(Washington, D.C.): On Friday, the lower house of the Russian Duma agreed to the ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This step has been trumpeted by the treaty’s
proponents as a major step forward toward its goal of globally banning the production and
stockpiling of chemical weaponry.

In fact, assuming that the Duma’s upper house goes along, Russia’s accession to the treaty will
simply move it from one category (a non-party) to another (a party that will violate the
CWC). It will certainly not mean the end of Russia’s vast chemical weapons program. In fact,
the Kremlin continues to engage in such activities covertly — including the manufacture of new
classes of “binary” weapons that are far more toxic than anything known in the West and
specifically designed to circumvent the CWC’s inspection regime.⁽¹⁾

Trick or Treat: Sticking Uncle Sam With the Tab for Russian CW Destruction

Indeed, the winning argument in the Duma appears to have been that CWC ratification would
enable Russia to offload a substantial portion of the costs of destroying its vast arsenal of
obsolete chemical arms onto the United States and other states parties.⁽²⁾ The Clinton
Administration has clearly signaled its readiness to provide substantial support as well —
notwithstanding assurances to the contrary made at the time of the CWC debate in the U.S.
Senate, which were reflected in Condition #18 in the Senate’s Resolution of Ratification.⁽³⁾
According to the New York Times on 16 October 1997 — when it appeared that Russia might not
ratify the treaty: “In Washington, officials have taken the position that once Russia ratifies the
convention, the costs of putting it into effect can be settled fairly easily.”

The ultimate costs to the U.S. taxpayer of this shakedown are not known at this writing. Just as it
was predictable Americans would wind up picking up part of Russia’s tab,⁽⁴⁾ however, it is a safe
bet that the costs of doing so will likely be huge.

Unfortunately, this is hardly the only example during the six-month period since the CWC entered
into force of the critics’ dire predictions coming to pass. Consider the following warnings issued
during the course of the Senate debate — and indications that they are being proven correct:

Item: ‘The CWC Will Facilitate Economic Espionage Against U.S. Companies’

During the initial debate, opponents of the CWC warned that the CWC’s verification regime
would compound the already serious problem posed by foreign economic espionage against the
United States.⁽⁵⁾ According to the Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection
and Industrial Espionage, America loses an estimated $2 billion dollars per year as a consequence
of economic espionage.⁽⁶⁾

As it happens, U.S. chemical companies are an especially lucrative target for commercial
intelligence collection since they are world leaders in their industry. On 13 May 1997, Dr. Bruce
Merrifield — a professor at the Wharton School of Business and former Under Secretary of
Commerce with long experience in the chemical industry and other high technology fields —
reiterated concerns he expressed prior to the CWC’s ratification in testimony delivered to the
Senate Judiciary Committee then considering the Treaty’s implementing legislation (see below).
Dr. Merrifield warned that the U.S. chemical industry is a primary focus for foreign industrial
espionage. He also advised Senators that access provided to foreign nationals under the CWC
would permit a trained engineer or chemist to identify, and therefore to steal, a company’s trade
secrets, sometimes without having actually to enter a production or research facility.

Interestingly, similar concerns are now being voiced by one of the most outspoken advocates of
the CWC: the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA). In the course of the CWC debate,
the CMA incessantly made representations to the effect that the CWC’s intrusive verification
provisions would pose no threat to the U.S. chemical manufacturing business.⁽⁷⁾ For example, in
one of its “fact sheets” CMA noted, “Routine inspection of chemical facilities can quickly and
efficiently verify compliance with the Convention, with little or no disruption in production
activities….Sensitive commercial information is not jeopardized by the CWC.”⁽⁸⁾

In a recently released 38-page report, however, the Chemical Manufacturers Association seems to
have adopted a much more realistic, and dire, view of the threat. Judging by Economic
Espionage: The Looting of America’s Economic Security In The Information Age,⁽⁹⁾ the CMA
now seems seized with the very problem it was assiduously downplaying just a few months ago.
For example, this report observes:

“America, its businesses, their ability to be competitive, innovative and to expand and
create new jobs and technologies — in short, the Nation’s economic security — are
under assault from foreign spies who are stealing vast amounts of America’s most
sensitive and valuable business data at an unprecedented and alarming rate….Economic
espionage is a direct threat to the economic security of the United States.“
(Emphasis added.)

Specifically, the CMA analysis cites evidence of the ease with which foreign operatives can
obtain coveted Confidential Business Information if given even limited access to American
competitors’ facilities. “The techniques used by spies range from ‘dumpster diving’ or ‘trash
trawling’ (that is, searching through companies’ office trash), to elaborate multi-faceted efforts
including high-surveillance and other information-collection methods designed to assemble
important segments of what the experts call a ‘corporate puzzle.'”

Two specific examples quoted by the CMA are worthy of note: First, “In 1983, a delegation of
Soviet scientists invited to tour a Grumman aircraft plant on Long Island were told they could
carry no cameras and take no notes. Still, by putting adhesive tape on their shoes, the scientists
were able to collect slivers of metal alloys being used for new U.S. fighter planes.”⁽¹⁰⁾ And
second, “Plant managers became suspicious when, during [a] tour, three visiting South Koreans
were caught dipping their ties into a lab sample of the product.”⁽¹¹⁾

Fears that the Chemical Weapons Convention will be exploited for the purpose of conducting
economic espionage have only been further reinforced by the nature of the appointments to key
posts by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The job of Director
of Verification has gone to Major General Jean-Louis Roland who previously served as the
chief of the Arms Control Division of France’s Defense Staff. And the Director of the OPCW’s
Inspectorate is a former senior official in Japan’s Self-Defense Force, Ichiro Akiyama. The
French and Japanese intelligence organizations are among the world’s most aggressive in pursuing
competitive advantages for their companies through official conduct of industrial espionage. It
would be extraordinary indeed if these countries were not to seek to use the placement of their
nationals into such sensitive positions for the purpose of advancing their priority agendas.

Item: ‘The CWC Will Contribute to Proliferation and Protect Those Who Engage in It’

One of the most contentious issues in the U.S. Senate’s debate on the Chemical Weapons
Convention arose from hard experience with an earlier arms control agreement: the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative, which encouraged the
transfer of “peaceful” nuclear technology and know-how to non-nuclear states parties served as
the model for the CWC’s Article XI. Just as the former has been exploited by the likes of Iraq,
Iran, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Algeria, Brazil and Argentina as a cover for their respective
nuclear weapons programs, Article XI⁽¹²⁾ — derisively dubbed by critics the “Poisons for Peace”
provision⁽¹³⁾ — seemed sure to be used to justify and conceal transfers of technology, equipment
and know-how directly relevant to the production of chemical weapons.

A case in point was revealed on 30 October 1997 by the Washington Times’ National Security
correspondent Bill Gertz. Mr. Gertz cites a classified U.S. intelligence report as concluding that
“Chinese technicians completed work in June on a factory [in Iran] that makes ‘glass-lined
equipment.'” Such equipment is said to be “essential in the production of chemical warfare agent
precursors.”

Since “the equipment factory is a ‘dual-use’ production facility capable of producing chemical
warfare equipment as well as equipment for producing civilian chemicals like detergents,” China
and Iran — both of whom have ratified the CWC (although Iran has not yet completed the process
by depositing its instruments of ratification in The Hague) — can be expected to insist that such a
transfer is not only legal, but unobjectionable. After all, states parties have an affirmative
obligation not to “hamper…the economic or technological development of States Parties, and
international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and
chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention.” (Emphasis added.)

Although CWC proponents attach great weight to the italicized portion of the text, the
Sino-Iranian chemical cooperation makes clear that there is no way confidently to differentiate
between dual-use technology transfers that will be used for prohibited and non-prohibited
purposes. As a result of the CWC, it is predictable that more such dangerous technology will be
flowing into threatening hands in the future.

Item: ‘The CWC is Unverifiable’

Opponents of the CWC warned that the treaty’s verification regime — while the most intrusive
ever negotiated — would be inadequate to the job of detecting and proving the existence of covert
chemical weapons production and stockpiling by nations determined to persist in such activities.
This critique has been abundantly borne out by Saddam Hussein’s success in defeating the far
more intrusive and effective inspections that have been scouring Iraq since 1991 in search of
prohibited chemical and other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

In an interview in early August, Amb. Rolf Ekeus, former chief UN weapons inspector, reported
that during the last six years the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) has uncovered
a large portion of the Iraqi chemical weapons program. However, Mr. Ekeus claims Iraq is still
hiding chemical weapons and chemical weapons technology, and does not intend to surrender
these capabilities: “We have documentary evidence about orders from the leadership to preserve
a strategic capability …. UNSCOM uncovered work on the nerve gas VX and says that 3,000
kilograms of VX is missing.”⁽¹⁴⁾

In a report issued on 7 October 1997, Ekeus’ successor, Amb. Richard Butler, revealed the
abiding nature of Iraq’s ambition to defend and enhance its weapon manufacturing capabilities.
“The outstanding problems are numerous and grave,” writes Butler. And last week, Saddam
audaciously acted to degrade the inspection regime still further — and create the precedent for
destroying it altogether — by barring the most capable inspectors of all, the Americans, from
serving on UNSCOM teams.

The case of Iraq has been instructive of the difficulty in implementing the verification measures of
the CWC. Creena Lavery, special assistant to the director of UNSCOM in Baghdad claimed,
“UNSCOM has shown that it is very, very easy to conceal this sort of thing. We’ve been
here six years and have a very intrusive mandate. We can…go anywhere and take anything
away. But we still can’t confirm we know everything. It raises questions about what other
countries can get away with.”⁽¹⁵⁾ This is true in spades of the far less robust regime that is
supposed to underpin the CWC.

Item: ‘Rogue States Will Continue to Have Chemical Weapons‘

Iraq is, regrettably, not the only rogue state bearing out the critics’ charge that many of the most
dangerous chemical weapons nations will not even bother to become party to the CWC, let alone
eliminate their CW arsenals. Consider the following evidence that has come to light since the
treaty entered into force:

• According to a report aired on 4 August 1997 by the Christian Broadcasting Network, satellite
  photos have revealed that “Syria appears to be deploying deadly new nerve agents loaded onto
  missiles at sites near the cities of Hama and Homs in northwest Syria.” The photos further
  show a “chemical weapons plant near Homs,… where nerve agents, such as VX gas, are being
  manufactured. This picture [on screen] also shows how the deadly chemicals are stored in
  small tanks away from the main facility under heavy guard.”⁽¹⁶⁾

Published reports suggest that Syria has also maintained a “strategic missile capability”
for delivering its chemical weapons — an arsenal of up to 150 Scud missiles built with
the assistance of China and North Korea and capable of a devastating chemical attack
on Israel. The Syrian despot, Hafez Assad may believe that his country, with the
Middle East’s largest chemical weapons stockpile⁽¹⁷⁾ and an eroding conventional
military capability, might benefit from a preemptive strike on Israeli population centers
if the ensuing conflict could be terminated by international pressure for a cease-fire.

It has belatedly dawned on the Israelis that this reality makes it dangerous
for Israel to ratify the CWC.⁽¹⁸⁾ They now face the Hobson’s choice of
eliminating chemical weapons that constitute a key part of the Jewish State’s
deterrent posture or face sanctions that could prove, in the words of one
commentator, to be “a mortal blow to Israeli high tech firms, which are also major
exporters.”⁽¹⁹⁾

• According to a report released in August by the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, North
  Korea has amassed a 1,000-ton chemical weapon stockpile — 70 tons of which could be used
  immediately upon South Korean population centers. In addition, the reports revealed the
  North continues to produce 15.2 tons of chemical weapons each day, a mere fraction of its
  capacity in a time of crisis to produce up to 40 tons per day at as many as eight chemical
  weapon factories in a time of crisis. The KJCS conclude, moreover, that: “We believe that the
  North has no qualms about using chemical weapons.”⁽²⁰⁾

Although President Clinton asserted that, thanks to the CWC, “it will be more
difficult for terrorists and for rogue states to get or make poison gas,” the treaty is
unlikely to have any discernible impact on the North Korean threat. Its weapons of
mass destruction programs are largely indigenous⁽²¹⁾ and the CWC’s sanctions regime
will do little to deter future build up of chemical weapons in North Korea or other
countries that have developed chemical weapons on their own.

Developments in Iraq, Syria and North Korea belie President Clinton’s assurances that “by
ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention…we can help shield our soldiers from one of the
battlefield’s deadliest killers.” To the contrary, they confirm that the CWC will not: 1) banish
poison gas; 2) protect American troops from chemical attack; 3) stop rogue nations or terrorists
from building chemical weapons; or 4) give the “international community” the tools to prevent,
halt or punish those who do.

Item: ‘Declarations by States Parties Will Not Make a Difference’

Not only is the Chemical Weapons Convention not a global or verifiable ban, whatever limited
utility it has depends critically upon the good faith of its states parties in declaring the size, nature
and location of their chemical stockpiles. The preponderance of inspections and other monitoring
required by the treaty involve such declarations. Where countries decline to acknowledge their
CW capabilities — or misrepresent those they do acknowledge having — the treaty regime
becomes even more irrelevant to the persistent reality that chemical weaponry abounds.

The case of India is instructive. After repeatedly denying that they maintained a chemical
weapons capability, the Indians confessed in a declaration to the OPCW to having produced and
stockpiled a small chemical arsenal.

This revelation has been, by far, the most hyped development since the CWC entered into force.
The treaty’s champions have cited it as proof of its effectiveness and a watershed event in the
history of arms control. Far from a cause for celebration, this revelation should awaken
proponents to the hard reality: A country that has systematically lied about its CW capabilities
may still be significantly understating them. The Indians clearly have established and concealed
chemical weapons facilities in the past; it would be foolish to assume that they will stop doing so
now.

More troubling still is the fact that, in contrast to the Indian disclosure (which New Delhi saw fit
to make public, presumably as part of a deterrent calculation vis à vis Pakistan), other nations’
declarations are apparently not going to be revealed — by some accounts, even to member
governments. This makes even more of a mockery of the idea that the CWC will produce real
transparency, let alone a basis for judging that totalitarian systems like China (or even still
significantly closed societies like Russia’s) have honestly reported their CW holdings, let alone
taken all measures necessary to eliminate production capabilities⁽²²⁾ and destroy all stockpiles.

Item: ‘The CWC Will Serve as an Undesirable Precedent’

Critics of the CWC repeatedly warned that the “triumph of hope over experience” epitomized by
this treaty — the willingness to disregard objective realities concerning the impossibility of
verifiably and globally eliminating through an arms control agreement technologies as ubiquitous
as those involved in chemical weapons arms — would subsequently be cited as a prototype for
future agreements. This prediction, too, has been borne out over the past six months.

• The Antipersonnel-Landmine Ban: Those promoting a treaty that purports to prohibit the
  production, stockpiling and use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) have repeatedly claimed
  that the Chemical Weapons Convention proved that the international community could rid the
  world of weapons deemed to be “illegitimate” or “immoral.” This argument has been used
  with considerable effect in countering the responsible objections from the U.S. military to an
  APL ban⁽²³⁾ — notably the fact that some countries will not sign up and others who do will
  nonetheless continue to use landmines. Why, it is asked, did the same prospect not prevent the
  Joint Chiefs of Staff from objecting to a chemical weapons ban that had precisely the same
  shortcomings? The only satisfactory answer is that the U.S. military has learned from the
  CWC experience; unverifiable, unenforceable and ineffective arms control agreements may or
  may not make a moral statement but they will not provide real security. They serve instead
  merely to whet the appetite of those who hope in a similar manner to eliminate a whole slew of
  vital defense capabilities.⁽²⁴⁾
• Improved Verification Provisions for the Biological Weapons Convention: As part of its
  bid to generate private sector support for the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Clinton
  Administration assured the U.S. biotech industry that it would not be subjected to the same
  risks of economic espionage now arising from the CWC — assurances that deceitfully ignored
  the fact that pharmaceutical and other biotech firms, and any other facility in the United States,
  are already subject to intrusive challenge inspections pursuant to the CWC.

Predictably, the Administration has proceeded nonetheless to support international
efforts to amend the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) by attaching to it a
verification regime modeled after that created for the CWC. Not only does this
initiative violate its expressed commitments to the biotech industry. It is also
manifestly incompatible with U.S. security interests to facilitate the compromise of
proprietary information belonging to an industry that currently dominates the world
market — and whose technology can be so readily diverted to biological weapons of
incalculable menace.

Even the Clinton interagency appears to understand this reality. Reportedly, they
are being overruled, however, by the same National Security Council staffers whose
personal investment in the CWC transformed its approval by the Senate into a
presidential priority in 1996 and 1997. Like the proverbial bad penny, the CWC will
continue to keep coming back to haunt us.

The Bottom Line

The foregoing litany is meant to be an illustrative, and certainly not exhaustive, treatment of the
“early returns” on the Chemical Weapons Convention. In short, the treaty is not working as
advertized — nor can it.

It is especially tragic that the Senate allowed itself to be hornswoggled into agreeing to the
CWC’s ratification by the 29 April entry-into-force date. Senators fell prey to the fraudulent
argument that only by doing so could they ensure the United States had a voice in the
implementation of this treaty. In fact, as the Russians demonstrated by demurring for six-months
without losing their ability to participate in and to influence decisions by the OPCW, the real
reason for giving the Senate the bum’s rush was to avoid the further strengthening of the
opponents arguments that would occur with the passage of time.

This reality should be borne in mind now, as the Administration leans on the House of
Representatives to complete action on S.610, the implementing legislation for the CWC, prior to
its recess next week. Thanks to the hard work by treaty critics in the Senate led by Senator Jon
Kyl (R-AZ), this bill has been substantially improved over the version originally submitted by
President Clinton. In light, however, of the problems that have come to light since the treaty was
ratified — for example, those involving commercial espionage that even the Chemical
Manufacturers Association are now acknowledging — it may be desirable to take additional time
to consider further tightening of its provisions to protect U.S. civil liberties and intellectual
property.

In any event, in the interest of holding accountable those responsible for the Chemical Weapons
Convention and, where possible, mitigating the harm it is doing to American security and other
interests, the Center for Security Policy will be continuing to monitor this treaty’s implementation.
It urges those with oversight responsibility in the Senate and House to do no less.

– 30 –

1. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Russia’s Covert Chemical Weapons Program
Vindicates Jesse Helms’ Continuing Opposition to Phony C.W. Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4
February 1997).

2. According to a press release issued by the OPCW on 24 May 1997, the European Union has
already committed 10-15 million ECU for weapons destruction upon the Duma’s ratification of
the CWC.

3. Condition #18 stipulated that the U.S. shall not allow Russia to make deposit of its instruments
of ratification contingent upon the U.S. paying for the destruction of Russia’s chemical weapon
stockpiles and production facilities.

4. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled C.W.C. Watch #1: Russia Defers Ratification, Seeks
Payments For Compliance and a ‘Seat At The Table’ Anyway (No. 97-D 59, 30 April 1997).

5. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Truth Or Consequences #5: The C.W.C. Will Not Be
Good For Business — To Say Nothing of the National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17 February
1997).

6. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage,
National Counterintelligence Center, June 1997.

7. Any concerns the CMA may have had about commercial espionage were clearly subordinated
to the conviction that the 192 large chemical manufacturing concerns that constitute its
membership could gain access to new markets pursuant to the CWC. Unfortunately, as was
observed by the treaty’s critics at the time, such new markets are almost certainly going to be in
nations with whom such trade was not previously possible for fear that chemical materials and
technology would be diverted to weapons production. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled A
Place to Start on Campaign Finance Reform: C.M.A. Should Refrain From Putting Senators
in Compromising Positions on the Chemical Weapons Convention (No. 97-D 34, 26 February
1997).

8. “Chemical Weapons Convention Fact Sheet,” Chemical Manufacturers Association. This
assessment ignores the significant distinction between “routine” inspections (the relatively
unintrusive monitoring regime to which CMA member companies’ “declared” chemical
manufacturing facilities would be subjected) and the much more invasive on-site “challenge”
inspections to which a great many non-CMA companies — in fact, any facility in the United States
not “declared” pursuant to the CWC — could be exposed.

9. Economic Espionage: The Looting of America’s Economic Security In the Information Age,
Chemical Manufacturers Association, Autumn 1997.

10. From Wall Street Journal reporter John Fialka’s 1997 book, War by Other Means.

11. R. Capps, “The Spy Who Came to Work,” Society for Industrial Security Management,
February 1997, No. 2, Vol. 41, p.46.

12. Article XI (2)b states that State Parties shall “undertake to facilitate, and have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical
information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited
under this Convention.”

13. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences #12: The C.W.C.’s
Technology Transfer Provisions Will Exacerbate the Chemical Weapons Threat (No. 97-D 56,
22 April 1997).

14. “What Can a Defiant Nation Hide From World? Anything It Wants,” Christian Science
Monitor, 30 July 1997.

15. Ibid.

16. “Peace Melts and Threats Increase for Israel,” Christian Broadcasting Network, 4 August
1997.

17. “Israel and Foes Race to Upgrade Arms,” Christian Science Monitor, 30 July 1997.

18. According to a 15 July 1997 article in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz:

“Israel’s decision to become one of the cosignatories to the charter, which calls for
a total ban on the production, use and storage of all chemical weapons and for the
destruction of all chemical arsenals, was taken at an optimistic point of time, when
many believed that a ‘new Middle East’ was in the offing. The assumption was that
Israel’s decision would be followed by a similar move on the part of the Arab states
and that, in the final analysis, one of the most menacing unconventional threats to the
security of the region would be neutralized.

“However, since the decision taken by the then-prime minister and defense
minister, the late Yitzhak Rabin, to have Israel co-sign the covenant, there has been a
drastic lowering in the level of expectations among policy-makers in Jerusalem with
regard to the prospects for regional cooperation on security and strategic matters….The
problem is that compliance with the covenant’s terms could eliminate an important
element in Israel’s deterrence equation. This point is particularly crucial if the Arab
states persist in their refusal to sign the treaty. Under such circumstances, most of the
countries in the Middle East, except for Israel, would have chemical weapons.”

19. Ibid.

20. “North Koreans ‘Amassing Chemical Weapons,'” Daily Telegraph, 19 August 1997.

21. See an unclassified report from the Director of Central Intelligence entitled, “The Acquisition
of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions,” released June 1997.

22. It is a further proof of the futility of the CWC and the naivete, if not the arrogance, of its
authors that virtually any chemical, pharmaceutical or fertilizer factory can be rapidly (and, if
desired, covertly) converted to weapons production. Thanks to the inherent dual-usability of such
facilities there is, as a practical matter, no prospect of actually eliminating such production
capabilities.

23. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Celestial Navigation: Pentagon’s Extraordinary
’64-Star’ Letter Shows Why The U.S. Cannot Agree to Ban All Landmines (No. 97-D 97, 14
July 1997) and Press Release entitled Many of Nation’s Most Respected Military Leaders Join
Forces to Oppose Bans On Use of Self-Destructing Landmines (No. 97-P 101, 21 July 1997).

24. For example, the “disinventors” have announced their intention to try — in addition bans on
landmines, blinding lasers and chemical and biological weapons — to abolish: fuel-air explosives,
depleted uranium rounds, “fragmenting” bullets, non-lethal weapons and ultimately nuclear arms.