Tag Archives: Donald Rumsfeld

Truth or Consequences #8: The C.W.C. Will Exacerbate The Proliferation Of Chemical Warfare Capabilities

March 6, 1997Center for Security Policy

(Washington, D.C.): In recent days,
proponents of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) have taken to
dissembling about the clear meaning —
and certain effect — of the treaty’s
Article XI. Article XI says, in part:

“…States parties
shall…undertake to facilitate,
and have the right to participate
in, the fullest possible exchange
of chemicals, equipment and
scientific and technical
information relating to
the development and application
of chemistry for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention;

What is more — as noted in the href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_38at”>attached article
in the current edition of the New
Republic by Douglas J. Feith, a
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense responsible for chemical arms
control during the Reagan Administration
and founding member of Center Board of
Advisors — Article XI goes on to say:

“[States parties
shall] not maintain among
themselves any restrictions,
including those in any
international agreements,
incompatible with the obligations
undertaken under this Convention,
which would restrict or impede
trade and the development and
promotion of scientific and
technological knowledge in the
field of chemistry for
industrial, agricultural,
research, medical, pharmaceutical
or other peaceful purposes….”
(Emphasis added.)

In addition, the CWC’s Article X declares
that “Every state party shall have
the right to participate in the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, material
and scientific and technological
information concerning means of
protection against chemical
weapons.”

‘Poisons for Peace’

Any reasonable reading of this
language shows that these
provisions would require the United
States (in the event it ratifies the
Convention) to provide other states
parties — including in all likelihood
countries like Iran, Cuba, China and
Russia — with state-of-the-art
manufacturing capabilities and defensive
technologies with direct relevance
to chemical warfare activities.

After all, advanced facilities
designed to manufacture pesticides,
fertilizers and pharmaceuticals have the
inherent capacity to produce chemical
weapons in substantial quantities.
Supplying potential adversaries with
modern chemical defensive gear could
equip them to engage in chemical war.
It could, in addition, aid in efforts to
defeat Western protective equipment. As
the Center recently reported,⁽¹⁾
General Norman Schwartzkopf recently
reacted with incredulity and horror when
advised that the CWC, which he has
endorsed, would have such effects.

Will the U.S. Violate the
CWC?

Remarkably, the Clinton Administration
and other CWC advocates are now claiming
that the United States will not be
compelled by this treaty to transfer to
nations like Iran and Cuba chemical
technology that will lend itself to
diversion for military purposes.
Presumably, they think they will not have
to abide by the treaty’s
“obligation” to provide
chemical defensive gear to Teheran or
Havana, either. Maybe so. Still, it
would be helpful to establish in advance
— and formally codify in any resolution
of ratification — precisely which of the
CWC’s provisions the United States will
not observe. Such a step would
do much to protect against the
predictable post-ratification demand from
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and
State Department lawyers to the effect
that the United States must faithfully
observe all of the treaty’s
articles and obligations.

Even If We Don’t, Who Else
Will Observe Export Controls?

As Mr. Feith observes, even if the
United States does selectively
adhere to the Convention and maintains
export controls (not to say embargoes)
against Iran and Cuba, however, “Articles
X an XI will invite other countries to
transfer dangerous technology to them.
Germany can be expected to invoke the
treaty against any U.S. official who
protests a planned sale of a chemical
factory to, say, Iran.” CWC
advocates’ assurances to the contrary
notwithstanding, voluntary
supplier control arrangements like the
Australia Group are likely to fall victim
to the CWC-blessed, trade uber alles
appetites of such “friendly”
nations.⁽²⁾

What is more, one can safely predict
that the prospect of foreign competitors
closing such sales will cause would-be
American suppliers to seize upon these
same provisions to argue that Washington
has neither the right nor an interest in
penalizing U.S. firms. This punch has
been telegraphed by the emphasis the
frantically pro-CWC Chemical
Manufacturers Association has placed on
the opportunity the Convention will
create for increasing exports, presumably
to countries where such U.S. exports are
not currently permitted.

The Bottom Line

Douglas Feith’s essay in the New
Republic and an op.ed. by former
Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger,
Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger
which appeared in the Washington Post
yesterday⁽³⁾
make one point crystal clear: CWC
Articles X and XI are but two of the
myriad reasons why the United States
would be better off not being a
party to this Convention.

The Senate would be well-advised to
give these arguments careful
consideration. Indeed, it would
make sense to defer action on the
treaty’s ratification until after it had
been in force for some period so as to
evaluate whether these unintended and
counterproductive effects are as serious
in practice as in prospect they would
appear likely to be. Either way,
the Senate should resist the pressure to
rubber-stamp this accord — pressure that
will only intensify as treaty advocates
realize that time is no more on their
side than are the merits of the case.

– 30 –

1. See the
Center’s Decision Brief
entitled Gen. Schwartzkopf
Tells Senate He Shares Critics’ Concerns
About Details of the Chemical Weapons
Convention ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_35″>No. 97-D 35, 27
February 1997).

2. For more on
German behavior unbecoming an ally, see
the Center’s Watch on the Rhine series
, e.g., Watch On The Rhine:
German Efforts To Extort The Czechs,
Forge Relations With Rogue States Are
Ominous Indicators ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=96-C_127″>No. 96-C 127,
10 December 1996) and Watch
On The Rhine #2: Germany Proceeds With
Bait-And-Switch Encouraging Sudeten
Claims And Moves To Reschedule Syrian
Debt ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=96-C_131″>No. 96-C 131,
19 December 1996).

3. See the
Center’s Decision Brief
entitled Truth Or
Consequences #7: Schlesinger, Rumsfeld
And Weinberger Rebut Scowcroft And Deutch
On The C.W.C. ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_37″>No. 97-D 37, 5
March 1997).

No to the Chemical Arms Treaty

March 5, 1997Center for Security Policy

By James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger,
And Donald Rumsfeld
Washington Post, 05 March 1997

The phrase “damning with faint
praise” is given new meaning by the
op-ed by Brent Scowcroft and John Deutch
on the Chemical Weapons Convention
[“End the Chemical Weapons
Business,” Feb. 11]. In it, the
authors concede virtually every criticism
made by those who oppose this
controversial treaty in its present form.

They acknowledge the legitimacy of
key concerns about the Convention: its
essential unverifiability; its lack of
global coverage; the prospect that it
will inhibit non-lethal use of chemicals,
including tear gas; and its mandating the
transfer of militarily relevant chemical
offensive and defensive technology to
untrustworthy countries that become
parties. It is our view that these
problems are inherent in the present
treaty.

Take, for example, Scowcroft and
Deutch’s warning against cutting
investment in chemical defensive
measures. Unfortunately, treaties such as
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) —
which promise to reduce the menace posed
by weapons of mass destruction but which
cannot do so — inevitably tend to
diminish the perceived need and therefore
the support for defenses against such
threats.

In fact, in December 1995, the
then-vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommended a reduction of more
than $ 800 million in investment on
chemical defenses in anticipation of the
Convention’s coming into force. If past
experience is a guide, there might also
be a reduction in the priority accorded
to monitoring emerging chemical weapons
threats, notwithstanding Scowcroft and
Deutch’s call for improvements in our
ability to track chemical weapons
developments.

Scowcroft and Deutch correctly warn
that the “CWC [must] not [be]
exploited to facilitate the diffusion of
CWC-specific technology, equipment and
material — even to signatory
states.” The trouble is that the
Chemical Weapons Convention explicitly
obligates member states to facilitate
such transfers, even though these items
are readily exploitable for military
purposes. What is more, the treaty
commits member states not to observe any
agreements, whether multilateral or
unilateral, that would restrict these
transfers.

In short, we believe that the
problems with the Chemical Weapons
Convention in these and other areas that
have been identified by Brent Scowcroft
and John Deutch clearly demonstrate that
this treaty would be contrary to U.S.
security interests. Moreover, in our view
these serious problems undercut the
argument that the CWC’s “imperfect
constraints” are better than no
constraints at all.

The CWC would likely have the effect
of leaving the United States and its
allies more, not less, vulnerable to
chemical attack. It could well serve to
increase, not reduce, the spread of
chemical weapons manufacturing
capabilities. Thus we would be better off
not to be party to it.

Notably, if the United States is not
a CWC member state, the danger is
lessened that American intelligence about
ongoing foreign chemical weapons programs
will be dumbed down or otherwise
compromised. This has happened in the
past when enforcement of a violated
agreement was held to be a greater threat
to an arms control regime than was
noncompliance by another party. The
United States and the international
community have been unwilling to enforce
the far more easily verified 1925 Geneva
Convention banning the use of chemical
weapons — even in the face of repeated
and well-documented violations by Saddam
Hussein. What likelihood is there that we
would be any more insistent when it comes
to far less verifiable bans on production
and stockpiling of such weapons?

As a non-party, the United States
would also remain free to oppose
dangerous ideas such as providing
state-of-the-art chemical manufacturing
facilities and defensive equipment to
international pariahs such as Iran and
Cuba. And the United States would be less
likely to reduce investment in chemical
protective capabilities, out of a false
sense of security arising from
participation in the CWC.

In addition, if the United States is
not a CWC party, American taxpayers will
not be asked to bear the substantial
annual costs of our participating in a
multilateral regime that will not
“end the chemical weapons
business” in countries of concern.
(By some estimates, these costs could be
over $ 200 million per year.) Similarly,
U.S. citizens and companies will be
spared the burdens associated with
reporting and inspection arrangements
that might involve unreasonable searches
and seizures, could jeopardize
confidential business information and yet
could not ensure that other nations —
and especially rogue states — no longer
have chemical weapons programs.

Against these advantages of
nonparticipation, the purported
down-sides seem relatively
inconsequential. First, whether Russia
actually eliminates its immense chemical
arsenal is unlikely to hinge upon our
participating in the CWC. Indeed, Moscow
is now actively creating new chemical
agents that would circumvent and
effectively defeat the treaty’s
constraints.

Second, the preponderance of trade in
chemicals would be unaffected by the
CWC’s limitations, making the impact of
remaining outside the treaty regime, if
any, fairly modest on American
manufacturers.

Finally, if the United States
declines to join the present Chemical
Weapons Convention, it is academic
whether implementing arrangements are
drawn up by others or not. In the event
the United States does decide to become a
party at a later date — perhaps after
improvements are made to enhance the
treaty’s effectiveness — it is hard to
believe that its preferences regarding
implementing arrangements would not be
given considerable weight. This is
particularly true since the United States
would then be asked to bear 25 percent of
the implementing organization’s budget.

There is no way to “end the
chemical weapons business” by fiat.
The price of attempting to do so with the
present treaty is unacceptably high, and
the cost of the illusion it creates might
be higher still.

James Schlesinger was secretary of
defense under Presidents Nixon and Ford,
Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger
held the same post under Presidents Ford
and Reagan, respectively.

Russia’s Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms’ Continuing Opposition to Phony C.W. Arms Control

February 4, 1997Center for Security Policy

(Washington, D.C.): The Clinton
Administration’s campaign to railroad
Senators into approving the fatally
flawed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
ran into a major new obstacle today: The Washington
Times disclosed that a report
published recently in the classified
Military Intelligence Digest confirms
that “Russia is producing a
new generation of deadly chemical weapons
using materials, methods and technology
that circumvent the terms of [that]
treaty it signed outlawing such
weapons.”

Word of this frightening development
was originally leaked by a Russian
scientist, Vil Mirzayanov,
who had been involved in the Kremlin’s
covert development of a new class of
chemical arms. In an article he
courageously published in the Wall
Street Journal on 25 May 1994, Mr.
Mirzayanov wrote about a new Russian
binary weapon [i.e., one which uses two
relatively harmless chemicals to form a
toxic agent after the weapon is
launched]:

“This new weapon, part of
the ultra-lethal Novichok [Russian
for “Newcomer”] class,
provides an opportunity for the
[Russian] military establishment
to disguise production of
components of binary weapons as
common agricultural chemicals
because the West does not know
the formula and its inspectors
cannot identify the
compounds.” href=”97-D19.html#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾

Now, More Details About
Moscow’s Ongoing CW Program

Excerpts
of the secret intelligence report that
appear in today’s Washington Times
provide considerable detail about
Russia’s efforts to maintain a deadly
chemical arsenal, irrespective of its
treaty obligations. According to the Times,
these include the following (emphasis
added throughout):

“Under a program code-named
‘Foliant,’ a Russian
scientific research organization
has created a highly lethal nerve
agent called A-232, large
quantities of which could be made
‘within weeks’ through covert
production facilities….”

“A-232 is made from
industrial and agricultural
chemicals that are not lethal
until mixed and that never
had been used for poison gas.”

“‘These new agents are as
toxic as VX [a persistent nerve
agent], as resistant to treatment
as Soman [a non-persistent but
deadly poison gas] and more
difficult to detect and easier to
manufacture than VX.'”

“The report says A-232 and
its delivery means have ‘passed
Moscow’s rigorous military
acceptance testing and can be
quickly fielded in unitary or
binary form.'”

“Russia’s State Scientific
Research Institute of Organic
Chemistry and Technology created
the agents and novel ways of
making them to avoid detection by
international inspectors. ‘By
using chemicals not specified in
the CWC schedules, the Russians
can produce A-232 and its ethyl
analog A-234, in unitary and
binary forms within several
chemical complexes.'”

“The Russians can
make the binary, or two part,
version of the nerve agent using
a common industrial solvent
acetonitrile and an organic
phosphate compound ‘that can be
disguised as a pesticide
precursor.’ In another
version, soldiers need only
add alcohol to form the
agent, the report says.”

“‘These various routes offer
flexibility for the agent to be
produced in different types of
facilities, depending on the raw
material and equipment available
there. They also add
complexity to the already
formidable challenge of detecting
covert production
activities.'”

“The Russians can produce
the new nerve agent in ‘pilot
plant’ quantities of 55 to 110
tons annually,’ the report says.
Several Russian plants are
capable of producing the
chemicals used in making A-232.
One factory in Novocherboksarsk
‘is capable of manufacturing
2,000-2,500 metric tons of A-232
yearly.'”

“Several pesticide plants
‘offer easy potential for covert
production,’ the report says.
‘For example, substituting amines
for ammonia and making other
slight modifications in the
process would result in new
agents instead of pesticide. The
similarity in the chemistry of
these compounds would make treaty
monitoring, inspection and
verification difficult.'”

The Administration’s
Unconvincing Response: The CWC Will Solve
the Problem

The Clinton Administration’s
pollyannish response to these revelations
ought to be instructive to Senators
weighing the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Although the Russians are violating their
present obligation not to produce
chemical weapons and are doing so in ways
designed to circumvent the CWC’s
limitations and to defeat even on-site
inspection regimes, an Administration
spokesman told the Washington Times that
“the treaty would make it easier to
investigate such problems” since
“agents and components can be added
to the treaty’s schedule of banned
chemicals.” The National Security
Council’s David Johnson is quoted as
saying: “Without the CWC and the
verification tools it provides, you don’t
have the means to get at problems like
this. With CWC, you do.”

Such a statement is, at best, wishful
thinking. At worst, it is highly
misleading since, for reasons outlined
above, the Russian Novichok
weapons (and counterpart efforts likely
being pursued by other chemical weapons
states) are specifically designed
to thwart the CWC’s “verification
tools.”

A variation on this disingenuous theme
is being circulated in graphic form by
proponents of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. They offer two world maps,
one under the heading “The World
Without the CWC,” the other
“The World With the CWC.” The
former shows large areas of the world —
notably Russia, China, Iran, India and
Pakistan — with declared or suspected
chemical arsenals. The latter, though,
shows the entire world except for Libya,
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and North Korea as
being without either declared or
suspected chemical stockpiles.

It is deceptive to suggest that the
Chemical Weapons Convention will ensure
that Russia, China, Iran, India or
Pakistan will actually eliminate their
chemical weapons programs thanks to the
CWC. In fact, any country that is
wishes to retain even militarily
significant chemical stockpiles and is
willing to flout international law to do
so can be confident of its ability to
escape detection and sanction.
To his credit, one of the Convention’s
preeminent champions and distributors of
these maps — retired Lieutenant General
Tom McInerney — responded, when asked
whether he really believed that Russia
and China would give up their chemical
arms if they became parties to the CWC —
by saying: “Of course not.”

Enter Chairman Helms

As it happens, front-page treatment
was also given today to another aspect of
the Chemical Weapons Convention drama. A
29 January 1997 letter from Senator Jesse
Helms to Majority Leader Trent Lott
expressing the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee chairman’s strong opposition to
the present CWC was featured “above
the fold” by the Washington Post.
In this letter, Senator Helms
declares: “I am convinced that the
CWC, as it now stands, is fraught with
deficiencies totally inimical to the
national security interests of the United
States.”

Chairman Helms goes on to enumerate in
an attached memorandum specific
conditions that “are essential to
ensuring that the Chemical weapons
Convention enhances, rather than reduces,
our national security.” In
particular, he says preconditions are
needed to address six concerns which
“are best expressed in the letter
[Senator Lott] received on 9 September
1996 from Richard Cheney, William Clark,
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Alexander Haig, John
Herrington, Edwin Meese, Donald Rumsfeld,
Caspar Weinberger, 12 Generals and
Admirals and 47 [other] officials from
the Reagan and Bush Administrations” href=”97-D19.html#N_2_”>⁽²⁾:

Russian elimination of chemical
weapons and implementation of the
1990 Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (BDA);

Inclusion of countries other than
Russia believed to have chemical
weapons;

Certification by the U.S.
intelligence community that
compliance with the treaty can be
monitored with high confidence;

Specification of the actions that
will be taken by the United
States in the event of
non-compliance;

Establishing the primacy of the
U.S. Constitution over all
provisions of the CWC; and

Protection of U.S. confidential
business information (CBI).

Sen. Helms Rebuts the
Administration’s CWC Point Person

In addition, Senator Helms today sent
National Security Advisor Samuel
“Sandy” Berger a strongly
worded letter concerning correspondence
written by Dr. Lori Esposito Murray —
the Special Advisor to the President and
ACDA Director for the Chemical Weapons
Convention — to members of the Senate in
response to the Cheney et.al.
missive. Calling the Murray
correspondence “offensive,” the
Chairman offers his own, detailed
rebuttal of her claim that there were
“significant misinformation”
and “misstatements” in the
letter sent last fall by Secretary Cheney
and his colleagues.

Specifically, Senator Helms affirms
that (emphasis added throughout):

“The CWC does not —
in fact — effectively cover the
types of chemicals used to
manufacture chemical weapons.…Everything
from Sarin and Soman to VX can be
manufactured using a variety of
chemicals which are not
identified by the Schedules for
the application of the
verification regime.”

“…The CWC will not
do one thing to reduce the
chemical weapons arsenals of
terrorist countries and other
nations hostile to the United
States.…Not one
country of concern to the United
States has ratified this
convention.”

“…The CWC is not
‘effectively verifiable’
and Dr. Murray should not have
made representations to the
contrary….Declassified portions
from [a] August 1993 National
Intelligence Estimate note:

“‘The
capability of the
intelligence community to
monitor compliance with
the Chemical Weapons
Convention is severely
limited and likely to
remain so for the rest of
the decade. The
key provision of the
monitoring regime —
challenge inspection at
declared sites — can be
thwarted by a nation
determined to preserve a
small, secret program
using the delays and
managed access rules
allowed by the
Convention.'”

The Bottom Line

The Center for Security Policy commends
Senator Helms for his leadership in
insisting that the Chemical Weapons
Convention’s myriad, serious defects be
addressed and corrected before
the Senate is once again asked to give
its advice and consent to this treaty. It
looks forward to working with him,
Senator Lott and all others who share
Chairman Helms’ determination to ensure
that the CWC is only ratified if it
“enhances, rather than reduces”
U.S. national security.

– 30 –

1. See in this
regard Not ‘Good Enough for
Government Work’: Senate Needs to Hear
About Russian Chemical Weapons From Russian
Experts ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=94-D_100″>No. 94-D 100,
5 October 1994).

2. Copies of this
letter, which was originally circulated
by the Center for Security Policy last
fall, may be obtained by contacting the
Center.

Truth or Consequences #1: Center Challenges Administration Efforts to Distort, Suppress Debate on C.W.C.

January 29, 1997Center for Security Policy

(Washington, D.C.): Like a saturation
bombardment of toxic gas on a World War I
battlefield, proponents of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) have suddenly
unleashed a barrage of Cabinet-level
public statements and op.eds.,
departmental letters, government fact
sheets and interest group point papers.
The purpose seems to be to asphyxiate
informed debate about this treaty with
billowing clouds of false or misleading
information, even as the Convention’s
critics are wrongly accused of doing the
same thing.

For example, in a letter written to
Senators on 14 January 1997, Dr. Lori
Esposito Murray — the Special Advisor to
the President and ACDA Director on the
Chemical Weapons Convention — took
strong exception to correspondence
authored by a large and distinguished
group of former senior civilian and
military officials who oppose
ratification of the CWC in its present
form. The latter include: former
Secretaries of Defense Dick
Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld
and Caspar Weinberger,
former U.N. Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick, former Secretary of
State Alexander Haig and
former National Security Advisor to the
President William Clark.

Dr. Murray declared that the Cheney
et.al. letter “contains significant
misinformation about the
Convention.” She proceeds to cite
several portions of the letter (which was
circulated by the Center for Security
Policy originally last fall and again
earlier this month) href=”97-D14.html#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾,
which she characterizes as
“misstatements.” In opposition
to these alleged
“misstatements,” Dr. Murray
offers what she calls “facts.”

As a contribution to a real and
informed debate about the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the Center will be
issuing a series of Decision
Briefs in the coming days
briefly responding to each of Dr. Murray
points — and similar arguments on behalf
of the treaty made by others — that have
the effect of confusing or distorting, if
not actually suppressing, such a debate.

CWC Will Impinge
Upon Americans’ Constitutional Rights

As Secretaries Cheney, Rumsfeld,
Weinberger and their colleagues noted in
the joint letter: “We are concerned
that the CWC will jeopardize U.S.
citizens’ constitutional rights by
requiring the U.S. government to permit
searches without either warrants or
probable cause.” Dr. Murray
describes this as a
“misstatement” and declares as
a “fact” that:

“The Administration expects
that access to private facilities
will be granted voluntarily for
the vast majority of inspections
under the CWC. If this is not the
case, the United States
Government will obtain a search
warrant prior to an inspection in
order to ensure that there will
be no trampling of constitutional
rights.”

On 9 September 1996, Department of
Justice officials publicly acknowledged
in testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee that in such cases a criminal
warrant would be required. The
problem is that obtaining such a warrant
from a court would require demonstration
of probable cause. This
will be impossible in most cases because
the nation requesting an inspection need
not cite its reasons for making such a
request.

Hence, the Clinton
Administration faces a difficult choice.
If the U.S. government respects its
citizens’ rights not to be subjected
involuntarily to searches in the absence
of judicial warrants, it will be creating
a precedent other countries will
assuredly cite to refuse on-site
inspections on their territories. If it
does not respect those rights, it will be
acting in an unconstitutional manner.

Judge Bork Is Concerned
About the Treaty’s Constitutional Impact

In a letter sent to Judiciary
Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch last
August, a respected constitutional
scholar and distinguished federal judge,
Robert H. Bork, expressed the view that
“there are grounds to be concerned
about [CWC provisions’] compatibility
with the Constitution.” He wrote:

“Fourth and Fifth Amendment
concerns are raised by the United
States’ obligation to open to
on-site inspections any facility,
whether in the public sector or
privately owned. Apparently,
no probable cause need be shown.
A foreign state will have the
right to challenge inspection of
a U.S. facility without the
grounds that are essential for a
search warrant.

“The U.S. is required by the
CWC to enforce inspection by an
international team, even over
opposition from the owner.
On-site personnel can be
compelled to answer questions,
provide data, and permit searches
of anything within the premises
— including records, files,
papers, processes, controls,
structures and vehicles.

“Whatever the merits
otherwise of the claim that the
‘pervasively regulated
industries’ exception avoids the
Fourth Amendment problems, it is
my understanding that the
majority of the 3,000-8,000
companies expected to be covered
are not pervasively regulated.

“Additional Fifth Amendment
problems arise from the authority
of inspectors to collect data and
analyze samples. This may
constitute an illegal seizure
and, perhaps, constitute the
taking of private property by the
government without compensation.
The foreign inspectors will not
be subject to punishment for any
theft of proprietary information.

“American citizens will have
fewer rights to information
concerning investigations
concerning them or their
businesses than they would if
investigated by a U.S. agency.
Freedom of Information requests
will not be permitted under the
proposed CWC implementing
legislation….

“…The owner of a facility
will [likely] be faced with an
international inspection team,
backed up by the U.S. government,
demanding access to his property
and demanding answers and
documents from his employees. No
one will be shown a search
warrant and, so far as I can
gather, the owner or employee
must decide on the spot whether
he has a constitutional right to
refuse what is demanded. If he
refuses and turns out to be
wrong, he will face punishment.
At least a citizen shown a search
warrant knows that a judge has
deemed the search constitutional.

“The provision in question
speaks of constitutional
obligations with regard to
property rights or searches and
seizures. That does not cover the
Fifth Amendment right not to
incriminate oneself. Yet
self-incrimination is a real
danger for people required to
answer questions, turn over
documents and other matter.”

Judiciary Committee Chairman
Henry Hyde is Also Concerned

On 28 August 1996, Chairman Hatch
received a letter from his House
counterpart, Rep. Henry Hyde. It
expresses similar misgivings to those
addressed by Judge Bork. Rep. Hyde asked:

“How can we accede to an
arrangement that grants an
international inspection agency
the right to demand access to
thousands of privately owned U.S.
facilities without requiring the
foreign inspectors to demonstrate
probable cause necessary to
secure a judicial warrant —
except by compromising the
American owners’ constitutional
rights?

“Similarly, how can those
owners be denied due process —
or, for that matter, the right to
sue for damages in the likely
event that the foreign inspectors
use their eighty-four hours of
on-site inspection to elicit
sensitive proprietary data and
then that data finds its way into
the hands of competitors
overseas? As you are well aware,
there is growing concern about
illegal commercial espionage. If
we are not careful, it would
appear that we may be creating
through the CWC a legal
opportunity for carrying out such
intelligence collection, to the
severe detriment of America’s
competitive position.

“A further concern arises
from the fact that the new
Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons will be
significantly less accountable
than U.S. regulatory agencies for
information collected in the
course of international
inspections of American
businesses. I understand that the
draft implementing legislation
proposes to preclude requests
about OPCW inspections that might
otherwise be made under the
Freedom of Information act.

“…Whatever one
thinks…about the wisdom of
ratifying a treaty that is
inherently unverifiable,
unenforceable and inequitable,
the likelihood that it will
compromise the constitutional
rights of many thousands of
American companies and their
owners and employees should be
sufficient grounds for its
rejection.”

The Bottom Line

Clearly, there are grounds for concern
about the constitutional impact of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. These cannot
be dismissed as “misstatements”
or “myths.” Neither can
consideration of such issues be
responsibly deferred — as some treaty
proponents are arguing — until after
the CWC is ratified by the United States.
At that point, the theoretical option of
building safeguards into the implementing
legislation will be a non-starter, at
least from a practical point of view, to
the extent such protections would
conflict with “the supreme law of
the land,” i.e., a ratified treaty.
Accordingly, the Center for Security
Policy encourages members of the Senate
to examine the constitutional and other,
serious problems with the Chemical
Weapons Convention prior to any further
consideration of this accord.

– 30 –

1. See the Center’s
Transition Brief
entitled Here We Go Again:
Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval
of Flawed, Unverifiable, Ineffective
Chemical Weapons Treaty ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_5″>No. 97-T 5, 8
January 1997).

LETTER SENT TO SENATOR LOTT REGARDING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

September 9, 1996Center for Security Policy

September 6, 1996 wp=”br1″>

Hon. Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Lott:

As you know, the Senate is currently
scheduled to take final action on the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on or
before September 14^th. This
treaty has been presented as a global,
effective and verifiable ban on chemical
weapons. As individuals with considerable
experience in national security matters,
we would all support such a ban. We have,
however, concluded that the present
Convention is seriously deficient on each
of these scores, among others.

The CWC is not global since
many dangerous nations (for example,
Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have
not agreed to join the treaty regime.
Russia is among those who have
signed the Convention, but is unlikely to
ratify — especially without a commitment
of billions in U.S. aid to pay for the
destruction of Russia’s vast arsenal.
Even then, given our experience with the
Kremlin’s treaty violations and its
repeated refusal to implement the 1990
Bilateral Destruction Agreement on
chemical weapons, future CWC violations
must be expected.

The CWC is not effective
because it does not ban or control
possession of all chemicals that could be
used for lethal weapons purposes. For
example, it does not prohibit two
chemical agents that were employed with
deadly effect in World War I — phosgene
and hydrogen cyanide. The reason speaks
volumes about this treaty’s impractical
nature: they are too widely used for
commercial purposes to be banned.

The CWC is not verifiable as
the U.S. intelligence community has
repeatedly acknowledged in congressional
testimony. Authoritarian regimes can be
confident that their violations will be
undetectable. Now, some argue that the
treaty’s intrusive inspections regime
will help us know more than we would
otherwise. The relevant test, however, is
whether any additional information thus
gleaned will translate into convincing
evidence of cheating and result in the
collective imposition of sanctions or
other enforcement measures. In practice,
this test is unlikely to be satisfied
since governments tend to look the other
way at evidence of non-compliance rather
than jeopardize a treaty regime.

What the CWC will do,
however, is quite troubling: It will
create a massive new, UN-style
international inspection bureaucracy
(which will help the total cost of this
treaty to U.S. taxpayers amount to as
much as $200 million per year). It will
jeopardize U.S. citizens’ constitutional
rights by requiring the U.S. government
to permit searches without either
warrants or probable cause. It will
impose a costly and complex regulatory
burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000
companies across the country may be
subjected to new reporting requirements
entailing uncompensated annual costs of
between thousands to
hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per year
to comply. Most of these American
companies have no idea that they will be
affected. And perhaps worst of all, the
CWC will undermine the standard of
verifiability that has been a key
national security principle for the
United States.

Under these circumstances, the
national security benefits of the
Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do
not outweigh its considerable costs.
Consequently, we respectfully urge you to
reject ratification of the CWC unless and
until it is made genuinely global,
effective and verifiable.

SIGNATORIES ON
LETTER TO SENATOR TRENT LOTT
REGARDING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

As of September
9, 1996; 11:30 a.m.

Signatures on letter and other
former Cabinet Members:

Richard B. Cheney,
former Secretary of Defense

William P. Clark,
former National Security Advisor to the
President

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,
former Secretary of State (signed on
September 10)

John S. Herrington,
former Secretary of Energy (signed on
September 9)

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
former U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations

Edwin Meese III,
former U.S. Attorney General

Donald Rumsfeld,
former Secretary of Defense (signed on
September 10)

Caspar Weinberger,
former Secretary of Defense

Additional Signatories (retired
military):

General John W. Foss,
U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding
General, Training and Doctrine Command

Vice Admiral William Houser,
U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Aviation

General P.X. Kelley,
U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps (signed
on September 9)

Lieutenant General Thomas
Kelly, U.S. Army (Retired),
former Director for Operations, Joint
Chiefs of Staff (signed on September 9)

Admiral Wesley McDonald,
U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme
Allied Commander, Atlantic

Admiral Kinnaird McKee,
U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director,
Naval Nuclear Propulsion

General Merrill A. McPeak,
U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of
Staff, U.S. Air Force

Lieutenant General T.H. Miller,
U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former Fleet
Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine
Aviation

General John. L. Piotrowski,
U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice
Chief, U.S. Air Force

General Bernard Schriever,
U.S. Air Force (Retired), former
Commander, Air Research and Development
and Air Force Systems Command

Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh,
U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander 3rd
Fleet (signed on September 10)

Lieutenant General James
Williams, U.S. Army (Retired),
former Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency

Additional Signatories
(non-military):

Elliott Abrams,
former Assistant Secretary of State for
Latin American Affairs (signed on
September 9)

Mark Albrecht, former
Executive Secretary, National Space
Council

Richard Allen, former
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs (signed on September 11)

Kathleen Bailey,
former Assistant Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency

Robert B. Barker,
former Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear and Chemical Weapon
Matters

Angelo Codevilla,
former Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute
(signed on September 10)

Henry Cooper, former
Director, Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization

J.D. Crouch, former
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense

Midge Decter, former
President, Committee for the Free World

Kenneth deGraffenreid,
former Senior Director of Intelligence
Programs, National Security Council

Diana Denman, former
Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory
Council

Elaine Donnelly,
former Commissioner, Presidential
Commission on the Assignment of Women in
the Armed Services

David M. Evans,
former Senior Advisor to the
Congressional Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe

Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.,
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State

Douglas J. Feith,
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense

Rand H. Fishbein,
former Professional Staff member, Senate
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.,
former Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense

William R. Graham,
former Science Advisor to the President

E.C. Grayson, former
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Navy

James T. Hackett,
former Acting Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency

Stefan Halper, former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(signed on September 10)

Charles A. Hamilton,
former Deputy Director, Strategic Trade
Policy, U.S. Department of Defense

Thomas N. Harvey,
former National Space Council Staff
Officer (signed on September 9)

Amoretta M. Hoeber,
former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Army

Charles Horner,
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Science and Technology

Fred Ikle, former
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Sven F. Kraemer,
former Director for Arms Control,
National Security Council

Charles M. Kupperman,
former Special Assistant to the President

John Lehman, former
Secretary of the Navy

John Lenczowski,
former Director for Soviet Affairs,
National Security Council

Taffy Gould McCallum,
columnist and free-lance writer

James C. McCrery,
former senior member of the Intelligence
Community and Arms Control Negotiator
(Standing Consultative Committee)

Bruce Merrifield,
former Assistant Secretary for Technology
Policy, Department of Commerce

Philip Merrill,
former Assistant Secretary General of
NATO (signed on September 10)

J. William Middendorf II,
former Secretary of the Navy (signed on
September 10)

Laurie Mylroie,
best-selling author and Mideast expert
specializing in Iraqi affairs

Richard Perle, former
Assistant Secretary of Defense

Norman Podhoretz,
former editor, Commentary
Magazine

Roger W. Robinson, Jr.,
former Chief Economist, National Security
Council

Peter W. Rodman,
former Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs and former
Director of the Policy Planing Staff,
Department of State

Edward Rowny, former
Advisor to the President and Secretary of
State for Arms Control

Carl M. Smith, former
Staff Director, Senate Armed Services
Committee

Jacqueline Tillman,
former Staff member, National Security
Council

Michelle Van Cleave,
former Associate Director, Office of
Science and Technology

William Van Cleave,
former Senior Defense Advisor and Defense
Policy Coordinator to the President

Malcolm Wallop,
former United States Senator

Deborah L. Wince-Smith,
former Assistant Secretary for Technology
Policy, Department of Commerce

Curtin Winsor, Jr.,
former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica

Dov S. Zakheim,
former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

WHEN SEVEN SECDEFS SPEAK, WILL CONGRESS LISTEN? NEW VOICES JOIN CENTER’S CALL FOR MORE B-2 BOMBERS

January 6, 1995Center for Security Policy

(Washington, D.C.): In a remarkably auspicious
start to 1995, seven former Secretaries of Defense — representing
every Democratic and Republican Administration since
Richard Nixon’s — have joined forces on behalf of
one of the most important, and most endangered, programs
in the Pentagon budget: the B-2 “Stealth”
bomber. Under the auspices of the Alexis de Tocqueville
Institution’s Committee for the Common Defense, Melvin
Laird, James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Harold Brown,
Caspar Weinberger, Frank Carlucci and Dick Cheney wrote a
joint appeal (see
attachment) to President Clinton urging that the
opportunity to secure full value from a $20+ billion
investment in the B-2 program not be squandered by a
premature termination of production of this aircraft.

The arguments advanced by the Secretaries of Defense
concentrate on the importance of maintaining a strong and
flexible long-range manned bomber force in the present —
and prospective — strategic environment. They note that
“the end of the Cold War was neither the end of
history nor the end of danger.” They also observe
that, without continued production of the B-2, it will be
exceedingly difficult for the United States to maintain
an inventory of 200 bomber aircraft — a force the
Secretaries say “is not enough to meet future
requirements, particularly in view of the attrition that
would occur in a conflict and the eventual need to retire
the B-52 [force].”

In a statement that should be of particular
interest to a Republican-dominated Congress that is
determined to make government more efficient, keep down
federal spending and yet maintain a strong national
defense, the seven former Secretaries of Defense
observed:

“…[The B-2] remains the most cost-effective
means of rapidly projecting force over great
distances. Its range will enable it to reach any
point on earth within hours after launch while being
deployed at only three secure bases around the world.
Its payload and array of munitions will permit it to
destroy numerous time-sensitive targets in a single
sortie. And perhaps most importantly, its
low-observable characteristics will allow it to reach
intended targets without fear of interception.”

These arguments have long been advanced by the Center
for Security Policy. They featured prominently, for
example, in a High-Level Center Roundtable Discussion⁽¹⁾ held last
spring on “the Future of the Manned Bomber
Force.” Secretaries James Schlesinger and Caspar
Weinberger participated in this day-long discussion as
did, among others: the present Commander of the Air
Combat Command, Gen. John M. Loh; former Secretary
of the Navy and Defense Department Comptroller Sean
O’Keefe; former Under Secretaries of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz and Donald Hicks; Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Miller;
senior representatives of the Congressional Budget
Office and the Defense Budget Project; and top
journalists from a number of national and trade
publications.

The Center for Security Policy commends former Representative
Jim Courter — a long-time and valued member of its
Board of Advisors — who founded and chairs the de
Tocqueville Institution’s Committee on the Common
Defense, and his organization for facilitating this
important new contribution to the debate over the B-2
bomber. It urges every Member of the 104th Congress to
heed the wise counsel of these seven distinguished
Secretaries of Defense.

– 30 –

(1) See, The Case for
Continued Production of the B-2 Bomber: Center Roundtable
Shows Why the U.S. Can’t Afford to Stop Now, ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=94-P_64″>No. 94-P 64, 24 June 1994)
and its attached summary.

Letter to the President

January 6, 1995Center for Security Policy

January 4, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing you to express our concern about the impending termination of the B-2 bomber
production line. After spending over $20 billion to develop this revolutionary aircraft, current
plans call for closing out the program with a purchase of only twenty bombers. We believe this
plan does not adequately consider the challenges to U.S. security that may arise in the next
century, and the central role that the B-2 may play in meeting those challenges.

At present the nation’s long-range bomber force consists primarily of two aircraft: the B-52 and
the B-1. The 95 B-52’s are all over thirty years old, and their ability to penetrate modern air
defenses is very doubtful. This 96 B-1’s were procured as an interim bomber until B-2’s were
available.

Even after all twenty B-2’s are delivered, the inventory of long-range bombers will total barely
200 aircraft. This is not enough to meet future requirements, particularly in view of the attrition
that would occur in a conflict and the eventual need to retire the B-52’s. As the number of
forward-deployed aircraft carriers declines and the U.S. gradually withdraws from its overseas
bases, it will become increasingly difficult to use tactical aircraft in bombing missions. It therefore
is essential that steps be taken now to preserve an adequate long-range bomber force.

The B-2 was originally conceived to be the nation’s next generation bomber, and it remains the
most cost-effective means of rapidly projecting force over great distances. Its range will enable it
to reach any point on earth within hours after launch while being deployed at only three secure
bases around the world. Its payload and array of munitions will permit it to destroy numerous
time-sensitive targets in a single sortie. And perhaps most importantly, its low-observable
characteristics will allow it to reach intended targets without fear of interception.

The logic of continuing low-rate production of the B-2 thus is both fiscal and operational. It is
already apparent that the end of the Cold War was neither the end of history nor the end of
danger. We hope it also will not be the end of the B-2. We urge you to consider the purchase of
more such aircraft while the option still exists.

/Signed/
Melvin Laird

/Signed/
James Schlesinger

/Signed/
Donald Rumsfeld

/Signed/
Harold Brown

/Signed/
Caspar Weinberger

/Signed/
Frank Carlucci

/Signed/
Dick Cheney

Letter to the President

January 6, 1995Center for Security Policy

January 4, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

/Signed/
Melvin Laird

/Signed/
James Schlesinger

/Signed/
Donald Rumsfeld

/Signed/
Harold Brown

/Signed/
Caspar Weinberger

/Signed/
Frank Carlucci

/Signed/
Dick Cheney

Strategic Defense and Deterrence Project

January 1, 1988Frank Gaffney, Jr.

Since its inception, the Center has supported the deployment of a system to protect the U.S. against ballistic missile attack, as well as supporting the maintenance of an effective nuclear deterrent.

Ballistic Missile Defense

A successful launch of a ground based interceptor missile. 14 December 2005

In the early 1990’s, the Center for Security Policy was practically alone in demanding that the U.S. free itself from the Cold War ABM Treaty. Under then chairman Douglas Feith, the Center developed the principal legal rationale for withdrawing from the treaty.

In 2002 the Center’s years of hard work paid off when President George W. Bush formally withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and officially began deploying of a viable defense system against incoming ballistic missiles.

The Center continues to advocate for missile defense through numerous meetings with congressional and executive branch personnel, issuing reports on strategic defense, and sponsoring educational forums.

Effective Nuclear Deterrence

LGM-118A Peacekeeper missile system being tested at the Kwajalein Atoll. The white lines are the re-entry vehicles. One Peacekeeper can hold up to ten independently tageted warheads.

For over sixteen years the Center has championed for a safe, reliable and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent. In scores of published analyses the Center has argued against the U.S. ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a treaty whose prohibition on others’ testing could not be verified or enforced.

Thanks in part to the information produced and distributed by the Center and the intellectual contributions of many members of its National Security Advisory Council and its larger network of security policy practitioners (notably, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and five of others who held that post — including two previous recipients of the Center’s “Keeper of the Flame” award: Caspar Weinberger (1991) and Donald Rumsfeld (1998)), a majority of the Senate voted in 1999 not to approve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty — the first time in history any arms control agreement has been defeated in Congress.

The Center believes that U.S. national security requirements and the condition of the Nation’s aging stockpile dictate that modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is required. The following areas in which such modernization is most needed include: assuring the future effectiveness of the “Triad” of land-, sea- and bomber-based nuclear forces; enhancing the U.S. theater nuclear forces capacity; and the need for a concerted effort to recruit, train and retain the personnel needed to manage large-scale construction programs that will be essential if the Nation is to meet future plutonium “pit” manufacturing, tritium and other requirements associated with the maintenance of a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent.