Tag Archives: Defense Budget & Expenditures

Which Bush on Missile Defense?

(Washington, D.C.): The emerging conventional wisdom about George W. Bush is that he can be determinedly principled with respect to certain “big” issues and ruthlessly pragmatic when it comes to compromising about smaller ones. This explains, we are told, why he stood his ground on tax cuts but, for example, decided to bail out on military training at Vieques.

What About Defending America?

The question now urgently arising is: Will Mr. Bush’s oft-stated pledge to deploy missile defenses prove to be one of the big issues, to which he will remain steadfastly committed? Or does he see it as one of those policy areas where he can safely agree to compromises that would effectively eviscerate his commitment to defend the American people, their forces overseas and allies “at the earliest possible time”?

This is hardly an academic question. If Mr. Bush sees missile defense as the moral equivalent of tax relief, he needs to start making at once no less concerted an effort for the former than he did for the latter.

The Challenge

After all, the battlelines are now being clearly drawn. This was particularly evident when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was confronted during a hearing on June 21 before the Senate Armed Services Committee with the sort of disciplined Democratic opposition to missile defense last seen in 1998. In the run-up to that year’s congressional elections, the then-minority caucus succeeded on three different occasions in sustaining exactly the forty votes needed to filibuster legislation making it U.S. policy to deploy an effective, limited national missile defense as soon as technologically possible. (The next year, essentially the same bill passed both houses of Congress with overwhelming majorities and was signed into law by Bill Clinton.)

The committee’s new chairman, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, closed last Thursday’s proceedings by pointedly warning Mr. Rumsfeld that “you may find some of your priorities…for little things like missile defense, changed” in favor of greater spending in areas like quality of life, morale, pay and benefits and retention.

For his part, Russian President Vladimir Putin, the man Mr. Bush concluded he could “trust” after their ninety-minute meeting in Slovenia, is doing what he can to inflame opposition here and abroad to U.S. missile defense deployments. After their summit, he has repeated earlier warnings that Moscow would respond to such an initiative by retaining nuclear missiles that would otherwise be retired and/or by putting multiple warheads aboard new missiles that were supposed to carry just one. Such threats of an arms race, no matter how implausible (due to Russia’s economic situation) or incredible (given the lack of any compelling strategic rationale for such behavior in the post-Cold War world), are having the predictable effect of emboldening the critics.

So, too, are indications that President Bush is really seeking a deal with Putin. The latest indicator to that effect is a report published by Peggy Noonan in Monday’s Wall Street Journal based on an interview with President Bush last week. This generally very astute observer of the mondo politico observes that, “One might infer — and perhaps should infer — from the President’s comments that he will not attempt to tear the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty up, but instead will move for an amendment that would allow further missile testing.” Could Ms. Noonan have completely misread Mr. Bush? Or is she correctly discerning the migration of missile defense from a big issue to a compromisable small one?

You Can’t Get There From Here

The only problem with that idea is that, if President Bush compromises on missile defense — whether by acquiescing to Senate Democrats’ budget games, by quailing in the face of threats from Russia (or, for that matter, from China or North Korea) or by trying to negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty with the likes of Vladimir Putin — he can forget about actually deploying protection against ballistic missile attack. It won’t happen on his watch, unless someplace we care about is destroyed by one.

Here’s the rub: The ABM Treaty expressly required each of the two parties — the United States and the Soviet Union (a country that, by the way, ceased to exist a decade ago) — “not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense.” To ensure that such a “base” was not established, the Treaty also obliged each party “not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.”

Senators, Russians and allied leaders who insist that the U.S. must not depart from the ABM Treaty understand full well the practical effect of this arrangement. As long as the United States foreswears sea-, air- and space-based missile defenses in particular, it will be unable to develop, to say nothing of deploy, effective anti-missile systems. And it is impossible to “amend” a treaty whose sole purpose is to preclude national missile defenses so as to allow such defenses to be tested efficiently and deployed quickly particularly if our Russian negotiating partners remain adamantly opposed to our doing so.

The Bottom Line

In short, President Bush must establish at once where he stands on defending America, its forward deployed forces and allies. If Mr. Bush has not just been paying lipservice to the need for missile defenses, and remains determined to deploy them, he has no choice but to get started. Only by displaying the kind of resolve he showed on tax cuts refusing to take “No” for an answer, mobilizing his base and the country at large and not allowing himself to be stymied or slow-rolled will he be able to begin to provide the needed protection, first from the sea.

If Mr. Bush does not take that course of action, however, all other things being equal — big issue or no — he is going soon to find himself utterly hamstrung by those who oppose him politically and strategically. What will be compromised as a result, however, will not be merely his credibility, but the security of his nation and its people.

Memo to P.M. Koizumi: Time to Reign in Foreign Minister Tanaka, Reorder and Upgrade U.S.-Japan Security Ties

(Washington, D.C.): On Monday, 18 June, Japan’s new and controversial Foreign Minister, Makiko Tanaka, met with Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington D.C. Afterwards, Ms. Tanaka grudgingly conceded that she appreciates “that the U.S. position [on missile defense] is to consult with interested states such as Russia and China” and expressed her understanding for the need for further research. Tokyo’s emissary failed, however, to allay widespread U.S. concerns about her previously stated skepticism toward — if not her outright opposition to — the Bush Administration’s position on ballistic missile defense and, as Tuesday’s Washington Times gently put it, her “undue sympathy for China.”

Foreign Minister Tanaka also met separately on Monday with President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, and Mr. Powell’s deputy, Richard Armitage. (The latter’s participation was notable since Mr. Armitage was reportedly snubbed by Ms. Tanaka during his visit to Tokyo last month for the purpose of consulting with Japan’s leaders on U.S. missile defense plans.)

What’s Wrong With This Picture?

Particularly distressing were the Foreign Minister’s widely reported 25 May remarks to her Italian counterpart. She is said to have told him that the U.S. “says there’s a missile threat, but is missile defense necessary? Japan and Europe must tell the U.S., don’t do too much.” She reportedly added that, “Perhaps the U.S. is pushing this idea of missile defense plan to confront the Chinese economic and military threat. However, one has to counter with wisdom, not with military power.”

Those concerns could only have been intensified during her visit to Washington as Ms. Tanaka signaled ominously her desire to see changes in U.S.-Japanese security ties. Following her meeting with Secretary Powell, she observed, “The [bilateral] security arrangements have already lasted 50 years and we would like to look at its benefits and burdens carefully as we may be at a milestone in the Japan-U.S. security arrangement.” The umistakably unfriendly import of this remark prompted Gen. Powell to declare: “You should always remember that the best friend of Japan is the United States.”

Needed: A Reprioritizing and Upgrading of Bilateral Security Ties

The good news is that Ms. Tanaka’s boss, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, is scheduled to make his own state visit to Washington shortly. It behooves the Japanese leader not only to make clear where he personally stands with respect to his country’s security ties to the United States. He also needs to clarify his government’s stance with respect to several initiatives of growing importance to the bilateral relationship and the common defense interests of both Japan and America. By taking the following steps to accord selected, concrete actions the high priority they deserve, Mr. Koizumi can demonstrate that his Foreign Minister does not speak either for him, for his government or for the Japanese people on matters bearing on the enhancement of Japan’s military capabilities and its security cooperation with the United States:

Ballistic Missile Defense

In the face of the growing threat of ballistic missile attack emanating from East Asia against Japan and/or the United States, missile defense should be at the very top of the bilateral security agenda. While a cooperative U.S.-Japan research program in this area has been launched, the government of Japan has yet to announce that the political decision has been taken to deploy anti-missile systems. In the absence of such a decision, bilateral cooperation has been unhelpfully circumscribed. Now that the United States government has taken that decision first, in the form of legislation enacted in 1999 and more recently with the election of a President committed to defending America and her forces and allies overseas against this threat Japan should follow suit at once.

To its credit, Japan has committed to the purchase of two more Aegis destroyers in the current Mid-Term Defense Plan with one each to be procured in 2002 and 2003. This would bring to six the number of Aegis platforms in Japan’s inventory, giving it a considerable infrastructure to provide for an early and potentially highly effective anti-missile defense of the Home Islands by equipping these ships with both the lower-tier Standard Missile (SM) 2 Block IVA missile and upper-tier SM3 Block II missile as they become available. Unlike the first four ships, though, the next two AEGIS destroyers will reportedly have the software in place to deploy (without retrofitting) these Standard Missiles required for anti-missile purposes.

Prime Minister Koizumi should use the occasion of his first meeting with President Bush to announce a “go” decision by Japan to join the United States in acquiring a missile defense system. In order to ensure that this program receives the political priority and resources it will need, he and Mr. Bush should direct that henceforth bilateral cooperation on this joint program will be overseen at the ministerial levels in both governments.

Diet Resolution on Collective Defense

In the event of an Asian conflict today, Japanese self-defense forces would not be permitted to come to the aid of, for example, a U.S. ship under attack. The reverse would be permitted, however — and expected. This absurd and potentially costly (both in terms of lost lives and needless strains between allies) asymmetrical arrangement must be redressed. Fortunately, Prime Minister Koizumi reportedly plans to catalyze a reinterpretation of “collective defense” so as to enable Japanese defense forces to assist the United States in the defending Japan. He has also stated that Article 9 of the Japanese constitution should be changed to reflect the fact that Japan actually has an army and a navy.

Aerial Refueling Tanker/Transports

Japan’s acquisition of critically-needed aerial refueling tanker/transport aircraft was delayed by a full year due to political compromises attendant to the formation of former Prime Minister Mori’s coalition government. There should be no further slippage. These aircraft represent a potentially enormous “force multiplier” for American forces in East Asia if they interoperable with U.S. assets and can be employed to keep our AWACS and fighter aircraft on-station considerably longer.

The Future of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa

The Bush Administration’s ill-advised decision to end military training on the island of Vieques has had the predictable effect of intensifying pressure on the United States to end — or at least to relocate — American forces stationed on the Japanese island of Okinawa. There is, in addition, a pernicious effort afoot to afford the U.S. only a ten-year lease for any new facilities it might secure. The Japanese and American governments must work together to avoid creating conditions that would in a decade, if not sooner, eliminate bases and training areas critical to America’s forward deployment in the Western Pacific — and the defense commitments made possible by such deployment.

Maritime Patrol Aircraft

An indigenously manufactured Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) is reportedly the Japanese navy’s number one funding priority. The MPA is intended to replace existing and aging P-3C surveillance aircraft. It is critical, however, that the MPA be fully interoperable with existing U.S. maritime patrol aircraft, as well as the new U.S. Navy multi-mission maritime aircraft under development, but not yet funded. In addition, Prime Minister Koizumi should ensure the maximum possible degree of cooperation between Japanese contractors responsible for avionics- and systems integration-related activities and their American counterparts.

The Bottom Line

Even before the Japanese Prime Minister arrives in Washington and, hopefully, makes progress on the foregoing agenda, another senior representative of his government will be holding meetings here that can go some way toward reversing the damage apparently being done to the bilateral relationship by Foreign Minister Tanaka.

Tomorrow, Japan Defense Agency Minister Gen Nakatani is scheduled to hold meetings at the Department of Defense with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). Ideally, these sessions will set the stage for Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush to unveil on 30 June their shared commitment to begin deploying in the near future sea-based missile defenses based upon their two navies’ Aegis infrastructures.

On Trusting Putin

(Washington, D.C.): One blemish on a presidential visit of Europe that can otherwise only be described as a tour de force was George W. Bush’s declaration that he was able to “get a sense” of Vladimir Putin’s “soul.” While no fault could be found with Mr. Bush’s insight that Putin is “a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country,” his statement that he deemed his Russian counterpart to be “an honest, straightforward man” is simply over-the-top.

Still, this might have been nothing more than a bit of bonhomie, attributable to Mr. Bush’s famous friendliness and courtesy to a foreign dignitary. Or perhaps he was merely waxing enthusiastic, having gotten through a two-hour meeting with Putin without the career KGB man going ballistic over America’s determination to deploy a missile defense.

It is harder to dismiss, however, the President’s description of Putin as “trustworthy.” Mr. Bush went so far as to say “I wouldn’t have invited him to my ranch if I didn’t trust him.” This statement conjures up memories of too many American leaders who have indulged in the popular, but generally fatuous, notion that warm personal relationships with the top man in the Kremlin creates a realistic basis for constructive and close ties between the two nations. As syndicated columnist William Safire notes in today’s New York Times, this hubristic practice on the part of U.S. presidents goes back at least to Franklin Roosevelt’s day. In recent years, it has induced Ronald Reagan and George Bush the elder to prop up Mikhail Gorbachev and his dying Soviet Union. It contributed to Bill Clinton and Al Gore’s determination to ignore the corrupt and anti-reform behavior of Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin.

The regrettable fact is that Vladimir Putin can be trusted only to pursue his vision of a Russia that is once again a great power — at the expense of the freedoms enjoyed by his own people, the security of their neighbors and the interests of the United States more generally. If that is what Mr. Bush meant when he said he trusts Putin, he has it about right. If not, some further clarification is in order lest he repeat errors made by his predecessors on the basis of reposing unwarranted confidence in their Kremlin counterparts’ honesty and straightforwardness and our ability to do business with them.

Putin’s China Card

By William Safire

The New York Times, 18 June 2001

“I like Old Joe,” said F.D.R. about Joseph Stalin. Carrying on that self-deluding tradition of snap judgments, George W. Bush looked into the eyes of Vladimir Putin, announced, “I was able to get a sense of his soul,” and after two heady hours concluded he was “straightforward” and “trustworthy.”

Ever since the K.G.B. man emerged as the Russian oligarchs’ choice, President Putin has shown himself to be duplicitous (ask the Chechens), anti-democratic (ask the remains of Russia’s free press) and untrustworthy (ask the exiled oligarchs). We can hope that the Bush gush was flattery intended to show the U.S. president to be nonthreatening as his administration presses ahead with a missile defense.

The American gave the Russian what he most needs: public deference that salves Russia’s wounded pride, and respect to its leader abroad as Putin methodically chokes off opposition at home. Bush topped this off with a pre-emptive concession: agreement to exchange warm ranch- and-home visits, for which Putin was eager, even before any progress was shown in agreement to scrap the old ABM treaty.

The Russian partly reciprocated, as Bush hoped, by accepting the American formulation of “a new architecture of security in the world” and by hinting that “we might have a very constructive development here in this area.” That public optimism from Russia takes a little of the steam out of alarmist Franco-German protests that America, in defending its cities from rogue missiles, was starting “a new arms race.”

At home, Putin has cracked down on the new freedoms without curbing the old corruption. Example of the rule of lawlessness: his Duma passed a bill last week to make Russia the world’s nuclear waste dump, generating $20 billion over the next decade.

That would be the most dangerous boondoggle in history, with little control over 2,000 tons of radioactive garbage yearly. “One hundred million Russian citizens are against it,” says Grigory Yavlinsky, one of the few reformers left standing in the Duma, “and only 500 people are for it 300 members sitting here and 200 bureaucrats who will be getting the money.” (Fortunately for the world, the U.S. won’t bury our nuclear waste in Russia, where it could be reprocessed and sold to Iran for weapons production.)

Well aware of the weakness of his hand, Putin is emulating Nixon strategy by playing the China card. Pointedly, just before meeting with Bush, Putin traveled to Shanghai to set up a regional cooperation semi-alliance with Jiang Zemin and some of his Asian fellow travelers.

That deft maneuver puts European leaders on notice that Russia despite all the talk of becoming a “partner” in Europe knows that the center of America’s strategic concern in the coming generation will be Asia.

Putin is signaling Bush: European leaders may resent your economic competition and appeal to their voters by complaining about pollution, but that’s merely bickering within the Western alliance. A future recombination of China and Russia, however, would challenge America’s status as the world’s sole superpower. Therefore, you’d better prop up our Russian economy with none of your human- rights lectures and expansion of NATO to our borders lest we undermine your hegemony with a Beijing- Moscow axis.

I wonder if Bush and his advisers are catching that signal. If so, they don’t seem to have let Putin’s China card affect U.S. policy. In a strong and thoughtful speech in Warsaw, Bush sent a signal of his own: “No more Munichs, no more Yaltas.”

That means no more appeasement of threats of aggression (as at Munich just before World War II, or about Taiwan today) and no more carving up of the world into spheres of influence (as at Yalta at that war’s end, or blocking the entry of the Baltic nations into NATO today). I read that to mean we will support the entry of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania vigorously, despite Putin’s phony worry about NATO being “a military organization . . . moving toward our border.”

With the strongest hand any American ever held, Bush comported himself well. But he should remember Reagan’s “trust but verify.” When the manipulative Russian comes to visit at the Texas ranch this fall, I would hate to hear “I like ol’ Vlad.”

Don’t Politicize Military Matters

(Washington, D.C.): In the wake of two recent, controversial Bush Administration decisions with far-reaching national security implications, Democratic legislators have called for congressional hearings. Unfortunately, the focus of these initiatives could become an attack on the integrity and ethical conduct of the President’s senior political advisor, Karl Rove. This would appear to be a mistake for two reasons. First, Mr. Rove appears to be an honorable man and a dedicated public servant.

Second, there is a real problem with both the Administration’s recent approval of the sale of the Silicon Valley Group (SVG) to a foreign buyer and its announcement that the Navy would not be permitted to use Vieques Island for critical combined arms training after 2003. But that problem is the evident subordination of national security interests to political considerations, not unethical behavior. If the latter is what partisan congressional investigators choose to pursue, they may miss altogether what should trouble all of us — and fail to take whatever corrective actions might yet be possible.

Selling Our Seedcorn

Rep. Henry Waxman, Democrat of California and ranking minority member on the House Government Reform Committee, has asked that panel’s chairman, Indiana Republican Rep. Dan Burton, to launch an inquiry into Mr. Rove in connection with the SVG sale. Congressman Waxman did so in response to published reports that Mr. Rove may have had a conflict of interest since he was lobbied a few months back by Intel Corporation representatives anxious to have an interagency group known as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) approve SVG’s purchase by a Dutch competitor called ASML. At the time, the President’s advisor held at least $100,000 worth of Intel shares.

My sense is that, to the extent Karl Rove played a role in the Administration’s ultimate approval of the SVG decision over objections from the Pentagon, it was not because he was swayed by personal pecuniary considerations. Rather, many senior members of the Bush team — and, for that matter, Members of Congress — are anxious to do what Intel wants simply because they recognize that this huge company and its friends in Silicon Valley have become one of the most important new sources of campaign contributions and political influence.

The trouble lies with what Intel wanted. Intel is a principal consumer of electronic chip-manufacturing machines utilizing a technology known as lithography. Thanks to many millions of dollars of U.S. taxpayer investments in the Silicon Valley Group, its lithography machinery was among the best in the world. Moreover, it had pioneered breakthroughs in the field that promised to allow SVG to dominate the industry in the years ahead. Importantly, SVG was also the last manufacturer of lithography machines in the United States.

SVG’s European rival, ASML, saw an opportunity to take out its competitor and proposed to purchase it and a subsidiary called Tinsley Laboratories that manufactures precision optics used in spy satellites and for other defense-related purposes. Although the Defense Department belatedly recognized that it would be contrary to U.S. national security interests to have no American supplier of such equipment, Intel — which views itself as a multi-national, not a U.S., company — pushed very hard, and ultimately successfully, to have the Pentagon’s recommendations disregarded by the White House.

Dispensing With Realistic Training

A similar political override took place last week with respect to Vieques. Both Republicans and Democrats alike have appreciated that Hispanic Americans represent an increasingly influential and potentially decisive electoral group. (Surprisingly, even savvy Anglo politicians frequently fail to appreciate, however, that this community is far from monolithic in their views. For example, Cuban- and Mexican- Americans and others from Latin America share a common language but frequently have little else in common with Puerto Ricans.) Hence, Bill Clinton pardoned convicted Puerto Rican terrorists and pandered to the opponents of Navy and Marine training on Vieques.

Faced with the Clinton legacy on Vieques — specifically, the prospect of a possible repudiation in a referendum of the island’s residents to be held in November — and anxious to curry favor with Hispanics, the Bush team decided that the Navy would have to find someplace else to exercise by 2003. There is, however, no reason to believe that the military will in fact get two years to find someplace else. Neither is there anyplace else in prospect that will enable the sort of realistic training done at Vieques over the past sixty years, without which American personnel sent into harm’s way may suffer needless casualties and/or fail to accomplish their missions. The new Democratic chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Carl Levin, has announced his intention to hold hearings on this decision and will presumably zero in on its political aspects.

What Congress Should Do

Just as Congress could usefully examine the folly of allowing industries vital to U.S. security to be sold off to entities that may prove to be unreliable suppliers — and/or willing providers of such technology to potential adversaries — so it could helpfully conduct a rigorous evaluation of the assumptions underpinning the Vieques decision. In particular, legislators ought to assess whether Navy Secretary Gordon England’s claim that his service will find an “acceptable alternative” (as opposed to a place, or places, capable of providing the same training benefits as Vieques) is supportable and, if so, whether such lesser training is adequate.

In addition, Capitol Hill should address whether the precedent being set by the transparently politicized decision to get out of Vieques will have a highly detrimental ripple effect around the world and perhaps even in the United States itself. After all, what is to stop others seeking an end to military exercises in their backyards from demanding equal treatment with the Puerto Ricans?

The Bottom Line

In short, Congress could do a valuable service to the national interest and security if it helps the Bush Administration to keep politics out of military-related public policy decisions. The way to do this is not to pursue witchhunts against the likes of Karl Rove, but to establish unmistakably that such decisions should not be made in his office but in the Defense Department in consultation with the President’s National Security Advisor.

Message to the President From an Admirer: You Made a Mistake on Vieques

(Washington, D.C.): Yesterday’s announcement that the U.S. military would no longer be able to train on the island of Vieques was a grievous error. At it happens, the damage it could inflict is not limited to denying the armed forces realistic mock combat experience — the absence of which will likely translate directly into otherwise avoidable loss of life and may even jeopardize our troops’ performance in future conflicts.

The Vieques decision also has the potential to cause the Bush-Cheney Administration long-term political problems every bit as consequential as was its predecessor’s benighted effort to allow avowed homosexuals to serve in uniform.

In a column distributed today in National Review Online, the Center for Security Policy’s President, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. dissected the impetus behind and implications of the decision to appease opponents (foreign and domestic) of continued training on Vieques. It can only be hoped that arguments like those advanced by Mr. Gaffney will encourage the President to cut his losses — and the Nation’s — by quickly reconsidering this ill-advised and indefensible action.

Wayward Help’

By Frank J. Gaffney, Jr

National Review Online, 15 June 2001

The best that can be said for the Bush administration’s decision to stop military training on the island of Vieques is that it is a Solomonic one. Alas, in this instance, it has all the appeal of actually splitting the proverbial baby in two.

In one fell swoop, the president’s subordinates, led by his top political adviser, Karl Rove, have eliminated the one and only training range in the Atlantic where submarines, ships, aircraft, and amphibious troops can conduct realistic and vital combined-arms exercises. The U.S. military which had repeatedly been assured by the Bush team that “help is on the way” and the Clinton years of subordinating national security to political considerations were over–is understandably appalled, and furious.

After all, those responsible for ensuring the safety and combat effectiveness of Navy and Marine Corps personnel sent into harm’s way (e.g., every Atlantic seaboard-based unit deployed to the Persian Gulf) understand that troops whose first exposure to what Clauswitz called “the fog of war” comes in actual battle are likely to suffer needless casualties and perhaps be unable to prevail.

Even more troubling to the military was the president’s off-the-cuff explanation for this decision, as explained this week in Goteborg, Sweden. The three reasons he cited were: “One, there’s been some harm done to people in the past. Secondly, these are our friends and neighbors, and [third] they don’t want us there.” Unfortunately, these conditions apply, to one degree or another, just about everywhere the U.S. armed forces practice their necessarily noisy, disruptive, and/or destructive craft.

They certainly apply in spades in Okinawa, the lynchpin of America’s forward presence in East Asia and home to training areas every bit as essential to the readiness of U.S. forces in the Pacific as Vieques is to their Atlantic-based counterparts. Indubitably, the basis upon which the Bush administration has bailed out of Vieques will undercut the Japanese government, which has faced increasingly insistent pressure from Okinawans to end the U.S. “occupation” of their island.

For that matter, it is not unreasonable to anticipate that communities in the United States itself, tired of the inconvenience of being neighbors to live-fire ranges or simply lusting after the valuable real estate currently reserved for the military’s use, will want equal treatment with the Puerto Ricans. Even in the absence of the ominous Vieques precedent, such demands were on the rise thanks to the reality that fewer and fewer Americans have any connection to the armed forces. Now, such claims may become irresistible.

Matters are made worse by the indignation of the Puerto Rican activists and their friends (like Sen. Hillary Clinton, Al Sharpton, Gov. George Pataki, and Fidel Castro) who want to know why two years more must pass before the bombing, gunfire, and armed landings stop at Vieques. Having disconnected the order for the Pentagon to find someplace else to train from the requirement to find that place first, there is no obvious basis upon which demands for an immediate cessation can be resisted. The pressure will only further exacerbate an already growing rift between America’s civilians and the military sworn to defend them.

In the wake of a firestorm of criticism over the Vieques decision, the White House has tried to insist it was made “on the merits.” And yet, the contention that it was motivated by, as spokesman Ari Fleischer put it, the president’s commitment to “ensuring that our military is trained for the mission required,” is laughable. Had that really been the top priority, we would have resumed live-fire training at Vieques suspended by President Clinton and made clear that the island would remain an active exercise area for the foreseeable future.

Unfortunately, this is not the first time that the young Bush administration which came to office on a platform of ending the Clinton-Gore practice of compromising vital national security interests in order to satisfy perceived political dictates has engaged in just such behavior. For example, a few weeks ago, the White House overrode legitimate Pentagon objections to the sale to a foreign buyer of this country’s last manufacturer of the equipment needed to mass-produce high-quality electronic chips. The Washington Post reported this week that that action, which could have highly deleterious implications for defense production in the future, followed a meeting between a principal backer of the deal, Intel, and a man who at the time held $100,000 worth of Intel’s stock, Karl Rove.

The Bush administration has also alarmed those familiar with the deplorable condition of the armed forces bequeathed by Bill Clinton. They had been encouraged to expect that the promised “help on the way” would promptly translate into additional resources needed to fix well-documented shortfalls in maintenance, training, and procurement. Budgetary restraint has, however, been the order of the day to date, causing the president’s (Fiscal Year) 2001 supplemental request to be seriously inadequate. The same seems likely to be true of an amendment now being made to the Pentagon’s budget request for Fiscal Year 2002. Insult has been added to injury to the extent that the military’s top commanders feel their views and concerns have not been heard, let alone given proper weight, in the administration’s deliberations.

Ironically, if President Bush is perceived to be pandering to ethnic constituencies, big-business interests, and single-minded tax-cut advocates at the expense of his commitment to rebuild the U.S. military and restore American power, he runs a serious risk not only of undermining national security. He may also alienate a key element of his political constituency without which neither he nor his Republican party will fare well in future elections: the active-duty military and the millions of others in and out of uniform National Guard and Reserve personnel, veterans, defense contractors, their employees and unions, and other patriotic Americans who once formed the Reagan defense coalition. Corrective action on this front is urgently needed, now.

Don’t Go There: President Bush Must Avoid Temptation to Make Unwise Cuts in U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Forces

(Washington, D.C.): President Bush has skillfully set the stage for his meeting tomorrow with Russia’s Vladimir Putin. This is the intended by-product of his efforts during the preceding European stops to make unmistakably clear his commitment to defending the United States, its friends and allies against ballistic missile attack.

The Kremlin is, consequently, forewarned that its machinations aimed at blocking such a development by insisting on the sanctity of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty will not succeed. (This position is, of course, all the more preposterous in light of the systematic violation of that accord under both the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian regimes arising from Moscow’s deployment many years ago — and continuing modernization — of a prohibited territorial anti-missile defense.)

There are, nonetheless, at least two dangers still to be navigated.

  • First, Mr. Bush must avoid replacing a Russian veto derived from an outdated, undesirable and violated arms control agreement with a de facto Russian veto made possible by affording them a role in a “collaborative” or “cooperative” missile defense development effort. As the debilitating and hugely costly experience with Russian “cooperation” on the International Space Station attests, the price of obtaining from Moscow any useful technology — to say nothing of explicit political support for U.S. missile defenses — would likely be prohibitive.
  • Second, President Bush must exercise real care about cutting — or gutting — U.S. offensive nuclear forces. This is all the more important since he has already expressed an openness to certain changes in those forces that would, if actually adopted, be deeply worrisome. Specifically, in the context of creating a “new strategic framework” with Russia, Mr. Bush has said he would be prepared to make “deep” reductions in American strategic arms and de-alerting those that would be retained in the active inventory. He has also said he supports continuing the moratorium on nuclear testing first imposed upon his father.

For Vladimir Putin — whose own deployed nuclear forces must, of economic necessity, continue to contract — securing formal commitments from the American President to such arrangements would be a tour de force. They would effectively eviscerate the U.S. nuclear deterrent and preclude its reconstruction any time soon. In the process, the myth would be perpetuated that Russia is the United States’ peer and immutable adversary, a nation whose military capabilities must be rendered approximately equal to ours, no matter what.

It may well be that if Putin could get such an understanding, he would even signal a willingness to assent to some U.S. missile defense deployments (although the terms would be subjected to protracted and dilatory negotiations driven by Russian insistence that any permitted U.S. forces had to be of minimal capability and as cost-ineffective as possible). This is the kind of offer President Bush can and must refuse.

An impressively lucid and compelling warning about the inadvisability of making reckless concessions on U.S. nuclear forces was published in today’s Washington Times by Rep. Mac Thornberry. We can only hope that it will feature prominently in Mr. Bush’s briefing book for the morrow’s briefing.

How Low Should We Go on Deterrence?

By William M. “Mac” Thornberry

The Washington Times, 15 June 2001

Fifteen years ago, Ronald Reagan traveled to Reykjavik, Iceland, for his second summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev.

The turning point of the summit came when Mr. Reagan rejected Mr. Gorbachevs challenge to abandon development of a missile defense system in exchange for unprecedented cutbacks in the size of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

Although he was roundly criticized for it at the time, many now believe Mr. Reagans decision to hold firm hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Tomorrow, President Bush will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ljubljana, Slovenia. Clearly, the world has changed a great deal since 1986. However, one thing that has not changed is that the security of America continues to rest upon the strength of our nuclear deterrent.

In early May, President Bush spoke of shrinking the size of our nuclear arsenal to achieve “a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies.” Undoubtedly, we can safely reduce our current inventory of nuclear weapons without compromising our security.

But with some commentators suggesting that U.S. security needs can be met by a few hundred warheads in our arsenal, we need to consider some fundamental questions about what deterrence means and how we accomplish it.

What does nuclear deterrence mean today? During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was clearly defined. It meant having an arsenal big enough to deter the Soviets from attacking first and potent enough to respond effectively if they did.

Today deterrence comes from a more delicate balance of reducing proliferation, dissuading adversaries, and assuring allies. Our nuclear deterrent also may discourage use of other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical or biological weapons. This broader concept of deterrence should be considered as we determine the number and the characteristics of our future stockpile.

Still, there is power in sheer numbers. Published estimates indicate Russia still has about 6,000 to 7,000 strategic and 10,000 to 20,000 tactical nuclear weapons. Unlike the United States, Russia is still manufacturing new warheads. But we must look beyond just Russia. From China and North Korea, to India, Pakistan, and countries in the Middle East, more and more nations are seeking to strengthen their regional influence by enhancing their nuclear capability. The U.S. may face possible alliances among them or terrorist groups that are actively seeking a nuclear capability.

The lower we make the threshold for becoming a world power, the more tempting it becomes. There may not be an appreciable difference whether the U.S. has 7,000 or 4,000 weapons. Even 2,500 weapons may seem unreachable for an emerging nuclear power with a few dozen weapons on hand. But matching a U.S. stockpile of 500 or 1,000 weapons may seem much closer and much more achievable, both practically and psychologically. We do not want to lower the bar so much that others are encouraged to try to jump up and reach it particularly those who see nuclear weapons as a shortcut to global influence.

How can we achieve deterrence as our nuclear stockpile grows older and more strategically limited? Since we are unable to build new weapons or conduct nuclear tests on old weapons, our most significant challenge may be keeping our existing deterrent credible.

The science-based stockpile stewardship program is still unproven and underfunded despite the best efforts of our scientists and nuclear work force. And those who expect significant budget savings from a smaller arsenal will be disappointed, for the tools and processes cost roughly the same for 1,000 weapons as for 5,000.

But it could get worse. Deep cuts in the total number of warheads would reduce how many types of warheads we will have. For example, under START I the U.S. has nine different types of warheads. If we were to have only a few hundred weapons, we would probably keep only our submarine launched missiles, leaving just two or three different types of warheads. Logically, with fewer types of warheads, a problem with any one type and problems do develop from time to time disables a greater percentage of the stockpile. If we put all of our eggs into one or two baskets, a hole in one of those baskets could have devastating consequences.

The bottom line is that nuclear weapons have helped provide a stabilizing force in the world for more than 55 years. In the future, they may have a different role to play, but they will still be central to the security of the United States and world peace. A reduction in Americas nuclear arsenal may be sound policy. But how low we can go will depend on assessing the future threat accurately, deterring adversaries while assuring allies, and maintaining confidence in the weapons that remain.

Just as President Reagan held firm at Reykjavik when challenged to drop his plans for a missile defense system, so too should President Bush hold firm when called upon to cut our nuclear arsenal below levels on which the security of the United States and the world depends.

William M. “Mac” Thornberry is a Republican member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Texas and serves on the House Armed Services and Budget Committees and is chairman of the Special Oversight Panel on Department of Energy Reorganization.

Bush Really Grows in Office

(Washington, D.C.): During his second full day in Europe, President Bush further underscored his commitment to deploy missile defenses at the earliest possible time. In remarks at a press conference following his meeting with other NATO leaders, Mr. Bush made the following important points:

  • “There was broad agreement that we must seek a new approach to deterrence in a world of changing threats, particularly the threat posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.”
  • “I told the allies I’m committed to working closely with them to address this common threat by developing a new framework for nuclear security. This framework must include greater non-proliferation and counter-proliferation efforts, decreased reliance on offensive weapons, and greater transparency so that responsible nations can have greater levels of confidence.”
  • “I also spoke of my commitment to fielding limited, but effective, missile defenses as soon as possible. I explained that the ABM Treaty embodied the Cold War nuclear balance of terror between rival superpowers. But it no longer makes sense as a foundation for relations that should be based on mutual confidence, openness, and real opportunities for cooperation.”
  • “All this marks a major shift in thinking about some of the most critical issues of world security. And I was pleased by the open and constructive reactions. I’m encouraged that in today’s meeting we saw a new receptivity towards missile defense as part of a new strategic framework to address the changing threats of our world.”
  • “As one of our close allies noted, the world is changing around us, and NATO’s great strength has been a willingness to adapt and move forward. Another noted, NATO is a defensive alliance and, thus, an increasingly important role should be played by defensive systems to protect all our citizens from terrorist blackmail.”
  • “Secondly, we agreed that we must reach out to Russian leaders, and to a new Russian generation, with a message that Russia does have a future with Europe. The United States will seek to build this strategic framework with Russia. Now that Russia has recognized a weapons of mass destruction threat to Europe, future cooperative work on a new strategic framework could be a great task which brings NATO and Russia together.”

President Bush is to be commended for leaving no doubt about his determination to proceed promptly with deployment of missile defenses. It now falls to him to do just that by announcing forthwith that Aegis ships are authorized to perform this function and will be swiftly equipped with improved capabilities to do so. By taking these tangible steps now to remove the missile defense issue from the negotiating table, Mr. Bush can maximize the chances that Vladimir Putin will understand that the time has come for the Kremlin to accommodate — rather than to continue to resist — the inevitable U.S. deployment, a stance increasingly evident in European capitals.

The Stuff of Which W.’ IS Made

(Washington, D.C.): In an op.ed. article published as part of the Investor’s Business Daily “Brain Trust” featured columns, Center for Security Policy President Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. noted the strong similarities between the circumstances under which Ronald Reagan met Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik in 1986 and those surrounding George W. Bush’s imminent “summit” meeting with Gorbachev’s successor (in every sense of the word), Vladimir Putin. Noting the pressures each man came under to abandon the idea of building defenses against ballistic missile attack from the Kremlin, allied leaders, Congressional Democrats and even some of their own subordinates, Mr. Gaffney observed: “We will know shortly of what Mr. Bush is made. Let us all hope it is the stuff of Ronald Reagan.”

The early returns are now in. In remarks at a joint press conference yesterday with Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar Lopez, Mr. Bush made the following comments:

  • “Part of the problem with the ABM Treaty is that it prevents a full exploration of possibility. We’re bound by a treaty signed in 1972 that prohibits the United States from investigating all possibilities as to how to intercept missiles. For example, the technology of intercept-on-launch is a technology that we must more fully explore in order to make sure that we have the defensive capabilities necessary to prevent what I call blackmail.”
  • “The ABM Treaty is a relic of the past. It prevents freedom- loving people from exploring the future, and that’s why we’ve got to lay it aside, and that’s why we’ve got to have the framework, the discussions necessary to explain to our friends and allies, as well as Russia, that our intent is to make the world more peaceful, not more dangerous. Our intent is to bring stability into the world, and freedom-loving people must recognize the true threats that face democracies in the 21st century. The days of the Cold War have ended, and so must the Cold War mentality, as far as I’m concerned.”
  • “I look forward to making my case, as I did today over lunch, about missile defense. It starts with explaining to Russia and our European friends and allies that Russia is not the enemy of the United States; that the attitude of mutually assured destruction is a relic of the Cold War; and that we must address the new threats of the 21st century if we’re to have a peaceful continent and a peaceful world. Those new threats are terrorism, based upon the capacity of some countries to develop weapons of mass destruction and therefore hold the United States and our friends hostage. It is so important we think differently in order to address those threats.”
  • “I believe that people are interested in our opinion. I believe Mr. Putin is interested in our opinions. I know the president of Spain was willing to listen as to why it’s important to think differently in order to keep the peace. The ABM Treaty prevents our nation and other freedom-loving nations from exploring opportunities to be able to say to those who would hold freedom-loving peoples hostage that we’re not going to let you do so. And so I look forward to consulting and continue the consultations that have already begun.”

Importantly, President Aznar responded favorably to Mr. Bush’s unwavering commitment to missile defense, declaring:

“I want to say that according to my opinion, it’s absolutely understandable for any president to be concerned about the security of his citizens, and in this particular case, obviously, there is a concern that’s shared as a result of the collective security that we share. I sincerely believe that no one should be surprised that when we pose issues based on overcoming the past of the Cold War, policies going beyond the Cold War, presentations that go beyond the historical conflict of the Cold War, and we talk about new threats, new challenges, new problems, new challenges in general, again, in security we come to new initiatives. So far these initiatives have all been virtual in the sense that they were based on an offensive deterrent factor.”

“What I’m surprised by is the fact that there are people who from the start disqualified this initiative, and that way they are also disqualifying the deterrence that has existed so far, and probably they would also disqualify any other kind of initiative. But what we’re dealing with here is an attempt to provide greater security for everyone. And from that point of view, that initiative to share and discuss and dialogue and reach common ground with the president of the United States is something that I greatly appreciate.”

The Bottom Line

It can only be hoped that President Bush will be equally clear about his determination to defend America, its forces overseas and its allies in the days ahead. If he is, and if he follows his explanations with an announcement that the United States will promptly begin the deployment of such missile defenses as it can field — starting with adaptations to the Navy’s Aegis fleet air defense system — Mr. Bush will indeed prove to have the right stuff, the sort Ronald Reagan displayed to such good and lasting effect.

Let W. Be Reagan: How President Bush Should Handle Missile Defense Summitry

(Washington, D.C.): During his visit to Europe this week, President Bush is expected to face rough sledding on several issues from his hosts and other interlocutors. The principal topic of conversation, however, may prove to be insistent Russian and European objections to Mr. Bush’s commitment to missile defense.

On the eve of a meeting in Slovenia between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, the Center for Security Policy’s President, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., recalled an earlier summit in which a similar combination of domestic and foreign pressures was brought to bear against President Ronald Reagan’s own commitment to defending his people, their forces and allies against ballistic missile attack. The following essay, published yesterday in the Investor’s Business Daily, urges Mr. Bush to remain as Mr. Reagan did before him — steadfast in their shared determination to provide the anti-missile protection we require and deserve.

This recommendation is reinforced by the support that even a poll jointly commissioned by the left-wing Pew Charitable Trust’s Pew Research Center for The People and the Press and the Council on Foreign Relations has revealed based on a survey conducted from 15-28 May. It found that by a 51-38% margin, the American people favor “Mr. Bush’s proposed missile defense system.”

Interestingly, the survey found that “no significant change in support for the system when the concept was retested after respondents were exposed to arguments for and against missile defense.” These results are all the more extraordinary insofar as the Pew Center says that:

The survey shows a greater level of public awareness of arguments opposing missile defense than those favoring it. Fully 60% have heard that the program might be too costly, and nearly half are aware of concerns that building a missile defense system could trigger a new arms race and damage relations with Russia and China.

Fewer have heard the arguments, made by missile defense proponents….Despite the gap in awareness, however, majorities see these as important reasons to support the program; in contrast no argument against the proposal draws majority support.

The Pew/CFR poll also discovered the broad-based nature of the popular support that has long existed for missile defense, even observing that, “On balance, Democrats lean toward favoring the system with liberal Democrats evenly divided over it.” All the more reason why Mr. Bush should stay the course.

Let Bush Be Bush: He Should Push Missile Defense In Style Of Reagan

By Frank J. Gaffney Jr.

Investor’s Business Daily, June 11, 2001

Once upon a time, a President of the United States promised to protect his people, their forces overseas and friends against the threat of ballistic missile attack.

After a while, he went to Europe to meet with the leader of the Kremlin, a man who was determined to prevent America from having such defenses. The President was told that if he would only give up his commitment and agree to leave America vulnerable, Moscow would take dramatic actions to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

Allied governments urged the President to go along, warning him that his failure to do so would undermine their confidence in his leadership and perhaps weaken their ties to his country. If the President needed any further inducement to abandon his plan, Democrats in Congress strove to deny him the funds required to ready an effective missile defense. They believed that U.S. security would be better served by continuing to observe a treaty signed with Moscow in 1972 that prohibited the U.S. from developing, testing and deploying competent anti-missile systems, than it would be by having a territorial defense against missile attack.

In the face of all these pressures, even some of the President’s own advisers believed he should cut a deal with the Kremlin, notwithstanding that doing so would mean perpetuating America’s vulnerability. They told him he could secure his place in history, perhaps even win a Nobel Peace Prize, if only he would abandon his commitment to missile defense.

The President resisted all these pressures and inducements. He told the man from the Kremlin that he had an obligation to do whatever he could to provide protection against the deadly and growing menace of missile attack. By so doing, he earned a place in history of inestimably greater importance than any ephemeral arms control deal or Nobel prize.

This is not, of course, a fairy tale. It is a description of the circumstances that led up to the 1986 summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev — a summit that most at the time described as a failure because of Reagan’s refusal to abandon his Strategic Defense Initiative, even in the face of the Soviet leader’s promises to eliminate all Moscow’s nuclear weapons. In hindsight, it is clear that Reagan’s determination to pursue SDI in the face of stiff opposition contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union.

Now George Bush faces the same struggle as he heads this week to a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Like Gorbachev, Putin is using everything from blandishments to threats to media-directed appeals to thwart Mr. Bush’s Reaganesque vision of a U.S. capable of protecting its people, forces and friends overseas against accidental or intentional missile strikes.

To an even greater degree than their conservative counterparts fifteen years ago, the left-wing leaders of virtually every government in Europe (with the notable exception of Italy’s new Berlusconi administration) are adamantly opposed to U.S. anti-missile deployments — amazingly, even those that would provide protection to their own countries!

Meanwhile, Democrats in the U.S. Congress, especially in the new Senate leadership, are pronouncing President Bush’s determination to deploy missile defenses a nonstarter. And some around President Bush seem to believe that the “new strategic framework” he has called for really should look a lot like the old “Grand Bargain” sought by the Clinton-Gore administration: a deal that would package deep reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic arms with an allowance for the U.S. to deploy a missile defense of such limited capability as to be largely ineffectual.

It can only be hoped that President Bush will find in this challenging moment the courage of his convictions, like those that guided Ronald Reagan in an earlier time. However, even if the 43rd President of the United States should yield to the temptations the 40th President so steadfastly resisted, it is unlikely this nation will remain undefended against missile attack. Missile defense is almost certain to come eventually.

Instead, if President Bush agrees to some deal with Vladimir Putin that allows the latter to exercise what would amount to a continuing veto power over U.S. missile defenses, he will simply assure that the deployment of American anti- missile systems occurs after we need them — probably after some place we care about, perhaps in this country, perhaps overseas, has been destroyed by a missile attack.

This would be a most undesirable legacy, a grave disservice to the nation and one that would permanently dishonor this presidency. We will know shortly of what Mr. Bush is made. Let us all hope it is the stuff of Ronald Reagan.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. was responsible for missile defense policy in President Reagan’s Pentagon. He is currently the President of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C.

Bush and the Democrats on Security Policy: Potential Peril — and Opportunity

(Washington, D.C.): Sunday’s New York Times featured an article that should serve as a wake-up call to the Bush Administration’s national security team and Republican political operatives. Under the headline “Differences over Vieques Bitterly Divide Democrats,” the Times described a rift in Democratic ranks over defense matters that arguably has not been seen since Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson fought with the “Blame- America-First” types in his party over Vietnam, U.S.-Soviet arms control and other defining Cold War issues in the 1970s and ’80s.

It turns out that not all Democratic politicians agree with liberals like Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Robert Kennedy, Jr. and DNC Chairman Terry McAulliffe who have associated themselves with radical Puerto Rican demands that the United States immediately halt vital military training on Vieques Island near Puerto Rico. Others, like moderate-to- conservative House Armed Services Committee members Reps. Solomon Ortiz and Gene Taylor have strongly disassociated themselves from what Mr. Solomon described as “anti- military” attitudes and Mr. Taylor called “pandering of the worst sort” to Hispanic voters.

Even the Democratic chairman of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, Rep. Silvestre Reyes — while sympathetic to the people of Vieques and critical of the Navy’s handling of the islanders’ concerns — has warned, “We can’t afford to send our [service]men and women into harm’s way without the proper training.”

This development presents George W. Bush with a potential problem. It also has the makings of a terrific opportunity.

A Choice for Security Policy

The problem is that his policies on Vieques (which President Bush has decided to stop using in 2003, irrespective of whether another facility for properly training our men and women in uniform can be found), on the overall budget for defense and on ending the crimes against humanity being wrought by the odious government of Sudan invite his Democratic opponents to “run to his right” on many security policy matters.

On the other hand, by adopting a more robust position on these issues, Mr. Bush can both avoid a political liability effectively exploited against his father by Bill Clinton in 1992 (when Clinton cynically adopted for the purpose of the campaign harder-line stances than Bush-the- Elder had on Russia, Iraq, China and Milosevic) and build strongly bipartisan support for his defense and foreign policy positions.

For example, Mr. Bush should join sensible Democrats in insisting that the armed forces cannot stop training in Vieques unless and until there is someplace else for them to garner equally realistic preparation for combat. He should welcome bipartisan efforts on Capitol Hill to provide something approaching what the military needs in the way of funding for modernization, maintenance and world-wide operations — an amount considerably in excess to the $18 billion plus-up the Bush Administration has requested.

President Bush should also shift course on Sudan by embracing an approach to stopping the Khartoum regime’s genocide, slave-trading, proliferation and support for international terrorism that enjoys wide and growing support, not only among conservative-to-moderate Democrats but across the political spectrum. This approach calls for blocking access to the U.S. capital markets for foreign oil companies whose exploitation of Sudanese energy reserves is providing revenue streams used by Khartoum to underwrite its predations.

The use of such limited capital market sanctions — approved by the House of Representatives last month by a vote of 422-2 but strenuously opposed by the Bush team — makes all the more sense since James Buckee, the president of one of the most egregious offenders, Talisman Energy Inc., recently made it clear that his company would sooner pull up stakes from Sudan than risk losing access to the American investors’ money: “I don’t think anybody could afford not to have access to the U.S. capital markets. No asset is worth that.”

Happily, President Bush has as well an opportunity to pick up critical Democratic support for his top national security priority: quickly protecting this country, its forces overseas and allies against ballistic missile attack. According to today’s New York Times, “a Democratic union representing defense industry workers has…begun urging its 750,000 active and retired members to push for missile defense. To my Democratic friends on Capitol Hill, I would urge them to forgo the short- term, tactical, partisan advantage,’ R. Thomas Buffenbarger, the president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers said recently. Can our party really afford to be seen as weak on the defense of America’s cities? I think not.'” Would-be presidential candidate and Senator Joe Lieberman is one of a number of Democrats who agree.

The Bottom Line

While Mr. Bush is vacationing this month, he would be well advised to do a little summer reading that could pay off, as Dick Cheney says, “big time” this fall when critical congressional votes take place on missile defense, Pentagon budgets, Vieques and Sudan. Last year, Dr. Robert Kaufman published a superb biography entitled Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics (University of Washington Press). It describes the myriad, extraordinary contributions Scoop Jackson made to this Nation’s security, environment quality and social well-being.

More to the point, the Kaufman book offers a salutary reminder of what can happen to a Republican President when national security-minded Democrats get to his right on defense and foreign policy (as Scoop and his colleagues did to Gerald Ford, with devastating effect on the Ford-Kissinger detente agenda). It also describes the enormous contributions sensible and public- spirited Democrats can, alternatively, make when they have a robust President and sound GOP security policies to support (as Jackson did for Ronald Reagan, until the former’s untimely death in 1983).