Tag Archives: Defense Procurement Policy

Message to the President From an Admirer: You Made a Mistake on Vieques

(Washington, D.C.): Yesterday’s announcement that the U.S. military would no longer be able to train on the island of Vieques was a grievous error. At it happens, the damage it could inflict is not limited to denying the armed forces realistic mock combat experience — the absence of which will likely translate directly into otherwise avoidable loss of life and may even jeopardize our troops’ performance in future conflicts.

The Vieques decision also has the potential to cause the Bush-Cheney Administration long-term political problems every bit as consequential as was its predecessor’s benighted effort to allow avowed homosexuals to serve in uniform.

In a column distributed today in National Review Online, the Center for Security Policy’s President, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. dissected the impetus behind and implications of the decision to appease opponents (foreign and domestic) of continued training on Vieques. It can only be hoped that arguments like those advanced by Mr. Gaffney will encourage the President to cut his losses — and the Nation’s — by quickly reconsidering this ill-advised and indefensible action.

Wayward Help’

By Frank J. Gaffney, Jr

National Review Online, 15 June 2001

The best that can be said for the Bush administration’s decision to stop military training on the island of Vieques is that it is a Solomonic one. Alas, in this instance, it has all the appeal of actually splitting the proverbial baby in two.

In one fell swoop, the president’s subordinates, led by his top political adviser, Karl Rove, have eliminated the one and only training range in the Atlantic where submarines, ships, aircraft, and amphibious troops can conduct realistic and vital combined-arms exercises. The U.S. military which had repeatedly been assured by the Bush team that “help is on the way” and the Clinton years of subordinating national security to political considerations were over–is understandably appalled, and furious.

After all, those responsible for ensuring the safety and combat effectiveness of Navy and Marine Corps personnel sent into harm’s way (e.g., every Atlantic seaboard-based unit deployed to the Persian Gulf) understand that troops whose first exposure to what Clauswitz called “the fog of war” comes in actual battle are likely to suffer needless casualties and perhaps be unable to prevail.

Even more troubling to the military was the president’s off-the-cuff explanation for this decision, as explained this week in Goteborg, Sweden. The three reasons he cited were: “One, there’s been some harm done to people in the past. Secondly, these are our friends and neighbors, and [third] they don’t want us there.” Unfortunately, these conditions apply, to one degree or another, just about everywhere the U.S. armed forces practice their necessarily noisy, disruptive, and/or destructive craft.

They certainly apply in spades in Okinawa, the lynchpin of America’s forward presence in East Asia and home to training areas every bit as essential to the readiness of U.S. forces in the Pacific as Vieques is to their Atlantic-based counterparts. Indubitably, the basis upon which the Bush administration has bailed out of Vieques will undercut the Japanese government, which has faced increasingly insistent pressure from Okinawans to end the U.S. “occupation” of their island.

For that matter, it is not unreasonable to anticipate that communities in the United States itself, tired of the inconvenience of being neighbors to live-fire ranges or simply lusting after the valuable real estate currently reserved for the military’s use, will want equal treatment with the Puerto Ricans. Even in the absence of the ominous Vieques precedent, such demands were on the rise thanks to the reality that fewer and fewer Americans have any connection to the armed forces. Now, such claims may become irresistible.

Matters are made worse by the indignation of the Puerto Rican activists and their friends (like Sen. Hillary Clinton, Al Sharpton, Gov. George Pataki, and Fidel Castro) who want to know why two years more must pass before the bombing, gunfire, and armed landings stop at Vieques. Having disconnected the order for the Pentagon to find someplace else to train from the requirement to find that place first, there is no obvious basis upon which demands for an immediate cessation can be resisted. The pressure will only further exacerbate an already growing rift between America’s civilians and the military sworn to defend them.

In the wake of a firestorm of criticism over the Vieques decision, the White House has tried to insist it was made “on the merits.” And yet, the contention that it was motivated by, as spokesman Ari Fleischer put it, the president’s commitment to “ensuring that our military is trained for the mission required,” is laughable. Had that really been the top priority, we would have resumed live-fire training at Vieques suspended by President Clinton and made clear that the island would remain an active exercise area for the foreseeable future.

Unfortunately, this is not the first time that the young Bush administration which came to office on a platform of ending the Clinton-Gore practice of compromising vital national security interests in order to satisfy perceived political dictates has engaged in just such behavior. For example, a few weeks ago, the White House overrode legitimate Pentagon objections to the sale to a foreign buyer of this country’s last manufacturer of the equipment needed to mass-produce high-quality electronic chips. The Washington Post reported this week that that action, which could have highly deleterious implications for defense production in the future, followed a meeting between a principal backer of the deal, Intel, and a man who at the time held $100,000 worth of Intel’s stock, Karl Rove.

The Bush administration has also alarmed those familiar with the deplorable condition of the armed forces bequeathed by Bill Clinton. They had been encouraged to expect that the promised “help on the way” would promptly translate into additional resources needed to fix well-documented shortfalls in maintenance, training, and procurement. Budgetary restraint has, however, been the order of the day to date, causing the president’s (Fiscal Year) 2001 supplemental request to be seriously inadequate. The same seems likely to be true of an amendment now being made to the Pentagon’s budget request for Fiscal Year 2002. Insult has been added to injury to the extent that the military’s top commanders feel their views and concerns have not been heard, let alone given proper weight, in the administration’s deliberations.

Ironically, if President Bush is perceived to be pandering to ethnic constituencies, big-business interests, and single-minded tax-cut advocates at the expense of his commitment to rebuild the U.S. military and restore American power, he runs a serious risk not only of undermining national security. He may also alienate a key element of his political constituency without which neither he nor his Republican party will fare well in future elections: the active-duty military and the millions of others in and out of uniform National Guard and Reserve personnel, veterans, defense contractors, their employees and unions, and other patriotic Americans who once formed the Reagan defense coalition. Corrective action on this front is urgently needed, now.

Don’t Go There: President Bush Must Avoid Temptation to Make Unwise Cuts in U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Forces

(Washington, D.C.): President Bush has skillfully set the stage for his meeting tomorrow with Russia’s Vladimir Putin. This is the intended by-product of his efforts during the preceding European stops to make unmistakably clear his commitment to defending the United States, its friends and allies against ballistic missile attack.

The Kremlin is, consequently, forewarned that its machinations aimed at blocking such a development by insisting on the sanctity of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty will not succeed. (This position is, of course, all the more preposterous in light of the systematic violation of that accord under both the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian regimes arising from Moscow’s deployment many years ago — and continuing modernization — of a prohibited territorial anti-missile defense.)

There are, nonetheless, at least two dangers still to be navigated.

  • First, Mr. Bush must avoid replacing a Russian veto derived from an outdated, undesirable and violated arms control agreement with a de facto Russian veto made possible by affording them a role in a “collaborative” or “cooperative” missile defense development effort. As the debilitating and hugely costly experience with Russian “cooperation” on the International Space Station attests, the price of obtaining from Moscow any useful technology — to say nothing of explicit political support for U.S. missile defenses — would likely be prohibitive.
  • Second, President Bush must exercise real care about cutting — or gutting — U.S. offensive nuclear forces. This is all the more important since he has already expressed an openness to certain changes in those forces that would, if actually adopted, be deeply worrisome. Specifically, in the context of creating a “new strategic framework” with Russia, Mr. Bush has said he would be prepared to make “deep” reductions in American strategic arms and de-alerting those that would be retained in the active inventory. He has also said he supports continuing the moratorium on nuclear testing first imposed upon his father.

For Vladimir Putin — whose own deployed nuclear forces must, of economic necessity, continue to contract — securing formal commitments from the American President to such arrangements would be a tour de force. They would effectively eviscerate the U.S. nuclear deterrent and preclude its reconstruction any time soon. In the process, the myth would be perpetuated that Russia is the United States’ peer and immutable adversary, a nation whose military capabilities must be rendered approximately equal to ours, no matter what.

It may well be that if Putin could get such an understanding, he would even signal a willingness to assent to some U.S. missile defense deployments (although the terms would be subjected to protracted and dilatory negotiations driven by Russian insistence that any permitted U.S. forces had to be of minimal capability and as cost-ineffective as possible). This is the kind of offer President Bush can and must refuse.

An impressively lucid and compelling warning about the inadvisability of making reckless concessions on U.S. nuclear forces was published in today’s Washington Times by Rep. Mac Thornberry. We can only hope that it will feature prominently in Mr. Bush’s briefing book for the morrow’s briefing.

How Low Should We Go on Deterrence?

By William M. “Mac” Thornberry

The Washington Times, 15 June 2001

Fifteen years ago, Ronald Reagan traveled to Reykjavik, Iceland, for his second summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev.

The turning point of the summit came when Mr. Reagan rejected Mr. Gorbachevs challenge to abandon development of a missile defense system in exchange for unprecedented cutbacks in the size of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

Although he was roundly criticized for it at the time, many now believe Mr. Reagans decision to hold firm hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Tomorrow, President Bush will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ljubljana, Slovenia. Clearly, the world has changed a great deal since 1986. However, one thing that has not changed is that the security of America continues to rest upon the strength of our nuclear deterrent.

In early May, President Bush spoke of shrinking the size of our nuclear arsenal to achieve “a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies.” Undoubtedly, we can safely reduce our current inventory of nuclear weapons without compromising our security.

But with some commentators suggesting that U.S. security needs can be met by a few hundred warheads in our arsenal, we need to consider some fundamental questions about what deterrence means and how we accomplish it.

What does nuclear deterrence mean today? During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was clearly defined. It meant having an arsenal big enough to deter the Soviets from attacking first and potent enough to respond effectively if they did.

Today deterrence comes from a more delicate balance of reducing proliferation, dissuading adversaries, and assuring allies. Our nuclear deterrent also may discourage use of other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical or biological weapons. This broader concept of deterrence should be considered as we determine the number and the characteristics of our future stockpile.

Still, there is power in sheer numbers. Published estimates indicate Russia still has about 6,000 to 7,000 strategic and 10,000 to 20,000 tactical nuclear weapons. Unlike the United States, Russia is still manufacturing new warheads. But we must look beyond just Russia. From China and North Korea, to India, Pakistan, and countries in the Middle East, more and more nations are seeking to strengthen their regional influence by enhancing their nuclear capability. The U.S. may face possible alliances among them or terrorist groups that are actively seeking a nuclear capability.

The lower we make the threshold for becoming a world power, the more tempting it becomes. There may not be an appreciable difference whether the U.S. has 7,000 or 4,000 weapons. Even 2,500 weapons may seem unreachable for an emerging nuclear power with a few dozen weapons on hand. But matching a U.S. stockpile of 500 or 1,000 weapons may seem much closer and much more achievable, both practically and psychologically. We do not want to lower the bar so much that others are encouraged to try to jump up and reach it particularly those who see nuclear weapons as a shortcut to global influence.

How can we achieve deterrence as our nuclear stockpile grows older and more strategically limited? Since we are unable to build new weapons or conduct nuclear tests on old weapons, our most significant challenge may be keeping our existing deterrent credible.

The science-based stockpile stewardship program is still unproven and underfunded despite the best efforts of our scientists and nuclear work force. And those who expect significant budget savings from a smaller arsenal will be disappointed, for the tools and processes cost roughly the same for 1,000 weapons as for 5,000.

But it could get worse. Deep cuts in the total number of warheads would reduce how many types of warheads we will have. For example, under START I the U.S. has nine different types of warheads. If we were to have only a few hundred weapons, we would probably keep only our submarine launched missiles, leaving just two or three different types of warheads. Logically, with fewer types of warheads, a problem with any one type and problems do develop from time to time disables a greater percentage of the stockpile. If we put all of our eggs into one or two baskets, a hole in one of those baskets could have devastating consequences.

The bottom line is that nuclear weapons have helped provide a stabilizing force in the world for more than 55 years. In the future, they may have a different role to play, but they will still be central to the security of the United States and world peace. A reduction in Americas nuclear arsenal may be sound policy. But how low we can go will depend on assessing the future threat accurately, deterring adversaries while assuring allies, and maintaining confidence in the weapons that remain.

Just as President Reagan held firm at Reykjavik when challenged to drop his plans for a missile defense system, so too should President Bush hold firm when called upon to cut our nuclear arsenal below levels on which the security of the United States and the world depends.

William M. “Mac” Thornberry is a Republican member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Texas and serves on the House Armed Services and Budget Committees and is chairman of the Special Oversight Panel on Department of Energy Reorganization.

Bush Really Grows in Office

(Washington, D.C.): During his second full day in Europe, President Bush further underscored his commitment to deploy missile defenses at the earliest possible time. In remarks at a press conference following his meeting with other NATO leaders, Mr. Bush made the following important points:

  • “There was broad agreement that we must seek a new approach to deterrence in a world of changing threats, particularly the threat posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.”
  • “I told the allies I’m committed to working closely with them to address this common threat by developing a new framework for nuclear security. This framework must include greater non-proliferation and counter-proliferation efforts, decreased reliance on offensive weapons, and greater transparency so that responsible nations can have greater levels of confidence.”
  • “I also spoke of my commitment to fielding limited, but effective, missile defenses as soon as possible. I explained that the ABM Treaty embodied the Cold War nuclear balance of terror between rival superpowers. But it no longer makes sense as a foundation for relations that should be based on mutual confidence, openness, and real opportunities for cooperation.”
  • “All this marks a major shift in thinking about some of the most critical issues of world security. And I was pleased by the open and constructive reactions. I’m encouraged that in today’s meeting we saw a new receptivity towards missile defense as part of a new strategic framework to address the changing threats of our world.”
  • “As one of our close allies noted, the world is changing around us, and NATO’s great strength has been a willingness to adapt and move forward. Another noted, NATO is a defensive alliance and, thus, an increasingly important role should be played by defensive systems to protect all our citizens from terrorist blackmail.”
  • “Secondly, we agreed that we must reach out to Russian leaders, and to a new Russian generation, with a message that Russia does have a future with Europe. The United States will seek to build this strategic framework with Russia. Now that Russia has recognized a weapons of mass destruction threat to Europe, future cooperative work on a new strategic framework could be a great task which brings NATO and Russia together.”

President Bush is to be commended for leaving no doubt about his determination to proceed promptly with deployment of missile defenses. It now falls to him to do just that by announcing forthwith that Aegis ships are authorized to perform this function and will be swiftly equipped with improved capabilities to do so. By taking these tangible steps now to remove the missile defense issue from the negotiating table, Mr. Bush can maximize the chances that Vladimir Putin will understand that the time has come for the Kremlin to accommodate — rather than to continue to resist — the inevitable U.S. deployment, a stance increasingly evident in European capitals.

The Stuff of Which W.’ IS Made

(Washington, D.C.): In an op.ed. article published as part of the Investor’s Business Daily “Brain Trust” featured columns, Center for Security Policy President Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. noted the strong similarities between the circumstances under which Ronald Reagan met Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik in 1986 and those surrounding George W. Bush’s imminent “summit” meeting with Gorbachev’s successor (in every sense of the word), Vladimir Putin. Noting the pressures each man came under to abandon the idea of building defenses against ballistic missile attack from the Kremlin, allied leaders, Congressional Democrats and even some of their own subordinates, Mr. Gaffney observed: “We will know shortly of what Mr. Bush is made. Let us all hope it is the stuff of Ronald Reagan.”

The early returns are now in. In remarks at a joint press conference yesterday with Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar Lopez, Mr. Bush made the following comments:

  • “Part of the problem with the ABM Treaty is that it prevents a full exploration of possibility. We’re bound by a treaty signed in 1972 that prohibits the United States from investigating all possibilities as to how to intercept missiles. For example, the technology of intercept-on-launch is a technology that we must more fully explore in order to make sure that we have the defensive capabilities necessary to prevent what I call blackmail.”
  • “The ABM Treaty is a relic of the past. It prevents freedom- loving people from exploring the future, and that’s why we’ve got to lay it aside, and that’s why we’ve got to have the framework, the discussions necessary to explain to our friends and allies, as well as Russia, that our intent is to make the world more peaceful, not more dangerous. Our intent is to bring stability into the world, and freedom-loving people must recognize the true threats that face democracies in the 21st century. The days of the Cold War have ended, and so must the Cold War mentality, as far as I’m concerned.”
  • “I look forward to making my case, as I did today over lunch, about missile defense. It starts with explaining to Russia and our European friends and allies that Russia is not the enemy of the United States; that the attitude of mutually assured destruction is a relic of the Cold War; and that we must address the new threats of the 21st century if we’re to have a peaceful continent and a peaceful world. Those new threats are terrorism, based upon the capacity of some countries to develop weapons of mass destruction and therefore hold the United States and our friends hostage. It is so important we think differently in order to address those threats.”
  • “I believe that people are interested in our opinion. I believe Mr. Putin is interested in our opinions. I know the president of Spain was willing to listen as to why it’s important to think differently in order to keep the peace. The ABM Treaty prevents our nation and other freedom-loving nations from exploring opportunities to be able to say to those who would hold freedom-loving peoples hostage that we’re not going to let you do so. And so I look forward to consulting and continue the consultations that have already begun.”

Importantly, President Aznar responded favorably to Mr. Bush’s unwavering commitment to missile defense, declaring:

“I want to say that according to my opinion, it’s absolutely understandable for any president to be concerned about the security of his citizens, and in this particular case, obviously, there is a concern that’s shared as a result of the collective security that we share. I sincerely believe that no one should be surprised that when we pose issues based on overcoming the past of the Cold War, policies going beyond the Cold War, presentations that go beyond the historical conflict of the Cold War, and we talk about new threats, new challenges, new problems, new challenges in general, again, in security we come to new initiatives. So far these initiatives have all been virtual in the sense that they were based on an offensive deterrent factor.”

“What I’m surprised by is the fact that there are people who from the start disqualified this initiative, and that way they are also disqualifying the deterrence that has existed so far, and probably they would also disqualify any other kind of initiative. But what we’re dealing with here is an attempt to provide greater security for everyone. And from that point of view, that initiative to share and discuss and dialogue and reach common ground with the president of the United States is something that I greatly appreciate.”

The Bottom Line

It can only be hoped that President Bush will be equally clear about his determination to defend America, its forces overseas and its allies in the days ahead. If he is, and if he follows his explanations with an announcement that the United States will promptly begin the deployment of such missile defenses as it can field — starting with adaptations to the Navy’s Aegis fleet air defense system — Mr. Bush will indeed prove to have the right stuff, the sort Ronald Reagan displayed to such good and lasting effect.

Let W. Be Reagan: How President Bush Should Handle Missile Defense Summitry

(Washington, D.C.): During his visit to Europe this week, President Bush is expected to face rough sledding on several issues from his hosts and other interlocutors. The principal topic of conversation, however, may prove to be insistent Russian and European objections to Mr. Bush’s commitment to missile defense.

On the eve of a meeting in Slovenia between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, the Center for Security Policy’s President, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., recalled an earlier summit in which a similar combination of domestic and foreign pressures was brought to bear against President Ronald Reagan’s own commitment to defending his people, their forces and allies against ballistic missile attack. The following essay, published yesterday in the Investor’s Business Daily, urges Mr. Bush to remain as Mr. Reagan did before him — steadfast in their shared determination to provide the anti-missile protection we require and deserve.

This recommendation is reinforced by the support that even a poll jointly commissioned by the left-wing Pew Charitable Trust’s Pew Research Center for The People and the Press and the Council on Foreign Relations has revealed based on a survey conducted from 15-28 May. It found that by a 51-38% margin, the American people favor “Mr. Bush’s proposed missile defense system.”

Interestingly, the survey found that “no significant change in support for the system when the concept was retested after respondents were exposed to arguments for and against missile defense.” These results are all the more extraordinary insofar as the Pew Center says that:

The survey shows a greater level of public awareness of arguments opposing missile defense than those favoring it. Fully 60% have heard that the program might be too costly, and nearly half are aware of concerns that building a missile defense system could trigger a new arms race and damage relations with Russia and China.

Fewer have heard the arguments, made by missile defense proponents….Despite the gap in awareness, however, majorities see these as important reasons to support the program; in contrast no argument against the proposal draws majority support.

The Pew/CFR poll also discovered the broad-based nature of the popular support that has long existed for missile defense, even observing that, “On balance, Democrats lean toward favoring the system with liberal Democrats evenly divided over it.” All the more reason why Mr. Bush should stay the course.

Let Bush Be Bush: He Should Push Missile Defense In Style Of Reagan

By Frank J. Gaffney Jr.

Investor’s Business Daily, June 11, 2001

Once upon a time, a President of the United States promised to protect his people, their forces overseas and friends against the threat of ballistic missile attack.

After a while, he went to Europe to meet with the leader of the Kremlin, a man who was determined to prevent America from having such defenses. The President was told that if he would only give up his commitment and agree to leave America vulnerable, Moscow would take dramatic actions to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

Allied governments urged the President to go along, warning him that his failure to do so would undermine their confidence in his leadership and perhaps weaken their ties to his country. If the President needed any further inducement to abandon his plan, Democrats in Congress strove to deny him the funds required to ready an effective missile defense. They believed that U.S. security would be better served by continuing to observe a treaty signed with Moscow in 1972 that prohibited the U.S. from developing, testing and deploying competent anti-missile systems, than it would be by having a territorial defense against missile attack.

In the face of all these pressures, even some of the President’s own advisers believed he should cut a deal with the Kremlin, notwithstanding that doing so would mean perpetuating America’s vulnerability. They told him he could secure his place in history, perhaps even win a Nobel Peace Prize, if only he would abandon his commitment to missile defense.

The President resisted all these pressures and inducements. He told the man from the Kremlin that he had an obligation to do whatever he could to provide protection against the deadly and growing menace of missile attack. By so doing, he earned a place in history of inestimably greater importance than any ephemeral arms control deal or Nobel prize.

This is not, of course, a fairy tale. It is a description of the circumstances that led up to the 1986 summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev — a summit that most at the time described as a failure because of Reagan’s refusal to abandon his Strategic Defense Initiative, even in the face of the Soviet leader’s promises to eliminate all Moscow’s nuclear weapons. In hindsight, it is clear that Reagan’s determination to pursue SDI in the face of stiff opposition contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union.

Now George Bush faces the same struggle as he heads this week to a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Like Gorbachev, Putin is using everything from blandishments to threats to media-directed appeals to thwart Mr. Bush’s Reaganesque vision of a U.S. capable of protecting its people, forces and friends overseas against accidental or intentional missile strikes.

To an even greater degree than their conservative counterparts fifteen years ago, the left-wing leaders of virtually every government in Europe (with the notable exception of Italy’s new Berlusconi administration) are adamantly opposed to U.S. anti-missile deployments — amazingly, even those that would provide protection to their own countries!

Meanwhile, Democrats in the U.S. Congress, especially in the new Senate leadership, are pronouncing President Bush’s determination to deploy missile defenses a nonstarter. And some around President Bush seem to believe that the “new strategic framework” he has called for really should look a lot like the old “Grand Bargain” sought by the Clinton-Gore administration: a deal that would package deep reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic arms with an allowance for the U.S. to deploy a missile defense of such limited capability as to be largely ineffectual.

It can only be hoped that President Bush will find in this challenging moment the courage of his convictions, like those that guided Ronald Reagan in an earlier time. However, even if the 43rd President of the United States should yield to the temptations the 40th President so steadfastly resisted, it is unlikely this nation will remain undefended against missile attack. Missile defense is almost certain to come eventually.

Instead, if President Bush agrees to some deal with Vladimir Putin that allows the latter to exercise what would amount to a continuing veto power over U.S. missile defenses, he will simply assure that the deployment of American anti- missile systems occurs after we need them — probably after some place we care about, perhaps in this country, perhaps overseas, has been destroyed by a missile attack.

This would be a most undesirable legacy, a grave disservice to the nation and one that would permanently dishonor this presidency. We will know shortly of what Mr. Bush is made. Let us all hope it is the stuff of Ronald Reagan.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. was responsible for missile defense policy in President Reagan’s Pentagon. He is currently the President of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C.

Bush and the Democrats on Security Policy: Potential Peril — and Opportunity

(Washington, D.C.): Sunday’s New York Times featured an article that should serve as a wake-up call to the Bush Administration’s national security team and Republican political operatives. Under the headline “Differences over Vieques Bitterly Divide Democrats,” the Times described a rift in Democratic ranks over defense matters that arguably has not been seen since Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson fought with the “Blame- America-First” types in his party over Vietnam, U.S.-Soviet arms control and other defining Cold War issues in the 1970s and ’80s.

It turns out that not all Democratic politicians agree with liberals like Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Robert Kennedy, Jr. and DNC Chairman Terry McAulliffe who have associated themselves with radical Puerto Rican demands that the United States immediately halt vital military training on Vieques Island near Puerto Rico. Others, like moderate-to- conservative House Armed Services Committee members Reps. Solomon Ortiz and Gene Taylor have strongly disassociated themselves from what Mr. Solomon described as “anti- military” attitudes and Mr. Taylor called “pandering of the worst sort” to Hispanic voters.

Even the Democratic chairman of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, Rep. Silvestre Reyes — while sympathetic to the people of Vieques and critical of the Navy’s handling of the islanders’ concerns — has warned, “We can’t afford to send our [service]men and women into harm’s way without the proper training.”

This development presents George W. Bush with a potential problem. It also has the makings of a terrific opportunity.

A Choice for Security Policy

The problem is that his policies on Vieques (which President Bush has decided to stop using in 2003, irrespective of whether another facility for properly training our men and women in uniform can be found), on the overall budget for defense and on ending the crimes against humanity being wrought by the odious government of Sudan invite his Democratic opponents to “run to his right” on many security policy matters.

On the other hand, by adopting a more robust position on these issues, Mr. Bush can both avoid a political liability effectively exploited against his father by Bill Clinton in 1992 (when Clinton cynically adopted for the purpose of the campaign harder-line stances than Bush-the- Elder had on Russia, Iraq, China and Milosevic) and build strongly bipartisan support for his defense and foreign policy positions.

For example, Mr. Bush should join sensible Democrats in insisting that the armed forces cannot stop training in Vieques unless and until there is someplace else for them to garner equally realistic preparation for combat. He should welcome bipartisan efforts on Capitol Hill to provide something approaching what the military needs in the way of funding for modernization, maintenance and world-wide operations — an amount considerably in excess to the $18 billion plus-up the Bush Administration has requested.

President Bush should also shift course on Sudan by embracing an approach to stopping the Khartoum regime’s genocide, slave-trading, proliferation and support for international terrorism that enjoys wide and growing support, not only among conservative-to-moderate Democrats but across the political spectrum. This approach calls for blocking access to the U.S. capital markets for foreign oil companies whose exploitation of Sudanese energy reserves is providing revenue streams used by Khartoum to underwrite its predations.

The use of such limited capital market sanctions — approved by the House of Representatives last month by a vote of 422-2 but strenuously opposed by the Bush team — makes all the more sense since James Buckee, the president of one of the most egregious offenders, Talisman Energy Inc., recently made it clear that his company would sooner pull up stakes from Sudan than risk losing access to the American investors’ money: “I don’t think anybody could afford not to have access to the U.S. capital markets. No asset is worth that.”

Happily, President Bush has as well an opportunity to pick up critical Democratic support for his top national security priority: quickly protecting this country, its forces overseas and allies against ballistic missile attack. According to today’s New York Times, “a Democratic union representing defense industry workers has…begun urging its 750,000 active and retired members to push for missile defense. To my Democratic friends on Capitol Hill, I would urge them to forgo the short- term, tactical, partisan advantage,’ R. Thomas Buffenbarger, the president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers said recently. Can our party really afford to be seen as weak on the defense of America’s cities? I think not.'” Would-be presidential candidate and Senator Joe Lieberman is one of a number of Democrats who agree.

The Bottom Line

While Mr. Bush is vacationing this month, he would be well advised to do a little summer reading that could pay off, as Dick Cheney says, “big time” this fall when critical congressional votes take place on missile defense, Pentagon budgets, Vieques and Sudan. Last year, Dr. Robert Kaufman published a superb biography entitled Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics (University of Washington Press). It describes the myriad, extraordinary contributions Scoop Jackson made to this Nation’s security, environment quality and social well-being.

More to the point, the Kaufman book offers a salutary reminder of what can happen to a Republican President when national security-minded Democrats get to his right on defense and foreign policy (as Scoop and his colleagues did to Gerald Ford, with devastating effect on the Ford-Kissinger detente agenda). It also describes the enormous contributions sensible and public- spirited Democrats can, alternatively, make when they have a robust President and sound GOP security policies to support (as Jackson did for Ronald Reagan, until the former’s untimely death in 1983).

With Friends Like These….

(Washington, D.C.): Last week, President Bush’s commitment to defend the American people, their forces overseas and allies against ballistic missile attack sustained what are widely perceived to be two serious, if not fatal, body blows.

The first occurred when Secretary of State Colin Powell proved unable to get the French and German governments to agree to consensus wording in a NATO document to the effect that the Atlantic Alliance faced a common threat of ballistic missile attack. The second was the result of Senator Jim Jeffords’ defection from the Republican caucus in the U.S. Senate – – a step that is expected to bring to power Democrats who also seem, to varying degrees and at varying times, to discount the danger posed by missile-delivered weapons of mass destruction.

Not So Fast

Before the obituaries are written on the centerpiece of Mr. Bush’s national security and foreign policy agenda, however, a bit of perspective is in order. If one understands the nature of the allied governments in question, their behavior is easily understood — if indefensible. And, while the hostility of the likes of incoming Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin and Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden to the deployment of missile defenses is visceral and politically ingrained, it is not universally shared by their colleagues in the Democratic caucus.

Some Friends’

It turns out that the problem with the French and Germans is not that they are so strategically incompetent as to be unable to recognize a real and growing danger from missiles capable, first and foremost, of targeting their territories. Rather, the issue is that the governments now in charge in Paris and Berlin give new meaning to the question, “With friends like these, who needs enemies?”

While most of our countrymen fail to appreciate it, the leaders of these and most other governments in Western Europe (with the notable exception of the newly elected Berlusconi administration in Italy, which supports missile defenses) are individuals who cut their political teeth demonstrating their opposition to U.S. military power, the NATO alliance and America more generally. Germany’s Prime Minister Gerhard Schroeder and his Green Party Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, are pedigreed leftists who were active in the pro-Soviet European Left’s campaign in the early 1980s aimed at preventing the deployment of U.S. intermediate- range nuclear missiles in five allied countries. Ditto France’s Socialist premier, Lionel Jospin, and, for that matter Britain’s Tony Blair and his Foreign Minister, Robin Cook. Even the present and immediate past Secretaries General of NATO, Britain’s George Robertson and Spain’s Javier Solana respectively, were determined opponents of the U.S. leadership of the Atlantic Alliance in the face of manifest Soviet threats.

The hostility being exhibited (to varying degrees) by these allied leaders toward American leadership today on missile defense is reminiscent of another difficult moment in U.S.-European relations. In the mid-1980s, American intelligence discovered a huge missile- detection and -tracking radar being built by the Soviet Union near the Western Siberian town of Krasnoyarsk. The character, capabilities and location of this radar made it as clear-cut a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as the United States was ever likely to find. When I and others briefed NATO defense ministers about this discovery, however, Britain’s Michael Heseltine — then the Minister for Defense in Margaret Thatcher’s government — strenuously refused to agree that the Krasnoyarsk radar breached the ABM Treaty. Subsequently, in private conversations, he admitted the real reason: It was not that he was unpersuaded of the merits of the case but was simply determined to prevent the United States from having an excuse to pursue a President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, to which he from the political Right and virtually everyone on the European Left vehemently objected.

Meanwhile, Back at NATO Headquarters

Similar considerations are likely to be at work later this week when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld addresses his counterparts at a NATO defense ministerial meeting in Brussels. Thanks to his brilliant leadership of a 1998 blue-ribbon commission on the dangers posed by ballistic missile proliferation, scarcely anyone is better equipped than Mr. Rumsfeld to elucidate the nature of the “common threat” posed to our allies and us by such weapons. Insofar as the left-wing Europeans don’t wish to be confused with the facts — any more than Michael Heseltine did a generation ago — Secretary Rumsfeld needs to make four points:

  • First, of course there is a threat. For example, Libya — a country whose megalomaniacal leader has already launched a missile aimed at a NATO installation in Italy (happily, without effect) has recently taken possession of some forty North Korean No Dong missiles, capable of ranging much of southern Europe. He is not alone, or necessarily the most dangerous of those who will brandish ever- longer-range ballistic missiles in the future.
  • Second, Secretary Rumsfeld needs to reinforce a message he first delivered in Europe last February — namely, that the decision to deploy U.S. missile defenses has already been taken. We are not going to be talked or euchred out of doing so by either friends or foes.
  • Third, the United States is going to provide such protection to its forward-deployed forces and its allies, first from the sea using existing Aegis air defense ships, and will do so at no cost to allied nations — unless they wish to contribute. If, on the other hand, allied populations really don’t wish to be defended, we can make arrangements to leave them as vulnerable as they are today.
  • And finally, the Kremlin under both the Soviet and Russian governments, has breached the ABM Treaty so comprehensively as to make the subsequently admitted Krasnoyarsk violation pale into insignificance. Indeed, that radar was but one piece of the sort of “territorial defense” against long- range ballistic missiles specifically prohibited by the ABM accord, the rest of which is now in place. NATO should be briefed on this heretofore unpublicized fact to counter persistent claims about the Treaty’s indispensability and sacrosanct nature.

The Bottom Line

These representations will also serve the Bush Administration as it seeks to regain traction on Capitol Hill. While the new Democratic leadership in the Senate will make common cause wherever possible with like-minded (though far more radical) leftists in Europe and elsewhere, at the end of the day, there are clearly Democrats with whom President Bush can work to defend America et.al., if he provides the requisite leadership. With friends like these and the common threat we face, he has no choice but to do so.

The Only Hope for Real Progress’ On Missile Defense

(Washington, D.C.):In a recent, brief conversation with President Bush, the Center for Security Policy’s President, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. thanked him for his leadership on the missile defense front but warned him that he was concerned the initiative was getting away from us. He responded confidently, “Actually, we are making more progress than you might think” and cited as an example his conversation earlier that day with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov.

Perhaps we are making considerable “progress.” There is increasing reason to believe, however, that the “progress” we are making is in the wrong direction.

Let’s Make a Deal’

This concern has only been aggravated by reports in recent days in the New York Times to the effect that Mr. Bush’s administration has decided to try to “buy” Russia’s support for his pursuit of protection against ballistic missile attack for the Nation, its forces overseas and allies. The paper actually quoted “one senior White House official” as saying “If we are going to make this work, the Russians have to agree to the plan.”

Specifically, the Bush team is said to have made an offer to share with Russia early warning information, to conduct joint anti-missile exercises and to purchase Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. A “senior administration official” told the Times: “Think of it as exercising their missile defense with ours, to see whether they could be made inter- operable. Our systems could be interconnected. It makes a lot of sense.”

What’s Wrong with This Picture?

Actually, it only makes sense if you make several dubious assumptions.

  • First, you have to believe that the Russians will be more accommodating if they think the United States will only proceed with missile defenses if they approve, than would be the case if the Kremlin knows it has no say in the matter. In fact, for most of the past seventeen years, successive American administrations have tried unsuccessfully to persuade Moscow to accede to U.S. anti-missile deployments. This experience suggests that, if in the future as in the past, we accord Russia a de facto veto over our missile defense programs, they will happily exercise it.

    As the New York Times noted: “The evolving strategy is in strong contrast to that of the administration’s early weeks, when Mr. Bush and his national security aides said they were preparing to speed ahead alone to undo the [1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile] treaty.” In fact, the first approach was the right one. The only hope for making the Russians (and, for that matter, our allies) tractable is to persuade them that the United States is going to do whatever is required to defend itself, whether others concur or not.

  • Second, you have to think that collaboration with the Russians on missile defense systems will not result in the compromise of U.S. anti-missile technologies. In fact, at the very least, the Kremlin will use any insights garnered from joint exercises and missile-sharing programs to improve the ability of their ballistic missiles to overcome such defenses. We may or may not worry about improved penetration capabilities being in Russian hands. We cannot ignore, however, the virtual certainty that these capabilities will be shared in short order with the many countries Moscow views as clients — from China to Iran, from North Korea to Libya — to whom it is feverishly proliferating its missile technologies.
  • Third, you have to believe that American military officers and defense-minded congressional leaders already anxious about the adequacy of Bush Administration spending on the promised rebuilding of the military will be happier if money is being spent buying Russian hardware than U.S. equipment. This is all the less likely if reports in today’s Washington Times prove correct, namely that the lion’s share of the projected infusion of some $30 billion in additional funding for the Pentagon is earmarked for necessary improvements in medical care and housing for the armed forces — leaving practically nothing for needed procurement of modern weapons.

    Even if the acquisition of Russian S-300 missiles at the cost of untold millions of dollars made strategic sense, such investments will face tough sledding at home to the extent that they come at the expense of the production of domestic anti-missile systems, to say nothing of ships, planes and armored vehicles that enjoy higher priority among the JCS and in some quarters on Capitol Hill.

  • Fourth, you have to ignore the fact that the Russians already have a territorial defense against ballistic missile attack. Their S-300s are upgraded versions of the nuclear-capable SA-10 surface-to-air missiles, thousands of which have been deployed across the former Soviet Union. When integrated with many older SA-5 SAMs, a number of large missile-detection and -tracking radars and an up-to- date ABM complex around Moscow, the Kremlin is in the enviable position of denouncing our prospective national missile defense system while preserving (in fact, while modernizing) its own extant one.
  • Finally, you have to assume that the new Democratic leadership of the Senate will be more willing to support the President’s missile defense program if given an opportunity to slow, encumber or otherwise derail it. There is no evidence to support this thesis. To the contrary, Senators Tom Daschle, Carl Levin and Joe Biden — the new Majority Leader and the presumptive chairmen of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, respectively — have been vocal opponents of efforts to defend America against missile attack since long before Mr. Bush came to town. All they need do to prevail now is to maintain the status quo of no anti-missile deployments and they will seize any chance afforded them to do just that.

The Bottom Line

In short, President Bush has a choice to make. He can make further “progress” on missile defense by heeding the advice and respecting the sensibilities of those who have kept this nation defenseless against missile attack to this point. Or he can make the only kind of progress that matters — by initiating deployments forthwith, first from the sea (as he intimated in his address last Friday at Annapolis was his intention), and pursuing thereafter whatever cooperation makes sense with the Russians and whatever dialogue is constructive with the allies and congressional Democrats.

The difference between the two approaches may determine whether the United States deploys effective anti-missile systems before we need them, or only after we do.

Changed Circumstances in Senate Require Bush to Move Now on Missile Defense

(Washington, D.C.): Senator Jim Jeffords’ departure from the Republican caucus may have one therapeutic repercussion: The Bush Administration will have an incentive to act with dispatch on its top national security priority — defending the United States, its forces overseas and its allies against ballistic missile attack.

As the Center for Security Policy’s President, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., notes in a column published today in National Review Online, changes in the Senate leadership — notably the expected passing of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee’s gavels to, respectively, Senators Joseph Biden and Carl Levin — make it imperative that President Bush remove his missile defense initiative from the death-of-a-thousand-cuts fate that awaits should it continue to be pursued in a business-as-usual fashion. The time has come for real presidential leadership. The way to do it is described below.

Boost Phase

By Frank J.Gaffney, Jr.

National Review Online, 24 May 2001

The defection of Sen. Jim Jeffords from the Republican party spells trouble for most of President Bush’s agenda. That is particularly true in one area: His commitment to defend the American people, their forces, and allies overseas against ballistic-missile attack.

The immediate problem is that Senators Jesse Helms and John Warner will, respectively, turn over the gavels of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees to their Democratic counterparts, Senators Joseph Biden and Carl Levin. That transfer of power means that Mr. Bush will no longer be able to count on two pivotal committees being led by legislators who share his sense of urgency about ending America’s present, absolute vulnerability to missile strikes. Now, these committees will fall into the hands of senators who have been the most indefatigable and effective opponents of previous efforts aimed at ending that vulnerability.

Left to their own devices, Messrs. Biden and Levin will do everything in their power to preserve the status quo. In Washington, few things are easier than resisting change. And what President Bush is proposing to do end the impediment to the deployment of effective missile defenses posed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed in 1972 with the Soviet Union, and initiate deployments impermissible under that accord will require him to overcome immense inertia.

Even before they became chairmen, both senators impeded the confirmation of some of President Bush’s appointees who will be responsible for missile defense and arms-control policy in the State and Defense Departments. Once they assume their chairmanships, it is a safe bet that they and their staffs will work assiduously to interfere with the Bush administration’s missile-defense policies and programs as well.

If the President is serious about deploying effective missile defenses, he will not be able to get there by accommodating, appeasing, or trying to compromise with the likes of Senators Biden and Levin. Adopting such an approach (as is so often the case with conventional opinion) is wrong. These legislators share an ideological commitment to the ABM Treaty and the arms-control house of cards built upon it. They may, for tactical reasons, choose to conceal their antipathy to anti-missile programs at variance with that accord, but they will never willingly agree to approve or otherwise legitimize such programs.

Instead, Mr. Bush’s only hope of realizing his goal of defending America against missile attack is to throw down the gauntlet. As William Kristol put it in an op-ed article in today’s Washington Post: “Bush will have no choice but to follow Reagan’s example. He will have to show that on a few key issues he can use the bully pulpit to strike fear into Democratic hearts. Any successful president needs to be not just liked but also feared.”

Here are the steps Mr. Bush should take at once to provide the needed leadership on missile defense and to minimize the chances that he will be thwarted at every turn by the likes of Messrs. Biden and Levin:

1. Mr. Bush should announce that the United States believes that the missile threat now justifies the immediate, emergency deployment of anti-missile capabilities. The emergency arises from missile developments in Iran, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and China (both vis-a-vis Taiwan and the United States). During recently completed consultations with many nations, his representatives made clear our view on this score and served notice that the president was determined to respond appropriately.

2. As a practical matter, an immediate deployment can only take place at the moment by using the Navy’s Aegis air-defense ships. While the existing Aegis system would have very limited ability to shoot down long-range ballistic missiles, the presence of an American missile defense of even uncertain effectiveness may help dissuade nations contemplating attacks and comfort coalition partners, other allies, and U.S. personnel sent into harm’s way who have reason to fear those attacks. A similar strategic benefit materialized when Patriot air defenses of unknown quality as anti-missile systems were dispatched to the Persian Gulf and Israel at the time of Operation Desert Shield.

3. What is more, six months from now given the appropriate presidential priority and a minimal increase in resources the Navy could introduce several low-cost improvements to the performance of the existing Aegis radar and missile systems so as to increase significantly their probability-of-kill under specified circumstances.

4. Accordingly, the president should immediately announce that, henceforth, Aegis ships equipped with existing Standard Missile II Block IV missiles will be tasked to provide whatever anti-missile protection they can to U.S. forces and allies and to the American people at home. The president has the authority to depart from the ABM Treaty which prohibits the United States from defending its territory against ballistic-missile attack without congressional assent. And, thanks to the negligible marginal costs associated with the first of these initiatives, he can act without having to seek additional funding from Congress.

5. Having set in train his defensive program, Mr. Bush can go to the American people and elicit their support for the next steps initially, the relatively low-cost upgrades to the Aegis system and then, as needed, other complementary and cost-effective anti-missile systems (the most attractive option being space-based defenses). In this fashion, the president has a chance to present Senators Biden and Levin with a fait accompli that will be much more difficult to oppose, let alone undo, than would be the sort of “business-as-usual” approach driven by budget timelines and processes. The latter are mortally susceptible to behind-the-scenes sabotaging at which veteran lawmakers like Joe Biden and Carl Levin are past masters.

As it happens, there will probably be no better time to launch Mr. Bush’s missile-defense initiative than in the midst of the hoopla over the summer’s newest blockbuster movie, Pearl Harbor. After all, the American people have rarely had more occasion to focus on the ineluctable fact that surprise attacks, like that on Oahu, are by definition surprises. With that reminder, President Bush should have to do little more than establish his determination not to leave our nation vulnerable to a future Pearl Harbor one that, if conducted by weapons of mass destruction and delivered via long-range ballistic missiles, could make the destruction on U.S. soil and loss of American lives inflicted by Japan in 1941 pale by comparison.

Pearl Harbor, All Over Again

(Washington, D.C.): Hooray for Hollywood! This year Tinsel Town will mark Memorial Day with a blockbuster designed to help all of us remember an event Franklin Roosevelt declared would “live in infamy.”

Coming at this juncture, however, “Pearl Harbor” The Movie, promises to be far more than diverting summer entertainment. It may prove a real public service — provided it serves to counteract the failure of America’s intellectual elite to recall, if not the Japanese surprise attack on the United States’ premier naval facility in December 1941, then the valuable lessons to be learned from that military disaster.

‘What, Me Worry?’

As it happens, certain politicians, pundits and editorial writers are now assuring the American people that we need not fear a surprise attack against this country. They aver that we can safely perpetuate our present unpreparedness, even though a growing number of dangerous nations are acquiring long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — a combination with the potential to cause devastation in this country that would make the tragic loss of some 2,000 lives at Pearl Harbor look like a day at the beach.

Some “experts” blithely dismiss President Bush’s determination to build an effective U.S. anti-missile system on the grounds that no nation would dare to attack the United States with weapons like ballistic missiles that leave a “return address.” Such attacks are unlikely, they say, because they would invite an assured retaliation from this country so destructive as to make the initial strike suicidal for the attacker.

Presumably, the film due to be released this Friday will share with the American viewing public the warning given to the Japanese high command by Admiral Yamamoto — the brilliant strategist who planned and executed the attack on Oahu. He told them that, apart from the unlikely prospect that the United States would be so demoralized at the loss of its Pacific fleet that it would sue for peace on Imperial Japan’s terms, the ultimate result would be eventual and certain defeat for the land of the Rising Sun.

In the event, while the decision to inflict mortal harm on the U.S. in 1941 may have made no sense to us, another nation — for its own reasons — decided to undertake it. The attack on Pearl Harbor proved to be, as Yamamoto predicted, an act of suicide for most of the leaders of the Japanese empire, as well as one of premeditated homicide for millions of others throughout the Pacific and Asian mainland.

What ‘Forward Engagement’ Requires

The case for missile defense today is made even stronger by the fact that ballistic missiles offer nations like North Korea, Iran or Libya another option. What if such a rogue state chose merely to threaten the launch of WMD-equipped ballistic missiles in order to dissuade an undefended United States from resisting its acts of local aggression?

We should recall that it was a near-run thing when George Bush senior decided to ask Congress for permission to repel Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Even in the absence of a proven Iraqi capability to inflict mass destruction at will on the United States, the vote in the Senate was extremely close. Would we have gone forward with the build-up to Operation Desert Storm — let alone the Gulf War itself — if Washington, New York or some other place in America could have been credibly threatened with annihilation?

Certainly, as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has repeatedly pointed out, we could not have counted on our allies to participate in the Grand Coalition if their capitals had been in the cross-hairs. Now that many of them are coming within range of Iranian and Libyan missiles, alliance solidarity in future collective defense actions cannot be reliably assumed.

This reality makes all the more ironic — indeed, Orwellian — the title chosen for a new organization reportedly being formed to fight the Bush missile defense initiative. According to Sunday’s Washington Post, “nearly 100 Democratic experts on defense and foreign policy have formed a group called Americans for Forward Engagement.” Their first priority apparently is to help fellow partisans in Congress to block the deployment of effective anti-missile systems.

How, one might ask, will the United States be able to perform “forward engagement” if neither its own troops nor its allies are defended against extant, let alone emerging, missile threats? Under what circumstances will the American people be willing to engage on behalf of their own interests (let alone distant allies’) overseas if, by so doing, they invite mega-Pearl Harbor attacks against their families and communities at home, from even Third World countries?

The Bottom Line

The truth of the matter is that the “usual suspects” opposed to missile defense — the Clinton team that wasted eight years and billions of dollars that could and should have been used to develop and deploy needed anti-missile systems and their friends in academe, arms control activist cells, the press and foreign capitals — think the only forms of “engagement” that serve U.S. interests are trade and disarmament agreements. Most no longer admit they oppose missile defenses; it turns out, for good reason, that that is an untenable position politically. Instead, they conjur up misleading and disingenuous reasons for opposing anti-missile defenses, excuses that they hope will attract more popular support from a public duped by false claims that defenses can’t work, are unaffordable or will actually reduce our security.

If, as must be hoped, “Pearl Harbor” serves to remind the American people about the abiding dangers of surprise attack and the costs of unpreparedness, the critics of missile defense should be put on notice: It is irresponsible to persist in policies that effectively ignore emerging threats and condemn this country to a posture of vulnerability — a posture that may in the future insidiously distort U.S. security policies and/or cost the lives of many of our countrymen. Should such possibilities eventuate, moreover, those responsible must be expect to be judged even more harshly than were those held accountable for the disaster at Pearl Harbor. After all, the former will have known about, yet forgotten, the lessons of that first Day of Infamy.