela, effectively grounding the regime’s fleet of aging F-16 fighters and C-130 transports. By that time, however, the regime had decided to buy from EADS and Sukhoi of Russia.

     

  • Military embargo. The administration imposed a military embargo on Venezuela and urged other countries to do the same. Sweden, for example, has followed the U.S. lead, but France, Germany, Spain and Russia (the largest owners of EADS) have not.

     

  • Attempt to deny Venezuela a seat on U.N. Security Council. The administration has worked mightily to deny the regime a rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council. However, the State Department has done a poor job of working with other hemispheric countries to deny Caracas the votes. Latin American and Caribbean governments have complained of U.S. clumsiness, short-sightedness, failure to counter vastly more generous offers from Chavez, and failure to support a realistic alternative candidate.

     

  • Curb the tendency to talk loudly while carrying a big stick. The United States blusters too much, especially at the highest levels, but with Venezuela it has generally pursued the right course. The President and Secretary of State have been correct not to let the dictator bait them and thereby increase his prestige and lower theirs. The White House’s recent dismissal of the Venezuelan dictator as a "gnat" is exactly the right approach.

     

  • Increased intelligence priorities. Over the summer the administration created a "mission manager" in the intelligence community to concentrate on Cuba and Venezuela. This is an important step, signifying a high intelligence priority, as the only other country-specific mission managers are for Iran and North Korea.

    What Needs to be Done

    There is much more to do, most of which can be done easily by White House directive and by Congress saying "no" to bailing out Chavez and his friends. Policy recommendations include:

     

  • Issue a Venezuela finding. The President should issue a finding that the U.S. will not allow forces allied with international terrorism to subvert democracy and prop up dictatorships in the Americas.

     

  • Set up an interagency working group on Venezuela. The group should be modeled loosely on the new interagency working groups on Cuba. The "control room" must be in the White House, not the State Department, chaired personally by the Vice President, with the proper National Security Council staffing, budget and authority to ensure that the president’s policies are faithfully executed. A model is the Reagan-era Working Group on Soviet Active Measures.

     

  • Set up a White House working group on Venezuela. The administration should create an informal, bipartisan White House Working Group on Venezuela, comprised of independent policy experts, NGOs, political strategists, public affairs practitioners, intelligence officers, diplomats and others to meet weekly to discuss Venezuela-related issues and how best to address them. This outside group would be similar to the successful White House Task Force on Central America under the Reagan Administration. In addition to helping build a constituency for action against the Venezuelan regime, it would energize outside individuals and groups, help them network with one another and with U.S. officials under White House auspices, permit them to provide straight outside advice on a Venezuela strategy, and serve as a feedback mechanism for administration policies and statements.

     

  • Systematically collect and exploit intelligence on the Venezuelan regime to educate the public at home and abroad. As the Reagan Administration did about the Soviet military buildup and about Soviet bloc expansion into Central America and the Caribbean, the U.S. must systematically collect intelligence on the Venezuelan regime and its leaders, and use that intelligence for public education and public diplomacy purposes. The U.S. has ample opportunity to collect accurate, reliable intelligence about the regime, its leaders, and their ties to terrorism and organized crime, and provide that information to the public on a regular basis.

     

  • Wage intense but low-level political and psychological warfare against the regime. The President should task the intelligence community to collect and analyze information that can be used to educate and influence the international community about the Caracas regime, and to promote operational objectives inside Venezuela. Those objectives include: divide the regime leadership from its followers, divide regime figures against one another (especially over questions of corruption and nepotism), divide patriotic Venezuelans in the military and security services from the thousands of Cuban intelligence and security personnel in the country, support and unify the internal opposition to the regime, and promote a return to democracy. Given its total failure to promote U.S. interests through public diplomacy, and the incompatibility of the mission with the culture of the foreign service, the State Department is the last place to be in charge of such an operation. The White House should coordinate the campaign across the agencies.

     

  • Create a surrogate radio, TV, and Internet media network for Venezuela. While the regime has not crushed the independent press yet, it has imposed severe restrictions that have alarmed the Inter-American Press Association. The U.S. shouldn’t wait until Chavez silences or co-opts the free Venezuelan media. It must create surrogate radio, TV and Internet outlets immediately, modeled after the successful Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty system aimed at the Soviet Union, or after Radio Marti set up for Cuba. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) has been loath to dedicate resources toward Venezuela programming and has devoted an amount so small as to be useless. The president should stop allowing Clinton appointees to run the BBG, and appoint only BBG board members and staff who support special programming for Venezuela.

     

  • Stop U.S. government subsidy of the Venezuelan regime. The single largest American subsidy of the Chavez regime is the daily hemorrhaging of cash for Venezuelan oil and fuel services. Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, is 100 percent owner of the Tulsa-based CITGO oil company. By purchasing CITGO products, U.S. government agencies are diverting taxpayer dollars to the Chavez regime. Therefore the U.S. should bar any government agency or contractor from purchasing CITGO products effective immediately.

     

  • Prepare pre-emptive and retaliatory economic action in event of oil crisis. The administration should draft emergency plans to seize all of CITGO’s assets and sell them to American oil companies. Because CITGO is not private property but a foreign state-owned enterprise, property rights are not an issue. The plans should include using the proceeds to reimburse American companies cheated and otherwise victimized by the regime, finance efforts to help Venezuelans restore democracy in their country, cover expenses to clean up after Chavez in Venezuela and other countries, and reimburse regime victims. The plans should ensure that the innocent individual American service station franchises would not be adversely affected.

     

  • Show other countries that there is a price to be paid for helping to arm the Venezuelan regime. EADS CASA, the French-German-Spanish-Russian aerospace company, has gone out of its way to ignore repeated U.S. requests not to sell C-295 military aircraft to Caracas. The company has circumvented the U.S. nonproliferation law and willfully broken the U.S. arms embargo against Venezuela. It has also misled Congress about the nature of the Venezuela deal. EADS CASA planned to recoup any losses incurred in its Venezuela sale by getting Congress to buy the C-295 for the new Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program. Therefore, Congress and the Administration must declare that the U.S. will not purchase any EADS CASA aircraft until the Chavez regime is gone. That means removing the EADS CASA C-295 from consideration in the JCA program and removing funding for purchase of the aircraft by the Coast Guard Deepwater program.

     

  • Work with other governments in the region. The U.S. has more potential allies down there than it realizes. Many governments, even those on the Left, are fearful of the Venezuelan regime and what it means for them. The Chavez style of subversive and violent revolution is a threat to the legitimacy of the democratic Left in the region. The Caracas-backed regime in Bolivia overstepped when it confiscated property and breached energy contracts with Argentina, Brazil and Spain – all governed by leftist politicians who are divided between their softness toward anti-U.S. rhetoric and action, and the trampling of their own business interests. As we predicted in our 2005 paper, "What to Do About Venezuela," Latin American leaders are getting sick of Chavez and his antics. It is quite possible for him to self-destruct – but not without American help.

    The Bottom Line

    Undoubtedly, the danger posed by the Venezuelan regime is real and growing. Steps like those described above must be adopted without further delay if the United States is to retain influence in its own backyard.

    • Prevent Venezuela from joining Security Council

    By Luis Fleischman

    (Washington, D.C.): On October 16, a secret ballot of the United Nations General Assembly will decide who will be elected for the Latin American seat at the UN Security Council left vacant by Argentina. If no country wins two-thirds of the vote — 128 out of 192 — the Assembly votes again, until one country wins the necessary majority.

    The two leading contenders are Venezuela and Guatemala, even though there are now talks regarding the possible candidacy of Uruguay for the seat instead of Venezuela.

    Venezuela has put a lot of effort into winning this seat. Among those supporting Venezuela are the 22 members of the Arab League, the countries of the Southern Common market Mercosur including Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Bolivia, Cuba and the Caribbean Community 13 country trade bloc known as CARICOM. Russia and China have announced that they will also support Venezuela. Iran, of course, is a strong supporter of Venezuela. Opposed to Venezuela are Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Most European countries seem to be backing Guatemala while Asia and Africa are divided. In Latin America Chile, Haiti and Peru remain undecided.

    Even though Venezuela is a country led by a radical and delirious dictator, it has amassed great support. This is the effective result of a world campaign which included more than a mere public relations strategy. Venezuela has been offering subsidized oil to countries in the Caribbean, buying foreign debt bonds (Argentina) and offering financial assistance to far away countries in Asia and Africa.

    Why should the world oppose Venezuela’s seat on the UN Security Council since it would be temporary?

    There are a number of reasons why it is imperative to oppose Venezuela’s bid to be on the Security Council. Venezuela proclaims a strong anti-Americanism, and, at the same time tries, to counterbalance US power in the world and particularly in Latin America. In the course of that action Venezuela’s leader Hugo Chavez makes alliances with rogue and dangerous states such as Iran and Syria, tries to politically de-stabilize regimes in Latin America such as Peru, Mexico and Ecuador; actively supports radical guerilla and terrorist groups such as FARC and has declared open support for Hezbollah. As a matter of moral principle this should be unacceptable in an era characterized by a global war against terrorism and the danger of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of unscrupulous states and organizations. Appointing Venezuela to the Council would be the wrong message to the world community and a big defeat for the enlightened nations of the West.

    By the same token and in more formal terms, Venezuela occupying a seat in the Security Council is nothing but a reversal of the reforms promoted by the US and European countries in the world body.

    Nothing has reflected more the moral bankruptcy of the world body than the third world and the former communist block’s concept that social justice and social equality stood as supreme values above what is morally acceptable or human rights, properly speaking. Thus, membership of rogue states and ruthless dictatorships on the Security Council and on the Human Rights commissions has been routine throughout the history of the United Nations. This moral relativism has ultimately helped legitimize terrorism and other forms of political violence.

    Thus, for example, Yasser Arafat was welcomed in the UN in 1974 at the peak of the most vicious massacres of civilians and children carried out by the PLO. The idea that attacking those perceived as being strong and powerful is acceptable regardless of human casualties or cruelty. This spirit was for years supported not only by the Soviet Union and the third world but often directly or indirectly by a French-led European community motivated mostly by dependency on the third world raw materials (mostly Arab oil) and its Gaullist dream of counterbalancing American power in the West. All this together explains the reason why this spirit prevailed despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a world power. There is no doubt in my mind that Osama Bin Laden counted on the support of this world attitude and the ambiguity of the world community before perpetrating the 9/11 attacks in order to win the public relations battle.

    However, things have taken a different turn lately. The events of 9/11 were followed by terrorist attacks in the railways of Spain in March 2004 and attacks in Great Britain in July 2005. This has had some impact on Western European attitudes, particularly France. Despite the highly unpopular war in Iraq among European nations, Europe was willing to take an active role in the US initiative to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, most notably France that only in 2003 was at the forefront of anti-American opposition. This is concurrent with the plan initiated and promoted by the Bush Administration to reform the highly shady United Nations.

    Thus, the appointment of Venezuela to fill the Security Council seat would be a political and moral reversal. Venezuela is a country that has openly supported everything the western world stands against. Chavez’s concern for the Latin American poor and other "acts of compassion" should not blur the fact that the man is a regional conspirator and an ally of rogue states. If the world community provides a Security Council seat to Venezuela it would provide him with a platform to be a strong advocate of Iran and international terrorism. This would be a defeat not only for the US but also for the western hemisphere as a whole. Voting for Chavez is against the spirit of reform and moral improvement promoted by the United States and other Western countries. The fact that Europeans are not voting for Venezuela is encouraging but they must also apply their influence to convince Latin American countries, who themselves have a third very good reason to defeat Chavez: the stability of their still fragile and young democracies.

    The US and its European allies must convince Latin American countries that the short-term benefits deriving from the relation with Venezuela should not interfere with the long-term stability of the region. Latin American countries must be reminded that Venezuela is a highly de-stabilizing force that has and can turn against democratically elected regimes in Latin America, as Hugo Chavez has already done in Peru, Mexico and Ecuador. It would be difficult to convince Argentina since Chavez, by buying foreign debt bonds from Argentina and providing other trade benefits, has enabled the Argentinean government to restore some of the reserves lost as the result of the payment of the foreign debt to the International Monetary Fund. However, Brazil is by far stronger and less dependent on Venezuela. Chavez incited Bolivia to nationalize Brazilian owned companies (Petro-Bras). Brazil, being the largest, most powerful and oil-independent country in Latin America has no reason to support Venezuela except for President Lula’s socialist affinity with Venezuela and solidarity with another member of Mercosur. Chile, under President Michelle Bachelet’s leadership, has for a long time shied away from the assertiveness of its predecessors and become apologetic of Latin American populisms. Chavez endorsed Bachelet when she ran for election. In return, Bachelet in early September, stated that to "vote against Chavez is to vote against the region". However, later the same month Venezuela and Chile confronted each other amid declarations by the Venezuelan Ambassador in Santiago accusing the Chilean Christian Democratic Party of having supported the coup against Chavez in April 2002 and the Pinochet coup against Allende in 1973. Bachelet declared that the Ambassador’s statements are "unacceptable" and represent interference in Chile’s internal affairs. Now the government of Chile is again considering whether it will vote for Chavez or not. This is a perfect time for American and western diplomats to persuade Chile to vote against Venezuela.

    Chile has not only been an ally of the US but also one of the most economically successful countries in Latin America. Chile, like Brazil, does not depend on Venezuela. The US must convince Chile that the relationship with the US is important and that Chile’s position may be weakened by siding with somebody like Chavez. Furthermore, Chavez is not a regional leader but, as he has demonstrated, his authoritarian instincts may turn against an ally at the moment Chavez is displeased with certain policies carried out by a regional country. The same principle applies to Argentina and other countries. However, the stubborn personality of the Argentinean president does not allow for dialogue, at least for the time being. Furthermore, Argentina was a bankrupt country and Chavez’s help was badly needed. However, Chile is different. Chile is successful and it should not budge by showing weakness. Chile, like Brazil must be persuaded to oppose Venezuela. It goes without saying that Peru suffered direct interference by Chavez in its domestic politics. Chavez criticized the current President of Peru, Alan Garcia, during the election by confronting him and publicly supporting the pan-indigenous, ultra-nationalist Ollanta Humala.

    In sum, it is imperative that US and European diplomats continue an aggressive diplomacy and give priority to the goal of defeating Chavez’s bid to the Security Council. World principles and world stability are at stake.

    Ethanol: A means toward energy independence?

    Since President Bush’s state of the Union Address in January, there has been a heightened search for alternative sources aiming towards more energy independence. It is indeed necessary to stop financing national economies of those states which are genuinely countering democracy and human rights. Sugar cane based ethanol might be one of the emerging alternatives to fuel cars. Recent news stories about energy saving measures have highlighted the success Brazil is having, using sugar based ethanol to solve its fuel problems. Since the US is facing $3 a gallon gasoline prices the question is why not follow Brazil’s example and begin resorting to plant based instead of fossil fuels.

    NEWS:

    • Calderón wins Mexican Presidential Election.  Obrador’s irresponsible attitude.  Mexico: Oil deposit discovered under Gulf of Mexico.
    • Lula’s Electoral Success Continues in Brazil.
    • Cuba’s Castro says worst is over.
    • Roldós Leads Viteri in Ecuador Ballot.
    • Ortega Leads by Six Points in Nicaragua
    • Chavez says Venezuela and Syria are united against the U.S.  Venezuela’s fight for U.N. seat divides.   Venezuela to seize golf courses.  Venezuela, China to set up $5B Fund.
    • Perú: Largest LatAm gold mine in Peru resumes operation after protest.
    • Bolivia’s four provinces to stage anti-president strike. 

    Editor’s Note: "Hello Mr. Chavez"

    We will use a small section of the Americas Report when possible, to include news of what Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez says directly to his target audience. Since the briefs are in Spanish, the Editor will translate them into English. These stories are taken from www.tinku.org. This web page does not reveal its location, funding or contact information. Tinku.org claims to be "a medium of alternative independent information for Latin America and the world and a poetic encounter between different cultures which criticizes contemporaneous cynicism." It is evident that it promotes the political agenda of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez so it is not difficult to imagine who is responsible for its content. The people that run Tinku.org are up to date in any news happening around the world that could affect Chavez’s policies and are very aware of any criticism against him. They are also very savvy in obtaining and distributing information since Tinku’s contents can also be watched and listened to live via satellite through "Telesur", a Venezuelan TV channel and radio station based in Caracas.

    View full version of the Americas Report (PDF)

    For any questions, comments, or those interested in receiving this report in the future or seeking to have their email removed from our list please contact Nicole M. Ferrand at our new e-mail address: mengesproject@centerforsecuritypolicy.org. If you have news stories that you think might be useful for future editions of this report please send them, with a link to the original website, to the same e-mail address. If you wish to contribute with an article, please send it to the same address, with your name and place of work or study.

    Chavez’s oil problems with China

    Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has repeatedly expressed his wishes to sell large amounts of oil to China in order to reduce or even stop his need to export it to the United States. The latest statement made by the country’s oil minister, Rafael Ramirez, is that the South American country plans to increase its oil sales to China to 200,000 barrels a day from the current 150,000. Chávez had previously said that he hoped to export 300,000 barrels a day to the Asian giant by the end of the year.

    Chavez’s capacity to create controversy is undeniable. He is best pals with Fidel Castro, has signed arms deals with Russia and has visited his Iranian new friend Mahmoud Ahmadinejad openly calling for the destruction of the U.S. echoing the Middle Eastern dictator’s words. It is ironic that although he hates the United States so much, he makes sure his oil shipments arrive without delay to this country’s ports obtaining revenues of millions if not billions of American, yes American dollars.

    NEWS:

    • Venezuela: Iran’s Trade Exchanges with Venezuela to Boost to US$8 billion.  Venezuela’s Chavez Runs for Re-Election.
    • Brazil: Brazil’s Lula Closer to First Round Victory.
    • Mexico still Presidentless.
    • Raul Castro receives Hugo Chavez in Cuba.  Learn to live without me, Castro tells Cubans as he turns 80.  Iran, Cuba to expand industrial cooperation.
    • Bolivia’s President Morales drops to 68% approval.
    • Ortega Barely Edging Montealegre in Nicaragua.  Nicaragua: Energy Crisis gets worse
    • Ecuador, Chile sign agreements on petroleum cooperation, tariff cuts.
    • China free-trade pact clears final hurdle in Chile.  IMF applauds Chile.

    View full version of the Americas Report (PDF)

    For any questions, comments, or those interested in receiving this report in the future or seeking to have their email removed from our list please contact Nicole M. Ferrand at our new e-mail address: mengesproject@centerforsecuritypolicy.org. If you have news stories that you think might be useful for future editions of this report please send them, with a link to the original website, to the same e-mail address. If you wish to contribute with an article, please send it to the same address, with your name and place of work or study.

    Chavez’s war from Washington

    By Eric Sayers

    (Washington, D.C.): Over the course of his presidency that began in 1998, Hugo Chavez has managed to transform an emerging democracy and promising regional ally of the United States into an authoritarian state that is enemy to the Free World. In his own country, Chavez has rolled back democratic institutions and consolidated power by silencing the independent media and supporting aggressive tactics against the political opposition.

    He has also sought to export the “Bolivarian revolution” by using the country’s vast oil wealth to support other would-be autocrats in neighboring countries’ elections – including most recently in Bolivia, Peru, Mexico and Nicaragua. All the while, Chavez has augmented his military with the assistance of other strongmen such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin, who recently delivered of a range of weapons to Venezuela, including fighter planes and Kalashnikov rifles.

    While it is widely recognized that Chavez is working fastidiously to expand his influence throughout Latin America, his efforts have gone entirely unnoticed on another front – the U.S. homeland. His most potent tool and single greatest accomplishment in this campaign, moreover, has been the establishment of a base of operations in our very capital from which to engage the United States in the war of ideas.

    The War at Home

    Founded in 2003, the Venezuelan Information Office (VIO) has hardly attempted to disguise the influence operation it is running for Chavez. In fact, VIO openly acknowledges that it receives funding from the Venezuelan government – to the tune of an estimated $800,000 annually – to “educate the public about contemporary Venezuela…[and] to present an accurate view of the current political scene in Venezuela for the American public and build allies for the Venezuelan people.”

    The VIO’s objective, then, is to create within the United States a base of support for, or at least sympathy with, the Chavez regime that can be used as leverage to prevent the United States from adopting the measures necessary to check the dictator’s regional and global ambitions. This is accomplished in several ways:



    • One of its primary missions is to serve as a media “watchdog” by monitoring U.S. news coverage and commentary on Venezuela that challenges “factual inaccuracies.” VIO not only entrusts its staff with authoring responses to material unfavorable toward Chavez, but it also organizes “Action Alerts” that provide would-be writers a how-to on opinion letter writing, complete with talking points.


    • Hardly reactionary, however, VIO also produces positive commentary on its website – which receives up to 15,000 hits per day according to its staff – on the state of Chavez’s “Bolivarian Revolution.” These propaganda pieces fall under headings such as: “Democracy in Venezuela,” aimed at dispelling the notion that the country has slipped into autocracy; “International Cooperation,” emphasizing Venezuela’s commitment to being a peaceful, law-abiding neighbor and member of the international community; and “The Opposition,” pointing to the media and political opposition’s corruption.


    • VIO’s website also offers a “Take Action” section that promotes “10 things you can do to support the revolution.” Among other methods, it encourages readers to join or start their own “Bolivarian Circles,” and provides information on how to go about doing this. Ostensibly, these loosely knit social organizations are intended to improve local communities, but in reality serve as solidarity networks and as mini-VIOs operating throughout the United States, organizing support for Chavez and his agenda. It has been reported on numerous occasions, moreover, that these groups have used violence against Chavez opponents and members of the media.


    • The organization facilitates Potemkin-village vacations for American citizens wishing to travel to Venezuela. As explained by VIO Executive Director Deborah James, the purpose of these trips is to show Americans “the incredible social transformation that is happening in Venezuela, and in particular when they learn about the use of oil revenues to benefit all Venezuelans, people contact us so that we provide them with ways they can work against U.S. intervention.”


    • VIO has informally allied itself with various other leftist and radical groups in the United States, with whom it appears at peace and social justice events. Its staff has also contacted and visited different college campuses across the country where they distribute literature and VIO’s propaganda tool-of-choice – DVD copies of “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised,” a pro-Chavez documentary on the 2002 Venezuela coup.


    • Finally, VIO directly lobbies U.S. policymakers. Among these activities, its staff is in frequent contact with congressional and administration offices – claiming about 100 visits per year, in addition to countless phone calls and emails.

    We’ve Seen This Before

    Chavez’s influence operation is not without precedent. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also established a base within the United States from which to engage the Free World in a war of ideas – the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). Directly funded by the Soviet government, CPUSA worked tirelessly to counter anti-Soviet rhetoric, expand its membership, and distribute its own version of the truth in order to create support for the Evil Empire.

    Recognizing the CPUSA as a propaganda front for the Soviet Union, however, America of yore correctly chose to confront the enemy by passing the Subversive Activities Control Act (SACA) of 1950, which recognized CPUSA as an “agency of a hostile foreign power” that constitutes “a clear, present and continuing danger to the security of the United States.” Under SACA’s provisions, the U.S. government acted decisively to counter the internal communist threat by requiring the registration of communist organizations with the Attorney General, while asserting the ability to deport members of these groups who were non-citizens.

    Unlike decades past, however, the United States today does little to counter foreign propaganda, aside from requiring groups that receive foreign funding to register with the Justice Department under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938 that was originally set up to track Nazi propaganda. Even this is of little consequence, as the unit within the Justice Department that administers FARA is severely under-funded – so badly that its computer database is reported to be on the verge of “a collapse that cannot be fixed” – and consequently is unable to keep tabs on such organizations.

    The Bottom Line

    The well-funded and well-organized propaganda campaign run by Chavez through the Venezuela Information Office represents a direct effort by a hostile foreign government to organize popular resistance within the United States. Thus far, VIO has been able to fly below the radar, receiving attention only from a small collection of Venezuelan bloggers. Its efforts to influence U.S. policy toward Chavez’s government must be taken seriously.

    Congress should begin by providing the funding necessary to ensure the FARA Unit can maintain a database of all information relating to the lobbying practices of foreign governments. Beyond this, insufficient policies currently regulating the types of organizations that can register under FARA must be updated to account for the origins and intentions of applicants. Immediately in order, then, is the formation of a new unit within the DOJ that has the power to deny applications from groups that hope to run influence operations for openly antagonistic governments.

    The United States simply cannot afford to remain unilaterally disarmed on this front as on so many others in the war of ideas. Confronted once again by an enemy attempting to destroy the Nation from within, we must recapture our national resilience that was evident in the earliest days of the Cold War, and confront those forces hostile to the Free World.

    Who’s losing Latin America?

    Decision Brief                                       No. 06-D 23                           2006-05-01


    (Washington , D.C.): Millions of illegal immigrants are marching in America ‘s streets and boycotting jobs, schools and merchants. Their explicit purpose is to blackmail our government into granting rights to which they are not entitled.


    Good Here, Bad There


    These activities demonstrate two realities: First, life is good in this country and the opportunities for economic advancement are extraordinary for those willing to work hard.


    Second, life is typically not so good in Mexico and the other Latin American nations from which these illegal aliens principally come. Unfortunately, if present political, economic and social trends continue south of our border, there will likely be many more immigrants coming here unlawfully in search of better lives, and to flee increasingly hard ones in their own countries.


    In fact, a prospective surge in illegal immigration – perhaps coupled with a further radicalization of those already in this country – are just some of the reasons why these worrisome trends should command far greater attention from American policy-makers and citizens alike. Despite the serious and almost-without-exception adverse implications of events throughout Central and South America for our strategic, trade and security interests, however, neither the Bush Administration nor either party in Congress is doing much to address them.


    Among the indicators of trouble ahead are the following ominous developments:


    Cuban dictator Fidel Castro has been rescued from oblivion by the oil wealth and vaulting strategic ambitions of his most promising prot?g?, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. The two authoritarians have adopted a new strategy, born of the realization that radical anti-American leftists can be brought to power throughout the hemisphere the same way Chavez was – by ballots, rather than bullets.


    Funding and organizational support from Venezuela is making the electoral playing-field uneven across the region, giving a formidable advantage to populist revolutionaries over their democratic opponents. Once in office, the latter can rely not only on money from Chavez and his Islamofascist (for example, Iranian) and Chinese friends. They can also elicit muscle from Castro’s foreign legion (Communist Cuban special forces, police, praetorian guards, doctors and teachers) to help consolidate control and eliminate their opponents.


    This phenomenon is already well-advanced in Bolivia , where Evo Morales was elected president in December, after fomenting populist upheavals to topple not one but two elected governments. He has moved rapidly in the ensuing months to neutralize the parliament, constitution and judiciary that might act as checks on his steady accretion and exercise of power.


    In Peru , another would-be dictator, Ollanta Humala, has won the first round of balloting to replace outgoing President Alejandro Toledo. While it is not clear at this writing whether he will prevail in the upcoming run-off, Humala’s inflammatory rhetoric (threatening the country’s political elite and its constitutional democracy, admiring the violent terrorist group known as the Shining Path and signaling a willingness to go to war with neighboring Chile ) represents a frightening prospect for Peru , the region and U.S. interests. Even if Humala loses, it is not clear that he will refrain from fomenting trouble for the new government – and the rest of us.


    Bolivia and Peru are relatively distant and it is seductive to discount them as security problems for the United States . The same cannot be said of Mexico , which will hold a presidential election in July. Polls have long suggested that the likely winner will be Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, the rabidly anti-American former mayor of Mexico City .


    Like others of his persuasion, Lopez Obrador’s bid appears to have benefited from financing and help on the ground from his soulmates in Caracas and Havana , who clearly relish the prospect of extending their axis to the border of the United States. While the race has of late become increasingly competitive, as the conservative PAN party’s candidate Felipe Calderon has gained ground, Washington confronts the distinct possibility of having an explicitly hostile government in Mexico.


    The implications of such an outcome could be far-reaching for the integrity of our southern frontier, illegal immigration, drug-trafficking, terrorism, trade and the radical “reconquista” movement (which is intent on “taking back” at least parts of the United States for Mexico). Even under the relatively friendly government of Vincente Fox, as Heather Mac Donald pointed out last November, “Mexican officials here and abroad are involved in a massive and almost daily interference in American sovereignty.” Imagine what representatives of an unfriendly Mexican apparat might do.


    Then, there is Nicaragua. All other things being equal, the Marxist Sandinista party still led by Commandante Daniel Ortega is poised – with help, ironically, from both the Venezuelan and American governments – to win national elections in November. For his part, Chavez is pumping money and possibly agents into his allies’ campaign.


    The Bush Administration is doing its part by unabashedly and ham-handedly backing Eduardo Montealegre, a foreign minister under the discredited former president, Arnoldo Aleman. Montealegre has fractured the anti-Sandinista democrats and his candidacy seems likely to precipitate their defeat. Yet, Washington refuses to reconsider and either support the candidate of the largest and best organized pro-democracy party, the Constitutionalist Liberals, because of its association with Aleman – or at least remain neutral.


    The Bottom Line


    The consequence of all these elections may well be the complete undoing of Ronald Reagan‘s legacy of successfully countering and, with the notable exception of Castro’s Cuba , defeating totalitarianism in our hemisphere. At some point in the not-too- distant future, the question will be asked, probably with political repercussions: “Who lost Latin America ?”


    There is still time for the Bush Administration and Congress to avoid this stigma by countering these trends and their strategic implications. But to do so, they will have to engage far more vigorously against Latin America ‘s enemies of freedom, investing considerably greater human and financial resources, high-level attention and political capital in once again securing our hemisphere.


     

    What to do about Venezuela

    What to Do About Venezuela

    By J. Michael Waller

    Introduction

    Among the more troubling legacies Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has inherited is one of neglect towards the Western Hemisphere, a legacy that has seriously diminished the United States’ stature and influence in most of the Americas.  This is due, in part, to the self-imposed abdication of the Nation’s hemispheric security obligations.  Secretary Rice has signaled by her recent trip to the region and a major address on the subject delivered today that she intends to address the problem – and not a moment too soon.

    Today, Washington’s friends in Latin America stand isolated, disillusioned, and bewildered.  At the same time, the foes of freedom are advancing their objectives in our hemisphere with an effectiveness unseen since the presidency of Jimmy Carter in the 1970s. Lack of a coherent U.S. strategy toward the region since the end of the Cold War, no less so since 2001, has allowed other actors to enter and dominate the scene.

    These actors range from old, obsessed figures like Cuban dictator Fidel Castro and warmed-over ’70s terrorists-turned-politicians like Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, to Carter himself, whose continued international work certifying election results has provided essential political cover to anti-democratic forces in the region.  Indeed, it might be said that over the past four years, Jimmy Carter has been the most visible and arguably most influential U.S. leader in Latin America.

    Nowhere is the lack of a U.S. strategic approach to the Western Hemisphere more evident than in the unchecked rise of a self-absorbed, unstable strongman in Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, who has made common cause with terrorists and the regimes that support them, and has developed a revolutionary ideology that has begun to plunge the Americas again into violence and chaos. It is necessary for the democratic nations of the hemisphere to come together and stop this rising threat to peace before it is too late.

     

     

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    J. Michael Waller, Ph.D., is the Center for Security Policy’s Vice President for Information Operations.

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