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If You Like the Rigging of the Lebed Dismissal, You’ll Love the Rigging of the Global Credit and Securities Markets

(Washington, D.C.): It is ironic that
the firing of Russian National Security
Advisor Aleksander Lebed — a key
indicator of the political instability
and potential for turmoil in Russia —
occurred just hours after the last U.S.
presidential debate passed without a
single question
about the security
policy challenges that will confront the
next occupant of the White House. Few
actions could more forcefully underscore
the folly of believing that the world can
be safely ignored or demonstrate more
clearly the dangers of the Clinton
practice of over-investing in the
Kremlin’s ruling elite.

Specifically, the transparently
orchestrated dismissal of General Lebed
put into sharp focus the recklessness of
several Clinton initiatives designed to
prop up the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin
government. These include the following:

Unjustifiable Lending by
the IMF

In the months leading up to this
summer’s presidential elections in
Russia, the International Monetary Fund
responded to intensive pressure from
Washington and other Western capitals by
relaxing the criteria and the
conditionality terms that borrowing
nations are expected to meet before
receiving disbursements on IMF loans. As
the Casey Institute of the Center for
Security Policy noted on 10 September:

“…The IMF, after
temporarily suspending the July
tranche of a $10.1 billion loan
to Russia, suddenly deemed that
Moscow had finally come to grips
with its tax collection problem
(despite the fact that tax
collection fell by 62% in the
first six months of 1996). This
decision, made only two weeks
after the original suspension,
came on the heels of comments
made by the new Russian Finance
Minister, Aleksandr Livshits,
that equated Russian tax
collection with a ‘black hole’
and said that Russia is an
unusual country because it is
possible to ‘pay no taxes at all
and nothing whatever will
happen.’

“Moreover, the IMF agreed to
raise Russia’s budget deficit
target from 4% to 5.25% of GDP,
allowing it to qualify for
further disbursements of the
loan, despite a ballooning
deficit. It appears to many
informed observers that these IMF
decisions were designed to allow
President Boris Yeltsin to make
good on at least some of his
outrageous election campaign
promises and to ensure that the
Clinton Administration’s
misguided Yeltsin-centric Russian
policy does not collapse prior to
the November elections.” href=”96-C100.html#N_1_”>(1)

On 24 September 1996, the Casey Institute
called attention to relevant remarks made
in Washington five days earlier by Grigori
Yavlinsky
. href=”96-C100.html#N_2_”>(2)
Before a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
audience, the economist and former
self-declared democratic candidate for
the Russian presidency, confirmed the
Center’s long-held suspicion that IMF
disbursements to Russia were directly or
indirectly being used to help finance
what Yavlinsky described as
“genocide” in Chechnya, saying
in part:

“…It looks like
our government is collecting
taxes from you…via IMF — and,
by the way, spending them on the
war, the war in Chechnya.
Nobody can say that this money is
not used for that.
It [is
being] used to finance the war.
But they’re not collecting even a
half of the taxes they have to
collect, but they have money from
the IMF to use it for the war in
the same time.

The OPIC Scam

The Clinton Administration next moved to turn
the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) into the latest White
House slush-fund-of-choice for extending
aid to the Russian government. In July
and August alone, OPIC provided $830
million toward guaranteeing or insuring
against political instability and other
country-of-risk factors in Russia. The
intensifying instability there has only
served to reinforce concerns that these
contingent liabilities will become
due-and-payable liabilities, in a manner
reminiscent of other
taxpayer-underwritten guarantee schemes
gone sour
(e.g., the Savings and
Loan crisis, the Agriculture Department’s
Commodity Credit Corporation
multi-billion debacles in Iraq and the
Soviet Union, etc.)

Worst yet, in September, the
Administration sought congressional
approval to double its credit guarantee
and insurance ceilings to roughly $45
billion. The Center joined with a number
of other organizations across the
political spectrum to oppose this
unwarranted expansion of U.S. contingent
liabilities. Thanks to the leadership of
Reps. John Kasich (R-OH), Ed Royce (R-CA)
and others, this ill-advised initiative
was soundly defeated in the House of
Representatives.

The Penetration of Western
Securities Markets — It Begins…

Russia currently has total
indebtedness of roughly $130 billion —
the vast majority of which has been
“rescheduled” due to the former
Soviet Union’s default on Western private
sector and government credits. Even the
estimated $19 billion in loans extended
to Russia since 1991 has experienced late
interest payments, with the prospect that
this debt could also be rescheduled down
the road.

Against this backdrop it is
stupefying that credit rating agencies of
Europe and the United States are giving
Moscow an inflated credit rating

— so much so that it is higher than that
of Brazil, Turkey, Argentina or Venezuela
and on a par with Mexico, India and
Hungary. Not surprisingly, the
most egregious rating was provided by the
European agency IBCA of BB+ (i.e., one
notch below “investment grade”)
.
Moodies offered a rating of BA2 (two
notches below investment grade). And
Standard and Poors gave Russia a rating
of BB- (three notches below). According
to some experts, the European rating
would serve to encourage even
conservatively managed pension plans to
hold Russian paper. href=”96-C100.html#N_3_”>(3)

In short, Russia is in a
position to secure a roughly $500 million
bond issue with a probable five-year
maturity following what money managers
almost universally judged to be an
unexpectedly high (read, unwarranted) set
of credit ratings.
As soon as
November 1996, Moscow plans to go to
market with an initial Eurobond offering
and expects to receive an interest rate
of only 300-350 basis points (3-3.5%)
above comparable U.S. Treasury bonds.
Prior to this surprise rating, Russia
could not have expected a rate less than
400-450 basis points. According to
Russia’s draft 1997 budget, the Kremlin
is planning to raise at least $1.3
billion in Eurobonds next year alone. The
lead managers for Russia’s first issue
are J.P. Morgan and SBC Warburg.

Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is
likewise looking to the Western
securities markets to raise capital for
the enterprise that serves as his
political base and source of immense
personal wealth, Gazprom. The world’s
largest gas company is expected to raise
$500 million by selling 1.5% of its
equity to international fund managers. It
will first issue a $380 million offering
of American Depository Shares (each of
which represents 10 ordinary shares) for
a total of 23.7 million shares this year.
These international shares will sell for
about $1.40 apiece — substantially
higher than the $0.40 per share domestic
price — and will be traded initially on
the London Stock Exchange. A New
York offering is expected within as
little as 12 months.

What Will Russia’s
‘Financial Breakout’ End up Funding?

The prospect that the Kremlin will for
the first time begin selling securities
not only to European and Japanese
investors but to American securities
firms, mutual and pension funds,
insurance companies, corporations, and
individual portfolios is made all the
more ominous by the potential uses to
which such new sources of funds may be
applied. Probably unbeknownst to
the typical American investor or employee
who may wittingly — or unwittingly
wind up holding Russian paper, these
undisciplined, unconditioned and largely
non-transparent revenue streams flowing
into the Kremlin’s coffers could be used
to underwrite activities inimical to U.S.
and Western security interests.

These might include:

  • The funding of Russian
    supplier credits to facilitate
    the transfer of nuclear reactors
    to the fanatical Islamic
    government of Iran
    , a
    regime determined to divert the
    associated technology,
    infrastructure, know-how and
    training to the production of
    nuclear weapons.
  • The completion of
    irretrievably flawed Soviet-era
    VVER 440 reactors under
    construction at the Juragua
    nuclear complex near Cienfuegos,
    Cuba.
  • A contribution to
    Russia’s ongoing
    strategic force modernization
    programs
    including new
    classes of mobile ICBMs (the
    TOPOL-M), SS-N-24/26
    submarine-launched ballistic
    missiles and retrofitted Typhoon
    submarines on which they will be
    deployed.
  • Helping to finance
    Moscow’s efforts to intimidate,
    coopt and coerce secular Muslim
    states involved in the
    extraction, processing and
    transmission of the estimated 200
    billion barrels of oil in the
    Caspian Sea basin
    .
  • Underwriting a major new
    initiative by the Russian
    intelligence services intended t
    o
    secure critical military,
    industrial and financial
    information at the expense of
    Western interests.
  • Enabling Moscow to meet
    its existing pledge of a $10
    billion credit to expand and
    accelerate Iraqi oil production

    the moment UN-imposed sanctions
    are eased or lifted. And
  • Providing new revenues to
    be skimmed by corrupt officials,
    joining untold billions of
    dollars already diverted to
    secret bank accounts in
    Switzerland, Cyprus and
    elsewhere.

What Will Be Reaped

If allowed to go forward under present
circumstances, two further developments
seem predictable: First, the
politicized process that has given Moscow
today’s inflated credit ratings will, in
due course, improve further — ultimately
passing the threshold of “investment
grade” securities.
At that
point, it will be highly problematic to
impose the necessary discipline,
transparency and conditionality on this
sophisticated funding mechanism for the
Kremlin’s activities.

And second, the large number of likely
holders of Russian paper and the
secondary markets for these instruments
make it virtually impossible to
reschedule bonds and notes. This, in
turn, can be expected to give
rise to a potentially large number of
constituencies
that will almost
certainly demand U.S. government or
multilateral bailouts in the event of
liquidity crises that impede Moscow’s
ability to redeem its bonds on the
respective maturity dates. (Recall the
circumstances that led to the misuse of
the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the
U.S. Treasury to redeem Mexico’s tesobonos.)

Worse yet, these
constituencies can be predicted to
produce powerful new political advocacy
groups that could come to rival the China
Lobby
, which has successfully
emasculated many U.S. foreign, economic
and security policies toward Beijing,
lest American financial and commercial
interests be adversely affected.

The Bottom Line

These ominous prospects demand that
Moscow’s stealthy financial breakout be
subjected to urgent and close scrutiny.
Even though Congress is out of session
and otherwise preoccupied at the moment,
the stakes are such that committees like Senate
and House Banking and Commerce
Committees, House National Security and
International Relations Committees,
Senate Armed Services and Foreign
Relations Committees and the respective
bodies’ Intelligence Committees

should elicit as much information as
possible from relevant executive branch
and independent agencies.

The latter should include: the Treasury
and State Departments, the Federal
Reserve, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the CIA and FBI
.
Formal hearings should then be held
promptly next year upon the convening of
the new Congress as the horse will
already be out of the barn in Europe and
at least some U.S. fund managers will
probably have begun taking Russian paper
into their international portfolios.

If Congress does its job, it will
clearly establish the increasingly
strategic dimension of the international
efforts being mounted by governments like
that of Russia and China to diversify the
way they fund themselves and their global
activities. It can only be hoped that the
national security implications of these
seemingly benign and legitimate market
initiatives will be addressed in time.

– 30 –

1. See Double
Trouble at OPIC: Exposing Taxpayers and
Underwriting Foreign Adventurism

(No. 96-C 82,
10 September 1996).

2. See Yeltsin
Has Been Politically Terminal for Months;
What Did Al Gore Know — and When Did He
Know It?
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=96-C_89″>No. 96-C 89, 24
September 1996).

3. The Casey
Institute will shortly publish a more
detailed examination of the forthcoming
Russian bond offering and its
implications for the equities of both
Western governments and private
investors.

Newt Gingrich 1996 Keeper of the Flame remarks

Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives

On the Occasion of His Being Honored at the Center for Security Policy’s

"Keeper of the Flame" Award Dinner

18 September 1996

The ANA Hotel, Washington, D.C.

MR. GINGRICH: Thank you all very much. I told Chris [Cox] that the eloquence of that particular introduction was so overwhelming, it was proof he had worked for Ronald Reagan.

This is a very dangerous city because you find yourself listening to this, and then you get all excited, and then you realize it was describing you and you know you can’t quite live up to it. So it’s a native thing.

But I appreciate very much the friendship that we have and the job that Chris has done over the last few months, particularly when he led a very, very important effort on looking at terrorism just before we broke for August. And I think he did a very, very good job of trying to sort out what was really needed and what was purely politics. And I really think he does a tremendous job overall, and it’s no accident that he produced the bill which was the first override of a Clinton veto, because he brings a level of brilliance to it that is quite remarkable.

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: I’m very honored and humbled to be at a table that would have somebody of the background and the sheer brilliance of a Richard Perle; somebody who has begun to reshape the entire national debate on how we survive, such as Frank Gaffney; and my very dear friend and the leader, first in the House and now in the Senate, in the whole effort to protect America’s cities from missiles, Senator Jon Kyl–all here at the same time.

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: And because this is a very serious group, this is a group that gets together because we really do believe that America’s security is at risk and we really do believe that there are dangers and we believe–I think virtually every person in this room has studied history and in many cases lived history enough to know that lack of preparation, lack of foresight, lack of realism, lack of candor about our security needs, are precisely the ingredients to truly create a catastrophe; that it is those who avoid the realities of the world and those who avoid the lessons of history who are the most dangerous because they are precisely the people most likely to create the conditions for the next disaster because they have not got a clue what their policies lead to.

And so I recognize that almost everybody who is here tonight came here with a serious purpose, and a difficult purpose. It’s very hard in a free society in peacetime to understand and take to heart George Washington’s injunction that if you want peace, you must prepare for war. It’s very hard to recognize that when every–there’s every good excuse to not think about the future. It is the absolute nature of a free society to worry about going to the lake for the weekend, to worry about paying for the next vacation, to worry about where–what we might do with our children’s college education, and to put off for another few weeks or another few months or another few years disagreeable, unpleasant, and difficult things, and to give those around the world who might do us harm every possible benefit of the doubt.

That is the nature of a free society. It is why, as late as November 1941, the U.S. Congress voted against defending the island of Guam with fortifications, because we did not want to provoke the Japanese fleet, which was already at that time preparing for Pearl Harbor and practicing it.

It is the reason why before World War I the army was so small that, as late as 1916, General Pershing was actually renting cars in order to prepare along the Mexican border.

It is the reason why at the Spanish-American War our logistics were so inadequate that we literally did not know how to organize the fleet at Tampa Bay. In one of the great moments of entrepreneurial brilliance characteristic of this country, Theodore Roosevelt promptly seized his own ship, mounted the Rough Riders, seized two war correspondents, and sailed off to Cuba, cheerfully happy.

[Laughter.]

MR. GINGRICH: Something which does not fit our current, larger, and more sophisticated military model.

[Laughter/applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: There was a book written a few years ago which is really a terrific election of chapters, each dealing with–it’s called "First Battles," produced by the U.S. Army, looking at what happened in each first battle of the American Army in each of the wars we fought and recounting again and again and again the ease with which a free society forgets the hard lessons of preparedness and drifts off into a delusion.

Now, I thought what I would talk about tonight–because when you deal with this administration, it is so easy to drown in the tactical opportunities of commenting on each week’s confusion that it’s very hard to back up and look at the larger picture. And the scale of their systematic avoidance of reality and misstatement of fact is so enormous that you could simply spend your lifetime dealing with: What did they really do? What did they really mean? Why did they say different things than they did or meant? And yet it gets you nothing in the end.

And so I thought I would come in the opposite direction and back all the way out and suggest that what those of us who care the most about American security should focus on is Orwell’s "Politics and the English Language," maybe the most insightful single essay about politics in the 20th century, the essence of which is quite simple: Words matter; that it is desperately important in a free society to insist on clear language; and that, in fact, our opponents on the left consistently fail to be clear in their language because they cannot survive in an honest debate if they’re clear.

And so they deliberately, systematically, and willfully misuse the English language because they cannot possibly stand up and honestly and accurately defend their policies.

Now, let me suggest to you–and I’m picking up one of the words that Chris had gotten from Dwight Eisenhower, a pretty good source. That’s clarity. But I want to talk about three words: clarity, coherence, and consistency–three things I want to suggest to you are lacking in this administration at levels that are breathtaking, and if you are a serious student of American survival, at levels that are, frankly, frightening.

And I want to make the following observation: I believe intellectually in our capacity to understand the world. The democracies are in a greater danger than they have been at any time since Stanley Baldwin lied to the English people about the Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Germany. I believe that we are in a greater danger than we were under Jimmy Carter because at the time that Carter was willfully neglecting reality, there were surrounding him a strong alliance, a consistent military commitment, a generation of people dedicated to the defeat of the Soviet empire, and a political movement fully aware of the fact that if we were not armed and we were not strong that freedom would die.

And so there was a clear, compelling, and coherent alternative, and every day that Carter was in office, there were people making the case across this land. And some of them, of course, are here tonight, and several have been recognized: Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dick Allen, I saw Fred Ikle here. People who spent their life intellectually creating the framework and day by day, again and again and again, communicating that what Carter was doing was madness. And, of course, we were then saved from any argument by the combination of the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a moment at which President Carter, you will remember, said with enormous clarity he had now changed his opinion of the Russians and realized for the first time that they were, in fact, not friendly neighbors committed to hanging out together and drinking soft drinks and eating popcorn.

This was a sign that maybe he had been missing during things such as the Hungarian revolution suppression and a variety of other moments of learning that had occurred during his lifetime. But it was nonetheless a wonderful moment and one which filled many of us with a sense of security that we were moving towards an awareness that the world was dangerous.

Now, while Carter in himself and in the McGovernites that he surrounded himself with–and I once got in trouble for using that term. Technically, for any press that are here, it’s McGovernite. It was translated by the New York Times into "McGovernik," because it was very late at night and the reporter couldn’t remain any coherence or clarity about what I had actually said.

[Laughter.]

MR. GINGRICH: But McGovernite’s a legitimate term. The McGovern movement was a foreign policy movement which believed sincerely that the greatest danger to the planet was the United States, the greatest threat to the world was the CIA, and that the American military on any given day were probably bad, and that if only we would allow all those nice other people to go do nice things, that they would all be good.

And I have always respected a great deal the courage of Morton Kondrake and Fred Barnes, both of whom said they had believed all that until they watched the North Vietnamese Army enter Saigon, and that they realized at that moment on that day that this was an occupying not a liberating army and that everything they had believed was a lie.

Now, they at least had the moral courage to confront reality. There are scattered through this administration a number of people who not only do not have that courage but they have to compound their lifetime of being wrong with new errors and new falsehoods. And it is an enormous danger to the world, because we can’t talk honestly, we can’t have a coherent, clear conversation.

Let me start with point number one. The world is dangerous. Now, this is an important debate. If the world is dangerous, we should have a CIA Director who believes in the CIA. Now, I know this a high standard–

[Laughter/applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: But the truth is, after this election, when we’re beyond immediate partisanship, there should be a thorough investigation of the current Central Intelligence Agency. The degree to which it has been politicized should be ripped apart, and we should insist on the establishment of a professional Central Intelligence Agency with a professional director dedicated to the defense of the United States rather than to the defense of left-wing politicians. And I think it is a desperately important thing.

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: Now, let me just suggest to you that if we, in fact, focused intently, what is happening in northern Iraq is simple a Middle-Eastern equivalent of the Bay of Pigs. You can tell who lost. We are flying people out of the country so they won’t be killed.

Now, one of the ground rules of history is that the people being evacuated probably didn’t win.

[Laughter.]

MR. GINGRICH: And I want to stick here again–clarity, clarity, clarity. This is an enormous defeat for the United States. This is a defeat that will reverberate for a generation in the Middle East.

I don’t know any of the details. I’m just telling you what I have read in the paper, but which my staff has confirmed is within reasonable grounds something I can repeat without being too wrong. And that’s sort of–I think that’s what public politicians should do. I think you should consciously avoid learning all those little secrets that you can then, you know, tell various and sundry strange people, who then go and tell various and sundry strange people, and then it ends up in The Star or something, and you just feel so embarrassed at having tossed that stuff around.

[Laughter.]

MR. GINGRICH: I think that you should actually try to restrict what you learn that is secret while you’re a public politician.

[Laughter.]

MR. GINGRICH: It just saves you from later embarrassment.

So let me repeat the public source information about Iraq. As the story is told, the Central Intelligence Agency, under the leadership of a group of left-wingers who don’t believe in it, has spent something like $100 million, to no avail, has propped up several groups trying to undermine Saddam, has failed on a large scale, having first enticed people into working with the United States, and then, in effect, having allowed them, A, to be killed and, B, to be driven out of their homeland.

Now, everywhere in the world people will notice this, and America will be weaker, and our belief the next time somebody meets with us will be weaker, and people will be less likely to work with us. This is bad. It is bad for freedom, it is bad for America, and it is bad for the people who we first enticed to get involved and then failed to defend.

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: Now, I believe there are three levels of dangers that we should deal with with three different strategies, and I think they are very discrete and quite different. The first is terrorism; the second is adventurous or outlaw states; and the third is great powers. And they’re quite different challenges.

Terrorism comes basically in three forms: random people who have unusual personalities. The Unabomber is a case. It’s likely, if we ever find out who had the bomb in Atlanta, that will turn out to be a case. Those are, frankly, police actions requiring the FBI, are virtually unstoppable, and in a free society you will occasionally have somebody who acts out their particular derangement in a violent way.

The second group are private groups engaged in terrorism. There are remarkably few of them. They are very hard to sustain. And the fact is you can almost always track them down if they engage in action over any length of time.

The third, which is often mistaken for the second, are organized, systematic extensions of terror–of state power engaging in guerilla warfare, but masking it as terrorism. When you have organized groups in the Bekaa Valley and they are sustained by Iran and they have a headquarters in Damascus, they are acts of war. They are not terrorism in any traditional, anarchic sense of the turn of the century. They are guerilla warfare being waged by a state for its diplomatic and military purposes. And we should deal with them accordingly.

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: For the greatest power in the world to say to Libya "We don’t quite know how to get two people out of your country" has to be regarded in historic terms as an extraordinary abdication of our capabilities.

For a great power to say to the Sudan "We know you harbor terrorists, we know you threaten your neighbors, we know you have caused people to be killed, but we don’t know how to deal with a country as weak as the Sudanese Government" is a lack of purpose on a historic scale.

For a country to say "We will blind our eyes to Lebanon, we will wonder why the Israelis are so harsh when they retaliate to protect their own children and their own women and their own innocent civilians, we will tolerate Iranian money propping up various terrorist groups across the planet, we will know that in country after country, in Latin America, in the Philippines, across Europe, that the Iranians are engaged, but we will not, of course, engage Iran as though we were a great power and we were fed up with state-supported terrorism, and we will coddle the Syrians while they sustain and defend terrorism"–terrorism would not last a week in Lebanon if Syria did not protect it. Terrorism–

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: And for this administration to have had the Secretary of State visit, I believe it was 27 times, the city of Damascus, to have tea with the dictator, to raise him to the level of being the equal of the United States, is the worst possible foreign policy. We should be doing the opposite. We should be saying to Assad, Prove you are worthy of treating with the greatest democracy on the planet by expelling the terrorists from Lebanon, and when you have proven you are worthy of being part of the civilized world, give us a call.

Let me be very clear–

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: Let me be quite clear. Ronald Reagan was correct when he said of the Soviet Union it is an evil empire. And, in fact, after the collapse of the Soviet empire, there were Russian leaders who said it was a remarkably helpful speech, because they hadn’t quite been sure.

[Laughter.]

MR. GINGRICH: And they meant it quite seriously. If we in the West in our freedom didn’t have the nerve to condemn their tyranny, maybe it wasn’t such a bad deal.

Well, let me suggest the same thing about Syria’s behavior and Lebanon. A regime which is itself a dictatorship internally, which has ruthlessly killed its own people in large numbers, which actively sustains war against its neighbors by terrorism, and which then claims it has no control over those it controls is behaving in a destructive and despicable manner and should be treated as a nation more appropriately isolated than negotiated with, and we should have the nerve to set down a marker for the world that we are tired of terrorist states and we are tired of states which support terrorism. And that includes Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and we are quite large enough and powerful enough to organize efforts to make sure that we make our will felt.

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: What I am suggesting in part is that we pull most terrorism out of terrorism. That’s not an FBI problem. It’s a military problem. It’s a diplomatic problem. It’s an intelligence agency problem. Let’s let pure, true terrorism by random individuals and tiny groups, that’s the FBI’s problem. But anytime there is systematic, organized support by a state, that is a military/diplomatic problem and should be dealt with by the intelligence agencies, the military, and the State Department at the highest levels. And it, frankly, then shades into the next problem, which is outlaw states and adventurous states.

Now, these are manageable problems, but they require those three words I talked about earlier: clarity, coherence, and consistency. You need to be able to define early: What is our goal with Iraq? What is our goal with Iran? What is our goal with Syria? What is our goal with North Korea? What is our goal with Libya? Just to take five random examples, none of which this administration could tell you because it’s so complicated to be clear. And then you have to remember the next day what you said, and that’s so hard.

[Laughter.]

MR. GINGRICH: And then somebody might actually make you stick to your word, and that’s so difficult.

But you can’t lead an alliance, you can’t educate a free people, you can’t design a strategy if you don’t have clarity, coherence, and consistency.

Now, at the level of Iran, Iraq, Libya, we frankly can design strategies that are relatively conventional. I think through diplomatic, economic, military, and other pressures we can over time have an enormous impact.

But I want to raise a third area that we don’t even talk about very seriously that I think is a real challenge. It’s not necessarily a problem, but it’s a challenge, and that is great powers. We are very foolish to look out over the next half century and assume that we can deal with China without an enormous amount of thought. And I think that we’re a little silly–

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: –to look at Russia with anything less than seriousness. And I don’t by this mean paranoia and I don’t by this mean defining them as enemies. I would simply suggest to you that a nation of over a billion, two hundred million people, developing in a serious way, with a strong sense of ethnic and cultural identity, is a profound and an important force on this planet, and that we Americans have an obligation to take far more seriously, in the best sense of the word, the emergence of China as a partner on the planet, and that we have to be thinking very deeply and very seriously, far beyond the issues that currently tend to fascinate us, far beyond what will be seen by the long run of history as secondary issues, and ask ourselves: What’s our vision of our relationship with China 50 years from now? What’s our vision of how we interact with the Chinese people as they emerge as a world power?

It is inconceivable in the Information Age that a billion, two hundred million Chinese will be anything less than extraordinarily important. And yet we have no positive, long-term, active engagement designed to reach out and designed to transform our relationship. And I think our view towards China, frankly, should be very much what happened with Britain at the turn of the century when they decided they could not afford America as a competitor and they had to find a long-range relationship with us that was much more based on an alliance and a friendship rather than a competition and hostility. And it was an enormous change, and it took over 20 years to effect.

And yet I would suggest to you that when you start thinking about great powers in the Information Age, the speed of information, the nature of worldwide monetary systems, the level of violence at low cost that’s going to be available, that we have an obligation to really think creatively at the level of Russia, of Germany, of Japan, of China, of Brazil, and to really start–of Indonesia, for example, one of the great giants we pay far too little attention to, and to really begin to rethink what is the 21st century model. It’s not just NATO redesigned. It’s not just some kind of unilateral power projection. But it’s, in fact, a very different engagement of the American people.

Now, as we think about all that–and I want to draw a distinction here between diplomatic and military thinking. Diplomatic thinking should always look out for the best, for the greatest opportunities, for the opening up. Military thinking should be ruthlessly engaged in looking at capabilities, not intentions.

This is why I would draw the comparison to Stanley Baldwin. Just as the democracies in the early ’30s enormously underestimated the potential military capability of their competitors, the objective reality is that, for all practical purposes for most Americans, the relative safety and capabilities is no greater today than it was 15 years ago. The objective fact is, if anything, there are more missiles on the planet, and the odds of their proliferating are greater.

I would say that there is no single insult to intelligence and to the desire to protect America greater than the CIA report which was deliberately rigged by this administration to ensure that it would not tell us the truth. The fact is there are countries that are dangerous that will be able to purchase long-range missiles almost certainly within a decade, and at least one news report suggests that Iran may be able to buy Russian launch vehicles within the next two years.

Now, anyone who believes in a world in which the Germans are rushing to sell equipment of dubious nature to Iran no matter what, a world in which we are constantly policing our allies about chemical warfare weapons getting to Libya, anybody who believes that major countries with a lot of money are not going to be able to reach out and purchase space launch vehicles, which happen to have remarkably similar characteristics to ICBMs–as in identical. The only difference is, remember, if you are a terrorist state, all you want is an area weapon. As long as you hit somewhere near a major city, it’s good enough. It’s not the sophistication we’re used to. It’s not the complexity we’re used to. But I would suggest to you that the damage it does is extraordinary, and we are not psychologically nor intellectually prepared for that world.

That’s why I think that national missile defense should be as large a crusade for our generation as radar was for Winston Churchill, and we should be as adamant in getting it as they were in the 1930s because it may well be that decisive in our survival in the 21st century.

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: There are several other things we should insist on. We should insist on the re-establishment of human intelligence and the capacity of the intelligence agency to, frankly, have spies. And let’s be blunt. Words matter. If you asked me would I like to have people inside terrorist organizations who favor the West and help us know when they’re going to do something, my answer’s yes. Would I like to have people in Beijing who care about our values and will let us know things? My answer’s yes. Do I think it would be good to know what the Iranian Government is doing or the Libyan Government? My answer’s yes. And I think we have to be prepared to win the intellectual argument in a free society that, as long as the world is dangerous, it is better for America to have knowledge, and that requires an intelligence agency that is respected, that is policed by the Congress but it is not destroyed by the Congress, and that systematically engages in trying to understand what is happening everywhere in the world. And the dismantling of our human intelligence capabilities in this administration is a disgrace, and it is weakening our capacity to survive, and it is exactly the wrong direction. We need more intelligence because the fact is when you start dealing with regional powers and terrorist groups, you need fewer things that satellites tell you with photographs and more things that people tell you with a phone call. And that is simply an objective reality that this particular administration totally is ignoring, and ultimately it’s going to cost American lives.

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: I just want to mention three other words. This administration is stretching our military, frankly, on the verge of the breaking point. The military gets smaller. There are fewer personnel. They get sent more places.

Every time you send a soldier or a sailor or a Marine or someone from the Air Force to a country, you need two other people, one on the training base and one on the rotation base, just to be able to do that. So when you hear about 25,000 people going somewhere, you just tied up 75,000 people. If you continue to have troops in South Korea, if you continue to have troops in Okinawa, when you send troops to Bosnia, to Haiti, when you find new places and new activities, it is amazing how thin the structure is getting.

And yet if you were to look at the serious plans of this administration for what they would really do if they didn’t have a Republican Congress, you’d have an even smaller military with an even smaller budget sent even more places with even less adequate training and less adequate equipment. And I think at some point somebody needs to stand up and say there is a minimum size to being the world’s only superpower, and we have gotten smaller than that in terms of our regular units, and we have an obligation to insist on a military in which people can serve without being burned out by the sheer constancy of their being used.

It stuns me that at the very time we were engaged in military action in Iraq, we had troops is Bosnia, and the State Department was sending people to Haiti. The administration was asking us to cut our defense appropriation by $3 billion. It just to me was mindless.

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: So I would make an argument that we need to get–we need to understand the importance of a sustainable military force of a size large enough to truly help us lead the planet.

Second, I think we have to talk honestly about modernization. We are living off of Ronald Reagan’s buildup. We are living off of Cap Weinberger’s contracts. The fact is this is an administration that cheerfully uses B-52s older than the people who are flying them, that fires off Tomahawk missiles it did not ask for. I cannot tell you how galling it is to be told by the administration they don’t need something they won’t use which they’ll then be proud of when they do use it.

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: And it’s a continuing pattern.

I believe that the Chiefs of Staff will tell you in private that they believe we’re at least $120 billion short of the money we need for modernization to keep this force going, and that’s before the next round of cuts if the liberals keep control of the Office of Management and Budget.

The fact is we’re going to have too small a force with too obsolete a weapons system, and I think it is a serious problem in not very many years. And we’re going to risk the lives of young men and women because we send them places without adequate strength, with weapons that will, in fact, not have any great qualitative advantage over the people we send them against.

Desert Storm was the one-time decisive victory of the Reagan buildup before it was dismantled. It should not be seen in any way as an example of what we could do in the next ten years, and we are closer to Task Force Smith in the Korean War than we are to Desert Storm if we stumble into a big problem five years from now with a shrinking military, with obsolescing weapons, with a political leadership that doesn’t know how to design a serious campaign, which gets me–

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: Which gets me to the last word I want to use for a minute, and this is the right kind of group to use it, but it makes you a little frustrated in a democracy, and it’s useful to remind yourself that democracies are great and wonderful things which stumble along for long periods not doing the wisest of all things, but then somehow have this romantic capacity to get enormous energy to mobilize themselves in a crisis, and that one of the keys is to just persistently keep saying it in the hopes that when the crisis shows up, enough people will have read your books or heard your speeches that they decide to do the right thing. But it’s the nature of democracies.

But at the level of those who really care about thinking about the issue, there’s another word that I think is probably the ultimate condemnation of this administration. It’s the word serious. Security policy is a serious business. Diplomacy is a serious business. National defense is a serious business.

Now, let me just give you two or three very quick examples, and let me start by saying I’m so proud of Chairman Ben Gilman because on one of the topics, Haiti, he has consistently maintained the willingness to dig in and dig in and dig in. And you had this extraordinary spectacle Saturday of the newspaper article which said, if I read it correctly, that because of the enormous success of this administration in pacifying Haiti and establishing human rights, we were rushing security personnel down to protect the President from his own presidential bodyguard, who turned out to have become a left-wing death squad, based on our most recent indications. And so as a sign of the stability we brought to the island, we now felt everyone was so safe that we would surround the President of the country with bodyguards.

Now, I thought that was probably not as stable as I had hoped would be happening–

[Laughter.]

MR. GINGRICH: But Ben is looking into it because it represents a very serious flaw. Apparently the people we were training had developed this odd habit of killing people that they didn’t agree with, which I thought was much closer to Papa Doc Duvalier and an older and more primitive Haiti, which I saw a presidential speech two years ago promising us we were eliminating by the sending of American forces to Haiti. But I may have missed something, and Ben will be holding hearings on this. Now–

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: But let me cite what I think has been in the last two weeks the sort of thing which a novelist would have found a little hard to put into a novel as an example of non-seriousness in a serious way. And that’s what happened in the last couple weeks in Iraq.

Apparently, we got the sense that Saddam Hussein was going to go into some villages in order to disrupt what we were doing and in order to break apart the Kurdish opposition. We apparently told Saddam, You shouldn’t do this. He apparently thought we weren’t serious. So he did it.

We then told Saddam, We’ll show you. So we then fired off missiles, which cost about $1,200,000 apiece and take about 18 months to build.

Now, we fired them at the south, although we were mad about the north, but we didn’t have anything to hit in the north so we hit something in the south. Furthermore, the Turks, who were the neighbors we were protecting, didn’t want us to do anything in the north, and, in fact, it turned out neither the Kuwaitis nor the Saudis who we protect in the south wanted us to protect them in the south. So we fired the missiles from ships and aircraft so that we wouldn’t have any of the neighbors we were protecting mad at us for protecting them.

Then we did such decisive damage that the best estimate I can get is that per $1,200,000 missile that took 18 months to build, we probably did about $60,000 of damage, which took about three days to fix.

Now, this is normally not an exchange rate you invest in. If you look at systems analysis in World War II or operational analysis, as it was called back then, we tried to avoid this kind of exchange rate because it turns out you go broke before victory.

[Laughter.]

MR. GINGRICH: But, nonetheless, we were–

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: Now, at that point, this administration, which had so thoroughly failed to consult the Congress, after I watched the briefing on CNN, I got the call telling me about the briefing I had just seen, which I thought was a little unusual and out of sequence, but kind of interesting.

We then found out that this administration, which had not done this for public relations and did not mean this in any way to involve publicity, had released the sending of 5,000 troops to Kuwait to the press before they mentioned it to the Kuwaitis, which caused the Kuwaitis to be more irritated than the Congress, so the Kuwaitis said, We don’t think we’ll take them. Which led the administration to say, Well, we really meant to ask you first, and we didn’t really know this was going on.

Any of you who happened to watch "Meet The Press" on Sunday, I followed Ambassador Albright, whose explanation of confusion was, I thought, elegant and professional. She took an impossible situation and turned it into one which was incoherent in a way which no one could follow so you could never render judgment because you didn’t have a clue what had happened. It was a marvelous moment.

[Laughter/applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: Now, I just want to suggest to all of you that while you waver between rage and the combination of wrong policy, incompetence, and mendacity in this administration, and a sense of humor at the burlesque nature in which they carry out foreign policy, there’s something deeper that should strike. And I want to close this, but I want to say this for the record as seriously as I can, because every American who is worried about safety in the world and every American who’s worried about the survival of freedom should think about it seriously.

I would comment to every American going back and reading the opening chapters of Winston Churchill’s "History of the Second World War." I would commend they go back and remember the years that the locus eight(?), the period when, as he put it, in the ’20s and the early ’30s the democracies could have protected freedom at virtually no cost, the years when the democracies had the time and the strength and the opportunity that, with the smallest amount of wisdom, they could have succeeded. Because we have had four years of a tragedy. We have had four years of lost time in Russia, four years of lost time in reaching out to China, four years of lost time in defeating state terrorism, four years of lost time in building a national missile defense, four years of lost time in rebuilding our intelligence capabilities, and four years of lost time in sustaining the extraordinary level of professionalism and commitment and dedication in our armed services. For four years–

[Applause.]

MR. GINGRICH: For four years, this administration has mismanaged, misled, and misconstrued our security and our foreign policy. So far it has not led to a calamity. But everyone who is sophisticated knows that on virtually every front we are fraying at the edges. We’re fraying at the edges with our allies, who wonder what we’ll do next and who they can believe. We are fraying at the edges domestically in holding us together with an administration which systematically fails to consult the Congress and systematically fails to inform us and, we were told today, will not tell us what they are spending in the Middle East because they know it will force them to sign the appropriations bill. And so they don’t even want to tell us what they’re spending until after we get beyond the election, because they know it undermines everything they’re trying to do in cutting defense.

And I just want to suggest to all of you that at the core of the survival of our children’s country, we need to re-establish a seriousness of purpose and an honesty of intellect and a willingness to have clarity, to have coherence, and to have consistency. Or we are going to once again face a crisis of enormous proportions, and we will pay in blood what we are giving up today in time and preparation.

Thank you very, very much.

Prepared Testimony of Sven F. KraemerFormer Director of Arms Control, National Security Council Staff 1981-1987, Before the House Committee on International Relations

Global Proliferation Threats, China and MFN

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the International Relations Committee of the House of
Representatives, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a mounting strategic threat to
the United States. The chief sources of that threat are not only the handful of infamous rogue
regimes. The threat also comes from officials in Russia and China who are their chief suppliers
and who are selling dangerous weapons and technologies to others hostile to America.

Most tragically and unnecessarily, the global proliferation threat is compounded by the illusions,
cover-ups and weaknesses of Clinton administration defense and foreign policies which are
heading America and her key allies for the bull’s eye of disaster.

I hope that today’s hearing can help make a difference in preventing future proliferation Pearl
Harbors. I hope your Congressional colleagues will support policies commensurate with the
threats. It is necessary to describe threats realistically, to use the instruments of American
leverage, to stem the flows of advanced dual-purpose technologies that are the wild card of
proliferation, to give teeth to sanctions against violators, and to have military means and deployed
defenses available in case sanctions and arms agreements fail. Otherwise you have no chance to
“provide for the common defense” or assure “the blessings of liberty.”

I understand that today’s heating is focused principally on a senior representative of the Clinton
administration. As only a few minutes of testimony will be available for critics of the
administration’s policies, I have prepared a more extended statement for our review. I hope your
Committee to hold detailed hearings on these issues. I urge that Congress to establish a “Team B”
group of experts to conduct an independent analysis and to report its findings and
recommendations.

I would welcome an opportunity to testify in the future and to participate in new assessment
efforts. I worked on such issues in the U.S. government for twenty-five years beginning with the
Kennedy administration and including with four presidents and ten National Security Advisors’ in
the White House. I recently completed comprehensive analyses of the threats and alternative
responses. My prepared statement covers two interrelated subjects: Part I Proliferation Threats
(pp. 1-12) and Part II- China, MFN and Security (pp. 12-24).

The Globe at Risk

The Clinton administration is grossly failing to deal with threatening global realities in its defense
and arms control policies. The administration is in denial, colors its official threat estimates and
rejects both vigorous enforcement and advanced active defense programs in countering
proliferation threats. The administration is wedded to cornerstone myths about a benign new
world order, about its ability to deal with dictators as if they were democrats, about inevitably
benign strategic partnerships with Russia and China, and about the efficacy of multilateral
agreements and international “norms,” although these paper regimes lack effective verification and
effective sanctions and tend to disarm America rather than rogues. Instead of working at home
and abroad to block high-tech flows to rogue states and those who supply them, the flow of
enabling technologies for advanced weapons continues virtually unchecked as the Clinton
administration too often puts the seeks short-term commercial gains over security and
appeasement over enforcement. At the same time U.S. military forces and production as well as
research and development levels have been drastically cut even as much of the world is arming.

The strategic reality is that notwithstanding unprecedented hopes and opportunities for a peaceful
post-Cold War era, the world remains very dangerous. An unstable and undemocratic Russia and
China and a number of rogue states proliferate weapons and violate agreements and are generally
rewarded rather than sanctioned by the United States. Missile deterrence has broken down in at
least seven recent conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia and missiles can now
readily reach U.S. forces and allies in numerous hotspots overseas. Sea-borne threats can
devastate America’s coastal cities with any of the thousands of shorter-range missiles which are
available throughout the world today. Militant ideologies and international criminality are
increasing. The proliferation of new information technologies and new information warfare threats
can rapidly increase others long-range power, potentially devastating key nodes of America’s
commercial and defense infrastructures. America faces new forms of attack by rogues undeterred
either by arms control agreements or by classic notions of deterrence.

In a MAD Maginot Line stance that will inevitably prove costly in American lives and treasure,
the administration remains wedded to the doctrine of Mutual Assured Doctrine (MAD) and the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty incorporating that doctrine while it condones much arms
control cheating and major arms buildups in Russia and China. It supports the broken ABM treaty
even as it vigorously opposes the accelerated deployment of robust national anti-missile defenses
required to “provide for the common defense” of the American people, their key allies and their
vital interests. One result, as stated starkly by Secretary of Defense William Perry in testimony to
the House National Security Committee in March 1996: “We have no capability to shoot down
any ballistic missiles fired at the United States.” Absent such an insurance safeguard, America
doesn’t have any counter-proliferation policy either.

I. PROLIFERATION THREAT
ASSESSMENTS — TRUE AND FALSE

There has been a major flap recently about the Clinton administration’s cockeyed intelligence
estimates on proliferation threats and the President’s use of those estimates in vetoing national
missile defense deployment programs. The President and his team have downplayed proliferation
dangers from China, Russia and various rogue states and have invariably trumpeted “successes.”
But on two rare occasions President Clinton did appear aware of the real world dangers his
administration’s illusory proliferation and defense policies all too often deny. On November 9,
1995, following the wording of a similar directive issued a year earlier (November 14, 1994) he
issued an Executive Order in which he declared:

“I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, find that the proliferation of
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (“weapons of mass destruction”) and of the means of
delivering such weapons, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby, declare a national
emergency to deal with that threat.” (Emphasis added.)

If taken literally, and seriously, the 1995 and 1994 Executive Orders acknowledge grave current
strategic threats to the United States from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the means of delivering them.

These threats should be matched by requisite policies and programs, to fulfill the Constitutional
imperative “to provide for the common defense.” On the contrary, however, the administration’s
proliferation and arms control policies have increasingly been policies of illusion, denial, cover-up,
and high-risk gambles.

Considerable insight into the realism or falsity of current Clinton administration proliferation
estimates — and current lack of credibility — can be gained from comparing them to other official
estimates.

Bush Administration

Before Bill Clinton took office, Bush administration officials hopeful about a benign new world
order that was to emerge from the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union, nevertheless
became increasingly concerned about the global proliferation threat. They understood the threat
not only with regard to Iraq, against which they prosecuted the Gulf War and in which they found
missile and weapons capabilities far more advanced than previously declared by international arms
inspectors or anticipated by U.S. intelligence. They also saw the threat as deriving from other
rogue states and from other rogues, including potentially some in the dismembered Soviet Union,
with its instabilities and its uncertain weapons controls.

The Bush administration’s official proliferation estimate presented one year before Bill Clinton
took office foresaw a major threat within the decade of the nineties. As presented by Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney in his 1992 annual report to the President and the Congress:

“By the end of this decade as many as nine developing countries could have nuclear weapons, up
to thirty could have chemical weapons, ten could posses a biological weapons capability and up to
twenty or more could acquire missiles through overt or covert means.” (Emphasis added.)

In response to this threat and to the “loose nukes” problems of unauthorized or accidental
launches in the states of the former Soviet Union, the Bush administration had proposed initiatives
which included development of new post-Cold War technology controls, new counterproliferation
efforts (both organizational and programmatic) and deployment, by 1996, of an antimissile Global
Protection System Against Limited Attack (GPALS).

Russia — 1991-1992

During this same
period the clear and present proliferation threat also came to be recognized in Russia and
provided a basis for moving ahead on the anti-missile defenses now opposed by Clinton officials
and Yeltsin’s hardliners. An example of expressed Russian concern occurred during the last days
of the Soviet Union, at an October 1991 conference of U.S. and Soviet experts. There, Lt.
General Viktor Samaylov a senior representative of the office of Russian State Counselor on
Defense, declared:

“We realistically appraise that by the year 2000, about 15-20 or more governments and states will
have their own ballistic rockets and launchers. Half of these governments will have missiles with
more than a 5,000, or up to a 5000mile range. I think this is a very serious source of threats…in
the future. Therefore, an integration of joint efforts towards an ABM agreement is both full of
promise and full of interests for us.” (Emphasis added.)

In another example during the initial days
of the new Russia, Marshall Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, Commander of the Joint Armed Forces of
the Commonwealth of Independent States declared in February 1992:

“The thing is that we have nonetheless reached the point where roughly a dozen more countries
could shortly join the nuclear club. We will have less and less reliable insurance against breaches
in the rules of storage and protection and unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons in various regions.
All this convinces us that it is time to think about a global defense system.” (Emphasis added.)

Similar themes were expressed by President Boris Yeltsin in his January 1992 address to the
United Nations and at his summit meeting with President Bill Clinton in June 1992.

Early Clinton
Administration Warnings — 1993

In the opening days of the Clinton administration, before the
new Clinton orthodoxy was to impose severe policy constraints on objective intelligence
assessments, two senior U.S. Central Intelligence officials provided testimony in close agreement
with the proliferation assessments of the Bush administration.

In February 1993, Clinton’s new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, R. James Woolsey,
summarized the threat as follows in testimony to the U.S. Senate:

“More than 25 countries, many
of them hostile to the United States and our allies, may have or may be developing nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons — so called weapons of mass destruction — and the means to
deliver them. Aside from the five declared nuclear powers, numerous countries have, or are
pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities. Iraq and Iran, for example, have the basic technology to
eventually develop such weapons.

“More than two dozen countries have programs to research or
develop chemical weapons, and a number have stockpiled such weapons, include Libya, Iran, and
Iraq. The military competition in the always volatile Middle East has spurred others in the region
to pursue chemical weapons. We have also noted a disturbing pattern of biological weapons
development following closely on the heels of the development of chemical weapons.

“More than a dozen countries have operational ballistic missiles, and more have programs in place
to develop them. North Korea has sold Syria and Iran extended range Scud C’s, and has
apparently agreed to sell missiles to Libya. Russia and Ukraine are showing a growing willingness
to sell missile technology prohibited by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Egypt
and Israel are developing and producing missiles, and several Persian Gulf states have purchased
whole systems as well as production technology from China and North Korea. Some have
equipped these missiles with weapons of mass destruction, and others are striving to do so.”

In his testimony Woolsey also touched on massive control problems in Russia, where, he said:
“many agencies involved in controlling exports are also responsible for promoting military
exports, creating obvious concerns…(and where) the lure of large, illegal profits means that the
risk of such transfers will grow.”

No doubt understanding that his realistic assessments would prove unwelcome in the Clinton
administration bent on denying global threats and on cutting deep into the marrow of U.S. defense
capabilities, Woolsey testified: “I have painted a rather bleak picture, but accuracy and candor
require bleakness. And unless we reverse the current trends, the future could come to be even
more dangerous than these descriptions of current reality.” Within days of Woolsey’s testimony,
Lawrence Gershwin, the Central Intelligence Agency’s senior analyst for strategic forces, provided
additional perspective which further confirmed the extreme seriousness of the proliferation threats
facing the United States and the Clinton administration. In a prepared statement first presented at
a Washington D.C. forum in March 1993, and presented in Congressional testimony and to allies
in essentially the same form during the next several months, Gershwin provided sober threat
estimates on the strategic/ICBMs from proliferation. First he noted the current intercontinental
threats from space-launch vehicles which could serve as intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs); second, he predicted indigenous development of ICBMs in as few as eight years; and,
third he foresaw substantial ICBM infrastructure capabilities within the next decade.

According to Gershwin’s early 1993 testimony:

  • For space-launch vehicles: “Presently, India, Israel, and Japan have developed space-launch
    vehicles that, if convened to surface-to-surface missiles, are capable of reaching targets in the
    United States. Brazil has a space launch vehicle under development that is expected to be test
    launched within the next five years.”
  • For indigenously developed Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missiles (ICBMs): “After the United States House of Representatives turn of the century…some
    nations that are hostile to the United States may be able to indigenously develop ballistic missiles
    that could threaten the United States. We really cannot give you a precise date — it could be eight,
    ten, or fifteen years from now — when these ICBMs could be deployed.”
  • For the next decade: “Over the next ten years, we are likely to see several Third World nations
    establish the infrastructure and develop the technical knowledge required to undertake ICBM and
    space launch vehicle development.” (Emphases added throughout.)

Like Woolsey, Gershwin pointed to Russia and China as proliferators and especially to Iraq, Iran,
Syria, Libya and North Korea as hostile nations gaining very dangerous capabilities. Russia, for
example, had recently “advertised a derivative of the old SS-23 ballistic missile for sale as a
civilian rocket” and with North Korea, there was “the real possibility that it has already
manufactured enough missile material for at least one nuclear weapon.” Like Woolsey in this and
other testimony, Gershwin noted that indigenous developments could be speeded up through
shortcuts such as acquisition from other countries.

But above all, Gershwin pointed to the historically new dimension of global proliferation problems
by comparing the regional proliferation threat, existing even as he spoke, i.e., as Bill Clinton was
entering office, to the strategic threat facing the United States in 1960 — the period of the Cold
War, around the time of the Cuban Missile crisis. Gershwin noted that: “The potential capabilities
of some of these countries are comparable to, and in some cases, more lethal than the Soviet
threat in 1960. With leaders like Quaddhafi and Saddam Husayn, and in many cases weak,
unstable, or illegitimate governments, our classic notions of deterrence hold much less promise of
assuring US and Western security.” (Emphasis added.)

Clinton Administration from 1994 to Mid-1995

During 1994 and early 1995, with Woolsey still at the CIA, statements by key Clinton
administration officials continued to confirm that the proliferation situation was very serious and
involved missiles numbering in the thousands. In 1994, when John Deutch was still the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, he reported that: a ballistic missile threat to U.S. territory could emerge by
the end of the decade. In March 1995, the theater threat was described in near strategic global
terms by Lt. General Malcolm O’Neill, the then Director of the Pentagon’s Ballistic Missile
Defense Office, as follows:

“The (Theater Missile Defense) TMD threat I think is here. I think we can all agree that beyond
the thousand or so that are pointed at Israel, there are probably another three or four thousand
that are pointed at other people in the world, being held for use by potential adversaries, some of
whom are not so deterrable as was shown when Saddam Hussein used the SCUDS against Saudi
Arabia and Israel.”

In March 1995, at the Central Intelligence Agency, a new Proliferation Center established by
Director Woolsey released a detailed unclassified study of the proliferation threat. This report
found a growing threat in its survey of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and chemical, biological,
nuclear and advanced conventional weapons. In addition to reporting 31 incidents involving
nuclear materials (for the period June to December 1994), the CIA report found that:

“At least 20 countries–nearly half of them in the Middle East and South Asia-already have or may
be developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile delivery systems. Five
countries–North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria–…pose the greatest threat because of the
aggressive nature of their WMD programs. All five already have or are developing ballistic
missiles that could threaten US interests…. Worsening economic conditions and the lure of
lucrative foreign sales will encourage other states or firms to engage in WMD-related technology
transfers…(and) an even more troubling issue–the potential for smuggling nuclear weapons or
nuclear-related material from the former Soviet Union–has contributed to the growing
proliferation problem.”


Regrettably, the earlier realism, professionalism and candor disappeared
with the resignation of Woolsey from the CIA. All three of the realistic strategic factors cited by
Gershwin, as well as his historical understanding that current threats could be considered
dangerous strategically, as during the Cold War were subsequently considered taboo. No doubt
that would have called for tougher anti-proliferation policies, for arms control agreements with
mandatory inspections and mandatory sanctions and for accelerated deployment of theater and
strategic anti-missile defenses. As political correctness came to dominate, all such warnings came
to be denied while the arms control and anti-missile policies became even weaker.

The Tainted National Intelligence Estimate of December 1995

The Clinton administration stalled
on new proliferation assessments throughout 1995 as it vigorously opposed Congressional efforts
to provide the national defense insurance policy of effective national anti-missile defenses,
particularly in the Contract with America and by increasing evidence of public concern about the
absence of such defenses in a volatile world. At the same time, Representative Curt Weldon and
others in the Congress pressured the administration for an updated National Intelligence Estimate on the
proliferation threat, only to encounter a stall and to be told during the year that it would be
available in May, in June in July in September, etc. Members of Congress were astonished to hear
about a new NIE and a new bottom line when the NIE was cited in a December 1, 1995 letter to
Senators opposed to efforts to assure deployment of effective anti-missile defenses as rapidly as
possible. As reported by Representative Floyd Spence, the Chairman of the House National
Security Committee at a February 1996 hearing of the Committee: “…a recently completed
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), prepared by the intelligence community, concludes that the
threat to the United States posed by long-range ballistic missiles is lower than previously believed.”

A letter by the CIA’s Director of Congressional Affairs to Senators Bumpers and Levin, written
on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), John Deutch, asserts that the previous
intelligence community estimate of the missile threat to the United States as reflected in the
language of H.R. 1530 (the FY 1996 Defense Act passed by the House and the Senate),
‘overstates what we currently believe to be the future threat.’ The letter states that it is ‘extremely
unlikely’ any nation with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would be willing to sell them;
declares that the U.S. early warning capability is ‘sufficient to provide notice many years in
advance of indigenous development”; and judges the prospect of an operational North Korean
ICBM within the next five years to be ‘very low.'”

It was soon made clear to members of Congress, and reported in official unclassified testimony by
Richard Cooper, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, that the new NIE was at
odds with prior official estimates:

“First, the Intelligence Community judges that in the next 15 years no country other than the
major declared nuclear powers will (indigenously) develop a ballistic missile that could threaten
the contiguous 48 states or Canada. Second …. North Korea is unlikely, in the next 15 years, to
obtain the technological capability to develop and deploy a longer-range ICBM capable of
reaching the contiguous 48 states.”

President Clinton cited this unreal, doctored estimate as he vetoed the Defense Bill passed by the
Congress.

The NIE’s Dangerous Assumptions

The dangerous, and ridiculous, lengths to which the Clinton administration has gone in its efforts
to disguise the proliferation threat — apparently so as to paint its counterproliferation and arms
control efforts as successes and to block U.S. strategic defense programs — are clear from the
NIE’s unclassified version as subsequently briefed to the Congress by senior CIA officials.
Testimony indicates that those who tasked the NIE simply excluded the most likely major threats
from the analysis and that the analysis was further compromised by far-fetched assumptions about
a benign global environment belied by the well-known realities previously set forth by the U.S.
government. The Clinton administration’s NIE, and the foundation of its counter-proliferation
and related arms control and missile defense policies are fatally flawed by:

  1. The exclusion of all
    “non-indigenous” threats, i.e. threats accelerated by the purchase or theft of weapons and delivery
    systems.
  2. The exclusion of threats to the “non-contiguous” states of the United States of America, i.e.
    Hawaii and Alaska, except from North Korea.
  3. The exclusion of threats from “major declared
    nuclear powers,” Russia and China, which have face “loose nukes” and proliferation problems.
  4. The false assumption that “No other potentially hostile country (other than North Korea) has
    the technical capability to develop an ICBM in the next 15 years.”
  5. The false assumption that while “any country with an indigenously developed space-launched
    vehicle (Iraq is one)…could develop an ICBM within five years…. a flight test is a sure detectable
    sign of a ballistic missile program….(and) we would almost certainly obtain earlier indicators of
    an ICBM program.”
  6. The admission that “foreign assistance can affect the pace of a missile
    program…(while claiming that) the Missile Technology Regime (MTCR) has significantly limited
    international transfers, (although) leakage…will likely continue.”
  7. The false assumption, belied, inter alia, by Russian and Ukrainian sales proposals and by the
    administration’s September 1995 “space-launcher” sales agreement and Russian, Ukrainian and
    Chinese machinations involving SS-18 ICBM stages that “we expect no country that currently has
    ICBMs will sell them.”
  8. The assumption that “we believe that an attack by cruise missiles
    launched from ships off the (US) coast would be technically feasible, but unlikely.”

Since the NIE
was issued, former CIA Director Woolsey and Lt. General Malcolm O’Neill, the former Director
of the Pentagon’s Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, have been among those sharply
criticizing the NIE and calling for a new estimate.

Arms Control, Deterrence and War

Arms control treaties and deterrence assumptions based on the effectiveness of treaties lacking
mandatory inspections and sanctions and backed by the threat of military power and the
deployment of active defenses have proved illusory and MAD Cold War theories of deterrence
based on Mutual Assured Destruction have proved dangerously obsolete.

Currently touted “bans” on chemical and biological weapons, nuclear testing and Strategic Arms
Reductions (with virtually no eliminations) cannot be effectively verified or enforced but are likely
to lead to precipitous U.S. disarmament which is likely to be largely unilateral and highly
destabilizing. While the Clinton administration is falling over backward to let Russia’s generals
make the obsolete ABM Treaty even more restrictive for U.S. defenses against proliferation, the
administration is modifying the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement against the interest of
our allies in Turkey and Norway and against our friends in the Baltic nations.

Today, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, China, Russia and other nations take little risk in their violations
of major arms control agreements. Programs to produce weapons of mass destruction have been
discovered in rogue countries like Iraq, North Korea and Iran notwithstanding the fact that their
leaders have signed treaties prohibiting such activity. Seven missile wars have been fought in the
Middle East and South Asia, e.g. between Iraq against preponderant U.S. forces, in the war
between Iraq and Iran, in Russia’s war against Afghanistan and in the Gulf War.

While receiving advanced technologies, trade rewards and billions of U.S. dollars, Russia and
China, in particular, continue to abet proliferation toward such states. The rest of the Western
world, including the United States has lax technology transfer and trade policies which further
exacerbate the problem as technologies and expertise spread rapidly to forces professing deadly
hostility to the United States.

Gulf War Lessons

If, as is surely the case, the Clinton administration is wrong in its optimistic arms control and
defense assumptions, the price in American lives and treasure will be incalculable.More Americans
were killed (28) and wounded (78) by a single Iraqi missile in the Gulf War than by any other
action. One missile nearly hit a troopship in port. Israeli cities were terrorized at considerable cost
in lives and at a reported cost of a 25% slowdown in Israel’s economy. The United States was
lucky to face primitive SCUDs with its limited capability Patriot defenses; but as it was the United
States Air Force could not find a single SCUD mobile launcher in 5,000 sorties and the only
defense we had were the Patriots.

Iraq’s SCUDs were not deployed with the chemical and biological warheads which Iraq had
developed or the nuclear warheads which it might have had available six months later. With help
from Soviet military advisors, Iraq became masterful in the techniques of “maskirovka”, deception
and denial and continues such efforts. Had Iraq launched missiles with weapons of mass
destruction, the Gulf War and thus the fate of Saudi Arabia and Israel and our strategic interest in
both, would likely have ended in disaster.

As it was, the war cost $65 billion, most paid by Saudi Arabia. If U.S. and coalition forces had
been challenged by weapons of mass destruction, if Kuwait and Saudi Arabian oil had fallen into
Iraqi hands, if the regional momentum against Israel had been fueled by Iraqi victory, or if
proliferation of cyber and information warfare technologies continues apace, the costs in lives and
treasure. would have been far higher and lasting.

Immediate Sea-borne Threats to the United States

A final note should be made on the coverup involved in the Clinton administration’s attempts to
distinguish threats to the “indigenous” United States involves the current threat from sea-borne
missiles. In addition to the intercontinental missiles and their many thousands of warheads which
can reach every part of the United States from Russia and from China, most or all of the United
States, including Washington D.C. and numerous population centers along our coasts, can be
today be hit by ship borne missiles such as SCUDs fired, ample, from Iraqi, North Korean or
Iranian ships off our shores. Lack of land silos or substantial prior testing is no impediment. As
noted by Dr. William Graham, a former presidential science advisor and former director of the
president’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament:

“Ballistic missiles do
not need to have a long range to threaten the United States. In the 1950’s, the U.S. launched
several ballistic missiles from the deck of a ship, and sent them to high altitudes where their
nuclear payloads were detonated. Most of the population of the U.S. lives near the East and West
coasts, and thus is highly vulnerable to a ship-launched missile that could be covertly deployed in
the merchant traffic several hundred miles at sea. The modifications to such a ship would not need
to be obvious, and a few test missile launches could be performed in remote locations in attempts
to avoid detection.”

The Future?

Wake up America! A mix of aggressive global trends and weak U.S. strategic policies may well
bring missile Pearl Harbor catastrophes into America’s future. Above all, the fatally flawed
multilateral anti-proliferation and arms control regimes in which the Clinton administration
entrusts America’s security and sovereignty cannot come close to guaranteeing American security
and global stability. They are lowest common defense denominator efforts which cannot substitute
for effective American diplomacy backed by effective American defense capabilities.

Without exception, as currently designed and operated by the international community, these
paper arms control regimes can be exploited by rogues for cheating and appeasement. They lack
the effective verification, effective sanctions, and capable military safeguards which could deter
proliferation and provide for America’s common defense we need against rogues wherever they
may be, including Middle East, Russia and China.

II. FOCUS ON CHINA, MFN, AND SECURITY

A special emphasis is warranted on China. As
you and other members of the House of Representatives review proliferation problems and vote
on China MFN I would like to emphasize that there is a strong strategic connection between these
two issues. If you are serious about proliferation you should not reward China with MFN, given
its poor record in proliferation, in trade, and in its aggressive behavior toward its neighbors. I
testified on these issues to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations two weeks ago, and
would like to draw on some of that testimony today. The behavior of China’s hardliners is getting
more dangerous and tough standards, not MFN, are required at this time.

Congressional leadership, American leadership, will be essential for reformers and reform in China
in setting high standards in human rights, trade, and in security issues such as countering
proliferation and having effective arms control. More than ever, a new generation of
reform-minded Chinese needs our witness and our help against an authoritarian and aggressive
tide. The high human rights and security standards set by the Helsinki accords and by Reagan
administration defense and foreign policies gave just such critical legitimacy and support to the
voices of freedom and responsibility behind the Soviet empire’s Iron Curtain.

America made a decisive difference in winning the Cold War with the Soviet Union. We can make
a key, perhaps decisive, difference as China rapidly heads for great power status. Within the next
decade or two China will be one of the world’s two or three most powerful nations. It already has
the world’s third-ranking economy and is increasing its national assertiveness as it builds regional
and strategic military might. What America does, or fails to do — what we stand for as a nation —
will have considerable influence on whether or not China’s national assertiveness will be
aggressive and whether China can turn from its reactionary Communist ideology to the path of
democracy and peace.

A — TRADE ARGUMENTS AGAINST MFN

Your deliberations on proliferation issues and your vote on Most Favored Nation status for China
are strategically interrelated. But even from a strictly trade point of view, I believe the United
States should not conduct “business as usual” by extending MFN to China this year, but should
elevate standards and step up the pressure across the board in support of reform and
responsibility. Even with this week’s movement on closing (really closing?) a number of CD
factories (as if Chinese authorities couldn’t have long done this if the CD’s involved political
dissent), China remains in breach of numerous agreements and its trading behavior has not met
proper international trade standards, much less standards deserving of a “most favored”
characterization or the “free trade” or “normal trade rules” title with which some would rename
MFN rather than face the realities.

What free trade? China has too often acted erratically and illegally, pirating our patents,
restricting markets, and engaging in corrupt practices, even as it has built up a $35 billion trade
surplus against the United States, as it ships some 40% of its exports to our shores, as it has cost
over $2 billion in copyright losses and as it has already cost a net loss of some 200,000 U.S. jobs
as estimated by AFL-CIO representatives. And why did Clinton administration U.S. Patent Office
officials indicate in April of this year that the entire U.S. patent base would be given to China,
without restrictions and for free? These facts indicate that China needs America’s technology,
investments and markets far more than we need China’s and that we are giving away the leverage
for assuring real changes in China and in the Chinese-U.S. relationship. MFN suspension may
bring some short term losses in American dollars and jobs. But he costs will be far less than if —
through kowtowing steps such as the unconditional extension of MFN — America acquiesces in
China’s trade abuses, cuts the ground out from under the reformers, and sets the United States up
for far greater longterm losses as China’s ill-gotten gains begin dramatically to undercut our
competitive advantage in key economic sectors and begin to cost us far larger numbers of dollars
and jobs. And the U .S. flow of technology is already hurting us in China’s proliferation, military
and economic activities. How can any American, businessman or not, go along with the
immorality of failing to say “no” to China’s human rights, business and military abuses? And do
Americans really not care that Chinese “People’s Liberation Army” companies are established in
the United States — including nine in California — by the very same people whose soldiers run
China’s slave-labor prison camps.

B — THE SECURITY DIMENSION — TEN REALITY
CHECKS

An equal playing field for free trade can only be assured by political freedoms backed by sound
security policies. MFN and trade must always be considered in the context of profound moral and
strategic questions involving human rights and security. There can be no secure trade, or peace or
progress if there is no democracy at home, if neighbors can be threatened abroad, if proliferation
to rogue nations can be conducted as state policy, and if agreements cannot be trusted or
enforced.

President Clinton said in April that China’s greatest security threat to America was its pollution
potential from cars — not its proliferation activities, not its military programs, not its imperial
reach. His administration acts under a dangerous post-Cold War illusion that strategic threats
have disappeared, that democracies and dictators are not really all that different, that America is
unassailable and invincible, and that we and our allies need to do little or nothing to provide for
the common defense other than to have reasonably acceptable trade relations and sign ever new
paper agreements promising good behavior in arms even if there are no effective verification
procedures, sanctions, or U.S. defense programs to back these up. In this setting the
administration has virtually ended restrictions on the flow of militarily useful advanced
technologies to China, and through China’s proliferation, to rogue nations. It is time for reality
checks, bottom-up reviews and in-depth hearings. It’s time to take the blinders off about
dangerous strategic realities about China compounded by high-risk Clinton administration policy
gambles.

1. Communist China is Not Democratic and China’s Military Leaden Are Not Under
Democratic Control.

The overall strategic reality about China is that neither China’s political and military leaders nor
their programs are under democratic control and that China’s proliferation activities and its
imperial drive to be a regional and worm power in economic and military terms continues,
unchecked by democratic limits and too often appeased by foreign powers including the United
States. The basic economic and political reality is that notwithstanding economic progress
especially in Beijing and the coastal cities of Shanghai and Guangzhou, a struggle continues
between China’s reformers and the old party cadre and clans who resist reform and who seek to
maintain a Communist society and tight national cohesion during the transition from Deng’s
“preeminent leadership.” The People’s Republic of China is not a “republic” any more than the
People’s Democratic Republics of Eastern Europe under Soviet rule. Taiwan and Hong Kong are
far more democratic and far more like real republics. The “people” the PRC leadership still most
stands for are those of the families or “clans” of the senior Communist Party officials and the
senior officer cadre of the People’s Liberation Army. They dominate political, economic, cultural
and military life. For reasons of ideology, power and privilege they are determined to avoid
Mikhail Gorbachev’s “perestroika” and “glasnost” reforms, which overthrew Gorbachev and the
Communist dictatorship and ended the Soviet Union.In this context, official Chinese claims that
China is spending only $5 billion a year on defense are patently untrue. A U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) study published in 1994 provides DoD estimates of over $30 billion and U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimates of about $50 billion annually. Expenditures
have risen since then and are supplemented by high-technology acquisitions through high priority
trade and intelligence operations. In this context too, official Chinese claims that it is not
proliferating technologies and/or weapons of mass destruction abroad are also untrue. There is no
ready way of knowing the correct Chinese defense figures or internal program details since there
is no free Chinese Congress in Beijing with the power of the purse and of appointment, nor any
free press or free political questioning. The Clinton administration all too often simply accepts
China’s explanations, excuses and behavior and even augments China’s emerging strategic threat
through advanced technology transfers.

2. China, Proliferation and Broken Treaties

A principal immediate problem is that China, along
with Russia, has the world’s worst record on the proliferation of components and technologies of
weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and that the Clinton administration is failing to act to
block such activities. I believe it is time to consider those who supply and support rogues to be
considered as rogues themselves. General Brent Scowcroft, U.S. National Security Advisor in the
Ford and Bush administrations, has warned: “The Chinese military seems to be willing to sell
weapons to anyone who can pay the price….” including militant states hostile to the United States.
China has accumulated an abysmal record of broken anti-proliferation treaties and broken U.S.
laws, a record which the Clinton administration has abetted through acquiescence. The treaties
broken by China include the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Chemical Weapons Convention. U.S. laws broken
by Chinese proliferation activities, and generally not enforced by the Clinton administration,
include the U.S. Nuclear Prevention Act, the U.S. Arms Export Control Act and the National
Defense Authorization Act. China’s role in North Korea’s nuclear and missile proliferation
activities is a case in point. It is highly suspect since North Korea’s nuclear reactors and missiles
closely resemble China’s. But China has denied knowledge or leverage in North Korea, has
opposed tough sanctions against North Korea and has recently refused to participate in
multilateral talks on future peaceful developments on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile the
Clinton administration rewarded North Korean violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
with new reactors, $4 billion, and postponed inspections of suspect sites.

China has supplied nuclear reactors to Algeria and Iran, chemical weapons materials to Syria and
Iran, and missiles to numerous countries including Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
China’s most recent illegal proliferation activities reported early in 1996, include sales to Pakistan
involving M-II missiles and 5,000 ring magnets used in gas centrifuges that enrich uranium for
weapons and which may have achieved operational status. But in addition to special problems
relating to Pakistan, it appears that China may have a larger strategic purpose in mind particularly
with Iran, which its hard-line strategists may well view as a long- term surrogate against U.S.
allies and interests in the Middle East. Early in 1996 it was reported that China had delivered
ballistic missile components, C-802 missiles, chemical weapons precursors, and nuclear weapons
related materials to Iran. In March 1996 The Washington Post reported:

“U.S. intelligence officials have concluded that companies in China are providing Iran with several
virtually complete factories suited for making deadly poison gases, an act that may violate a U.S.
law as well as China’s pledge to abide by a global treaty banning such assistance, according to
U.S. officials…. For more than a year, Washington has been monitoring a steady flow of Chinese
chemical related equipment to Iran, where it is being installed in new factories ostensibly meant to
produce industrial chemicals for commercial use. But U.S. officials say the factories have a covert
military use and have already complained to Beijing about the assistance without avail. The influx
of Chinese technology is helping to fuel what one U.S. official described as ‘the most active
chemical weapons program in the Third World.'”

With only rare and brief exceptions, the Clinton
administration has opposed application of the commercial and other sanctions established against
proliferants under U.S. laws and international treaties. The Clinton administration role has been
one of appeasement. Far from utilizing the legal and sanctions instruments at hand, the
administration has during the past year reportedly failed to act on five such cases on which the
Congress had urged the President to act. On top of everything else, he is failing to obey U.S. law.

As one example, the Clinton administration has opposed the demand of Senator Larry Pressler
and others to implement the U.S. sanctions required by the 1993 U.S. Defense Authorization Act
(co-sponsored by then Senator Albert Gore) against nations that transfer advanced weapons to
Iran or Iraq. Senator Pressler had noted that China’s cruise missile deal with Iran violates U.S. law
and “is a vital national security matter and demands immediate attention.”

3. China’s Military
Modernization — Conventional and Strategic Strike Forces

In addition to extending its strategic
reach through proliferation activities, China is building up modern strike forces designed for
regional and internal military roles and its strategic missiles, already able to reach the United
States, are being substantially augmented in their mobility and their offensive capability. The reality
of a potential Chinese strategic threat is officially denied in the Clinton administration’s public
intelligence estimates about future missile threats and is generally ignored by officials and media
focused militarily primarily on China’s gunboat diplomacy in the South China Sea and on its
military exercises and missile threats in and around Taiwan.

The serious reality is that China’s
announced military doctrine and programs call for highly mobile strike forces, with new
generations of ships (including submarines, destroyers and possibly a carrier) and advanced naval
and land-based fighter aircraft. These systems, some being acquired from abroad, are to be
equipped with modern weapons systems and high-tech command and communications linkages.

The strike forces appear to have both regional and internal security functions in asserting Beijing’s
far-reaching sovereignty claims. China’s vigorous nuclear force modernization program includes a
wide range of new strategic and intermediate-range missiles based on land and sea, and appears to
be benefiting from new flows of arms and technology from Russia. These systems include new
truck-mobile nuclear missiles whose solid-fuel propulsion and enhanced accuracy adds to their
high capability and low vulnerability. Numerous intermediate-range missiles, with strategic
potential when launched with lower-weight warheads, are hidden in caves and tunnels and
include the DF-4s. Two new ICBM systems are underway to augment the Dong Feng 5/5A
(CSS-4) — the DF-31 and the DF-41. The Julang I (CSS-N-3) missile fired from China’s
XIA-class nuclear submarines will be augmented by the intercontinental-range DF-31/JL-2.

The launches of advanced Chinese missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan in the summer of 1995 and in
March 1996 and the sales of Chinese cruise missiles to Iran which began in the 1980’s (and are of
the type with which Iraq killed Americans on the USS Stark) and were reported upgraded in April
1996, reflect modern cruise missile capabilities with which China is showing its muscle. These
capabilities are reportedly greatly enhanced by the acquisition of Western technology including
advanced computers and engine. Some of America’s biggest companies others are transferring
very sophisticated technologies to China, apparently virtually unchecked by administration
constraints. McDonnell-Douglas even permitted Chinese visits to plants where the B-1 bomber
and C-17 strategic transport plane were manufactured and sold advanced “axis” tools used to
manufacture aircraft, cruise-missiles and nuclear warheads.

4. China-Russia Strategic
Collaboration, SS-18 ICBM Proliferation, and Other New Threats

Collaboration and transfer of advanced weapons and technologies, possibly including SS-18
strategic Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to China, are increasing between Chinese
and Russian military leaders including hardliners who may wish to work against what some
perceive as common, democratic enemy, the United States.

Chinese and Russian military leaders have recently described relations as the best in decades, i.e.,
since the Stalin-Mao alliance. In September 1993 the two countries agreed not to target or use
force against each other, the former an agreement China rejected for the United States when
proposed by the Clinton administration. Following several high-level exchange visits, Yeltsin’s
April 1996 visit to Beijing cemented a close strategic partnership, with Yeltsin asserting that Russia
had not found a single point of disagreement with China. No disagreement on proliferation, nuclear
testing, technology theft, human rights abuses, border disputes?

Russia shows no apparent hesitation in providing advanced weapons and technologies, including
nuclear technologies, to China’s military. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Russian military
specialists are in China and a February 1996 Congressional staff study reported recent Chinese
purchases from Russia as including: 26 Su-27 fighters (with an additional 26 under negotiation,
and by now reportedly under contract, along with a factory to build more), 24 Mi-17 helicopters,
10 IL-76 heavy transport planes, 100 S-3O0 surface-to-air missiles and 4 mobile launchers,
advanced rocket engines and missile guidance technology, 100 Klimov/Sarkisov RD33 engines,
uranium enrichment technology and nuclear reactors.

An extremely troublesome recent development has been the possible collaboration of senior
Russian and Chinese authorities in seeking to transfer to China Russian SS-18 intercontinental
ballistic missiles, the most deadly strategic weapon of the Cold War, from a deployment site in
Ukraine. All SS-18 missiles are to be destroyed under the START II treaty, but in one of several
damaging amendments to this treaty (and to START I), the Clinton administration in September
1995 permitted Russia and Ukraine to sell the stages of such missiles anywhere in the globe as
“space launchers,” e.g. to Cuba, Iran, etc.? Of course anything that can launch a “peaceful” object
into space can also launch a warhead.

In January 1996 Ukraine expelled three Chinese nationals for trying to obtain SS-18s at a
missile-production facility in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, presumably with the cooperation of the
Russian military personnel at the site who oversee nuclear weapons security and the planned
movement of the weapons to Russia. In May 1996, these efforts were boldly renewed and the
Clinton administration, caught with its earlier space-launcher concessions seemed paralysed in
response.

5. China’s Nuclear Weapons Tests

China has recently conducted a series of nuclear weapons tests while the United States has not,
and the Clinton administration is augmenting China’s nuclear strike capabilities.

The United States and Russia have conducted no nuclear tests since 1992, a fact soon likely
critically to impair the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in a world of evident nuclear
ambitions among a number of rogue states. During this four year period, China has continued a
robust nuclear weapons test program even while asserting support for a future Comprehensive
Test Ban (CTB), a top Clinton administration priority for 1996 even though the proposed CTB
treaty cannot be effectively verified or enforced. China exploded a one megaton weapon in 1992
and conducted other large-scale nuclear tests in October 1993, in June 1994 (an H-bomb), in
October 1994, and in 1995, with indications for further tests in 1996.China points to France as an
excuse, but while France conducted six small-scale underground nuclear tests as precursors to
preparing to join the Comprehensive Test Ban agreement, France sharply contrasts with China in
key ways. All French military forces are under assured democratic civilian control, France has a
record of compliance with treaties, French military forces, including its nuclear forces, are being
sharply reduced and no French forces are targeted against the United States.

As in other aspects of China’s strategic modernization, Clinton administration policy on China’s
nuclear testing has been one of continuing acquiescence, and even assistance. Early in the
administration, for example, according to an October 1994 report in The New York Times: “After
China’s test last October (1993), President Clinton instructed Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary to
begin reviewing options to resume American testing at the Nevada test range (but) when this
threat drew no response from the Chinese, the White House conceded that nothing it could do in
the form of pressure could dissuade Beijing, and the effort was abandoned.”

In October 1994, incredibly, Secretary of Defense William Perry publicly offered advanced U.S.
computer technologies to China for the specific purpose of simulating nuclear weapons tests and
thus directly increasing potential threats against America’s cities if hardliners prevail in China. The
computers are reportedly of higher quality than the advanced computers deployed on the U.S.
AEGIS cruisers. How can the Clinton administration claim an antiproliferation policy when it
undertakes such dangerous gambles?

6. China’s Biological and Chemical Weapons Programs

China has a very poor record on chemical and biological weapons agreements and related
proliferation activities.

U.S. government reports have repeatedly noted China’s violations in the area of chemical and
biological weapons programs. The annual compliance report to the Congress issued by the
President and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1994, noted that: “China’s CBM
mandated declarations (Confidence Building-Measures of the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Conventions) have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program and there are strong indications
that China probably maintains its offensive programs.” The classified version of this ACDA report
reportedly was even more explicit in condemning these treaty violations.

An April 1996 proliferation report issued by the office of Secretary of Defense William Perry,
described China’s programs as follows: “China has a mature chemical warfare capability and may
well have maintained the biological warfare program it had prior to acceding to the Biological
Weapons Convention in 1984. It has funded a chemical warfare program since the 1950’s and has
produced and weaponized a wide variety of agents. Its biological warfare program included
manufacturing infectious micro-organisms and toxins. China has a wide range of delivery means
available, including ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, and is continuing to develop systems
with upgraded capabilities.”

7. China’s Espionage and the Abuse of China’s Defense “Conversion”
and U.S. Aid

China’s technological and military espionage activities have been stepped up
significantly and are reportedly abetted by the U.S.-China Joint Defense Conversion Commission
established in 1994 by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry and China’s General Ding Henggao,
Director of the Commission for Science Technology and Industry for National Defense
(COSTIND). The Clinton administration is ignoring serious warnings that China is stealing or
buying advanced dual-use technologies which will undermine U.S. military security and our
commercial competitiveness in the future. Already two years ago, Senator Larry Pressler warned
that: “The Chinese are engaged in an unprecedented espionage campaign and nuclear weapons
buildup…but I can’t get senior Clinton administration officials to acknowledge the threat.”
Representative Nancy Pelosi, a member of the House Intelligence Committee, similarly warned
that “China is engaged in a full-court press to obtain American high technology to modernize its
military….” Yet, said Pelosi, Washington has “turned a blind eye to this practice.”

In addition to serious economic consequences, including grave long-run damage to the
competitiveness of U.S. companies, dangerous security implications derive from China’s
acquisition of sensitive technologies whose transfer the Clinton administration has encouraged
notwithstanding their high military and proliferation potential, e.g. advanced computers, cruise
missile engines and satellites. According to Time magazine, U.S. intelligence officials reportedly
warned the administration about one such transfey in April 1994, involving the sale of rocket
engines, that “China will gain high-quality military technology, which could be used for a new
generation of cruise missiles…(which) would put most of the rest of Asia within range of Chinese
nuclear attack.” Secretary of Defense Perry has continued to place great confidence in the
reliability of General Ding, COSTIND and China’s “conversion,” and has sought substantial U.S.
taxpayer funds to support the COSTIND effort even though this project and its participants are
highly suspect. U.S. defense intelligence analysts have identified COSTIND as an espionage
organization “attempting to steal foreign technology with military applications, primarily from the
United States.” General Ding is described in his own official biography as having “organized and
coordinated research and production of strategic missiles and the launching of satellites.”

China’s paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, has officially defined China’s “defense conversion”
programs as follows: “Combine military and civilian, combine war and peace, give first priority to
military products and make civilian products finance the military.” Lt. General James Clapper, the
former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has testified to the Congress that the China’s
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a role in all important Chinese industrial and business
organizations, especially those involving joint ventures with foreigners. Through PLA business
ventures, and the participation of the Chinese intelligence services in the PLA’s dealings, U.S.
technology is thus immediately vulnerable to being skimmed off for the purpose of accelerating
China’s ambitious military modernization programs, programs which may threaten U.S. allies and
U.S. forces in the future. According to recent testimony by AFL-CIO officials at least eight
businesses have been established in California by the PLA, the same institution which runs China’s
slave labor camps. It should be noted that while China enthusiastically uses its military and
business relationships as well as its overseas students and business contacts for technological
espionage, it severely restricts the flow of even appropriate legitimate information to western
businesses. New Chinese restrictions announced in February 1996 led Clinton administration
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to note plaintively that: “This is, of course, an issue of free
speech and censorship, but it is also at the heart of our trade relationship ….clearly it is a step in
the wrong direction, to state the obvious.” Indeed!

8. Chinese Colonialism

In its regional imperial drive, China has used military force not only against Taiwan, but also in
pressing its extensive territorial claims in territories of the South China Sea, including the oil-rich
Spratly and Pescadores islands, in gun boat battles with Philippine and Vietnamese ships. China is
also building bases in Burma and in the Indian Ocean.

In support of its extensive sovereignty claims beyond the mainland, China has engaged in gunboat
diplomacy, has sought aerial refueling capabilities, has bought advanced strike aircraft such as
Su-27s, and is seeking an aircraft carrier and other force projection capabilities while also building
up mobile rapid-reaction forces around China’s periphery.

Fighting what senior Communist leaders consider the virus of democracy and self-rule wherever it
arises — whether in Tiananmen, Tibet, or Xinjiang, whether in Taiwan or in Hong Kong — China
rejects international human rights standards anywhere in China’s orbit. China has made clear that
when it takes over Hong Kong in July 1997 and Macao in 1999 it will remove existing democratic
laws, officials and institutions.

China appears to view the 21 million people of Taiwan much like Saddam Hussein viewed the
people of Kuwait, which he called Iraq’s 19th province and then proceeded to invade. Mainland
China has not controlled Taiwan for over a hundred years, since 1895, and has maintained a
Communist Party dictatorship while Taiwan has made great strides toward democracy. Taiwan
surely has no desire or capability to attack the mainland and represents no conceivable military
threat whatsoever, yet Chinese acts of war launched missiles at Taiwan and the international
waters around it.

Isn’t it time that the people of Taiwan should feel secure in their democracy and their
self-determination without fear of attack from China and that the United States fully supports
them in this process, as required by morality and by U.S. law? If China can accept “two systems
one country,” why not “two systems, two countries?” As The New York Times editorialized in
February 1996, “There increasingly is a case to be made for Taiwanese independence. Taiwan has
not been ruled by China for most of the last century. It has a different political and economic
system and its people enjoy a freedom and affluence many rightly fear could not survive under
Communist rule.”

9. A Range of Potential Threats to America’s Security

In addition to proliferation dangers which can rapidly threaten U.S. forces and allies overseas,
U.S. intelligence and Defense Department officials have recently noted that China’s military
build-up, both strategic and conventional, has increasingly serious implications for United States
security. In May 1994, the then head of the Pentagon’s Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Lt.
General Malcolm O’Neill, told the Congress that U.S. intelligence analysts expected growing
numbers of Chinese missiles to be aimed at the United States and its interests. While China signed
a non-targeting agreement with Russia, it turned down Clinton administration requests for such a
symbolic arrangement (unverifiable though it would have been) and some analysts report that
China’s nuclear doctrine calls for use of nuclear weapons not simply for deterrence against hard
military targets such as U.S. missile silos, but against “soft” targets, i.e. American cities. The
Clinton administration has no arms control sanctions or missile defense programs available or
planned which could possibly handle such threats effectively.

In a 1995, the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense concluded that
the pace of China’s military modernization program, which includes substantial conventional force
improvements, would enable China to defeat U.S. forces in a regional military conflict in Asia by
the year 2020. During the March 1996 Chinese missile launches over and around Taiwan, a
Chinese official went so far as to threaten Los Angeles with nuclear attack if the U.S. were to
defend Taiwan against invasion from mainland China. In recent months, Chinese criminal mafias
have been caught repeatedly in immigrant smuggling and narcotics operations in the United
States. A new level of danger with potential fire-spark implications for America’s inner cities
occurred in May 1996. Chinese agents, linked to a Chinese company directed by officials tied to
China’s top leaders, were caught in an FBI sting operation in San Francisco selling 2,000 AK-47
automatic assault rifles and numerous hand grenades and offering Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to
Americans whom the Chinese apparently assumed were criminals or radical militants likely to use
them against American people and institutions in our inner cities. That’s proliferation truly coming
home to U.S. cities! Why don’t those who favor gun control move to exert gun control over
China’s guns and China’s riot promotion in the United States?

10. In Sum: The Fatal Consequences of Clinton Administration Policy Incoherence toward China
and the World

I believe there has never been anything, even during the Carter administration, like the Clinton
administration’s high-risk gambles and continuing confusion and weakness in U.S. defense and
foreign policy. Unless reversed, this administration’s policies will bring America major disasters,
of which a failed China policy will be just one.

At the height of the 1996 Taiwan crisis, and as China has been caught in a series of dangerous
proliferation schemes, a Washington Post editorial captured some of the flavor of the Clinton
administration’s fatally confused China strategy as follows: “Let’s go through this carefully.
American intelligence believes China has been selling sensitive nuclear weapons related equipment….
American law and policy prescribe a range of economic and other penalties for these
dangerous contributions to nuclear spread. Yet the Clinton administration is described as leaning
toward waiving the sanctions. The reason given is to ease tensions with Beijing and to improve
the climate in which efforts would be made to persuade China to curb those exports in the future.
That’s right: The Chinese are the accused violators, and the Americans–as the complaining and
injured party–are backing off….” (Emphasis added.)

The Post editorial continued: “It is already established that the Clinton administration is putting
trade over human rights in its China policy, even though the mellowing that trade was expected to
bring about is so far not in sight. Now it is being established that the administration is putting
trade–‘There are tremendous commercial opportunities there, export chief Ron Brown said this
week–river nonproliferation as well. The administration’s China policy is on the edge of
incoherence. The Chinese could be forgiven for thinking that in any given case they “…can press at
the margins, play on the differences among the elements of American government and society and
have their way by standing firm.” (Emphasis added.)

In fostering extraordinarily weak norms for multilateral arms control, including antiproliferation
agreements and in all too often appeasing Russia’s hardliners on START, national missile
defenses, Chechnya (Boris Lincoln?), economic reform, etc. the Clinton administration continues
to set very poor policy precedents. They undercut reformers and appease Communist nationalists,
not only in Russia but also in a China unaccustomed to keeping agreements or meeting
international human fights standards.

Unwilling to punish China’s proliferation activities and violations of numerous existing arms
control agreements, the Clinton administration has actually stepped up the flow of advanced
dual-purpose technology to China and pushed for new arms control agreements which China is as
unlikely to heed in areas of nuclear testing, chemical weapons, retargeting, etc.. Trade, and unfair
trade at that, has been elevated far above the efforts to improve the human fights, proliferation
and military abuses that should have been at the core of a developing U.S.-Chinese relationship.As
Deng fades from the scene, it is especially necessary for America to stop treating China’s leaders
like children and instead seriously to step up to China’s hardliners and to buttress the cause of the
reformers and fundamental reform. It is essential to hold China to fulfillment of its international
obligations in human fights, trade and arms control. We need new policies, new programs and a
Pacific Democracy Defense Program and more.

On proliferation issues, as on China policy generally, U.S. appeasement will only increase the
militancy and leverage of hardliners in China and elsewhere around the world. Unless reversed,
current policy is sure to set back the cause of reform, responsibility and peace, and to increase
potential threats from China and the rogues to whom it is proliferating dangerous military
technologies. These threats endanger not only key U.S. allies in Asia, but to vital U.S. interests in
that region and to the United States homeland itself.

‘USEFUL IDIOTS’: WHY WOULD ANY AMERICAN HELP FIDEL CASTRO BRING HIS CUBAN CHERNOBYLS ON-LINE?

(Washington, D.C.): An article in today’s Washington
Times
offers the latest evidence that the Clinton
Administration is bent on normalizing relations with
Fidel Castro’s Cuba
. While it notes the official
party line — “a White House spokesman said there
has been ‘no weakening’ of the President’s commitment to
the economic embargo” against Cuba — the report
illustrates just how weak that commitment actually is:

“…Mr. Kavulich [president of the U.S.-Cuba
Trade and Economic Council, one of a number of such
councils established to open and/or foster trade with
Communist nations], who arranged business meetings
for Mr. Castro when the Cuban leader visited New York
last year, confirmed widespread reports that the
State Department is advising [American] companies to
make their Cuban contacts now in anticipation of the
embargo being eased or lifted
. ‘We deal with
State and Treasury every day,’ Mr. Kavulich said.
‘We’ve heard the exact same statement.'”
(Emphasis added.)

A Classic Bait-and-Switch

Even as the Clinton Administration sends such signals
to corporations more interested in exploiting a new,
cheap work force and selling products to an untapped
market than in freedom for Cuba, it is going to
extraordinary lengths to elicit support from
Cuban-American voters determined to secure a Cuba
Libre.
Notably, the Administration recently
undertook what appeared to be a politically motivated
purge of virtually its entire Cuba policy-making team, a
group whose unabashed determination to restore normal
relations with Castro was a serious irritant to the
influential Cuban-American community. Among the departed
(or departing) are: Morton Halperin, Senior
Director for Democracy, National Security Council; Edward
Casey,
Deputy Assistant of State for Inter-American
Affairs; Richard Feinberg, Senior Director for
Inter-American Affairs, National Security Council; Arturo
Valenzuela,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs; and Michael Skol,
Principal Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs.

The Administration’s ideological agenda is such,
however, that it will almost certainly act to ease or end
the embargo immediately after the November election — whether
President Clinton is reelected or not.
While such
a step will be dressed up in the sort of trade promotion uber
alles
policy that has been used to justify, for
example, normalization of relations with Vietnam and
ignoring malevolent Chinese behavior, its practical
effect will be to achieve a longstanding goal of the
American Left: providing life-support for Fidel Castro’s
failed, despotic regime.

Enter the Cuban Chernobyl

There is though one major problem. Castro appears
determined to bring on-line two Soviet-designed VVER-440
nuclear reactors that are approaching completion near
Cienfuegos, Cuba. As knowledgeable defectors href=”96-D13.html#N_1_”>(1), the General
Accounting Office, NBC News and the Center for Security
Policy (2)
(among others) have pointed out, there is ample reason
to believe that such a step will give rise to a nuclear
accident, possibly involving the dissemination of deadly
levels of radiation over much of the United States.

The following are among the defects that have been
identified in the Juragua nuclear reactors:

  • As many as fifteen percent of the 5,000 welds
    joining pipes used in the reactors’ auxiliary
    plumbing system, containment dome and spent
    fuel-cooling system are known to be flawed.

    According to Vladimir Cervera, the senior
    engineer responsible for overseeing quality
    control at the Juragua reactor, X-rays showed
    welded pipe joints weakened by air pockets, bad
    soldering and heat damage. Bear in mind that, if
    a single weld
    in a U.S. reactor were
    suspected of being defective, the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission would never allow it to go
    on-line and, if discovered after that step had
    occurred, would immediately suspend nuclear
    operations.
  • As most of the Juragua complex’s welds are now
    encased in concrete, it is impossible to identify
    which are defective examining an x-ray of each
    one. Unfortunately, the Cuban intelligence
    services are reported to have destroyed such
    x-ray imagery and other documentation concerning
    safety violations. Corrective action will, as a
    result, be near impossible; at a minimum, it will
    require massive deconstruction and costly
    repairs.
  • Sixty-percent of the materials supplied by the
    former Soviet Union for use in these reactors is
    defective.
    Soviet advisors reportedly told
    Cuban officials they could not guarantee that
    valves installed in the first reactor’s emergency
    cooling system would function under certain
    conditions.
  • Worse yet, much of the reactor’s equipment —
    including the reactor vessel, six steam
    generators, five primary coolant pumps, twelve
    isolation valves and other sensitive gear — has
    been left exposed to the elements and sea air for
    as long as eighteen months
    . In tropical
    areas, such machinery must be stored in climate
    controlled facilities to avoid serious corrosion
    and other damage which can cause a breach in the
    structural integrity of nuclear reactors. Such
    corrosion has already taken place.
  • In a number of cases, equipment designed for
    one specific function has been used for other
    purposes when the appropriate components were
    unavailable.
    This sort of jury- rigging
    increases the chances of systemic failures.
  • Construction supporting primary reactor
    components contains numerous structural defects
    .
  • The first reactor’s dome would not be able to
    contain overpressures associated with meltdown
    conditions.
    The upper portion of the
    containment dome has been designed to withstand
    pressures of seven pounds-per-square-inch —
    versus some 50 pounds-per-square-inch required of
    U.S. reactors. In addition, the reactor
    containment structure contains defective welds in
    its seals.
  • Cuba’s human and technological infrastructure
    is vastly inferior to that of the former Soviet
    Union.
    And as the Chernobyl accident
    demonstrated at incalculable cost, even the old
    Soviet infrastructure proved inadequate safely to
    design, construct and operate nuclear plants.
  • Finally, there is reason to believe that the
    Cienfuegos area is seismically active — a
    reckless place to put even well-designed and
    -constructed
    nuclear reactors
    .

‘Useful Idiots’ Tour a ‘Potemkin Village

Understandably, few Americans would support
improvement of relations with a regime bent on creating a
Chernobyl 180 miles off the U.S. coast.
After all, as
Roger W. Robinson, Jr. — former Chief Economist at the
National Security Council and a long-time member of the
Center for Security Policy’s Board of Advisors — told
the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee
on the Western Hemisphere on 1 August 1995:

“A Cuban nuclear accident — either of a
technical nature or the result of sabotage — could
have a similar effect to the detonation of a
nuclear device near the United States, causing a
plume of radioactive fallout that, depending on the
season and prevailing winds, could either stretch
across the lower tier of the country to Texas or race
up the eastern seaboard to Washington D.C. and
possibly beyond within the first four days.

The Cuban government has, therefore, been anxious to
allay concerns about its irretrievably flawed nuclear
reactor program. It has sought to discredit the expert
testimony of defectors. It has opened negotiations with
various European and Latin American companies and
Russia’s notorious Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom)
aimed at giving the reactors a patina of safety by
importing Western technology and know-how. Unfortunately
for Fidel, the defectors are too credible to be
cavalierly dismissed, even if other, independent U.S.
experts were not concurring in their assessments. What is
more, the structural nature of the problems they have
identified cannot be adequately offset by improved safety
controls and management techniques.

Faced with these impediments, Castro appears to have
taken pages from the Kremlin’s favorite playbook: Offer a
brief, and inevitably superficial, tour of the site
(reminiscent of Catherine the Great’s misleading
experience of a “Potemkin village”) to a group
of sympathetic Americans with no relevant technical
expertise (what the Soviet Communists used to call
“useful idiots”). Since the participants
would be unable to evaluate for themselves what they see,
and since in any event they will be unable to see
the most serious structural problems, their trip report
could be expected to confuse — if not diffuse — U.S.
popular anxieties about the Juragua facility.

Accordingly, the Castro regime has just hosted a
delegation organized by Wayne Smith (a former U.S.
diplomat who has become a full-time promoter of
normalized relations with Cuba) and comprised primarily
of retired military officers associated with the
left-wing Center for Defense Information (CDI). Also in
the company was Jack Mendelsohn, an official of the Arms
Control Association, a fervent disarmament advocacy
group. None of these individuals appear to have any
training that would enable them to evaluate the risks
associated with bringing the Cuban reactors near
Cienfuegos on-line.

One of the delegation’s leaders, the CDI’s Deputy
Director, Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, USN (Ret.),
obligingly announced in Cuba at the end of the tour:
“The cry of another Chernobyl is a red herring by
people who don’t want the plant completed.” Reuters
reported:

“The visiting group, while stressing that
safety fears were premature pending completion of
Juragua near the central port of Cienfuegos, said the
United States should get more closely involved in
finding out about Cuba’s plans. ‘If the United States
has problems [with the plant] it ought to get
involved in seeing what’s happening,’ said Jack
Mendelsohn.”

Such sentiments are likely to be a prominent feature
of a Washington news conference the delegation has
scheduled for Monday, 12 February.

But as Rep. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) — a
Cuban-American who serves on the House International
Relations Committee’s Western Hemisphere Subcommittee —
observed yesterday:

I cannot accept the statements by retired
military personnel who are visiting Cuba that cannot
be reconciled with the expert testimony and other
information we have received before our Subcommittee.

We have heard from those who have worked on the
Juragua project as well as from the GAO whose study
established that there are clear risks of an accident
with the reactors near Cienfuegos due to defective
welding, lack of controls and other nuclear
regulatory regimes.

It is hard to see how individuals whose
own background lacks practical or scientific
knowledge in the field can be reassured by Cuban
officials.
In my mind, such reassurances are
clearly not a sufficient basis to go forward with
turning on a defective plant, given the high risk
stakes for our Nation.”

The Bottom Line

The American people are entitled to know the truth
about the Clinton Administration’s agenda for normalizing
relations with Fidel Castro’s Cuba. They are also
entitled to the truth about the dangers posed by
Castro’s nuclear program. The latest delegation may be
designed to advance the true Clinton agenda aimed at
easing and/or ending the trade embargo against Cuba. It
will do so by obscuring, rather than illuminating, the
facts concerning the potential for a genuine Cuban
Chernobyl-equivalent.

The Center for Security Policy urges Rep. Menendez —
and such other leading legislators as Reps. Benjamin
Gilman (R-NY), Dan Burton (R-IN), Lincoln Diaz-Balart and
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Republicans of Florida) and Senators
Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Connie Mack (R-FL) — urgently to
convene further hearings on the Cienfuegos program. Their
purpose should be to ensure that American policy toward
Cuba is based upon the real and incipient threat posed by
the Castro regime, and not on disinformation or
wishful thinking.

Clear markers should also be laid down now by
the Congress that any foreign companies or government
agencies (e.g., Russia’s MinAtom) which decides to
participate in supplying components or financing for the
completion of the Juragua reactors — even if such
support is advertized as being for
“safety-enhancement purposes” — will face
swift import control sanctions
, forcing such entities
to choose between doing business with Castro and with the
vast American marketplace. In this manner, the United
States can probably stop the Cuban Chernobyl-equivalent
in its tracks and avoid the serious rupture in
U.S. relations with Germany, France, Britain, Italy,
Brazil and Russia should these countries (or their
nationals) be seen as bearing some responsibility for
making that sort of disaster possible.

– 30 –

(1) One of these defectors is Dr.
José Oro, former Minister of Industries and Director of
the Geophysics Agency for the Cuban government during
construction of the Juragua reactor. He recently offered
the following summary of the problems with this nuclear
complex:

“The most remarkable defects of the Juragua
nuclear plant involve: 1) the poor quality of the
welding of the pipes in the cooling system, 2)
inconsistent concrete standards due to the layering
of Soviet-supplied construction materials and Cuban
supplies during different phases of the project and
3) the absence of a depository for low, medium and
high level waste materials (as required by the IAEA
in Vienna as a necessary precondition for licensing
fuel purchases and operation of the plant).”

Another knowledgeable defector is engineer Vladimir
Cervera, who when asked if there was a danger of a
nuclear catastrophe at the plant answered, “Yes, I’m
sure of that….I saw by myself [the] defect inside the
welding joint[s].”

(2) For example, see the Center’s Decision
Briefs
entitled Center’s Robinson Urges
Congress to Thwart the Coming Cuban Chernobyl Nuclear
Crisis
(No. 95-P 51,
2 August 1995), Cuban Chernobyl: Congress Must Send
a Message to Moscow, Allies — Not in Our Backyard!

(No. 95-D 40, 26 June
1995), Castro’s Potemkin Nuclear Shutdown:
Chernobyl at Cienfuegos Still in Prospect
( href=”92-D_108″>No. 92-D 108, 10
September 1992), and A Ticking Anniversary Present:
Will Russia Give us a Chernobyl Ninety Miles Off the U.S.
Shore?
(No. 92-D 41,
8 May 1992).

‘Having It Both Ways’: Clinton’s Assault On National Security Would Gut Nuclear Deterrent And Prevent Missile Defense

(Washington, D.C.): President Clinton’s announcement Friday that he has decided to overrule the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other defense experts by forswearing all future nuclear testing capped a week of serious damage inflicted by him and his Administration on national security. The cumulative, adverse effect of Clinton actions will represent a "double whammy" for America: an inevitable erosion in the safety, reliability and effectiveness — in other words, the credibility — of the U.S. nuclear arsenal at the very moment that the President is trying to postpone indefinitely the deployment of anti-missile defenses, systems that might lessen somewhat the risks associated with such a step.

 

Double Whammy, Doublespeak

The convergence of these two developments demonstrates Mr. Clinton’s real disregard for the Nation’s long-term security interests, to say nothing of his utter disingenuousness. After all, the JCS know all too well the important role realistic nuclear testing has played in ensuring that U.S. nuclear weapons work properly when they are supposed to and — will not go off under other circumstances. According to an analysis produced by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, "one third of all the [nuclear] weapon designs placed in the U.S. stockpile between 1958 and 1987 required and received post-deployment nuclear tests to resolve problems." It goes on to say: "In three-quarters of these cases, the problems were identified as a result of nuclear testing."

To be sure, the President has glibly promised to spend "billions of dollars" for something euphemistically known as nuclear "stockpile stewardship." In this connection, significant sums will be expended to develop an array of exotic scientific techniques and facilities. It is hoped that they will, over time, be roughly as useful as nuclear testing, particularly in understanding the changes old nuclear weapons are undergoing. This is a priority since the average age of U.S. nuclear arms is already at a historical high, and going higher.

Still, to get the Joint Chiefs of Staff to drop their opposition to a permanent ban on all nuclear testing, President Clinton had to promise them an out: In essence, he pledged to include an escape clause in the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty now under negotiation. Mr. Clinton says, if it once again turns out that we have to conduct nuclear tests because "the safety or reliability of our nuclear deterrent [can] no longer be assured," he would exercise the U.S. right to withdraw from the CTB, citing its "supreme national interests."

Risky Business

This is a stunning pronouncement insofar as it belies the oft-asserted claim by opponents of nuclear testing, namely that the stockpile’s safety and reliability can be assured indefinitely without conducting further tests. At the very least, President Clinton is implicitly acknowledging the truth — to abandon testing is to take real, if hard-to-quantify, risks with the Nation’s deterrent.

Consider, for example, the implications of a test ban for nuclear safety. Today, roughly five thousand weapons in the U.S. stockpile contain an explosive material that is prone to accidental detonation. In the event one of these devices is exposed to fire or dropped, it could go off. Such an event would probably not cause a nuclear explosion, but it could catastrophically disperse radioactive material far and wide.

 

Thanks to past nuclear testing and developmental efforts, however, approximately one-third of the stockpile has already been equipped with material known as Insensitive High Explosive (IHE) that is far less susceptible to such dangers. For safety’s sake, most — if not all — of the remaining two-thirds of the arsenal should be modified with IHE, as well.

 

Unfortunately, given the exacting specifications associated with nuclear weapons designs and significant differences between the behavior of IHE and conventional high explosive, the former cannot simply be substituted for the latter. Appreciable design changes are required, the sort of changes whose effects on weapons performance can today only be confidently verified through nuclear tests. As recently as last month, the JASONs — an influential government-sponsored scientific advisory panel — cautioned that "discipline" will be needed in a no-test environment to avoid design changes that could compromise stockpile reliability.

 

In short, if all nuclear testing is foreclosed, the United States will have to choose between making its aging arsenal as safe as it knows how to or sacrificing confidence in the reliability and performance of its weapons. As the JASONs put it: "…Testing of nuclear weapons at the 500-ton yield level…[conducted on an ongoing basis] can add to long- term stockpile confidence."

 

Testing and Proliferation

 

Unfortunately, the JASONs nonetheless conclude in their recent report that the United States can dispense with testing. "…In the last analysis, the technical contribution of such a testing program must be weighed against its costs and its political impact on the non-proliferation goals of the United States." There are, of course, two problems with this conclusion. First of all, the contention that nuclear testing is incompatible with restraining proliferation is a political judgment, not a technical one. Consequently, while the JASONs are entitled to their opinions on this score, those opinions should not be accorded particular weight simply because they are held by individuals with scientific expertise.

 

Second, such a "grain of salt" approach is all the more necessary given that there has yet to be demonstrated any connection between U.S. nuclear testing and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is so notwithstanding the mantra-like assertion for decades by anti-nuclear activists that such a correlation exists.

 

The truth is that Little Boy, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima fifty years ago last week, had not been tested before its operational use. Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are widely believed to have nuclear weapons, yet they are not known to have conducted tests of their devices. And no one has plausibly demonstrated that the status of the U.S. nuclear test program has been a factor in decisions to "go nuclear" made by these countries — or, for that matter, those taken by Iran, Iraq, Syria, South Africa, Brazil or other once-or-future nuclear wannabes. Instead, local strategic considerations have been the preeminent consideration in each case.

 

In fact, history suggests that U.S. nuclear testing is not necessarily inconsistent with restraint in nuclear proliferation. After all, as admirers of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are wont to point out, the first three decades after the NPT came into effect saw only a handful of states become nuclear powers, far fewer than President Kennedy and others feared might be the case. Throughout this period, however, the United States engaged in a program of routine testing of its nuclear arsenal.

 

What ‘Escape Clause’?

 

President Clinton’s promise to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to withdraw, should the need arise, from a Comprehensive Test Ban is preposterous for one other reason. Even as he was formally announcing that commitment, Mr. Clinton was insisting that the United States could not get out of another arms control accord — the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty — despite the fact that it too has a "supreme national interests" clause. Could esoteric (and inevitably debatable) technical arguments about the need for testing to fix suspected problems with U.S. nuclear weapons possibly be more compelling than the present arguments for ending American vulnerability to missile attack in the face of a large and growing proliferation threat? It will take an extraordinarily courageous and principled leader to resist the pressure that will exist then, as now, to give greater weight to the diplomatic and arms control costs entailed than the security benefits made possible by a treaty withdrawal.

Importantly, the Administration has used just this argument to persuade the U.S. Senate to abandon an initiative aimed at defending the American people against missile attack. This initiative was specifically approved by a majority of Senators no fewer than three times within the past ten days. (1) As a result of negotiations conducted on the Administration’s behalf by Democratic Senators Sam Nunn and Carl Levin with Republican Senators John Warner and William Cohen, though, a "bipartisan compromise" has been developed as a substitute for the Senate-blessed language in S.1026, the FY1996 Defense authorization bill. When reduced to its essence, the compromise satisfies the Clinton objective of assuring the United States’ continued vulnerability to missile strikes for the foreseeable future.

Getting It ‘Both Ways’?

As it happens, on 4 August — the day after the Senate defeated two separate attempts to strike S.1026’s plan for deploying anti-missile defenses — it also debated the issue of nuclear testing. The latter fight was over whether to approve the use of $50 million in funds authorized for the Department of Energy so as to allow preparations for low-yield "hydronuclear" tests. The Senate voted 56-44 to approve such preparations.

This action, however, preceded (and perhaps impelled) the President’s announcement last Friday. His decision to ban all nuclear tests would preclude the U.S. from conducting even extremely low-yield tests (for example, those that produce as little of a blast as the equivalent of four pounds of high explosive) as part of the nuclear stockpile stewardship program. The absurdity of such restraint is evident from the fact that, if such tests are conducted by others, they will be undetectable. Interestingly, one of the Senate’s most rabid CTB enthusiasts, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) told the Senate in 1992 that these low-yield tests "need not be limited under a Comprehensive Test Ban."

 

In the course of the debate on testing, Senator Jon Kyl, a Republican freshman from Arizona who has already established himself as one of the institution’s most formidable experts on national security matters, made the following trenchant observation:

 

"…I…find it ironic that some people on the floor [yesterday] were suggesting that the reason we did not need missile defenses is because we could rely upon our Triad, our nuclear Triad. You cannot have it both ways. If you are not going to test [the] reliability and safety of the Triad, then you should be supporting missile defense. If you are not going to support missile defense, then you ought to be supporting the effectiveness of our nuclear Triad."

The Clinton Administration, of course, does want to have it both ways. On the one hand, it wants to continue its self-declared policy of "denuclearization." If left to its own devices, its pursuit of this policy — of which the complete cessation of nuclear testing is but one, small part — will ensure that President Clinton bequeaths to his successor: a nuclear deterrent that is the oldest in our history; an obsolete and non-functioning infrastructure for producing nuclear weapons; and a demoralized and inadequate work-force that may be incapable of ensuring that the Nation’s nuclear arsenal remains safe, reliable and effective. As Senator Richard Bryan, a Democrat from Nevada, told his colleagues on 4 August: "The combination of an aging stockpile and the decaying nuclear weapons expertise at the Nevada test site and at the [national] labs poses a direct threat to the safety and reliability of our stockpile." Were the Senate to reconsider and reverse its 4 August vote on nuclear testing, it would be contributing to such a threat.

On the other hand, the Administration wants to deny this country the sort of insurance policy that missile defenses might offer as a hedge against a precipitous, risky "denuclearization" program. Mr. Clinton does not want to deploy any kind of missile defenses that might protect the American people and homeland. He is intent upon negotiating new agreements with the Russians that will both make such deployments still more problematic and greatly complicate the fielding of effective theater missile defenses. And the President wants no part of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty — or any other arms control accord — despite the threats unilateral U.S. compliance entail to this country’s supreme national interests. Regrettably, the Nunn-Levin-Warner-Cohen "compromise" would provide Clinton and Company political cover for each of these undesirable agendas.

The Bottom Line

Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the Congress should be under any illusion: The Clinton Administration is intent upon subordinating clear national security requirements to utopian arms control notions. Each failure by the military and/or the legislative branch to resist such efforts makes it that much harder to do down the road.

 

The Senate should stick by its guns: As long as the United States relies upon nuclear weapons for deterrence, it will have to conduct some periodic tests of those weapons. If one wishes to lessen the need for deterrence based upon nuclear weapons, then one must ensure there is an alternative; active defenses to missile and other attacks can contribute to such an alternative security posture. A policy that provides neither for the nuclear testing necessary to support the first nor the funding and programs necessary for the second is simply irresponsible. That reality is not altered, merely obscured, by defective arms control agreements like an unverifiable Comprehensive Test Ban accord and the obsolete ABM Treaty.

 

– 30 –

 

(1) For more on the Senate’s initial efforts to begin defending America, see the Center for Security Policy’s Decision Brief entitled, Profile in Courage: Dole’s Leadership Keeps Senate on Track to Defend America, Contrasts Sharply With Clinton (No. 95-D 54, 11 August 1995).

Excerpts of TESTIMONY BY ROGER W. ROBINSON, JR.

"The bottom line concerning recent reports of the [Cienfuegos] project’s revival under the sponsorship and coordination of Moscow is simply this: The Jurgua complex is even more frighteningly flawed and unacceptable today — given the passage of time and corrosive exposure to the elements — than it was some three years ago.

 

Why Cienfuegos Matters

"Today the United States is simultaneously facing several fateful foreign policy crossroads — the Balkans crisis, China policy, the Middle East peace process, managing Iraq, Iranian nuclear and oil-related developments, the Korean peninsula and others. The White House has thus far generally erred on the side of "engagement" as opposed to containment, isolation (e.g., like that of Iran) or even, in the case of Bosnia, limited military action. China broke the code for Cuba and other centrally-controlled economies on permitting economic liberalization while maintaining repressive political control.

 

"As shrewd observers of the international scene — assisted by the massive Russian signals-intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba — Fidel and his associates have had little difficulty in judging the time propitious to either complete their existing fatally-flawed VVER-440 reactors or shake down the U.S. and international community for some kind of substantial compensatory alternative. After all, what other conclusion can Havana reasonably reach from the cynical, short-sighted Western policies on display in the North Korean reactor-payoff scheme and the Russian-Iranian nuclear gambit? In short, it is clear to the Castro government that, with Moscow’s help, the United States can be had.

 

"Like Moscow’s two-strand Siberian gas pipeline deal in the early 1980’s, the Cienfuegos complex is an unprecedented "national project" with potentially decisive implications for the country’s long-term energy viability, hard currency earnings structure, attraction of other foreign direct investment, access to international financial institutions and, of course, nationalistic pride. More subtle are the national security parallels of these pivotal energy deals.

 

"In a somewhat different way, Cuba’s completion of the Juragua reactors could likewise empower the Castro government with a menacing — and even devastating — new policy lever in its relations with the United States. A Cuban nuclear accident — either of a technical nature or the result of sabotage — could have a similar effect to the detonation of a nuclear weapon near the United States, laying down a curtain of radioactive fallout that, depending on the season and prevailing winds, could either stretch across the lower tier of this country to Texas or race up the Eastern Seaboard to Washington D.C. and possibly beyond within the first four days.

 

"It is important to recall that Castro already has committed some $1.2 billion to constructing this facility and faces a similar sum required to complete the two reactors — a price-tag equivalent to almost two years of his country’s total hard currency export income. Accordingly, there will probably be no near-term end to Havana’s discussions with Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Brazil and others concerning how and when to revive the Cienfuegos deal, even if it should again be consigned to mothballs due to robust U.S. Congressional opposition. The only way around this Saddam Hussein-like phenomenon is to put a proverbial stake in the heart of this coming nuclear nightmare now.

 

"…This Moscow-sponsored Cuban nuclear deal is of a piece with energy-related foreign policy dramas currently playing an increasingly dominant role in world politics. For example, if one examines key underpinnings of the Russian invasion of Chechnya (e.g., securing strategic pipelines), Kremlin efforts to isolate Azerbaijan and Turkey, Moscow’s intention to ignore provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement in the Caucasus, the escalating threat posed by Iran and North Korea, China’s increasingly belligerent forays in the Spratley Islands and Germany’s plans to develop a nuclear research reactor using highly-enriched, weapons-grade uranium, a common theme emerges — energy.

 

"…To preserve the credibility of U.S. anti-proliferation efforts and the message to our allies and potential adversaries that we mean business on ensuring the safe, benign global development of nuclear energy, it is essential that we view the Cienfuegos nuclear project as a litmus test of American political will for the 21st century.

 

What’s Wrong With This Picture?

 

"What could be so dangerous about these reactors? The simple fact is, of course, that virtually everything is dangerous about these reactors. Several technical experts — some of whom are with us today — have discussed the numerous and debilitating technical faults of the plant, faults that are so fundamental to the construction and operation of the reactors that no "fixes" such as a modern control room or IAEA "safeguards" will be able to remove the danger. It is these critical safety issues that have brought us together today

 

"These flaws are illustrative of the myriad technical problems facing the Juragua reactors. Coupled with Cuba’s inadequate human and technological infrastructure — poor even by the Soviet standards that gave the world Chernobyl — a rational conclusion can be drawn: Any nuclear facility constructed in Cuba at any time in the future should be constructed entirely from the ground up, and must not incorporate any construction or components present in today’s Juragua project.

 

A Syndicated Russian-European Restart?

"…This estimated $2 – $2.4 billion project is well beyond the indigenous capability of a destitute Cuba and would require large-scale financing from European suppliers and Russia. As the architect of the decision to revitalize Juragua, Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) — with full government support — is reportedly seeking to syndicate the required financing to complete the project through a consortium of European suppliers said to include the German giant Siemens, Electrictie de France and Ansaldo SpA of Italy. (1) Given Cuba’s atrocious sovereign credit rating, deemed worst in the world in 1994 by Euromoney (2), there is little doubt that these firms will be provided by their respective governments with 100% taxpayer-guaranteed credits and/or insurance coverage to virtually eliminate the otherwise untenable commercial and political risk associated with substantial exports to Havana.

 

"Not only would Moscow like to see prospects improve for much-needed Cuban debt repayments (no matter how modest) by bringing Juragua on-line, other political and economic benefits would likely include:

 

  • A potential future bargaining chip with the U.S. — probably in the context of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission — to secure multi-billion dollar (U.S. taxpayer-financed) concessions if the Administration insists on the project’s termination or total reconstruction.
  •  

  • Long term preferential treatment for Russian suppliers in a potential expanding Cuban market due, in no small part, to the electric power, jobs, infrastructure development and West European life-support provided by an operating Juragua reactor complex.

"…It is a mystery why Greenpeace, Worldwatch and other environmental activists have not already mobilized to oppose the revival of the Juragua reactors. In relative importance, the dangers to the ecosystem likely to emanate from Cienfuegos dwarf those associated with the celebrated proposed sinking of Shell’s Brent Spar off-shore oil storage facility. If this averting of eyes continues, it would be fair to speculate that some twisted sense of political correctness may be at work here.

Conclusion & Policy Recommendations

"In conclusion, our nation is now forced to decide if the Cienfuegos project is to serve as a case study of how to shorten the life of tyrannical regimes which deny basic human liberties. In short, is our policy toward Cuba to be one of "engagement" and expanding Western life-support or isolation and bail-out avoidance?

 

"Castro is likely calculating — as a minimal fall-back position — that the presence of this profound new danger off our shores will ultimately result in U.S. "engagement" advocates rushing forward with a proposal to "make the reactors safe" and take advantage of this important new "window of bilateral cooperation." Thus far, he has probably been encouraged that yet another Clinton Administration reactor buy-off gambit is in prospect. It will probably be up to the Congress to prove him dead wrong… Simply put, what the beleaguered Cuban people need now is to have the Castro government put out of business, not given a new, taxpayer-financed lease on life.

 

"On the matter of "hot-button" issues for the international business community like contract sanctity (and the avoidance of), extraterritoriality, unilateralism and import controls, some new global realities have to be faced squarely. With some twenty or more countries actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems — primarily through Iraqgate-style covert procurement networks — it is an unaffordable luxury to respect these strongly-supported features of the international trading system in circumstances of overriding peril to our nation’s fundamental security interests. Like Conoco’s ill-fated Iranian venture, this project represents such a circumstance.

 

"Finally, the Russian government needs to understand forthwith that continuing to support this MinAtom initiative to revive the Juragua reactors — much like its efforts to complete Iran’s light-water reactors — will have severe consequences. For example, MinAtom’s eligibility to serve as a partner with the U. S. Enrichment Corp. in the $12 billion U.S. – Russia uranium deal would need to be reexamined. If necessary, Congress should utilize upcoming legislative opportunities to suspend — and even terminate — this deal with MinAtom contingent on that Russian agency’s handling of this Cuban reactor deal. The American people should not be asked to bridge-finance Russia’s atomic energy ministry when it is simultaneously engaged in supplying, and eventually fueling, a burgeoning nuclear threat to the United States.

 

"Other bilateral initiatives in the energy area — such as U.S. Eximbank and OPIC financing, guarantees and insurance coverage to support expanded Russian oil and gas production — should likewise be put at risk by the Congress, pending Moscow’s immediate disengagement from this prospective Cuban Chernobyl. Any attempts by Russia or other governments to fuel completed reactors in Cuba should be interdicted by the United States, by any measures deemed necessary.

 

"…All of the presidential candidates should, in the course of their respective 1996 campaigns, pledge to the American people that they will not permit — through announced disincentives for Moscow and allied firms or, failing that, direct interdiction — the irretrievably-flawed nuclear reactor complex at Cienfuegos to be completed, fueled and brought on line, at least not on their watch."

 

(1) "Russians Say They Are Coming to Build Cuban Nuclear Plant", The Wall Street Journal, 6 June 1995.

 

(2) Euromoney, "1994 Country Risk Report".

POLITICIZING NATIONAL SECURITY: IS THERE NO LIMIT TO WHAT CLINTON & CO. WILL DO?

(Washington, D.C.): At this writing, there appears to be
a reasonable chance that the Defense Department will tell
President Clinton what he desperately wants to hear, namely that
approving the Base Closure and Realignment Commission’s
recommendation to shut down two Air Force maintenance depots will
harm national security. By so doing, the Pentagon would get Mr.
Clinton off the hook: He can then claim that defense concerns,
not political interests, dictate that he must leave 12,000
employees of McClellan Air Force Base on the government payroll
— an action his handlers tell him is essential to his electoral
prospects in California.

Pork By Any Other Name

Let there be no doubt: The case for keeping these depots
open is rooted in politics, not in the Nation’s security.

These facilities are sprawling monuments to inefficient big
government. While they perform essential maintenance and repair
functions for the Air Force, they do so at substantially greater
cost than could private industry. Worse yet — as a founding
member of the Center for Security Policy’s Board of Advisors,
Richard Perle, has noted — in an era when research, development
and production of new weapons are being flat-lined, the armed
services’ continued reliance on government depots for maintenance
denies the private sector work that would help preserve an
industrial base capable of doing all these critical
functions.

Secretary of Defense William Perry, a man with considerable
experience in the defense industry, knows full well that the
Pentagon would be better off without the depots. He has said as
much in the past to industry representatives. Were he now to
claim otherwise by arguing that the bloated workforce at
McClellan is essential to the U.S. security requirements, he
would be guilty of a shameful subordination of the real
national security interests to the expediency-driven politics of
the Administration he serves.

Politics Running Amok

Unfortunately, this would hardly be the only instance of such
a politicization of the Pentagon. Consider but a few of the other
recent instances:

  • Leaving the U.S. vulnerable to missile attack: The
    Clinton Administration exhibits an obsessive political
    commitment to the obsolete 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
    Treaty, which effectively precludes the U.S. from
    defending itself against ballistic missile strikes.
    Accordingly, Dr. Perry and his senior subordinates
    determinedly dismiss the danger posed to the American
    people by the proliferation of long-range ballistic
    missiles. They argue that no malevolent country can
    acquire missiles capable of reaching the United States in
    less than 10-15 years. Yet, scarcely a day passes when
    there is not a new revelation about the transfer of
    advanced missile technology by the likes of Russia, China
    and North Korea to Big Power-wannabe states like Iran,
    Pakistan and Brazil. In the face of the emerging
    missile threat, it is inconceivable, Administration
    politics aside, that the Pentagon would continue to
    refrain from fielding anti-missile protection for the
    American people.
  • Transferring strategic technologies to Beijing: A
    top Pentagon official reluctantly acknowledged to
    Congress recently that the United States may have to
    adopt a policy of “containment” towards
    communist China in light of Beijing’s pursuit of policies
    and capabilities inimical to American security interests.
    The Clinton Defense Department, nonetheless, is fixedly
    pursuing a politically driven sales campaign providing
    the communist Chinese virtually any and all militarily
    relevant technology it seeks. Indeed, congressional
    sources report that, of all the contentious issues in
    the Fiscal Year 1996 Defense authorization bill, the
    Pentagon lobbied hardest against legislation that would
    cut off Department funding for a joint U.S.-Chinese
    Defense Conversion Task Force that has provided political
    cover for wanton American tech transfers to China.
  • The truth is, such transfers are not converting
    People’s Liberation Army (PLA) industrial facilities from
    defense to commercial activities. They are instead simply
    enhancing the PLA’s lethal capabilities. It is also
    apparently increasing the contempt the Chinese leadership
    feels for its interlocutors in Washington.

  • Killing the B-2: In addition, the Pentagon
    leadership heavily lobbied members of the Senate Armed
    Services Committee last week to block additional
    procurement of the B-2 bomber. Here again, the issue was
    politics but, interestingly, not the politics of
    California employment.
  • The Clinton Administration is committed to end
    production of the single most capable aircraft ever made
    for reasons having more to do with appeasing Democratic
    party ideologues (notably, Representative Ron Dellums)
    and with obeisance to a politically dictated — and
    grossly inadequate — defense budget. Even though the
    national security clearly dictates building additional
    B-2s as a means of effectively and rapidly projecting
    American power world-wide at low risk of loss of life on
    the part of U.S. servicemen, Secretary of Defense Perry
    insisted to Senators that no more than 20 stealth bombers
    were needed.

  • Whitewashing Vietnamese cooperation on POW-MIAs:
    The Pentagon is also playing its part in a heavily
    politicized bid to normalize relations with communist
    Vietnam. Defense personnel who should know better are
    treating the roughly 200 pages of documents recently
    turned over by Hanoi to U.S. officials as proof positive
    of the Vietnamese transparency and cooperativeness
    concerning unaccounted-for American POW-MIAs. This is, of
    course, utter nonsense.
  • Like the East Germans, Soviets and other
    totalitarians, Hanoi has maintained exacting records
    concerning personnel of interest to the State.
    Undoubtedly, whole archives in Vietnam are filled with
    data that would clarify, once and for all, the fate of
    these missing employees of the Department of Defense. But
    the confirmation such information would certainly
    provide that the Vietnamese knew much more about these
    POW-MIAs than it has revealed to date would be extremely
    inconvenient — to both Washington and Hanoi — at a time
    when the Administration and its friends on Capitol Hill
    are about to mount a decisive push to provide U.S.
    taxpayer-underwritten investment guarantees and economic
    assistance to the perpetrators of such war crimes.

  • Diverting funds to the erstwhile Bosnia ‘Rapid
    Reaction Force’:
    Finally, the Clinton Administration
    has, for blatantly political reasons, decided once again
    to treat Pentagon accounts as a slush-fund whose tapping
    will allow it to make good on misbegotten foreign policy
    initiatives for which Congress is unwilling to
    appropriate money. According to press reports, it is
    blithely diverting as much as $95 million from Defense
    Department funding to help underwrite the costs of a new
    allied expeditionary force in Bosnia.
  • The only rationale for committing such funds is the
    hope that the presence of this force will postpone the
    moment when Mr. Clinton’s pledge to insert 25,000 U.S.
    troops to help extricate the U.N. peacekeepers gets
    called. Unfortunately, the hapless rules of engagement
    and command arrangements for what was once called a Rapid
    Reaction Force will ensure that it is neither
    “Rapid” nor capable of useful
    “Reaction.” As a result, the U.S. will be
    throwing good money after bad, compounding past mistakes
    in Bosnia and complicating further NATO’s future options
    there.

The Bottom Line

Legitimate U.S. security interests are being jeopardized by
the Clinton Administration’s politicization of the Pentagon. As
with parallel efforts to ensure that the intelligence community
hues to a politically correct party line,(1) the Administration is
allowing core national security capabilities to be compromised.
To the extent that senior Defense Department policy-makers allow
themselves and their department to be used for such purposes,
they impugn their own integrity and demoralize those who work for
them in the belief that the first business of government is not
politics, but to provide for the common defense.

– 30 –

(1) See the Center for Security Policy’s Transition
Brief
entitled Apres Woolsey, le Deluge? Congress Must
Beware of Actions, Appointments That Will Weaken U.S.
Intelligence
(No. 94-D 127,
30 December 1994).

RUSSO-GERMAN ENTENTE: WESTERN INTERESTS AT RISK FROM KOHL PLEDGE ON G-7, SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE

(Washington, D.C.): Last week, German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Russian
President Boris Yeltsin summitted in
Bonn. These meetings provided a
desperately needed opportunity for the
two leaders to shore up their respective,
plummeting political fortunes.

The time-honored technique for
accomplishing this sort of rescue
operation “at the summit” is
through highly visible steps betokening
closer bilateral ties. Generally, the
price the Kremlin extracts for such steps
are significant financial, economic,
technological and/or political
concessions by the Western party. The
Kohl-Yeltsin meetings appear to have been
no exception.

Unfortunately, the history of close
German-Soviet/Russian relations is not an
altogether happy one. The Rappallo Treaty
between the democratic Wiemar
government and Lenin signed in 1922 and
the notorious Hitler-Stalin Trade and
Non-Aggression pacts of 1939 come to
mind.(1)
The greatest danger tends to
arise when the parties are less than
transparent about the exact nature of
their economic, financial and
technological ties.

A Stealthful Deal to Build
a New Siberian Gas Pipeline?

The Center for Security Policy has
received reports, for example, that
Russia and Germany (presumably with other
Western governments) have recently
completed negotiations concerning the
construction of a second strand of the
infamous Siberian gas pipeline.
Accompanying contracts have either been
signed or will be signed shortly. Such a
pipeline, scheduled to be completed by
1997 if not sooner, would
greatly expand Russian exports of natural
gas to Eastern and Western Europe (by
some 35 billion cubic meters annually),
increasing recipient nations’ dependence
upon this less-than-reliable source of
energy supplies.

This pipeline would not
transit Ukraine — as the first strand
does — affording Moscow a means of
completely cutting off its erstwhile
Ukrainian subjects without disrupting
supply to other customers
“down-stream.”

This initiative was first launched in
the early 1980s, but was aborted thanks
to assertive U.S. efforts led by
President Ronald Reagan. The reasons for
such American resistance remain largely
valid today:

  • First, Moscow has an
    established, debilitating
    track-record of using energy
    supplies as political leverage
    and/or punishment.
    In
    recent months, Ukraine, the
    Baltic States, and the
    Transcaucasus region have been
    subjected to politically
    motivated cut-offs or significant
    reductions in Russian supplies of
    natural gas and oil.(2)
  • These incidents have been but
    the latest instances of the
    Kremlin’s willingness to exploit
    energy dependence to advance its
    strategic objectives. As the
    Center for Security Policy noted
    in 1990, for example, the
    then-Soviet Union systematically
    threatened Hungary, Romania,
    Czechoslovakia and Poland with
    energy interruptions as a means
    of shoring up Moscow’s waning
    influence following the collapse
    of the Soviet empire in Eastern
    Europe.(3)
    Threats to Estonia’s energy
    supplies also featured
    prominently in Russia’s 1993
    campaign of intimidation against
    Estonia.(4)

    Today, as in the past, it is
    in the interest of Western and
    Eastern European nations to diversify
    their energy sources — not to
    increase their dependence upon a
    supplier that remains disposed to
    exploit energy blackmail when it
    suits its purposes.

  • Second, the Russian
    energy sector remains the most
    important source of hard currency
    for Moscow’s military and its
    supporting industrial base
    .
    As the Center for Security Policy
    noted in 1992 in critiquing an
    inadequately secured $2 billion
    Eximbank loan to Gazprom, the
    state-controlled enterprise
    responsible for Russia gas
    industry:
  • “…It is predictable
    that the Russian energy
    sector will simply serve once
    again as a multi-billion
    annual revenue stream for the
    preservation of the
    military-industrial complex.
    Given the strategic
    importance of energy and the
    large-scale hard currency
    cash-flow it could generate, the
    importance of democratic and
    free market reforms being
    irreversibly in place prior
    to
    such assistance
    cannot be overstated.”
    (5)

Brzezinski, Kissinger, et.al.
Urge Clinton to ‘Promote Energy
Independence’

On 4 May 1994, the American-Ukrainian
Advisory Committee — chaired by former
Carter National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski and including such luminaries
as Henry Kissinger, George Soros, Gen.
John Galvin and Malcolm Forbes, Jr.
(recipient of the Center for Security
Policy’s 1993 “Keeper of the
Flame” award) — sent an
extraordinary and highly relevant letter
to President Clinton. It expressed, among
other concerns, unease about Ukrainian
dependence on Russian energy supplies.

The Committee specifically recommended
that the upcoming G-7 Economic Summit in
Naples take steps aimed at providing
“assistance to promote energy
independence.” It cites as a
precedent for accelerating the
development of alternative, secure
sources of energy supply for Ukraine the
International Energy Agency Agreement of
May 1983, a landmark accord resulting
from the Reagan Administration’s
successful anti-pipeline diplomacy and
Poland-related sanctions.

The ‘G-8’ Commitment

Those parts of the Kohl-Yeltsin deals
that have been made public are
no less troubling. Take, for example,
Chancellor Kohl’s commitment to President
Yeltsin to secure membership for Russia
in the Group of Seven leading
industrialized nations, the G-7.
Unfortunately, this pledge is no mere
symbolic gesture; it would, if
actualized, constitute an immense — and
undesirable — change in the character of
this organization comprised of the West’s
most economically powerful democracies.

In fact, the predictable consequence
of including Russia — a nation with an
increasingly uncertain commitment to
democracy and an economy that is in
shambles
— in all G-7 deliberations
and decision-making would, at best,
complicate the Group’s operations. At
worst, it would prevent this
forum from serving as an effective tool
for developing and harmonizing Western
economic security policies. In any event,
giving Moscow a permanent seat at the
table will exacerbate the already
disproportionate attention given its
financial, economic and other needs in
G-7 deliberations.

In short, were the other member
nations to accede to German pressure to
become the G-8, yet another
institution that had proved a valuable
tool for promoting U.S. and Western
interests during the post-World War II
era would be compromised, perhaps
irreparably so.(6)

‘Such a Deal’

Press reports suggest that, in
exchange for this extraordinarily
significant concession, Chancellor Kohl
managed to have President Yeltsin back
off some threatened unpleasantness. With
an extortionate touch reminiscent of
past, boorish Soviet behavior, Yeltsin
had threatened to “crash” an
American-Anglo-French ceremony next
September marking the end of the three
powers’ troop deployments in Berlin. Kohl
was understandably horrified at the
diplomatic and political maelstrom likely
to be occasioned by the unwanted
participation of the very Russian forces
whose threatening occupation of East
Germany had necessitated those allied
deployments.

Yeltsin also reportedly promised to
support Germany’s inclusion as a
permanent member of the U.N. Security
Council — according to different reports
— “when it is discussed” or
“if [the Security Council] is
expanded.” What remains to be seen
is how much effort Moscow will exert to
promote the expansion of the Security
Council.

‘Thanks, But No Thanks

What is already clear, however, is
that such an expansion will merely
exacerbate the U.N.’s present inability
to act in a manner that advances U.S.
interests. The enthusiasm that has been
expressed (for example, by U.N. devotees
like Ambassador Madeleine Albright) for
including as Security Council members — in
addition to Germany
— nations like
Japan, India and Brazil is one of the
tell-tale signs of the syndrome known as
“mindless multilateralism.”

In this connection, the Center regards
testimony provided by a distinguished
member of its Board of Advisors, Richard
Perle, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on 12 May 1994, to be required
reading. In it, Mr. Perle, a former
Assistant Secretary of Defense, was
sharply — and properly — critical of
the organization and its peacekeeping
operations.

“…It seems to me that the
essential standard for American
policy on questions concerning when,
where and how we support U.N.
peacekeeping operations must be whether
those operations serve the interest
of the United States
. If
they do not, we ought not to support
them, no matter how many other
nations, with other interests, might
choose to do so….

“…When you hear State
Department officials assure you that
the interests of the United States
will be fully protected in any U.N.
actions in which we choose
to participate, remember the embargo
[on arms transfers to Bosnia] the
President is enforcing even though he
opposes it. And as you think about
the embargo President Clinton would
like to lift, ponder the army of
Administration officials circling the
Senate even as we speak, lobbying to
keep it in place.”

The Bottom Line

In July 1990, at the time when
Chancellor Kohl was consumed not with
reelection but with reunification, the
Center for Security Policy issued a
strong warning of the dangers inherent in
non-transparent dealings between Bonn and
Moscow:

“It has been obvious for
months that Bonn’s all-consuming
preoccupation with German
reunification and Gorbachev’s
desperate economic situation had the
potential to produce a dangerous
marriage of convenience. Instead of
attempting to manage the risks
inherent in such a prospect, the United
States government and its allies have
looked the other way on — if not
actively encouraged — the sort of
non-transparent, largely untied and
undisciplined German economic and
trade relations with Moscow

that have brought the West
considerable grief in the past.”

The Center believes that the United
States and the other Western nations can
ill afford to indulge in such behavior,
on either their own parts or on
Germany’s. If serious misunderstanding
and suspicions among the Western allies
— and possibly dangerous strains in
relations between them — are to be
avoided, it is vital that Germany make a
full disclosure of the agreements it has
reached with Moscow. In addition,
assurances must be obtained that in the
future, no commitments will be made
affecting Western equities in the G-7,
for example, without prior consultation
with and agreement from Germany’s allies.

– 30 –

1. See in this
regard, the Center for Security Policy’s
papers entitled Fifty Years
of Tyranny: The Intolerable Legacy of the
Nazi-Soviet Agreements of August 1939
,
(No. 89-50,
28 August 1989) and Ridley’s
Believe It or Not: What Are the Secret
Protocols to the New German-Soviet
Agreement?
, ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=90-P_69″>No. 90-P 69,
18 July 1990).

2. See, for
example, the Center’s Decision Brief
entitled, Yalta II: Western
Moscow-Centrism Invites New Instability
in Former Soviet Empire
,
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=93-D_101″>No. 93-D 101,
3 December 1993).

3. See Soviet
Economic Leverage: Moscow’s Tool for
Denying Baltic Independence Without Force
,
(No. 90-3,
8 January 1990) and Energy
Leverage: Moscow’s Ace in the Hole
,
(No. 90-20,
1 March 1990).

4. See Harbinger
of Things to Come? Russian Energy Sector
Imposes Boycott on Estonia After Getting
U.S. Aid
, ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=93-D_55″>No. 93-D 55,
28 June 1993).

5. See Revolving
Doors: Eximbank Official’s Scandalous
Self-Dealing is a Blow to U.S. Taxpayers,
‘Red Carpet’ for Returning Russian
Hardliners — and Their American Friends
,
(No.92-D
148
, 22 December 1992).

6. For a further
discussion of this process see ‘What’s
Really Wrong With This Picture’:
Center’s Gaffney Dissects Clinton
Security Policy
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=94-P_47″>No. 94-P 47, 10
May 1994).

WRITTEN TESTIMONY of ROGER W. ROBINSON, JR. before the HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CUBA AND THE JURAGUA NUCLEAR POWER COMPLEX

1 August 1995

2172 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to appear before the subcommittee on a pivotal issue in our
relationship with Castro’s Cuba and the ultimate transition to a democratic Cuba — the
Soviet-designed Juragua nuclear complex near Cienfuegos (sometimes referred to as the
Cienfuegos project). Over the past decade, I have served as president and CEO of RWR Inc., a
Washington-based consulting firm, and was formerly senior director for international economic
affairs at the national security council under president Reagan. Prior to my government service, I
was a vice-president in the international department of the Chase Manhattan Bank with
responsibilities for Chase’s loan portfolio in the USSR, eastern Europe and Yugoslavia.

Since the American people learned of the advanced stage of’ construction of the first of two
VVER-440 reactors in the spring of 1991 — which was some 60-70% complete at the time–I
have tried to monitor this portentous project and the associated implications for our national
security. In my capacity as a member of the Board of Advisors of the Center for Security Policy,
I co-authored several Decision Briefs published by the Center from May 1991 until the time that
the Cienfuegos project was reportedly mothballed in April 1992 (See for example, “Cienfuegos —
A Hundred Fires”: Muchas Gracias Moscow, But No American Chernobyls
, No. 91-P 44,
31 May 1991; A “Ticking” Anniversary Present: Will Russia Give Us a Chernobyl Ninety
Miles Off the U.S. Shore?
No. 92-D 41, 23 April 1992; “Hear Us Now and Believe Us
Later”: Business Done with Fidel Means Big Losses When Communists Fall
, No. 92-D 51, 8
May 1992; Castro’s Potemkin Nuclear Shutdown: Chernobyl at Cienfuegos Still in
Prospect
, No. 92-D 108, 10 September 1992). The bottom line concerning recent reports of the
project’s revival under the sponsorship and coordination of Moscow is simply this: the Juragua
complex is even more frighteningly flawed and unacceptable today — given the passage of time
and corrosive exposure to the elements — than it was some three years ago.

In the course of this testimony, I would like to review briefly why when viewed from a
wide-angle policy lens — the Cienfuegos project is important and emblematic of other past and
present global flash-points catalyzed by energy-related foreign policy dramas. Some of the
troubled legacy of the reactors’ construction and steps reportedly underway to revitalize the
project will likewise be addressed. Finally, I will offer several policy recommendations directed
toward ensuring that the current Juragua complex never comes on-line.

Why Cienfuegos Matters

Today the United States is simultaneously facing several fateful foreign policy crossroads — the
Balkans crisis, China policy, the Middle East peace process, managing Iraq, Iranian nuclear and
oil-related developments, the Korean peninsula and others. The White House has thus far
generally erred on the side of “engagement” as opposed to containment, isolation (e.g., like that of
Iran) or even, in the case of Bosnia, limited military action. China broke the code for Cuba and
other centrally-controlled economies on permitting economic liberalization while maintaining
repressive political control. (Many are now wondering if Beijing has over-played its hand even
with this White House in expanding missile proliferation, contemptuous human rights violations,
saber-rattling over Taiwan and unfair trade practices.) Vietnam certainly took a page from the
Chinese play book in its relations with the U.S. and is now awaiting lavish trade-related and
financial rewards for its gradual economic opening and still-pervasive authoritarianism. This same
cadre of Clinton policy-makers appears today to be working hard to devise a Vietnam-style “road
map” for incremental normalization of relations with Havana.

Although this assertion is vigorously denied by the Administration, the policy tactics and
wedge-building being employed by the State Department and White House are quite familiar.
Indeed, the confusing signals emanating from this Administration concerning its overall Cuba
policy are also manifest in its official position on the Juragua nuclear facility. A recent State
Department release on the project states “in the event construction on the Juragua reactors were
to proceed, however, we would continue to vigorously pursue initiatives that would improve the
safety of the facility and promote its safe operation.” This policy position says, in effect, “we
strongly object to Havana proceeding with this nuclear complex which fundamentally undermines
our security interests but if the Castro government chooses to ignore our diplomatic protests,
please complete the project with as many safeguards as possible.” Regrettably, we will probably
soon be hearing this same basic Administration policy prescription with respect to Russia’s supply
of nuclear reactors to Iran.

As shrewd observers of the international scene — assisted by the massive Russian
signals-intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba — Fidel and his associates have had little difficulty in
judging the time propitious to either complete their existing fatally-flawed VVER-440 reactors or
shake down the U.S. and international community for some kind of substantial compensatory
alternative. After all, what other conclusion can Havana reasonably reach from the cynical,
short-sighted Western policies on display in the North Korean reactor-payoff scheme and the
Russian-Iranian nuclear gambit? In short, it is clear to the Castro government that, with Moscow’s
help, the United States can be had.

To disabuse Havana of its assumption that revival of the Juragua complex will somehow have a
large direct or indirect payoff in the end, it may be worthwhile recalling another world-class
energy deal pursued by the Soviet Union under Ronald Reagan’s watch. Like Moscow’s
two-strand Siberian gas pipeline deal in the early 1980’s, the Cienfuegos complex is an
unprecedented “national project” with potentially decisive implications for the country’s long-term
energy viability, hard currency earnings structure, attraction of other foreign direct investment,
access to international financial institutions and, of course, nationalistic pride. More subtle are the
national security parallels of these pivotal energy deals.

In the case of the Siberian gas pipeline project, Moscow was well aware of the inordinate West
European dependency on Soviet natural gas supplies — ultimately projected to exceed 60% of
total European gas consumption — which would have resulted from the successful completion of
both strands of the twin 3,600-mile pipelines connected to the West European gas grid. More
secure Western suppliers of natural gas would always be underbid by the Soviet gas monopoly
GAZPROM — then headed by today’s Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin — because of
the absence of a Western cost structure (e.g., administered prices). The subsequent use of
“energy warfare” by the former Soviet Union against the Baltic states, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and
others who have dared to challenge Moscow’s will are now a matter of historic record. (This kind
of heavy-handed use of energy-related leverage is still regarded as a useful policy tool by Russia,
particularly given Chernomyrdin’s ascendancy to leadership.)

In a somewhat different way, Cuba’s completion of the Juragua reactors could likewise
empower the Castro government with a menacing and even devastating — new policy lever in its
relations with the United States. A Cuban nuclear accident — either of a technical nature or the
result of sabotage — could have a similar effect to the detonation of a nuclear weapon near the
United States, laying down a curtain of radioactive fallout that, depending on the season and
prevailing winds, could either stretch across the lower tier of this country to Texas or race up the
eastern seaboard to Washington D.C. And possibly beyond within the first four days.

A determined stand by President Reagan with Moscow and our allies terminated the planned
second strand of the Siberian gas pipeline deal, delayed completion of the first strand by two years
at enormous cost to Moscow and secured an alliance agreement to establish a strict ceiling on
Soviet gas deliveries to Western Europe (i.e., 30% of total gas supplies) in favor of the
accelerated development of secure Western supply alternatives. In addition, the Reagan
Administration simultaneously — and successfully — acted to strengthen multilateral export
controls on militarily-relevant technology and end subsidized official credits to Moscow. An
equally determined U.S. stand now on the Juragua complex would involve President Clinton and
those seeking the Republican nomination making clear to Havana and Moscow that this current,
unfixable project will not be allowed to come on-line under any circumstances.

There are other characteristics of the Cienfuegos project reminiscent of the now-historic
U.S.-Soviet “pipeline dispute” (this alliance policy dispute has, for several years, been a case study
at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government):

  • European governments, companies and banks simply did not share the U.S. view that Moscow
    should be penalized for its sponsorship of repressive martial law in Poland (and near Soviet
    invasion) in the early 1980’s, but instead should be de facto rewarded with the largest single
    Western taxpayer-subsidized transaction in the history of East-West trade.
  • the preponderance of voices in Europe, the media, the global business community and even the
    bulk of the Reagan cabinet called for abandoning the use of economic sanctions to limit Soviet
    policy options and damage its rigid, centrally-controlled economy (a possibility dismissed out of
    hand), arguing that “engagement” or commercial bridge-building would be the key to improved
    Soviet geopolitical behavior.
  • a thunderous rejection by most of the foreign policy establishment of the notion that an
    American president’s resolve to take a stand on the twin Siberian gas pipelines, high-technology
    export controls and official financial subsidies could ever hope to slow — much less ultimately
    derail — the Soviet juggernaut as a permanent superpower fact on the political landscape.

One does not have to search hard to extract from the line taken by Moscow and the allies in the
pipeline case the bulk of the arguments being used today in the effort to finesse — and, in the end,
live with — the completion of the Juragua complex no matter how defective it is reliably reported
to be. As with the Siberian pipeline deal, if European firms, governments and financial institutions
do not remain in the supply and funding game, Juragua has almost no chance of being realized. It
is important to recall that Castro already has committed some $1.2 billion to constructing this
facility and faces a similar sum required to complete the two reactors — a price-tag equivalent to
almost two years of his country’s total hard currency export income. Accordingly, there will
probably be no near-term end to Havana’s discussions with Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Brazil
and others concerning how and when to revive the Cienfuegos deal, even if it should again be
consigned to mothballs due to robust U.S. congressional opposition. The only way around this
Saddam Hussein-like phenomenon is to put a proverbial stake in the heart of this coming nuclear
nightmare now.

Finally, this Moscow-sponsored Cuban nuclear deal is of a piece with energy-related foreign
policy dramas currently playing an increasingly dominant role in world politics. For example, if
one examines key underpinnings of the Russian invasion of Chechnya (e.g., securing strategic
pipelines), Kremlin efforts to isolate Azerbaijan and Turkey, Moscow’s intention to ignore
provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement in the Caucasus, the escalating
threat posed by Iran and North Korea, China’s increasingly belligerent forays in the Spratley
Islands and Germany’s plans to develop a nuclear research reactor using highly-enriched,
weapons-grade uranium, a common theme emerges–energy. Moreover, most of these potential
front-burner challenges to vital U.S. security interests involve ostensibly civilian nuclear reactor
projects. Consequently, to preserve the credibility of U.S. anti-proliferation efforts and the
message to our allies and potential adversaries that we mean business on ensuring the safe, benign
global development of nuclear energy, it is essential that we view the Cienfuegos nuclear project
as a litmus test of American political will for the 21st century. If we cannot muster the national
determination to take a stand on a nuclear danger in our immediate proximity, how does this
country even hope to protect itself from some two dozen nations which have acquired — or are
projected to acquire by the end of this decade — weapons of mass destruction, some with ballistic
missile delivery systems?

What’s wrong with this picture?

Mr. Chairman, I have discussed several subjects relating to the strategic threat posed to U.S.
national security interests by the Juragua complex, as well as what are — in my view — similar
policy scenarios playing out elsewhere in the world. I would now like to touch briefly on the crux
of this issue; namely, what exactly makes these reactors so unsafe. After all — the argument goes
— we have successfully harnessed atomic power to generate electricity for civilian purposes for
almost half a century with, but for one major exception, no major disasters. What could be so
dangerous about these reactors?

The simple fact is, of course, that virtually everything is dangerous about these reactors.
Several technical experts — some of whom are with us today — have discussed the numerous and
debilitating technical faults of the plant, faults that are so fundamental to the construction and
operation of the reactors that no “fixes” such as a modern control room or IAEA “safeguards”
will be able to remove the danger. It is these critical safety issues that have brought us together
today, so I feel obliged to restate some key areas of concern likely to plague us if Juragua is ever
brought on-line.

  • sixty percent of the Soviet-supplied materials used in these reactors are defective, according to
    knowledgeable Cuban defectors from the project.
  • integral reactor systems — including the reactor vessel itself, six steam generators, five primary
    coolant pumps, twelve isolation valves and more — were stored outside for up to eighteen
    months, exposed to the highly corrosive tropical sea air and weather. Also, no nuclear reactor of
    Soviet design has ever been constructed in a tropical climate.
  • the support structures of key reactor components contain numerous structural defects.
  • the containment dome of the first reactor is designed to withstand pressures of only seven
    pounds-per-square-inch (psi), compared to the fifty psi in American reactors, leaving the Juragua
    dome exponentially weaker than an American reactor even in the event that the dome functions
    perfectly as designed — an unlikely prospect in the current situation.
  • as many as fifteen percent of 5,000 previously-approved welds in the reactor’s auxiliary
    plumbing, containment dome and spent-fuel cooling systems were x-rayed and found to be
    defective due to air pockets, poor soldiering and heat damage.
    The mere suspicion that even one weld is faulty will earn an American nuclear plant a
    suspension from the nuclear regulatory committee.
  • Cuban operators of the facility have received the precious little knowledge they have of their
    future craft from some training on Soviet “slow-response” simulators — deemed inadequate by
    U.S. standards as they do not simulate an actual crisis event in progress or even resemble the
    reactors at Juragua.
  • the design of the VVER-440 pressurized water reactor (pwr) is fundamentally dangerous, even
    with the addition of the containment domes. As already mentioned, VVER-440 model reactors
    built by the Soviet Union in then-East Germany were closed as soon as possible by Bonn
    following reunification. Despite these inadequacies, Siemens is reported to be considering the
    possibility of utilizing components from the closed GDR plants in the construction at Juragua.

Also, there are indications that:

  • Soviet advisors refused to guarantee to their Cuban hosts that the valves installed in the first
    reactor’s emergency cooling system would function under certain conditions. Many component
    parts originally designed for specific applications have been used to substitute for proper — but
    unavailable — components, increasing the likelihood of a disastrous accident by an unknowable
    factor.
  • Cuban intelligence knowingly destroyed x-ray photos and other evidence proving the extent of
    the reactor’s flaws, making it virtually impossible to take effective corrective action to repair the
    welds.
  • the Cienfuegos area is seismically active, making it a poor place to put even the safest reactor.

These flaws are illustrative of the myriad technical problems facing the Juragua reactors.
Coupled with Cuba’s inadequate human and technological infrastructure — poor even by the
Soviet standards that gave the world Chernobyl — a rational conclusion can be drawn: any nuclear
facility constructed in Cuba at any time in the future should be constructed entirely from the
ground up, and must not incorporate any construction or components present in today’s Juragua
project.

A syndicated Russian-European restart?

Despite this project’s terminal shortcomings, strong interest remains in bringing the nuclear
complex to completion. It is therefore useful to examine briefly the parties driving this deal and
their likely motivations. As mentioned earlier, this estimated $2-$2.4 billion project is well
beyond the indigenous capability of a destitute Cuba and would require large-scale financing from
European suppliers and Russia. As the architect of the decision to revitalize Juragua, Russia’s
Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) — with full government support — is reportedly seeking
to syndicate the required financing to complete the project through a consortium of European
suppliers said to include the German giant Siemens, Electricite de France and Ansaldo SPA of
Italy (‘Russians say they are coming to build Cuban nuclear plant,” The Wall Street Journal, 6
June, 1995) . Given Cuba’s atrocious sovereign credit rating, deemed worst in the world in 1994
by Euromoney (Euromoney, “1994 country risk report”), there is little doubt that these firms will
be provided by their respective governments with 100% taxpayer-guaranteed credits and/or
insurance coverage to virtually eliminate the otherwise untenable commercial and political risk
associated with substantial exports to Havana.

Indeed, it can be reasonably expected that official European export support programs like
Hermes of Germany and Coface of France will be pleased to accommodate — under political
guidance — any requests from such major firms to help establish national export beachheads in
Cuba. Accordingly, as this reported “joint stock company” — in Moscow’s parlance — evolves,
careful congressional scrutiny of any Western government risk insurance or official credits/credit
guarantees is warranted. The presence of such taxpayer-underwritten arrangements would make
participating European governments partners in the Cienfuegos restart — with all the attendant
culpability and foreknowledge.

Russia’s nominal leadership of such a syndicated revival effort would probably be secured by a
modest contribution of’ perhaps $25-$100 million — commensurate with its defaulted creditor
status (read: repeated debt reschedulings). In the 1992-1994 period, Russia began to prime the
pump for Cienfuegos with a $30 million credit line to Cuba, ostensibly to improve the mothballing
of the project. Not only would Moscow like to see prospects improve for much-needed Cuban
debt repayments (no matter how modest) by bringing Juragua on-line, other political and
economic benefits would likely include:

  • plaudits from the vast majority of un members, who would likely view Moscow’s Juragua
    initiative — and Russia’s probable success in recruiting “name” European firms — as a heroic effort
    to break the “unfair” economic embargo against Cuba.
  • an opportunity to advance Russia’s global reputation as a reliable supplier of nuclear reactors in
    the midst of a cut-throat competition with China and other players in this lucrative marketplace.
  • the generation of vast new Cuban goodwill (and future sweetheart deals) that Moscow could
    translate into multi-year renewal of its 1,000-man signals intelligence listening facility at Lourdes
    enabling it to continue to eavesdrop on America’s sensitive commercial and government
    communications.
  • A potential future bargaining chip with the U.S. — probably in the context of the
    Gore-Chernomyrdin commission — to secure multi- billion dollar (U.S. taxpayer-financed)
    concessions if the Administration insists on the project’s termination or total reconstruction.
  • possible “expressions of appreciation” from select European firms that — thanks to Moscow —
    would have yet another opportunity to cover their business risk exposure in the warm blanket of
    taxpayer-underwritten credit guarantees and insurance arrangements.
  • long term preferential treatment for Russian suppliers in a potential expanding Cuban market
    due, in no small part, to the electric power, jobs, infrastructure development and West European
    life-support provided by an operating Juragua reactor complex.

In addition, Cuba probably stands to benefit substantially from even a serious international
discussion regarding the completion of Juragua. Cuba today faces desperate energy and
electricity shortfalls, often leaving civilians — and businesses — without power for hours on end.
Two of the most promising areas of interest to potential foreign investors are the tourism and
mining industries, both of which are electricity-intensive. The ability to assure a long-term,
consistent supply of electricity will be required to attract foreign investment into these — and
other — sectors of the economy. Cuba’s abysmal credit rating — a serious constraint to borrowing
on international capital markets — is not a problem if and when European firms are able to line up
government-backed supplier credits and guarantees to help develop Havana’s energy sector. This
crucial outside assist would, in turn, free up indigenous resources to perpetuate the Castro
regime, albeit at an anemic level. Even if the project is ultimately abandoned, Cuba’s burgeoning
international business profile and likely western compensation package for halting construction
would be well publicized, probably contributing to a weakening of the U.S. embargo.

It is also interesting to note as we discuss who benefits from this project the deafening silence
of what would logically be one of the project’s harshest critics, the world environmental
community. The environmental catastrophe resulting from a nuclear accident at the Juragua
complex could well surpass any in the history of this hemisphere. With NBC Nightly News again
broadcasting a special investigation of the Cienfuegos project on 20 July — at least the third such
network news exposé — it is a mystery why Greenpeace, Worldwatch and other environmental
activists have not already mobilized to oppose the revival of the Juragua reactors. In relative
importance, the dangers to the ecosystem likely to emanate from Cienfuegos dwarf those
associated with the celebrated proposed sinking of Shell’s Brent Spar off-shore oil storage facility.
If this averting of eyes continues, it would be fair to speculate that some twisted sense of political
correctness may be at work here. For example, could it be that a fascination with Castro’s
mystique and revolutionary impulses would be allowed to blur or undermine the environmental
community’s stated global mission? It therefore remains to be seen if impending eco-disasters have
any politically-differentiating characteristics (e.g., big oil and Western governments versus
socialist nuclear developments).

Conclusion & Policy Recommendations

In conclusion, our nation is now forced to decide if the Cienfuegos project is to serve as a case
study of how to shorten the life of tyrannical regimes which deny basic human liberties. In short,
is our policy toward Cuba to be one of “engagement” and expanding Western life-support or
isolation and bail-out avoidance? For those who suggest that the prospects for the success of the
latter strategy are bleak, I have pointed to similar passionate arguments leveled at the first-term
Reagan national security community (i.e., NSC, CIA and the Defense Department), which dared
to formulate a strategy to stress out Soviet economic rigidities (an outline of this Reagan
economic strategy toward the former Soviet Union is provided in a recently published book by
Peter Schweizer entitled “Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the
Collapse of the Soviet Union,” Grove/Atlantic, 1994).

The results of this earlier effort are clear: the brittle, centrally-controlled Soviet system could not
withstand significant contraction in Western life-support in the areas of officially subsidized
financing, access to high technology and energy-related assistance and markets. I would also
argue that Fidel has considerably fewer options to cope with the denial of Western subsidies than
the resource-abundant Soviet Union, which lumbered on for another eight years.

Castro is likely calculating — as a minimal fall-back position — that the presence of this
profound new danger off our shores will ultimately result in U.S. “Engagement” advocates
rushing forward with a proposal to “make the reactors safe” and take advantage of this important
new “window of bilateral cooperation.” Thus far, he has probably been encouraged that yet
another Clinton Administration reactor buy-off gambit is in prospect. It will probably be up to the
Congress to prove him dead wrong. Falling into a calculated policy trap of this dimension would
be comparable to the utter fecklessness and miscalculation on tragic display today in Bosnia.
Simply put, what the beleaguered Cuban people need now is to have the Castro government put
out of business, not given a new, taxpayer-financed lease on life.

On the matter of “hot-button” issues for the international business community like contract
sanctity, extra-territoriality, unilateralism and import controls, some new global realities have to
be faced squarely. With some twenty or more countries actively seeking to acquire weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems — primarily through Iraqgate-style covert
procurement networks — it is an unaffordable luxury to respect these strongly-supported features
of the international trading system in circumstances of overriding peril to our nation’s fundamental
security interests. Like Conoco’s ill-fated Iranian venture, this project represents such a
circumstance.

Accordingly, those Western and Latin American companies and banks working to advance the
completion of the Cienfuegos nuclear complex should be subject to swift and decisive penalties by
the Congress. Import controls should probably be the sanction of choice for private sector
Western entities supplying Juragua, requiring an executive decision by the management of these
firms between doing business in the American market or the Cuban market. (U.S. import controls
were imposed for several months on five European firms — three of which subsequently failed —
which supplied the Siberian gas pipeline project over the Reagan administration’s objections with
the desired result of leveraging a new, security-minded allied East-West trade policy.)
Governments choosing to back-stop such companies and financial institutions should have more
than one bilateral priority put at risk by the Congress, if the Executive branch fails to demonstrate
adequate resolve.

Finally, the Russian government needs to understand forthwith that continuing to support this
MINATOM initiative to revive the Juragua reactors — much like its efforts to complete Iran’s
light-water reactors — will have severe consequences. For example, MINATOM’s eligibility to
serve as a partner with the U.S. Enrichment Corp. in the $12 billion U.S.-Russia uranium deal
would need to be reexamined. If necessary, Congress should utilize upcoming legislative
opportunities to suspend — and even terminate — this deal with MINATOM contingent on that
Russian agency’s handling of this Cuban reactor deal. The American people should not be asked
to bridge-finance Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry when it is simultaneously engaged in
supplying, and eventually fueling, a burgeoning nuclear threat to the United States.

Other bilateral initiatives in the energy area — such as U.S. Eximbank and OPIC financing,
guarantees and insurance coverage to support expanded Russian oil and gas production — should
likewise be put at risk by the Congress, pending Moscow’s immediate disengagement from this
prospective Cuban Chernobyl. Any attempts by Russia or other governments to fuel completed
reactors in Cuba should be interdicted by the United States, by any measures deemed necessary.

In closing, Congress should demand that Russia’s announced intention to complete the Juragua
nuclear complex be placed at or near the top of the agenda of the next session of the
Gore-Chernomyrdin commission. Indeed, the absence of this agenda item ought to be viewed
with profound concern. Finally, all of the presidential candidates should, in the course of their
respective 1996 campaigns, pledge to the American people that they will not permit — through
announced disincentives for Moscow and allied firms or, failing that, direct interdiction — the
irretrievably-flawed nuclear reactor complex at Cienfuegos to be completed, fueled and brought
on line, at least not on their watch.

‘B-S’ PATROL: SENS. BUMPERS AND SASSER WISH AWAY BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT, PROPOSE TO LEAVE U.S. VULNERABLE TO IT

(Washington, D.C.): According
to Senators Dale Bumpers (D-AR) and Jim
Sasser (D-TN), the appropriate time to
invest in a fire department is when you
are facing a raging flash-fire. This at
least appears to be the logic of the
stance they adopted in the course of a
recent Senate debate on a Bumpers-Sasser
legislative assault on the U.S. strategic
defense program.

On 7 August, Sens. Bumpers and Sasser
offered an amendment to the FY1993
Defense authorization bill which would
slash a further $1 billion from the
President’s request for the Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes
(GPALS) system. Taken together with the
$1.1 billion already deducted from the
request by the Senate Armed Services
Committee, the Senators’ amendment would
have the effect of eliminating fully 37%
of the funding associated with work on
strategic defenses in the next fiscal
year. In the words of Amb. Henry
Cooper, the director of the Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization, this
would “fundamentally destroy”
the core of the GPALS program,
effectively terminating its ability to
produce deployable defenses in the
near-term.

With Friends Like These…

The two Senators relied upon
statements by former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff William Crowe and
the current Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, Robert Gates, to
stake their claim that “we have run
out of enemies” and, therefore, that
spending can be dramatically reduced on
strategic anti-missile systems, in
particular, and on defense, in general.
For example, they quoted Adm. Crowe as
saying:

“At some point near the end
of the first decade of the next
century, we might be
vulnerable to attack by Israel,
Brazil, and India. Although
attack from those quarters seems
highly unlikely, in essence, I
believe the threat case has been
stretched to the limit by some
rather fanciful scenarios. It is
time to return to sanity.

“The critical point is that
the defense budget is close to a
zero-sum game, and money which
funds SDI will come from programs
which buy good defense
against more plausible and
likely
threats. Given the
nation’s pressing domestic agenda
the whole subject should be
reviewed….In any event, I would
argue for a throttled-back effort
which seems to accord more with
both economic and military
reality, perhaps in the
neighborhood of $2 billion
annually to keep the program
moving and our knowledge ahead of
competitors.”

Also quoted approvingly was an assessment
offered on 15 January 1992 by CIA
Director Gates to the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee:

“We do not expect increased
risk to U.S. territory from the
special weapons of other
countries — in a conventional
military sense — for at least
another decade.”

Another amendment co-sponsor, Sen. Carl
Levin (D-MI) drew the intended
conclusion:

“Why rush [to deploy
strategic defenses]? The only
reason is if we expect threats to
develop soon that SDI could
actually protect against. But we
do not. We are facing very
different threats after the Cold
War, and SDI is only designed to
address one of them — limited
ballistic missile attack. Even if
SDI works, it gives us no
protection against other means of
delivering weapons of mass
destruction — cruise missiles,
planes, boats, even
backpacks.”

The Perils of Selective
Citations

Interestingly,
the Senators neglected to mention several
other statements by Director Gates —
statements that seriously undermine their
contention that comprehensive,
cost-effective ballistic missile
defenses, like the Brilliant Pebbles
program (which is slated for evisceration
under the Bumpers-Sasser proposal), are
not needed now. Particularly noteworthy
was Mr. Gates’ response to a question
from Sen. John Glenn: “[W]e
do anticipate that at least some [Third
World ballistic missiles] will have the
capability of reaching the United States
by the end of the decade.”

Such a grim state of affairs could be
the consequence of several developments
now underway — or in prospect:

  • Russian sales of SS-25 (or other)
    boosters as space-launch
    vehicles;
  • Chinese sales of ICBMs to Third
    World countries;
  • new nuclear nations in the former
    Soviet Union; and
  • the proliferation of inherently
    dual-capable space- launch
    systems.

A Buyer’s Market

In fact, U.S. intelligence reportedly
believes that at least 15 Third
World countries already have
significant ballistic missile programs
,
and 24 or more Third World
countries may acquire them within the
next eight years
.

More frightening still, by the
beginning of the next decade, three (and
possibly more) Third World countries may
have missiles with ranges of up to 5,500
km — capable of striking anywhere in
Europe from the Mid-East. Such a
development could spell the end of
coalition-based responses to threats in
the latter region like that utilized in
Desert Storm and Operation Southern
Watch.

What is more, the proliferation of biological,
chemical and nuclear weapons
with
which such missiles might be equipped is
proceeding apace. By 2000, eight Third
World countries with missile programs —
including such pariah states as North
Korea, Iran and Syria — could have
either nuclear weapons capability or an
advanced nuclear weapons program. Even
highly inaccurate missiles could pose a
terrifying threat if equipped with such
weapons of mass destruction.

The breakup of the Soviet Union has
merely exacerbated these problems.
Scientists and technology associated with
weapons of mass destruction and the
ballistic missile systems by which they
can be delivered are now available on the
international market. Under these
circumstances, it is only prudent to
expect that more nations will be
able to threaten U.S. citizens, interests
and allies with these weapons sooner
than is currently anticipated.

Unforgiving Lead-times

Tragically, thanks in no small measure
to the earlier budgetary and legislative
machinations of people like Senators
Bumpers and Sasser, the United States
finds itself already seriously
“behind the power curve” in
responding to this threat. As a practical
matter, even if it were to make a crash
effort to deploy effective strategic
missile defenses — i.e., one involving a
program far more risk-intensive and
costly than that proposed by the Bush
Administration — the nation probably
could not have a competent ABM system in
place as soon as it is likely to be
needed.

The Center for Security Policy
believes that in light of the
aforementioned real and identified
dangers
that it is
unconscionable, however, for the U.S. not
to proceed at least as aggressively
as the Administration has recommended

so as to minimize the period and the
magnitude of America’s vulnerability. As
Gen. John Pietrowski, a former Commander
of U.S. Space Command and a distinguished
member of the Center’s Board of Advisors
recently observed, we have already had a
salutary warning of the potentially
enormous costs of remaining vulnerable to
missile attack:

“The only thing Saddam
Hussein really hurt us with [in
the Gulf war] were ballistic
missiles — notwithstanding his
immense conventional arsenal.
This was a lesson that was not
lost on lots of other countries
around the world.”

The Bottom Line

In
light of the real — and worsening —
nature of the ballistic missile threat
and the unduly long time it will take to
correct U.S. vulnerability to that
threat, the Center urges the
Senate to defeat the Bumpers-Sasser
amendment when a final vote on it is
called for after Labor Day
.

– 30 –

1. This Decision
Brief
is the first in a series
examining the various untenable arguments
offered by Sens. Dale Bumpers and Jim
Sasser to justify an amendment that would
gut the Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes program.