Tag Archives: FARC

The Danger of Negotiating with the FARC

In spite of its geographical proximity to the U.S. homeland, events in Latin America usually get sparse coverage in the American press.  Therefore, last week’s visit to Washington by Colombia’s president, Manuel Santos and his meeting with president Obama was hardly noticed.

The main highlight of their visit was president Obama’s reiteration of his support for Colombia’s “peace process”, namely the negotiations with the guerilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

President Obama’s support was not surprising given his inclination to always endorse negotiations. This is particularly relevant when the meeting with Santos took place a little more than a week after the signing of the polemical interim agreement with Iran.

We agree with the president that negotiations should always be the first resort and should be fully exhausted before the next step is taken. However, it is vitally important to check if the other side has undergone an evolution that can make a negotiation successful.

As Fox News journalist K.T Mc Farland recently pointed out “when Nixon reached the historic agreement with China, (and) when Reagan reached the historic agreement with the Soviet Union…  what those two breakthroughs had in common was the men at the top in China and Russia, were both willing to change course”.

Can we say that the FARC leadership whom President Santos is now in the process of negotiating with meets these criteria?

It is true that in the past democratic governments in Latin America reached agreements with guerilla groups that later were integrated into the democratic process. This includes Colombia, which negotiated a successful peace deal with the guerilla group “M-19”. However, the difference is that M-19 at the very beginning of the negotiation unilaterally renounced armed struggle. By contrast the FARC has still to do it two years after negotiations began.

Moreover, it is important to stress that the FARC is a narco-guerilla organization that has fought a nearly fifty year armed insurgency against the Colombian government using tactics of asymmetric warfare. The FARC is actively engaged in drug trafficking (its chief source of funding), extortion, kidnapping and generally terrorizing the Colombian population by carrying out massacres and murder of innocent civilians.

Under the leadership and direction of former Colombian president, Alvaro Uribe, the ranks of the FARC were reduced by half, its’ landholdings diminished and many of its top commanders were killed.

By substantially weakening the FARC, the Uribe government was able to restore a sense of security and stability to the country, unknown there for decades.

The question is why when the FARC has been considerably weakened does the current president, Manuel Santos want to make a deal with such an organization instead of trying to further decimate their ranks and continue the successful policies of his predecessor.

This question is even more relevant in light of the fact that the FARC has duped the Colombian government in past peace agreements, i.e. with former president Andres Pastrana who gave the group a vast tract of land inside the country that they used to their advantage to further build up their forces.

It is instructive to see how the current negotiations have evolved. The Colombian government and the FARC agreed to negotiate on the following points:

a) Rural development and agrarian reform. Here, the Colombian Government expressed its commitment to allow more access to land and infrastructure to those rural populations that currently do not benefit from quality services and that have been displaced from the land.

b) The disarmament of the FARC. This has been a key demand by the Government of Colombia.

c) Putting an end to the armed conflict. Here the final objective according to President Santos is to guarantee that future conflicts should not be solved via violent means.

d) The termination of the FARC drug trafficking activities- the objective is to reduce drug trafficking and to deprive the FARC of its most important source of funding. The FARC will be requested to eradicate cultivation of cocaine and eliminate labs.

So far the Government and the FARC have come to terms on only three points out of the 27 they agreed to negotiate. After almost two years of negotiations the parties only agreed on the need for agrarian reform. But even on this point the situation remains highly problematic.

As an example, last May 26 President Santos welcomed the agreement with the FARC over agrarian issues. Two days later the FARC assaulted a milk farm, blew the farm’s installations, and murdered its administrator in front of his wife and two children along with one employee. This was one of several incidents in the area aimed at intimidating and terrorizing the population. This puts into question the credibility of the FARC. In addition, their actions do not really benefit the peasants, the group whose interests the FARC claims to protect.

In terms of the other points no agreement of any kind has been reached.  Is it conceivable that the FARC would ever agree to disarm itself when it continues to use violence as a means to achieve its objectives or that it would give up its drug business, which constitutes their main source of funding?

Common sense tells us otherwise and the Colombian people seem to know that the Colombian government’s demands will never be met by the FARC.  Indeed, Santos’ popularity is at a 30% low. Only 23% of the Colombian people believe that the negotiations will come to fruition and less than 30 percent believe that the FARC will ever abandon their arms.

The FARC is aware of the people’s skepticism. Indeed, last August negotiations entered a crisis because the government said that any agreement reached with the FARC would be subjected to a referendum. Immediately, the FARC rejected that proposal.

Still the Colombian government insists that Colombia needs to negotiate since the country  “needs to find a solution to this problem”.  According to Humberto De La Calle, Colombia’s chief negotiator, “this is the moment to say that peace should stand above differences”.

This was a weird remark given the difficulties the government faces when trying to make the FARC agree on any minimal demand.

Moreover, as we pointed out in a previous article, the FARC has been part of the Chavez-founded Bolivarian Continental Coordinator or CCB), which later changed its name to the Bolivarian Continental Movement (MCB). The CCB/MCB views violence as a crucial and necessary component to achieve its goals.  In one of its statements the CCB pointed out that “The Continental Bolivarian movement is a means to promote the cause of the big nation” envisioned by Simon Bolivar”. Translated this means a country that constitutes both Venezuela and Colombia as part of the Bolivarian state.

Since being weakened and having their numbers reduced by close to half, the FARC has shifted a good deal of their operations to Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Their drug trafficking operations will most likely continue but under the name of a different group. This will give them the funds to finance their political campaigns inside Colombia as well as political outreach in other Latin American nations. What the FARC wants most is political legitimacy in order to run for municipal, state and federal offices and thereby weaken Colombian democracy from within, something they have been unable to accomplish during fifty years of insurgency.

The FARC is also working with other clandestine groups in the region. One of them is the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP). Most recently, the EPP carried out a major attack following the FARC blueprint. They abducted security guards at a ranch, freed a supervisor, who then rushed to inform the authorities, and then they ambushed the police officers when they arrived. Five people were killed.

According to a New York Times Report the EPP “is evolving from a ghostlike irritant for the authorities in Asunción, the capital, into a broader security threat in a backcountry that is already a hub for traffickers of marijuana, defiantly cultivated here on sprawling plantations, and Andean cocaine smuggled into Brazil and Argentina”.

Likewise, the group has intensified its operations, terrorizing the population, and killing peasants accused of collaborating with the authorities. Likewise, like the FARC they are beginning to control more and more territory in Paraguay itself and have managed to elude the Paraguayan government’s efforts to hunt them.

It seems that Santos underestimates the ideology and deep beliefs held by members of the FARC. Does Santos really believe that after fifty years of terrorism against the Colombian state and their close alliance with the late Hugo Chavez and his Bolivarian Revolution that all of a sudden they will become law abiding citizens sharing the same goals and aspirations of most Colombians?

The fact that the Colombia-FARC negotiations are taking place under the auspices of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Cuban government makes the entire enterprise even more problematic.

We assume that one of the reasons Santos agreed to negotiate with the FARC under the sponsorship of these rogue states is because their status has been enhanced in the continent. They have more international influence than conservative democratic countries such as Mexico or Colombia itself.  In addition, the influence of the U.S in the region is declining. Santos felt that negotiating with the FARC was a way of breaking its isolation in the region. However, the only result of this process will be that the FARC will be given legitimacy, the group will be removed from the terrorist list, will continue to undermine the Colombian government, and serve the expansion of the Bolivarian revolution.

Focus on Central America is Crucial to Our Security

Central America constitutes an important strategic area for the United States.  As discussed in my recent book “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Threat to U.S. Security”, legal and institutional collapse in Central America could have very serious consequences for regional and U.S security. Central America has been victim to increasing drug cartel activity as the situation in Colombia and Mexico has turned more complicated for the drug lords. In addition, Central America is an important area of transit for drug shipments. Several countries in Central America have fallen into a situation of anarchy.

Anarchy invites the proliferation of gangs, terrorist groups and foreign powers as the situation in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates.  The presence of terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Middle Eastern groups such as Hezbollah, and the growing presence of Iran in Latin America, as part of its alliance with the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian revolution, makes Central America into a key geo-political challenge.

Former U.S Ambassador to the Organization of American States, John Maisto has pointed out that the U.S State Department website lists areas in the world where the United States faces challenges but surprisingly Central America is not on that list.  Central America has been severely affected by the rise of drug cartels and drug trafficking activity.  This activity destroys the institutions of the state; it bribes judges, corrupts politicians and leaves the local populations at the mercy of violence and insecurity.  It is estimated that more than 80 % of the cocaine destined for U.S. consumption passes through Central America. This is a lot given the fact that the U.S. is the main consumer of such drugs. Central America has also become an easy area for human trafficking where most victims are Central Americans themselves.

Last year Central American nations in cooperation with the United States and the European Union launched “Operacion Martillo” (“Operation Hammer”).  This project consists of interagency and international cooperation on interdiction of drugs and it has had some major successes.

Other government efforts including the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) which is a product of the Merida Initiative, also focuses on counternarcotic activity.

So far these efforts have not been able to effectively crack down on the vast amounts of drug trafficking activities.  Although some leaders such as Guatemalan president, Otto Perez Molina were able to halt some of the advances of the drug cartels, most have not been able to reverse the course as was the case in Colombia under President Alvaro Uribe.

The hard-liner, anti-drug Guatemalan president eventually came up with a different idea: the legalization of drugs. With the legalization of drugs it is expected that crime and insecurity may go away. This is not going to happen. Not only will the drug cartels  not go away but violence will prevail and the thousands of gang members involved in it will not go away either.

Key Central American countries lack enough resources to defeat the drug cartels. Likewise, the poverty that prevails in these countries makes it easy for the cartels to establish areas of cooperation with the population.

Even Costa Rica, a traditional, democratic country that is an exceptional political phenomenon in Central America, now faces new challenges. Costa Rica has become a major warehouse and trading center for drug cartels. The country has become a meeting ground for Colombian and Mexican cartels where Colombian drug dealers leave their cargo for the Sinaloa cartel to pick up.

Costa Rica has no military, a small police force of 11,000, and has easily penetrable unguarded borders including a large coastal area. Under these circumstances Costa Rican state institutions, including the judiciary and the police are likely to succumb to corruption and drag along its most precious democracy and the peaceful character of this small nation.

In El Salvador, drug activity continues to develop as the cartels find natural allies in the street gangs whose presence in El Salvador is prevalent as they control many neighborhoods. These gangs, like Barrio 18 and MS 13, are mostly criminals deported from Los Angeles. Mexican traffickers also use El Salvador to launder money, a task made easy by El Salvador’s use of the U.S. dollar as their currency. What is worse, those who participated in the long Salvadorian civil war developed skills in the art of smuggling. Mexican gangs know well how to take advantage of this. Despite the efforts by the government to fight drug cartels mayors, public officials and others cooperate with the cartels.

In Honduras, drug trafficking has had a major presence; up to the point that families have amassed fortunes from the drug trade. Honduras is the main transit route for cocaine from Mexico to the United States. Street gang involvement in the drug business and in drug related crime has increased the level of homicides in Honduras to a comparable level as that in Afghanistan.

Honduras is the region’s largest transit area where hundreds of illicit flights transporting drugs take off heading north. Honduran authorities are basically helpless. It is estimated they intercept only 5% of the total amount of drugs coming in and out of their country.

Nicaragua is also a place that has more than 80 “blind spots” where traffickers cross. Nicaragua has been an easy place for drug traffickers and the Nicaraguan judicial system has reduced the sentences of many of these traffickers. Some believe that the drug cartels have been able to deeply penetrate the judicial system  The U.S. government believes that this is part of an intentional action by the Ortega Government whose objective is to protect the drug cartels.

In fact, a witness pointed out that high-level officials from the Nicaraguan National Police and one magistrate from the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) are accomplices of the drug cartels.   This case brought to public attention the impact that drug trafficking organizations are having on government institutions in Nicaragua.

In my view, despite the rhetoric of Nicaraguan officials against drug trafficking, Nicaragua is a member of the Bolivarian Alliance. The Bolivarian alliance is linked to the drug cartels and has focused more energy in fighting anti-narcotic activities than trying to combat the drug cartels. Many estimate that Nicaragua is intentionally providing a friendly environment to the cartels.

According to U.S. State department cables, the Sandinista Party (in power since 2006) has regularly accepted cash contributions from drug traffickers in return for non-guilty verdicts by Nicaraguan judges.

To summarize, Central America is one of the closest areas in the world to the United States. Every country in Central America is infested by drug cartels. Drug cartels destroy democracy; destroy the legal system, the state institutions and every aspect of orderly government. Geo-politically speaking, anarchy invites terrorism and foreign influence. With the presence of Iran, the FARC, and drug cartels in countries such as Nicaragua, the situation becomes more ominous.  It is Afghanistan all over again but this time much closer to home.

Although the United States has given attention to Central America through projects such as CARSI, the focus on this area needs to be deeper. In spite of reluctance in the U.S. political establishment to speak about nation building, nation building is what is needed. The security of Central America is our security and currently the battle is being lost.

Reflections on Regional Reactions to Chavez’s Victory

Two days prior to the Venezuelan presidential election, Francisco Toro, a Venezuelan journalist and blogger, wrote an op-ed in the New York Times stating that Chavez and his movement have become irrelevant.

As Chavez’s socialism is becoming increasingly authoritarian and has failed to reduce poverty, Toro claims that it is no longer an exemplary to other Latin American states; in his opinion, it is Brazil’s template—combining free enterprise and democracy with social programs aimed at reducing poverty—that is what everyone in the region hopes to follow.

To illustrate his point, Toro uses the examples of Ollanta Humala in Peru and Venezuelan presidential opposition candidate, Henrique Capriles Radonski. (To this list, we could also add Fernando Lugo in Paraguay). All of them ran on a “Brazilian” platform based on the social democratic principles established by former Brazilian president Lula Da Silva.

Toro also points out that, in public, the authoritarian and the social-democratic Left are united but, behind closed doors, they are divided to the point of being “viciously dismissive of each other.”

Yet, as we have observed, both the authoritarian and the democratic Left displayed public enthusiasm for the victory of Hugo Chavez. I would argue that this was not necessarily a public display of hypocrisy but rather an event that has serious implications for the region.

Indeed, shortly after Chavez’s victory was announced, various Latin American leaders congratulated Chavez. Of course, the followers of the Bolivarian alliance enthusiastically praised Chavez’s victory. Non-Bolivarian allies such as Argentina broadcasted live the announcement of the president of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council declaring Chavez the victor. Argentina’s president, Cristina Kirchner, tied Chavez’s victory to the future of her own government and political philosophy. Paraphrasing Venezuelan national hero, Simon Bolivar, Ms. Kirchner sent a written note to Mr. Chavez stating, “Hugo… you have cultivated the land and planted seeds in it; you have watered it and now you have harvested it….  Your victory is our victory.”

However, the reaction of the Government of Brazil is the most confounding, precisely because it is the Brazilian model that has been most often contrasted with Chavez’s.

Brazil’s president, Dilma Roussef pointed out that the “Venezuelan election is a model of an exemplary democratic process.”

Marco Aurelio Garcia, a senior advisor to President Roussef, and a former senior advisor to President Lula—and considered one of the most influential organic intellectuals and foreign policy architects of both governments—praised the democratic character of the Venezuelan elections. He also pointed out, “Venezuela is not a model Brazil should follow, but Chavez, with his own style, implemented a program of social inclusion. In this way, he sought to find equilibrium between political and social democracy. Such equilibrium is something the whole region aspires to achieve.”  (My own translation).

Interestingly enough, the first part of Garcia’s statement seems to point to a distance between Brazil and Venezuela (as Toro rightly pointed out) but the second part of the statement seems to recognize, as acceptable, the Venezuelan model.

Then, Garcia proceeded to complain about the “international support for the Capriles’ candidacy and for the attempt to delegitimize the democratic process in Venezuela”. In an even more perplexing statement, Garcia suggested that Chavez’s victory reinforced democracy, particularly after the region suffered “a democratic interruption with the impeachment of (President) Fernando Lugo in Paraguay.”

This argument surprised everyone that has followed or experienced the deterioration of democracy, human rights, and the increasing political restrictions and political violence promoted by the Venezuelan government for more than a decade now.

But this makes sense if we continue to listen to what they say.

Echoing Chavez’s repeated statements, Garcia said, “right and center-right opposition forces in Latin America supported Capriles.” Thus, he implied that the Venezuelan elections were a point of contention between the right and left wing forces in the region. Therefore, had Chavez lost the elections it would have been a defeat for the left in general—whether the authoritarian or the democratic wing.

This last point is particularly astonishing since Capriles ran on the platform of the social-democratic Brazilian model. However, the left could not see Capriles as one of them; he confronted Chavez, an authentic symbol of the left. The Bolivarian model for the Brazilin leaders may not be the model to follow, but Chavez remains a symbol of the left’s strength throughout the continent.

In other words, the Brazilin leaders felt that if Chavez lost the election, it may have made the entire left vulnerable.

Garcia acknowledged that in the region there are different types of leftist regimes but what they all have in common is that “all of them are marching in the direction of translating political democracy into a social factor.” Here, Brazil is passionately defending the idea that no political democracy can co-exist with inequality or the lack of social inclusion.

The fact that political democracy, human rights, and judicial independence are sacrificed in the name of social justice is of no concern to the Brazilian leaders.

Brazil’s position suggests that its government cares more for regional integration than for democracy.

Chavez is seen as a good partner for regional integration—and this is what matters to the Brazilian leaders. Both Brazil and Venezuela have championed the idea of regional integration and economic independence. This would not only be good for the region but also for Brazil as it aspires to be a regional leader and ultimately a world power.

The Brazilian government seems to obsessively believe that such integration can only work with left wing governments.

This is why Roussef pointed out that “Brazil wants to cooperate with Venezuela in the construction of a more equal and just South America by reinforcing bilateral relations and regional integration.”

The idea that regional integration can only come to being through the left and not through the right has pushed conservative governments, also eager to be part of this regional integration, to adopt positions aimed at gaining the acceptance of its leftist neighbors.

As an example, the foreign minister of the Conservative Government of Sebastian Pinera in Chile, Alfredo Moreno, not only congratulated Chavez on his victory but also pointed out that “most countries of Latin America are experiencing a democratic reality that has been in existence for a long time and this is different than what occurred in our continent a few decades ago.” The reference of course was to the right-wing military dictatorships of South America but does he really think that Venezuela is a true democracy?

Chile’s desire to be part of this regional integration not only contradicts the idea that integration can take place only through the left but also shows the overwhelming pressure left wing countries can exercise over conservative governments.

By the same token, the conservative government of Manuel Santos in Colombia has initiated talks with the guerilla group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). I dare to assume that a Colombia-FARC reconciliation is somehow tied to Colombia’s willingness to gain acceptability among the dominant left.

If at one point I thought, like Toro, that the solution to the problem of  Bolivarianism and the radical left could be found in the counter-balancing power of the moderate social-democratic left, I no longer hold this view.

For the moderate left, political or liberal constitutional democracy is only understood in the context of social justice. Without social justice, democracy has no meaning. But the problem has been that the drive towards regional integration became the excuse to disregard political democracy and legality.

I foresee that very soon the Organization of American States (OAS) and its democratic charter will cease to be relevant.

Perhaps, at this point, the best hope to weaken the power of Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution is if the moderate left loses elections in the countries where it holds power.

Furthermore, what we have witnessed during the different Latin American summits (including the Latin American and Caribbean Summit, the Summit of the Americas, and the OAS General Assembly) is that the leftist tsunami returned the intractable authoritarian Cuban regime to the status of acceptable government while the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Inter-American Court were ferociously attacked by the authoritarian left and by moderate Brazil.

In the short term, we will see the OAS coming under pressure to dissolve itself as governments in the region view it as an obsolete organization aimed at serving U.S. hegemony. This is a major challenge for the United States, which should try to use its influence to discourage such a situation.

This context may have affected Capriles Radonski’s decision to immediately accept the results of the election.

Indeed, those allowed to  “observe” the election included  Marco Aurelio Garcia himself; Carlos “Chacho” Alvarez, an Argentinean former vice-president  who is the head of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and a Kirchner loyalist;  and ; other individuals friendly to Chavez including a Spanish Communist professor and a fervent pro-Chavez Chilean writer, among others).  The Chavez-controlled Electoral National Council did not allow the OAS or any other neutral body to observe the election.

This was a deterring factor on Capriles.

Had Capriles waited a few hours and gotten the right advice, he could have requested a careful review of the electoral process. Had he done so, he would have, at minimum, brought the Venezuelan abuses to public debate or even mass protests and attracted some international attention. By accepting the results he contributed to the myth propagated by Chavez and his regional supporters that Venezuela is, without doubt, a true democracy.

The consequences of Colombia’s negotiations with FARC

Early in October, peace negotiations will take place between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Oslo, Norway. If successful, the talks will continue in Havana, Cuba.

These talks are taking place against the backdrop of major military victories by  the Colombian army against the FARC, the elimination of key FARC leaders in the last four years, and, confirmed connections between the FARC and the governments of Venezuela and Ecuador.

The upcoming talks were made possible through the mediation of Chile, Venezuela and Cuba. Venezuela and Cuba are two key players in the revolutionary, anti-American Bolivarian alliance. The Government of Venezuela has been one of the staunchest enemies of Colombia whom it views as an American puppet. Venezuela has also objected to the war on drugs and to Plan Colombia..  Many  of Hugo Chavez’s international political attacks have been directed towards Colombia.  Chavez even started an arms race with the help of the Russians and made a number of threats against his Colombian  neighbor.

Chavez also made alliances with the FARC, proven in the FARC Files (or Reyes Files) captured during a military raid in Ecuador early in 2008. Venezuela served as haven for the FARC guerillas escaping Colombia and also made alliances with other drug cartels who are the archenemies of the Colombian government.

The presence of Chile in the mediating group looks rather symbolic and poses a serious question mark as to their reasons for participating.

On the other hand these talks are taking place in Norway, far away from the region and in a country whose dominant political culture has been apologetic towards  extremist organizations.  According to Alan Dershowitz, a well-known Harvard Law professor, the former Norwegian Prime Minister, Kare Willock reacted negatively to President Obama’s selection of Rahm Emanuel as his chief of staff. It appeared that the fact that Emanuel was Jewish  disqualified him  for   a job that included dealing with  the Middle East conflict. Following the same logic, the Government of Norway has also maintained contacts with the arch-terrorist group, Hamas, claiming that it supports “dialogue”. [1] In other words, whether Norway’s opinion matters in the FARC-Colombia dialogue or not, Norway’s role is consistent with its approach that “terrorist groups might not be that bad, after all. It is likely that Norway’s sponsorship  will lend  legitimacy to the talks. It is also likely that they will  bestow  the status of “freedom fighter” upon  the Colombian guerrilla group even though the FARC  is and has  been responsible for the deaths of countless innocent people just like Hamas.

As stated, if the first round of talks are successful the second round will take place in Cuba, a country that has supported both terror and  the FARC.

Though it is not clear why Santos agreed to these negotiations given that terrorist organizations like the FARC are not known for their trust- worthiness in abiding by treaties, there are a number of possibilities as to why these negotiations are taking place and the kinds of outcomes that may result.

First, it is  possible that the Colombian government believes it can reach a good deal given the weakness of the FARC after four years of military setbacks. In this case, the FARC can either become a political party or somehow be integrated into the democratic mix. . Such expectation is based on the belief  that the FARC may replicate the experience of the M-19, a former guerilla group, which so far has been positive and lasting. Thus, if the FARC follows in the footsteps of the M-19,  Colombia could  have a situation of total peace. The Colombian people would then  be happy and grateful to President Manuel Santos for his efforts.  However,I find this scenario to be highly unlikely given the still extremist discourse, behavior and resentment of the FARC leadership.

In order to find a possible answer to the reason for these strange   negotiations, mediated by two allies of the FARC and enemies of Colombia, it is important to understand some of the shifts that the FARC has undergone in the last several years.

The alliances between the FARC and the Bolivarian countries have a deep strategic meaning.

The FARC is a guerilla movement with decades of experience in what is called “asymmetric war” or the war of the weak against the strong.  “Asymmetric war” is a concept adopted by Chavez very early in his tenure.  He defines it as the “war of all the people” against a never to come U.S. invasion.

Though defined this way by Chavez, asymmetric war can be fought in support of the consolidation of a revolution and the spread of terror on an  oppressed population or as a subversive force against a government the revolution seeks to overthrow.

The FARC’s weakening has forced the organization to cut an alliance with Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution.  In light of this, the Bolivarian Revolution seems to be the only viable way to achieve a radical transformation. Thus, the FARC has loosened its ideology of peasant-based Marxist revolution in order to embrace the Bolivarian Revolution and to commit to its expansion. This includes the fight against U.S. imperialism, neo-liberalism and globalization. Likewise, it embraces socialism and continental unity.

The Venezuelan Bolivarian leader, Hugo Chávez created a body called the Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (Bolivarian Continental Coordinator or CCB), which later changed its name to Bolivarian Continental Movement (MCB). The CCB and the MCB has the FARC as one of its members.

The CCB was founded in 2003 as an umbrella organization that integrates different social and political revolutionary organizations across Latin America. The organization seeks to “rescue and reaffirm our historical memory and Bolivarian integration in order to create a new alternative pole against the domination of the world imperial powers.” The CCB seeks to create “a movement capable of articulating the diverse revolutionary forces and to develop a strategy in order to defeat the imperialist strategy and so emancipate Latin America (Nuestra America) forever.”[2]

The CCB/MCB views violence as a crucial component on the way to achieve its goals. Indeed, in the aftermath of the CCB gathering in Caracas, -which was attended by representatives of global extremist organizations including terrorist groups such as the Spanish ETA (the Basque insurgency), the communist party of El Salvador, remnants of the Red Brigades and other armed groups [3] a declaration was issued that stated the following: “The Continental Bolivarian movement is a means to promote the cause of the big nation” envisioned by Simon Bolivar. “We are thought and action melted with weapons against injustice. We are the combination of a variety of forms and methods of struggle.” Likewise, the “Bolivarian revolution…will be defended with our soul and hearts and with blood loaded with anger if necessary.” Then, the declaration turns more specific: “We will defeat the regime of Alvaro Uribe in Colombia…We will defeat the regime in Honduras and open up the way for a constitutional reform…Colonialism in Puerto Rico, the Falkland Islands and the Caribbean will face us.”[4]

In a message delivered by video early this year, the FARC invoked Simon Bolivar’s name as a role model and  a liberator of  oppressed people and as a supporter of continental unity. Again, the FARC repeated  its fight against imperialism and its support for socialism. Continental unity would provide the power to fight the transnational corporations that exploit national resources for their benefit and not for the benefit of the people. [5]

Although, in the same message the FARC stresses the need to continue the armed struggle against imperialism and particularly against Colombia, it is clear that they  no longer have the ability to act without the help of the Bolivarian Revolution.

In short, the FARC has ceased to be a solely  Colombian organization but rather has  become part of the Bolivarian Revolution. Its  activities and involvement are  now  regional and transnational. Indeed, the FARC is involved in about thirty countries to varying degrees. Some of their operations are more visible and some  more clandestine. The FARC reaches out to students and regular militants with propaganda and ideology and sometimes helps insurgent militias. Sometimes, they are involved in drug trafficking and sometimes in money-laundering. Sometimes they have sought support for their organization and sometimes they have sought to secure sanctuary.

In Mexico, the FARC has worked with the  Ricardo Flores Magon Militia and  has provided financial support to left-wing politicians.

In Peru, the FARC has reached out to the Peruvian Revolutionary Movement, Tupac Amaru (MRTA). The FARC provided training to several groups including a splinter group of the MRTA and the Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR).  The FARC also recruited people in Peru and provided weapons to the Maoist guerilla group, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).  In El Salvador,the FARC used its connections with the Frente Farabundo Marti (FMLN), now in power, to purchase arms and munitions.

In Bolivia,the FARC tried to carry out activities of indoctrination.

In Chile, the FARC recruited members of the communist party and sent them to Colombia for guerilla training. Likewise, the FARC reached out to groups, such as the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR), the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), and the Mapuche indigenous movement. [6]

In Paraguay there has been a large presence of FARC members. They assisted the People’s Army of Paraguay (EPP) in the kidnapping and murder of Cecilia Cubas, the daughter of  former president, Raul Cubas (1998-1999).[i] The EPP is a relatively small Marxist group, mostly active in the northeastern part of the country. The connections with the FARC have existed for more than ten years and EPP members have received training in Colombia.  The group was not only assisted by the FARC, but has allegedly also received training in Venezuela and Cuba. The group considers Hugo Chávez a hero. [7]

In summary, the reason why the FARC wants these negotiations is  to give them legitimacy  in the eyes of the world under the auspices of an incredibly naïve Western country like Norway that sees nor hears  no evil. Since Norway’s attitude towards Hamas is exculpatory, it is likely that this country will turn the blame on the Colombian government while providing excuses and apologies for the FARC. Regardless of how insignificant Norway is as a world player, it could distort the Western European perception of reality in South America in the same way it has done  in the Middle East.

In addition, the FARC could get “a break” from the Colombian mighty and effective hunting machine.  In that way, the FARC could   then  concentrate on their Bolivarian revolutionary goals. Most recently, Hugo Chavez stated that if he does not win the October 7th election there would be civil war. For that he needs a robust and healthy FARC.  Therefore, the strategy is aimed at placing the Colombian government, which is the most effective tool against the FARC, on hold. But paraphrasing Chavez,”por ahora” (for now).

President Santos has proven to be a wise man. We hope he has taken all these elements  described above into account.

But Santos  also needs the help of the U.S. government to make the right choices. Santos has refused to agree to a ceasefire until the negotiations are under way.  Likewise, he pointed out that these negotiations will not be allowed to drag on forever.  Santos has said that he will give negotiations a chance for no more than six to eight months. This is good.  However, as pointed out, even if there is an accord, the dangers of the FARC are not likely to go away as long as Chavez keeps them busy and provides them with a life-line.

Colombia is the most important U.S. strategic ally in the region and should not fall into a trap. Colombia is the country that keeps U.S. enemies in the region at bay and is an important regional ally. It is not certain whether we have recognized the fact that the Bolivarian Alliance and their allies aspire to weaken and eventually defeat their American neighbor to the North. In the meantime Chavez and his allies will do anything in their power to chip away at  U. S. interests. The United States needs to open its eyes to this reality and act accordingly.

 

[1] Alan Dershowitz, “Norway to Jews: You are not Welcome Here” , Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2011

[2] “Aporrea, Conclusiones del II Congreso de la Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (29 February 2008),  http://www.aporrea.org/tiburon/n109960.html.

[3] Douglas Farah, Venezuela Hosts Terrorist Central in Caracas, 8 December 2008, http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/517/venezuela-hosts-terrorist-central-in-caracas

[4]  Noticias de la Rebelion, Declaración Bolivariana de Caracas, 17 December 2009, http://www.noticiasdelarebelion.info/?p=4931

[5] “Saludo de las FARC-EP, Marzo de 2012” http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=g9Gbk_RCopM#!

[6] The World of the FARC (Part II: America),” Semana,  January 6,  2009.

[7] Hanna Stone, “Paraguay’s EPP: Phantom or Rebel Army?,” 2 May 2011, http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/852-paraguays-epp-phantom-or-rebel-army.

[i] ‘Fluidos Contactos con las FARC antes del Secuestro de Cecilia Cubas”, ABC Color, Asunción, September 15, 2009.

The Assange Case and Ecuador: Correa Positions Himself as Chavez’s International Successor

Ecuador’s decision to grant political asylum to the computer hacker, Julian Assange, is very revealing in relation to the character and aspirations of the Ecuadorian president, Rafael Correa.

Assange was the man who succeeded in disclosing American state officials’ and diplomats’ conversations through Wikileaks as well as releasing thousands of pages of top secret documents. However, Assange besides being suspected of having raped two women in Sweden is also a man that has become an ideological symbol.

This is the reason why Assange was granted political asylum. Such status is usually given to people who have been persecuted for political or ethnic reasons. Assange, although the disclosure of secrets would make him an offender under U.S. laws if so charged, sought asylum over alleged sex crimes committed in Sweden.

Yet, Assange has become a political symbol as elements in the left have seen him as a man who mocked the great power, the United States. This is why several left-wing groups such as the 99 percenters, and other anti-capitalist groups, and civic libertarian groups have turned strongly in favor of Assange with total disregard for the allegations of sexual assault, which they interpret as an excuse.

According to Assange himself, Wikileaks was not just a method to disclose information but he had a purpose. For Assange, the disclosure of information weakens the organization whose secrets were revealed. (In this case the American government). He declared “if you cause them to collapse as an organization, to not be able to communicate with each other internally, to become paranoid and fall in on themselves, then they are no longer competitive” (Interview with Julian Assange)

Assange believes that states have secrets as part of a conspiracy aimed at increasing their own power. He views government like any other business or criminal organization. But Assange chose to target the U.S. government and no other organization.

This is something he shares in common with the Bolivarian Revolution: hostility to the West and to the United States. Thus, Assange has become a symbol just like Carlos “the Jackal”, the Venezuelan terrorist who served Palestinian and other terrorist organizations during the 1970’s. Indeed, Chavez demanded that France release “Carlos the Jackal”, a man responsible for multiple political assassinations. Carlos, then, like Assange now, became a symbol of anti-Western justice regardless of the crimes he committed. The same applies to the late Libyan dictator, Muammar Khadafy who was offered asylum in Venezuela.

Yet, it is interesting that this time it was Ecuador, not Venezuela who took responsibility for this symbol.

Correa is becoming more and more like Chavez. He is not just an ally but also somebody who is adopting the patterns of Chavez’s actions and rhetoric. He has turned into an ideological leader of the Bolivarian Revolution in international and regional forums.

Indeed, Correa has become the main advocate for the dissolution of the Organization of American States (OAS) and also the chief enemy of its inter-American commission for Human Rights. Along with this he has accused the organizations mentioned above as being instruments of the United States.

His speeches have turned more and more aggressive, accusing the media, picking fights against foreign companies like Chevron, developing relations with drug cartels and the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Correa was the first one to expel the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) from Ecuador and dismantle its main base of operations in Manta. Likewise, according to a FARC leader, the organization helped fund his 2006 electoral campaign.

Correa has also strengthened relations with Iran by helping the latter to dodge international sanctions. Recently, according to information coming out of the Ecuadorian press and discussed in an article published in “The Hill” by Otto Reich and Ezequiel Vazquez on August 6th, the Correa regime is now working with Iranian banks to open a conduit through its own central bank to allow Iranian money to flow throughout Latin America. Correa’s connections to Iran and likely attempts to help Iran avoid international sanctions should warrant much more serious investigation.

Correa has also become the most outspoken advocate of Cuba’s inclusion in international forums. In fact he was the first to boycott the last Summit of the Americas over Cuba’s exclusion.  Others followed his lead.

The Assange case is another act that places the Ecuadorian leader at the center of an ideological crusade.

The reason for this seems to be related to Chavez’s deteriorating health condition.

The Bolivarian Revolution has a key international component that might not be able to be replaced by any of Chavez’s successors in Venezuela. Ecuador lacks the substantial natural oil resources that Venezuela possesses but the Bolivarian Revolution also has an important ideological and rallying component that without the proper personality and leadership might not enjoy the same intensity.

Rafael Correa, like Chavez, is aggressive and belligerent. Like Chavez, he is fascinated by the Cuban revolution. He is hysterical and angry in his speeches and finds no problem in launching false accusations, pointing fingers at “enemies” whether they are real or fictional; and; he is perhaps the most articulate of all the Bolivarian leaders, in conveying the mad and demagogic message of the revolution.  Bolivian president, Evo Morales, who is no less ideological, is far from being well spoken or articulate and lacks the charismatic qualities needed to lead an international movement.

In essence, Correa is positioning himself as the successor to Chavez in the international arena.  This does not mean, necessarily, that Venezuela will lose its key role. Venezuela will continue to be the main funder and perhaps strategist of the revolution but Correa will lead the communications and energize the masses.

Originally posted here: http://www.theamericasreport.com/2012/08/21/the-assange-case-and-ecuador-correa-positions-himself-as-chavezs-international-successor/

The Future of Venezuela: Chavismo Without Chavez

Ever since announcing that he has cancer, the status of Hugo Chavez’s health and longevity has been an issue of great interest for those concerned about the future of Venezuela.

 Understandably, it is logical to hope that Chavez’s death will lead to a better future as he is considered to be a man who carries a very dictatorial and inflexible ideology. Such ideology guides Venezuela’s domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, it is hoped that the death of the Bolivarian leader may lead to a more pragmatic approach with more democracy and less anti-Americanism as well as a more positive foreign policy.

 This type of argument has no sufficient foundation on which to be sustained.  Looking at history, we see that, in those countries where the death of a leader led to radical change was, in fact, an exception.

 For example, in Spain, the death of Francisco Franco led to a transition to democracy after 36 years of authoritarian rule. However, in Spain there were gradual changes that enabled the transition after the death of the “Generalissimo”. First, the Spanish state evolved form being a European fascist type of regime following the Italian model to being an authoritarian regime that focused on economic development and moved Spain in the direction of a modern society. Whatever the intentions of Franco were, the economic modernization of the regime unleashed a number of important forces that generated tensions with the regime, particularly a business community, industrial sector, and other sectors and organizations that grew stronger and more independent.  The regime could not control society as it had intended. Furthermore, it was forced to show some flexibility. At one point more strikes were registered in Franco’s Spain than in the rest of Europe. Likewise, Spain’s being part of continental Europe felt the pressure of the environment to democratize since being a democratic state was a pre-condition to be part of the European Common Market.  At the time of Franco’s death there was a civil society in place ready for democracy. The transition was possible thanks to Adolfo Suarez, a man loyal to Franco. Furthermore, Spanish public opinion supported democracy and rejected the alternative after almost four decades of dictatorship.

 On the other hand, in countries such as the Soviet Union after the death of Joseph Stalin or Iran after the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the death of the strong man did not lead to democracy. Authoritarian structures remained in place . In the post-Stalin Soviet Union, no group was allowed to organize without permission and sponsorship of the government, even if the group was not political. Censorship and state-control of society continued. Moreover, despite the repudiation of Stalin by his immediate successor, Nikita Khrushchev, a less murderous Stalinism prevailed but Stalinim prevailed, nonetheless. Repression and the gulag remained alive for a long time. Hungary and Czechoslovakia were both crushed by Soviet invasions at the moment these Soviet satellite countries experienced revolts or considered reforms. It was only by the initiative of Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980’s that the Soviet Union began a transformation that led to its collapse.

 In Iran, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini ten years after the revolution not only failed to lead to a transition but those reformers such as Muhammad Khatami (1997-2005) failed in their attempts to make the regime more open and flexible. Khatami, indeed, advocated for issues such as freedom of expression, foreign investment, free market and better foreign relations. However, it was undermined by a structure built by Khomeini that gathered a group of hardliners that provided continuity to the regime.

 The Case of Venezuela

After his death, Hugo Chavez leaves behind a revolutionary process that is not only domestic but also transnational. He leaves a thirteen year old government that provided Chavez with enough time to purge members of the military and fill the army with loyal officers, many of whom live in luxurious homes and enjoy a life-style not easy to give up. This military is likely to resist change unless a new government provides them with the same conditions (all this assuming that these officers are opportunists and are not necessarily identified with the Bolivarian ideology). But even if these officers are true democrats that reject Chavez, the Bolivarian regime has already in place para-military groups such as the Bolivarian Circles. It has also created a militia that responds directly to the executive branch. As things are defined now, Para-military forces and even militias might be filled with “fighters” from other groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and even Middle Eastern terrorist groups such as Hezbollah; two groups Chavez has embraced. 

Secondly, the regime has created a network of people who have benefitted from his regime and would like to see continuity. This includes the “boliburguesia” , which is a business class that has made its wealth not from its hard work and devotion but by virtue of its connections to the state.

Henry Rangel Silva, now defense minister and former intelligence chief of the Venezuelan Army, said in a newspaper interview that the military would not accept an opposition victory in the October, 2012 election. His appointment later as Minister of Defense confirms that the Bolivarian leadership will provide continuity to the Bolivarian revolution regardless of an opposition victory in the upcoming election.

Nelson Bocaranda, who is a columnist for the Venezuelan daily El Universal, revealed that in Cuba there was a meeting between Hugo Chavez, Raul Castro, six Cuban generals and eight pro-Chavez Venezuelan generals, including the Minister of Defense, Rangel Silva. The discussion was focused on possible scenarios after the death of the Bolivarian leader. Bocaranda reports that among the issues considered was the possibility of creating a situation of chaos including violence and looting which would provide an excuse for the military and other non-military security forces to carry out a self-coup.

This suggestion was brought by no other than Rangel Silva who said, even before the trip to Cuba, that the Venezuelan armed forces “are now Chavistas”.

 These revelations should not surprise anybody who has been following the course of the Bolivarian revolution and its absolutist tendencies.

But there are other unfortunate elements at play here.

 At present, polls indicate that Hugo Chavez enjoys an eighteen point advantage over his opponent, Henrique Capriles Radonski.  Of course, this can change in the future but it still indicates that the majority of the Venezuelan population is more fascinated by Chavez’s welfare populism than disgusted by his anti-democratic and often violent practices. This is very much contrary to the dominant spirit of the Spanish people in the aftermath of Franco’s death that regarded democracy as a goal to be achieved.

 Moreover ,the Bolivarian revolution lives in a continental environment that values nationalism, populism and  welfare policies above liberal democracy. His partners in the Bolivarian countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Bolivia love Hugo Chavez for providing them with financial ideological support. Chavez also remains a symbol of liberation of Latin America (“Nuestra America”) for grassroots organizations including many indigenous organizations. The leaders of non-Bolivarian countries such as Argentina and Uruguay admire him and he is more than acceptable in the eyes of the leaders of Brazil, the fastest growing economy and democracy in the region.

Social justice and social equalities are the key codes for which democracy is sacrificed in Latin America, very much unlike in Europe of four decades ago, where Spain’s economic growth and opportunity was not enough of a condition for Spain’s acceptance in the community of European countries.

The Bolivarian revolution has not yet been defined as a dictatorship.  The existence of regular elections has distorted the fact that between elections there is intimidation of judges, violence, persecution of the opposition and restrictions on the media. The principle of national sovereignty stands above international demands for human rights. For the U.S government, the trauma of the war in Iraq and our image as nasty and interventionist has prevented it from even stating that the Bolivarian regime is not a democracy. The Bolivarian regime is a dictatorship legitimized by a doubtful electoral process that uses state resources to perpetuate its power and uses intimidation tactics to influence their vote. (For more information see this article).    

 “Chavismo without Chavez” seems to be the winner supported not only by what has been described above but also with an overwhelming dose of indifference in the region. The United States government has also run out of imagination and is crippled by inaction.

The word democracy was not heard at the Summit of the Americas that took place in mid- April in Colombia. Perhaps there is another word we can use to replace the word ”democracy” as  the word “terrorism” was replaced by “man-caused disaster”.

If there is such a word we have not heard it yet. As Winston Churchill pointed out after his predecessor Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich “You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war”.

We would say after the last Summit of the Americas to our American government: “You were given the choice between speaking up for freedom and surrender to the majority. You chose the latter. You will have tyranny”

Assassination plot in DC related to increasing Iranian presence in Western Hemisphere

Until Chavez assumed power Iran’s presence in the Western Hemisphere was not as strong as it is today. Its proxy, Hezbollah, had presence and even committed a number of atrocities in Latin America such as the attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires. However, its presence increased manifold since Chavez and his Bolivarian revolution began to spread throughout the hemisphere.

Not surprisingly the Iranians have tried to carry out another act of terrorism by attempting to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States with the help of a Mexican criminal group. Iran intended to carry out this attack by using an American citizen of Iranian origins who contacted a member of a well-known Mexican gang and drug cartel called "The Zetas". It was also disclosed that during their exchanges, they discussed attacks on Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington and Buenos Aires.

This event surprised a number of analysts and journalists including the New York Times because Iran usually carries out its terrorist attacks through proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Mahdi Army. This time, however, Iran sought the help of a drug cartel and a gang that seeks to make money and not to carry out political terrorist attacks.

Thus, Max Aub, a Mexican journalist working in Miami, raised the question on Spanish language TV, why would the Zetas undertake such a risky operation for such a small amount of money- only $ 1.5 million?

From a different angle, Ali Alfoneh, an expert on Iran at the American Enterprise Institute doubts that Ayatollah Ali Khamanei planned such an attack because "he is a very cautious statesman and thus he would not gamble on something that involves so many risks". In Mr. Alfoneh’s view, this plot is indicative of an internal struggle within the Iranian leadership.

Nevertheless, the Menges Hemispheric Security Project has been warning for some time of the connections between Middle Eastern terrorist groups, rogue states and drug cartels. (See the latest here ).

Unlike countries in the Middle East where Iran has at its disposal, proxy groups such as the ones mentioned above, countries like those in the Western Hemisphere- far away from Iran’s natural geographical sphere of influence-consist of relatively unknown territory for Iran. Drug cartels and other local criminal elements on the other hand, being heavily involved in many types of criminal activities, possess logistical and strategic knowledge of their operational territory and are therefore capable of providing a tremendous service to rogue states with terrorist intentions such as Iran.

The attacks carried out by Iran against the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish community headquarters in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 respectively are a case in point. During the investigation of these attacks it became clear that top officers of the Buenos Aires Province-which is the largest and one of the most corrupt police forces in Argentina- were involved in providing logistical and institutional support to the terrorists who carried out the attack. The cases against these police officers were dismissed for reasons that are not at all clear or justified (except on internal political grounds).

In the case of the plot against the Saudi Ambassador, the logic seems to be that the Iranians knew that the "Zetas" had ways to penetrate U. S. territory, since they have already done it. Also, the "Zetas" is the most ruthless and murderous group of all the drug cartels and gangs combined. The "Zetas" have been responsible for many massacres in Mexico, including mass murder of immigrants near the border, as well as kidnapping and extortion activities and piracy. In addition, they have been the main providers of fire -power initially to the Mexican Gulf Cartel and most recently to the families that control drug trafficking in Guatemala. Of course the "Zetas" are a drug cartel. However, they have always mainly been a supplier of violence. I would dare to say that for the "Zetas" being a killing and torture machine comes first and being a drug cartel comes second. Ruthlessness and audacity are key factors that the Iranians need. In answering the question why the "Zetas" would take such risk when the profit is not worthwhile, we can say that killing is part of the equation. Drug gangs are not there only for the money. There is a psychological element that plays a role. Killing is a challenge that is not necessarily limited by the need to make a profit. As an example a Mexican gang leader captured by Mexican authorities last summer, Oscar Garcia, admitted to killing 300 people with his own hands (he used to sadistically decapitate his victims with a knife) and ordered the death of another 300 people. This man- who confessed not without amusement that he was born to kill- began his career, like the majority of the "Zetas" members, in the police and the military. In other words, this is a vivid example of a man who joins the drug cartels not to become rich but to kill. It is safe to assume that he is not the only one.

Iran’s Strategy

It was the Iranian Quds force that planned the plot. Interestingly enough, the Quds force was established as a special branch of the Revolutionary Guards to help export the revolution through subversion and terrorism. Therefore, the Quds Force’s activities take place beyond the borders of Iran and it reports directly to the Supreme leader, Ali Khameini, and most probably to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as well. There is no reason to believe that these leaders did not know about the plot. To talk about an internal plot against the will of these leaders whose ruthlessness has been proven beyond any doubt, is also a baseless speculation.

A totalitarian state such as Iran is designed to inflict damage on what it considers to be its enemy. Iran has carried out a number of operations where it has not assumed responsibility for them. First the attacks in Buenos Aires mentioned above; the attacks on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996; a series of attacks on Paris’ metro systems; the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from Athens to London in 1985 where a U.S navy diver was murdered and others. Iran never assumed responsibility of these lethal attacks precisely because evidence beyond reasonable doubt against Iran was never clear. It was always Lebanese Shiites or unknown people who committed these crimes. This time Iran tried to do the same thing, which is to carry out an attack where there is no evidence of its involvement.
As scholar, Walid Phares, has rightly pointed out in an interview with Fox News, "in its operation against embassies in DC, Iran’s regime subcontracted cartels to strike, so that the Ayatollahs would escape international responsibility".

At this point there is little reason to doubt Iran’s responsibility for the plot against the Saudi Ambassador. What Iran is capable of doing on American soil or in any other country in the Western Hemisphere is a serious challenge that cannot be ignored. It requires heavy involvement by the White House. It cannot be delegated to any bureaucracy or agency that would treat these events as business as usual.

Iran has allies in the Western Hemisphere, first and foremost Venezuela under the leadership of Hugo Chavez. But other countries, following Chavez’ lead, such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua have also deepened relations with Iran at a very dangerous level.

Venezuela is Iran’s Main Gate to the Western Hemisphere

Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, has been a major facilitator of the Iranian banking system by helping create a joint Iranian Venezuelan bank to fund "development" projects. CSP staff member, Nicolas Hanlon reported that this bank is the offspring of The Export Development Bank of Iran. This Iranian institution is under sanctions from both the U.S. Treasury and the international community for its alleged involvement in Iran’s nuclear program. The joint bank venture is aimed at finding new ways to finance Iran’s nuclear program, and mainly avoid sanctions imposed on Iran by the international community.

Moreover, Chavez also maintains a relationship with the Al Quds Force.

In fact, in January 2009, the Italian daily "La Stampa", reported that the regular flights between Caracas, Damascus and Tehran constitute a device for Venezuela to help Iran send Syria material for the manufacture of missiles. Accordingly, the materials are destined for the "Revolutionary Guards", the main force protecting the Iranian regime. In exchange for those materials Iran provided Venezuela with members of their revolutionary guards and their elite unit, "Al Quds", to strengthen Venezuela’s secret services and police. Finally, In April 2010, the Pentagon reported the presence of the Quds Force in Venezuela.

Chavez also provides logistical help to Iran. In 2008, it was reported at a conference organized by the CSP Menges Hemispheric Security Project that there were Iranian partnerships with dubious local businessmen in factories located in sensitive areas with access to strategic routes. One of the speakers at the conference talked about those partnerships as possibly including connections between drug trafficking networks that control sensitive strategic areas and Iran. In fact, Iran has established a financial and business infrastructure with Chavez’s consent and encouragement that now includes banks, gold mining, a cement plant, a tractor and bicycle factory, a tuna processing plant and a joint oil venture. On December 30th, 2008 twenty two containers were confiscated from an Iranian cargo ship bound for Venezuela. When the Turkish authorities inspected the shipment, they did not find tractor parts but components to build weapons, bombs and possibly some radioactive material (See story here)

Finally, a 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that for some time Venezuelan ports and airports are being freely used by drug traffickers. It is no secret that Venezuela has become a major trans-shipment point for drugs coming from Colombia and Ecuador and that Chavez has close connections to the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) who in turn work closely with the Mexican cartels.

U.S. Policy Action Required: Sanctions Against Venezuela Are Crucial

Thus far, U.S. policy has detached Venezuela policy from Iranian policy despite everything mentioned above. Venezuela has served as Iran’s main ally in helping Iran to avoid sanctions, to increase its presence in the Western Hemisphere and has even maintained nuclear cooperation with Iran.

Currently there are sanctions against Iran imposed by the United Nations and by the United States. These are sanctions directed primarily against Iran’s energy sector but these measures need to be fully implemented. In addition, the Central Bank of Iran must be sanctioned. This past August, more than 90 U.S. senators signed a letter to President Barack Obama pressing him to sanction Iran’s central bank, with some, threatening legislation to force the move. Such a step could freeze Iran out of the global financial system.

In regard to Venezuela, U.S policy has been very mild towards Chavez for fear of looking like a "bully" and for fear of losing influence on a continent where the left has gained substantial power.

The Venezuelan oil-giant PDVSA was mildly sanctioned last summer. The sanctions imposed on PDVSA only prohibit the company from obtaining either a U.S. export visa or money from the U.S. Import-Export Bank, as well as banning them from attempting to obtain U.S. procurement contracts. These sanctions, however, are remarkably limited in scope. They do not affect PDVSA’s U.S. branch (CITGO), nor does it stop the import of Venezuelan oil to the U.S. About 10% of the total oil the U.S imports comes from Venezuela. (See more about sanctions on Venezuela here)

Since Venezuela is a key Iran partner it only makes sense for the United States, the European Union and the United Nations to impose sanctions on Venezuela, as well. Additional sanctions against Iran will only be partially effective as long as the Iranian government has carte blanche to launder their money through the Venezuelan banking system.

The U.S needs to be assertive also with other countries in Latin America that maintain relations with Iran. Not only Chavez and his Bolivarian allies hold strong relations with Iran but also moderate socialist countries such as Brazil and Uruguay have strengthened their relations with Iran as a show of independence from the United States. This includes trade relations and stronger political relations. With news about murderous Iranian intentions, it is vital that the United States along with Europeans press Latin American countries to distance themselves from Iran and join the sanctions policy.

In conclusion, security challenges emanating from the Western Hemisphere have long been neglected. It is not that surprising that Iran hatched a plot reaching out to a Mexican drug cartel to carry it out. What is surprising is the lack of awareness of Iran’s substantial presence in our hemisphere and the seeming nonchalance with which the U. S. treats this ever rising danger.

 

Originally published at The Americas Report, a project of the Center for Security Policy.

Qaddafi and Latin America

The positions that different Latin American countries have taken towards Colonel Qaddafi and the crisis in Libya present some interesting connections worth exploring.

It is not surprising that Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua have supported Qaddafi’s regime despite the severe crisis of legitimacy it is now facing. The reason for such support is obvious: Colonel Qaddafi is a ruthless dictator who has controlled Libyan society through coercion and fear. He has sustained his regime based on a socialist and anti-imperialist ideology, while seeking to extend his revolution to the rest of the region.

Influenced by the ideas of Pan-Arabism and former Egyptian leader, Jamal Abdel Nasser, Qaddafi tried to create a pan-African revolutionary government and supported subversion in Arab and African countries as well as international terrorism. Qaddafi trained terrorists in Libya including Latin American guerillas such as the Argentinean Montoneros and the Colombian M-19 and maintained strong relations with Carlos the jackal, a Venezuelan international terrorist that worked for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (one of the first terrorist organizations funded by Qaddafi).

Qaddafi has failed in every single project he tried to carry out. He failed to generate legitimacy through socialism; he failed to unite the region under his leadership and he even failed militarily against Chad. What Qaddafi tried to do in his country and region is what Chavez and Castro have tried to do in theirs. Despite Qaddafi’s failure and cruelty, Chavez, Castro and Ortega have remained supportive of the Libyan dictator and there is a reason for that.

The three Latin American leaders share with Qaddafi the desire to perpetuate themselves in power and pursue endeavors despite their foretold failure. These Latin American leaders, by supporting the Libyian dictator, are clearly showing their strong will to stay in power and to pursue their projects in spite of historical evidence of failure. This should send a clear message to their populations that neither Castro, Chavez or Ortega intend to give up power and that democracy in Venezuela and Nicaragua is a façade that will never enable change of governments. Like Qaddafi, these leaders are determined to rule without legitimacy, and are willing to repress opponents, regardless of the consequences. Their support for Qaddafi is equivalent to support for themselves

BRAZIL, CHILE, MEXICO, URUGUAY AND PERU

On the other hand, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru strongly condemned the Qaddafi regime. Peru was the first one in Latin America to break diplomatic relations with Libya. Chile’s attitude is not surprising given the stand they have taken since their transition to democracy in 1990 and their collective rejection of despotism.

Brazil constitutes the best surprise of all. Not only has Brazil strongly condemned the Libyan dictator but has also used its place in the United Nations Security Council to introduce and vocally support sanctions against the North African country. President Dilma Rouseff was the chief of staff to her predecessor, Lula da Silva. Lula’s foreign policy was characterized by protecting brutal dictatorships, such as Iran, while using the excuse that a foreign outcry over a country’s treatment of its citizens constitutes interference in their sovereignty.  

Undoubtedly, had Lula been in power he would have opposed sanctions against Libya because he would have viewed them not only as interference but also as an American-Western agenda. Furthermore, under Lula, Brazil has maintained strong economic relations with Libya. Brazilian construction companies have been a large part of the construction projects in the Libya. Since 2003, Brazil’s economic presence grew astronomically and contracts increased particularly in the last few years.   Libya has invested, by some accounts, more than $120bn in infrastructure projects. Petrobras, Brazil’s state controlled oil company established exploration operations in Libya in 2005. Likewise, Brazilian exports to Libya increased three times between 2003 and 2009. 

Lula purposely developed economic ties with Qaddafi. In July, 2009 Lula visited Libya and took with him 90 business representatives from Brazil. On that trip Lula called Qaddafi a ‘brother’ and ‘friend’.

Rouseff, a former prisoner of the Brazilian dictatorship of the 1960’s and 70’s, broke the scheme set by Lula and placed Brazil in a different light.  Uruguayan President Jose Mujica, also a former guerilla imprisoned by the military regime and a strong supporter of Brazil’s leadership in the region, followed suit by condemning Qaddafi’s actions against his own population.

ARGENTINA

So far Argentina has remained silent in relation to events in Libya. President Cristina Kirchner visited Libya in November, 2008 in what was defined as a business trip. During that visit Ms. Kirchner stated that she and Qaddafi have been political activists since they were very young. Likewise, both "shared strong convictions" and "questioned the status-quo that always avoids change and transformation".  This remark is as delirious as the whole phenomenon called "kirchnersim" but it is not coincidental. The Kirchner government has pursued a human rights agenda by reviving the trials against the inquisitors of the dirty war that took place in Argentina between 1976 and 1983.  Yet, the fact that Qaddafi has ran a murderous regime for the last 42 years means nothing to President Kirchner and the obsequent intellectual apparatus that supports her and views her and her late husband as the most progressive presidents Argentina ever had.  

However, for Kirchner, Qaddafi is a progressive in that he built his country on the principles of socialism and was an enemy of the U.S. In other words, Kirchner’s mindset is similar to Lula’s: if the perpetrator is on the right side of the ideological spectrum, violation of human rights and destruction of democracy is tolerable.  The fact that Qaddafi has made people disappear through his wicked secret service and continues to do so even with more fury as dissidence increases means little to Kirchner and her associates.

What we learn from this is that Argentina is morally neutral. Furthermore, it is neither a strong nor a reliable country. Kirchner’s Argentina continues to have a close association with Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez.  In the future, it will be hard to count on Argentina as a partner of the West when significant events take place.

ECUADOR AND BOLIVIA

President Evo Morales of Bolivia is another interesting case. Qaddafi began to build strong relations with Bolivia in 2008. Morales, a  staunch follower of Hugo Chavez, visited Qaddafi in Libya in 2008 and received, along with President Ortega of Nicaragua, a human rights award. It is not surprising that President Morales so far has remained silent on events taking place in Libya.

The same applies to President Rafael Correa of Ecuador, another Chavez ally.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Reactions towards events in Libya may lead us to some interesting but nonetheless partial conclusions. Could Rouseff’s Brazil be a positive force against the nefarious influences of Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua in the region and a partner of the West in the international arena? Brazil could certainly be a valuable partner since it is today one of the largest economies in the world and an active international political player. However, this will need to be tested in the near future. One of the tests for Brazil will be its position towards Iran, a country embraced by former president Lula da Silva. Lula became an enabler of Iran’s nuclear program and an apologist for Iran’s repression of its dissidents. Likewise, Lula’s foreign policy and international approach has been aimed at reducing U.S power. Brazil’s alliances with authoritarian countries such as China and Iran were part of its support for a so-called "multi-polar world" which for Lula was a euphemism for reducing U.S influence in the world.

Roussef’s moral stand in the Libyan crisis provides us with some hope for positive change, but the future still remains to be seen.

The attitudes of Bolivia’s Morales and Correas’ Ecuador are difficult to interpret with certainty. However, these countries’ neutrality contrary to Argentina could be interpreted as a sign that they are less inclined to be Chavez’s poodle dogs. In the past, Morales nationalized foreign companies hours after meeting with Hugo Chavez. Correa, with strong encouragement of Chavez, has provided shelter to and established relations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Lately, Bolivia and Ecuador have faced dissidence and rebellions against their policies. Both lack Chavez’s ability to exercise full control of their country. At times they have both found that following Chavez’s prescriptions and style has not been a blessing.

We are still far away from seeing an improvement in the situation in Latin America which could be considered highly dangerous. The continent faces increasing despotism, anarchism, loss of state authority, presence of local and foreign terrorism and dangerous foreign influences. All this constitutes a threat to regional and U.S. national security. This is why it is important to be aware of events and shifts in the region and adopt a dynamic, flexible and serious U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America.

A closer look at Brazil’s foreign policy

Latin America is increasingly turning into a geo-political and international challenge. On the one hand, Venezuela, under the leadership of Hugo Chavez, continues to support the Colombian narco-guerilla group known as the FARC. The FARC protects the activities of drug cartels, and cooperates with terrorist groups such as Hezbollah. On the other hand, a number of Southern Cone countries led by Brazil (and supported by Argentina and Uruguay) did not  go as far as Venezuela but have conducted a foreign policy which is detrimental not only to the United States but to the free world, in general.

Brazil under the government of Jose Inazio Lula Da Silva took advantage of the country’s economic growth (which was the cumulative result of years of economic and developmental polices that began before Da Silva took office) to flex its muscles in the regional and international arena.

President Lula Da Silva surprised the world, when despite having a left-wing background plus having been a co-founder along with Fidel Castro of the anti-American Foro de Sao Paulo, appointed conservative figures to his cabinet. That move was aimed at maintaining the continuity of Brazil’s economic development which was pretty much based on the strong role and cooperation of the business community. The fact that Lula did not go left on domestic and economic polices led many people in the region and in Washington to believe that Brazil’s stand in the international arena would be similar.

Thus, Washington policy makers sought out Brazil as an ally to counteract the growing malicious influence of Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez. However, they were very disappointed and astonished by the fact that Lula not only failed to play such an expected role but also became an enabler of Chavez’s revolutionary and expansionistic agenda.

In Lula’s own words, "Chavez has been the best Venezuelan president in 100 years". Likewise, Lula pointed out that the anti-democratic practices employed by the Venezuelan government belong to the realm of Venezuelan sovereignty and not to the domain of universal human rights. Just  last week Brazil and its allies in the Southern Cone supported the inclusion of Venezuela in Mercosur, the South American common market, despite Chavez’s anti-democratic practices which contradicts the group’s clause that conditions membership on the existence of fully democratic institutions.

In addition, Lula helped smuggle the deposed pro-Chavez former president of Honduras back into Tegucigalpa and shelter him there in the Brazilian Embassy. Lula has so far refused to recognize the elected government of Honduran president, Porfirio Lobo. The Brazilian president has also warmed up to the long and discredited die hard autocratic Cuban leader, Fidel Castro and called a Cuban political prisoner who died from a hunger strike a "criminal."

Beyond the region, Brazil joined forces with Turkey a number of months ago to cut a deal with Iran that would not only have not prevented Iran from developing a nuclear bomb but also encouraged it to develop more. Likewise, Brazil voted against sanctions on Iran imposed by the UN National Security Council. Thus, we have discovered that Brazil has had and continues to have its own distinctive foreign policy which requires further scrutiny and analysis.

First Brazil seeks to become an independent country with a personality of its own. It has sought to become influential in the region by supporting the principle of integrating Latin American countries into an autonomous group, independent of the United States or any world power. There is, in principle, nothing wrong with this type of policy.  On the surface, there is no reason to think that this policy represents a threat to the United States.   If the U.S can live with a strong European Union and European common market, there is no reason why a similar Latin American and Caribbean body should be a problem. Brazil also aspires to secure a permanent place on the United Nations Security Council along with long-established world powers. In principle, there is nothing wrong with such a desire. Brazil is a strong and large country. It is also democratic and historically tied to the West.

Along with China, India and Russia, Brazil seeks a multi-polar world where the United States is not the only superpower. According to their thinking, world power is best shared among a number of countries. This scenario is not necessarily a bad one if maximum cooperation is achieved between these different political poles.  One might question why the United States, alone, should be involved in every single case of counties that wish to develop nuclear weapons. Why should the U.S. be the only country to care about events in the world while the rest of the world waits for America to deliver a ready-made product? Why should the U.S. be the only country to raise concerns when democracy or human rights are violated while the rest of the nations seek only to satisfy their national interests?  Indeed, there is nothing wrong with multi-lateral cooperation.

However, Brazil’s international behavior under Lula has been guided by a strong and obsolete dose of anti-Americanism brought directly from Lula’s radical left political upbringing. Brazil does not really seek a multi-polar world of cooperation.  Lula’s notion of multi-polarity is based on his opposition to the power and policies of the U.S.  Thus, Brazil has cooperated with Iran‘s agenda of developing nuclear weapons and gave Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahamdinejad, a hero’s welcome when the latter visited Brazil. Brazil also recognized the fraudulent elections that gave a victory to Ahmadinejad in June, 2009 with no regard for the violence with which anti-government demonstrations were repressed.  This insensitivity is reflected in repeated statements made by Lula according to which Iran "has a right" to a nuclear program.

In this context, it is easy to understand why the Brazilian president was the first to unilaterally recognize the creation of a Palestinian state (with pre-1967 borders) while the U.S was making serious efforts to bring the Israelis and Palestinians together. According to Lula, who was successful in getting the Argentinean and the Uruguayan presidents to go along with this recognition, "it is a step to move forward a stagnant peace process". In fact, Lula was not only giving a free pass to the Palestinians in exchange for nothing but also trying to symbolically show its independence from and opposition to the United States and its ally, Israel.

Lula’s foreign policy logic is embedded not just on the fact that Brazil is now a great country and therefore it demands a place in the world. Such policy is also guided by a strong desire to diminish U.S influence; not only in the region but in the world. Lula’s policy is amoral and is deprived of any global responsibility. Jorge Castaneda, a former Mexican Foreign Minister, has observed that Brazil is part of a group of countries that oppose "more or less explicitly and more or less actively" notions such as human rights, democracy and non-proliferation. Castaneda pointed out Brazil’s foreign policy under Lula is closer to that of authoritarian China (with which Lula has astronomically increased commercial and political relations) than it is to the West. 

Lula’s logic is of a political not economic nature. Like his fellows on the radical left, he dreams of a world with little American influence and claims a leadership role without offering any ideas that contribute to world peace: such as stability, human rights, opposition to international terrorism and nuclear proliferation ,or,  any moral problems that have traditionally been the West’s preoccupation. Lula’s Brazil represents another version of Third World obsessed and outdated anti-colonialism. Under, a veil of sophistication (made possible due to comparisons with the ruthless and thuggish Hugo Chavez) Lula’s Brazil has become a negative force in the region (attracting Argentina and Uruguay, countries now run by two leaders who share Lula’s triumphalist attitude).  Brazil is largely seen by Western countries as an emerging economic power but not necessarily a reliable political player. Under the new Brazilian president, Dilma Rouseff, no change should be expected except for the worse since Ms. Rouseff is a former guerilla and as such is likely to strengthen the policies of her predecessor.

Meanwhile, the U.S and the Western powers should continue to block Brazil’s attempts at playing greater roles in international affairs (including its demands to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council) and treat that country with the suspicion it has earned.

The FARC’s senator

On September 27, 2010, Colombian Senator Piedad Córdoba was removed from her senate seat.  The country’s Inspector General provided evidence that supported the long held claim by high ranking Colombian officials that Ms. Cordoba had close ties to the narco-terrorist group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The decision removing Cordoba from office also forbids her from holding any public office for eighteen years.

In a statement, Colombia’s Attorney General Alejandro Ordoñez explained that this sanction applies to Córdoba "for collaborating and promoting the illegal armed group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia." He stated that Cordoba clearly exceeded the duties specified in the authorization given to her by the Colombian government as an official mediator for the release of hostages. According to the charges [PDF], she advised the FARC to send voice recordings instead of video footage of the insurgent group’s hostages as "proofs of life" in order to improve their strategy. The evidence against the now former senator consists of emails and letters found in the computers of slain commander "Raul Reyes," who was killed on March 1 of 2008. They identify Córdoba by her aliases of ‘Teodora’, ‘Teodora Bolivar’ and ‘La Negra.’ The documents allegedly show that her exchanges with the group’s leaders were more than friendly.

For many locals, the decision to dismiss Cordoba could not have come sooner. The former senator has been known for her ties to the FARC for years. Mrs. Cordoba is also a close friend of Hugo Chavez and both have worked tirelessly to overthrow the government of Colombia in order to take power and then give the FARC a principal role. It has been suspected that Cordoba receives money from Caracas in order to continue her support of the FARC and Chavez.

Colombia has long stood as a stronghold against Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution.  Bogota’s progress against the FARC represents a major obstacle in his pursuit of integrating more countries under his umbrella. He knows the only way he can endlessly get away with illegally grabbing power and money is if the U.S. is kept at bay. Chavez wants the FARC to become a legalized political party with representation. He already has the loyalty of Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Cuba, and Nicaragua who have become dependant on Mr. Chavez’s handouts and oil. In addition, many corrupt politicians and leaders have become accustomed to the gifts they receive from Venezuela in exchange for their support. Other countries and international bodies such as the OAS have preferred to appease Chavez and rarely raise any protest against his dictatorial ways.  Only a few openly confront Chavez and the most successful is Colombia. That is why Chavez and the FARC want its government destroyed.

To achieve this, the Venezuelan leader sought powerful allies within the Colombian government that could provide him with invaluable information and give him a powerful and visible voice for his cause. Piedad Cordoba is well respected by the international community and is an outspoken "human rights" activist, which gives her credibility in international forums and organizations. The socialist and leftist movements love her and portray her as an angel who wants to help in freeing the hostages held by the FARC. She even was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009, by former Nobel Peace Prize winner, Argentinean writer Adolfo Perez Esquivel. She did not win.

Who is Piedad Cordoba?

Piedad Esneda Córdoba Ruiz (born January 25, 1955) is a Medellin native of mixed white and Afro-Colombian parents and the leader of the "Poder Ciudadano Siglo XXI" political movement. She has been a senator in the Colombian legislature for four terms from 1994 to 2010, and was a Member of the Chamber of Representatives  from 1994 to 1994. She was removed from her seat in 2005 for fraud.

In 1999 she was kidnapped by the paramilitary group called the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). After several weeks she was freed and exiled with her family in Canada. After more than one year in exile, Córdoba returned to Colombia, leaving her family behind to resume her political duties.

A Controversial Figure

Mrs. Cordoba has always been surrounded by controversy. She has been outspoken in her support for a political solution to the FARC problem, and supports giving them the right to representation in the Colombian political system. In addition, she has legally defended several members of the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN). She was also an overt opponent of President Alvaro Uribe and even attended international forums to publicly criticize and condemn her own government. Case in point, three years ago, on March 11, 2007, she was invited to a symposium in Mexico City called Los Partidos Políticos y una Nueva Ciudad (Political parties and a new city) which was supported by the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Córdoba generated controversy after declaring that "the progressive governments of Latin America should break their diplomatic relations with Colombia" and also that Alvaro Uribe was a "paramilitary". Córdoba was later judicially denounced for treason after making these declarations, a charge which is currently being investigated by Colombia’s Supreme Court.

And just two months ago, Córdoba asked The European Union to put pressure on newly elected Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos on the subject of ending Colombia’s violent internal conflict. The senator asked the E.U. to push Santos towards dialogue with groups such as the FARC and the ELN, which Santos has recently said he would not do until the groups cease their violent attacks. "Knowing the situation with human rights in Colombia, I invite the E.U. to pressure Colombia and put more emphasis on the government to start a political dialogue," said the Senator in a conversation with news agency EFE.

She became famous in 2007, when President Uribe appointed her as a mediator to help free some hostages held by the FARC. Soon after, she invited Hugo Chavez to join her in the mediation effort. Córdoba and Chavez met with Raul Reyes, spokesman and leader of the FARC, Rodrigo Granda, Ivan Marquez and other members as part of the negotiations. Photos of Córdoba, Chavez and the terrorists surfaced in an online website called Agencia Bolivariana de Prensa (ABP) which showed Córdoba in an amicable and cordial relationship with the FARC, receiving flowers, kisses and hugs. That mission did not accomplish its goal. On November 22nd President Uribe ended the mediation after Chávez broke with diplomatic protocol by placing a series of calls directly to the high command of the Colombian military.

Piedad Cordoba and the FARC: the Evidence

Colombia’s Inspector General announced that his office has compiled a list of charges against Senator Piedad Cordoba in relation to allegations that she collaborated with the FARC outside of the parameters of her role as a hostage release negotiator. The investigation stems from evidence found in dead FARC leader "Raul Reyes" files, which the Inspector General’s Office says suggest that the "Colombians for Peace" leader was involved in "FARC-politics." Email correspondence between Cordoba and the FARC allegedly "contains elements that are not about humanitarian aid."

Under the code name of "’Teodora de Bolivar," she would be one of twelve people mentioned as part of a potential transitional government set up by the FARC  and Hugo Chavez in the event that they seized power in Colombia.

The emails show that during the failed attempt to rescue the hostages in 2007, she acted more as a FARC collaborator than like an official mediator, and that she contacted the group after her official mediation had ended. Mrs. Cordoba vehemently denies being Teodora, but every trip mentioned by ‘Teodora’ on her mails to the FARC matches one made by Mrs. Cordoba. In one email, ‘Teodora’ writes: "I leave for Washington on Tuesday, going for Sonia and Simon T". The senator’s trip to D.C. and her meetings with the two FARC leaders (both of them extradited to the U.S. by Colombian authorities) were known.

The files also indicate that Córdoba would have received money from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to fund social projects.

She also appears to have collaborated with the defense on some of the FARC members’ court cases.

On another e-mail sent on June 14, 2007, two months before she was designated as a mediator by  President Uribe, ‘Raúl Reyes’ asks a fellow FARC member to include Senator Córdoba on a list, in order that she receive FARC documents. In the same text, he also requests calling her by the name ‘Teodora.’

In a communication from September 1, 2007, ‘Raul Reyes’ tells ‘Iván Márquez’, another High Commander, "’la negra’ is an important element for the future, given who she is and her proximity to the man". He also says that she’s got "a good position about our organization". The investigation concluded that "la negra" was, in fact, Piedad Córdoba.

Another document was found in which Reyes writes, "Piedad, with great energy, here expressed her thesis that without the existence and strength of the FARC there wouldn’t be any opposition in Colombia". Reyes added that Córdoba had told him that she felt "fully identified" with the 12 points that the FARC thought necessary for a new government. On September 14, ‘Raul Reyes’ wrote to the whole High Command: "Piedad …. Is very happy and is considering the right moment to strengthen relations with the FARC in order to support a new government, where ‘la negra’ would be assisted by Chavez and where the FARC would have a principal role".

Another email, from September 23, 2007, is even more damaging. Reyes wrote to Manuel Marulanda, Farc’s top leader at the time: "Piedad told me, asking for our discretion, that Chavez contributed 100 million pesos to social work in her district. If so, "it doesn’t seem impossible to get 250 million for our Plan".

In another message of October 27, 2007, ‘Teodora’ makes another suggestion to Reyes: "we must support Chavez before December 2nd; he must win on his constitutional reform. So, I here respectfully dare to ask for these life proofs, so that my commander Chavez can show them to the world, as you would like to show them". And then she concludes that she’s ready to meet "the entire High Command of the army of the people, which is to say the FARC." [Piedad Córdoba: What’s the evidence? Revista Semana. October 6, 2010] Although the FARC did send the life proofs, the Colombian Army intercepted them.

In one e-mail, a FARC commander writes that Bolívar suggested delaying the release of former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt because without the famous hostage in the rebels’ hands, the world would ignore the FARC. In another message, Bolívar downplayed Betancourt’s failing health after shocking photos of the sick prisoner were released in 2007. "Ingrid is skinny but she’s always been skinny," Bolívar wrote. "She won’t die from that."

It is important to point out that Interpol validated the files and later reported that the Colombian government had not manipulated them.

The Inspector’s office concluded in its sentence that both "collaboration with and promotion of the FARC wasn’t only made in the period between August 15 and November 21, 2007 (when Córdoba was officially authorized to make the contacts), but also earlier and later in the years 2007, 2008 and 2010".

Córdoba rejected the Inspector General’s decision and accused him of "criminalizing humanitarian work." She has announced that she will counter the decision and intends to prove her innocence.

Colombia’s Supreme Court President, Jaime Arrubla said that his judicial body has not seen conclusive evidence that Senator Piedad Cordoba is guilty of "FARC-politics." However, many Colombians disagree with Justice Arrubla and accuse him of having a bias against the governments of Alvaro Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos for their strong hand against the terrorist groups FARC and ELN. Just in April of this year, Mr. Arrubla accused Colombia’s domestic intelligence agency, the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) of "a state conspiracy" against the Court and that the magistrates are facing "the biggest mafia" that has operated in Colombia. Mr. Arrubla has long been at odds with President Uribe.

Their troubles began when the Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion which found that the Justice and Peace Law introduced by the government, that set the rules for the 2003-2006 disarmament of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitaries, was synonymous with impunity. Under the law, members of the paramilitary forces who took part in the demobilization process and gave a full confession of their crimes would receive a maximum sentence of eight years.

But the real confrontation between the Supreme Court and the government of Mr. Uribe began when the Court started to investigate the ties between politicians and the paramilitary groups. The Supreme Court has been after many members of Congress and even Uribe accusing them of having ties with the paramilitaries. Mr. Arrubla has now opened an investigation into Inspector General Alejandro Ordoñez’s decision to ban Senator Piedad Cordoba from public office for her ties with the FARC.

Legal experts who have seen the documents say the evidence is heavily weighted toward Cordoba being Teodora Bolivar. The problem is that she is now portraying herself as a victim and some international leaders and even some media outlets are now publicly voicing their support for her.

But her behavior towards the FARC constitutes a crime and a serious breach of ethics especially given her position as a senator representing the Republic of Colombia. Former Deputy Justice Minister, Rafael Nieto commented: "There is no doubt that if she had acted the same way with the paramilitaries, she would be in jail." In addition, some say that the way she has behaved with respect to her own country constitutes treason.

The evidence is there for everyone to see and the 140 – page document has been evaluated and combed through by many legal experts and politicians. According to Colombian law, it is illegal to have a connection with any terrorist group including the FARC. Mrs. Cordoba should not be above the law and the decision of the attorney general should be respected and obeyed.