Tag Archives: Fred Fleitz

A President Betrays the American People — Obama’s Iran Deal

July 15, 2015Fred Fleitz

There’s a confusing debate underway on the merits of the new nuclear agreement with Iran announced today. The Obama administration and its supporters are praising the accord as a historic achievement for world peace. The president’s critics claim it is a terrible agreement that will bolster the nuclear program of state sponsor of terror. Both sides are throwing around nuclear terminology, timelines, and minutiae about the agreement.

How to make sense of this? I believe best way is to judge this agreement against President Obama’s own statements.

In 2007, when he was beginning his run for president, Senator Obama told a conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) that “the world must work to stop Iran’s uranium-enrichment program.”

On October 22, 2012, during a presidential debate with Mitt Romney, Mr Obama said: “Our goal is to get Iran to recognize it needs to give up its nuclear program and abide

In December 2013 at a Brookings Foundation forum, President Obama said: “They don’t need to have an underground, fortified facility like Fordow in order to have a peaceful nuclear program. They certainly don’t need a heavy-water reactor at Arak in order to have a peaceful nuclear program. They don’t need some of the advanced centrifuges that they currently possess.”

This is what the president said about the Iran nuclear program to get elected. This is what the president told the American people to reassure them about the Iran talks.

The agreement announced today does not come close to meeting these statements and promises.

Under the deal, Iran will keep its entire nuclear infrastructure. After the IAEA certifies compliance with easy-to-meet requirements, U.N. Security Council resolutions pertaining to Iran’s nuclear program will be lifted and Tehran will get an estimated $100 billion in sanctions relief.

Iran is currently enriching uranium with about 9,000 centrifuges. About 6,000 will be kept operational; about 5,000 will continue to enrich. Another 10,000 — many non-operational — will be put in storage or unplugged. However, no centrifuges will be destroyed or removed from the country.

Iran also will continue to develop advanced uranium centrifuges while the agreement is in effect. However, unlike the interim agreement, which set the stage for the nuclear talks and barred Iran from testing advanced centrifuges with uranium (a provision Iran violated in mid 2014), the new agreement requires only that R&D of advanced centrifuges be tested “in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium.” This means Iran will be allowed to do more-intensive testing of advanced centrifuges than was permitted during the nuclear talks.

Under the agreement, Iran is supposed to dilute its enriched-uranium stockpile, convert some of it to fuel plates for a small research reactor, or sell it on the open market. Diluting its enriched uranium could be reversed in a few months — possibly much faster if Iran uses advanced centrifuges.

A bizarre aspect of this part of the agreement is that Iran will receive natural uranium for any enriched uranium it “sells.” This will help preserve Iran’s enrichment capability and also solve a problem it has concerning access to natural uranium. (Iran has little natural uranium and its uranium mines are running out.)

Iran has agreed to replace the core of its Arak heavy-water reactor, which is under construction, so it will produce less plutonium and send the spent fuel rods of this reactor out of the country. However, it will be permitted to operate the Arak reactor, a significant reversal of pre-2013 U.S. policy that work on this reactor be halted permanently because it is a serious nuclear-proliferation threat. Because of this new provision, Iran will develop its expertise on operating and building heavy-water reactors during the period the agreement is in effect.

This adds up to an agreement that will shorten, not lengthen, the time to an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Effectively verifying this agreement will be impossible, since the “24/7” inspections promised by President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry in their speeches today apply only to Iran’s declared nuclear program and supply chain. The IAEA can “press” for inspections of military sites and other suspect nuclear sites, but the agreement does not provide for any penalty if Iran refuses to grant IAEA inspectors access.

Some of the worst U.S. concessions concern Iran’s eleventh-hour demand to lift embargoes on conventional arms and ballistic missiles. The conventional-arms embargo will stay in place for five years, and the ballistic-missile embargo will be in place for eight years but will be lifted sooner if the IAEA definitively clears Iran of any current work on nuclear weapons. The IAEA is very unlikely to find evidence of current nuclear-weapons work, as it won’t be allowed to inspect non-declared nuclear sites where this activity is taking place. This means these embargoes could be lifted much sooner.

To defend an agreement that legitimizes Iran’s nuclear program, President Obama could possibly claim that Iran can be trusted because it has begun to act like a responsible member of the international community. However, we know it hasn’t. A State Department report from last June found that Iran’s sponsorship of worldwide terrorism has continued and did not decline in 2014 during the nuclear talks. Iran also is stepping up its efforts to destabilize the Middle East and continues to back the Assad regime and an insurgency in Yemen.

As American supporters and detractors of the nuclear deal engage in a heated debate over the next two months before Congress votes on a resolution of disapproval of the deal, the most important question to resolve is whether President Obama had a mandate from the American people to negotiate this terrible and dangerous agreement. Would he have won the 2008 or 2012 presidential elections if he gave even a hint of a deal like this? Would Congress have supported this abrupt change in American foreign policy if the president had kept it informed about his nuclear diplomacy with Iran and consulted with the Hill during the talks?

The answers to these questions are clearly “no.” The Iran deal is the complete opposite of what President Obama promised the American people about how he would handle the Iranian nuclear program. Congress was kept in the dark about the talks, to stop lawmakers from interfering with an agreement the president knew he could never sell to the American people.

This is more than a bad deal. President Obama has betrayed the American people by agreeing to the kind of agreement with an enemy of the United States that he said he would not agree to. It is vital that Congress hold the president to his original promises by rejecting this agreement on a strong bipartisan basis and send a signal to the world that if a Republican is elected president in 2016, this deal will be declared null and void on his or her first day in office.

Iran Nuclear Deal Much Worse than Experts Predicted

July 14, 2015Fred Fleitz

The nuclear agreement with Iran announced Tuesday was billed by EU, Iranian and US officials as historic. It is that: it is a historically dangerous accord that will destabilize the Middle East by legitimizing the nuclear program of a radical Islamist state and a state-sponsor of terror.

The provisions of this agreement – available HERE – contains minor concessions by Iran but huge concessions by the United States that will Iran to continue its nuclear program with weak verification provisions. Conditions for sanctions relief will be very easy for Iran to meet.

Iran will not only continue to enrich uranium under the agreement, it will continue to develop advanced centrifuges that will reduce the timeline to an Iranian nuclear bomb. Unlike the interim agreement that set these talks in motion that barred Iran from testing advanced centrifuges with uranium (a provision that Iran violated in mid-2014), the new agreement only requires that R&D of advanced centrifuges be tested “in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium.” This means Iran will be allowed to do more intensive testing of advanced centrifuges than it was permitted during the nuclear talks.

The Obama administration will claim provisions of the deal requiring Iran to dilute or send out of the country its reactor-grade enriched uranium stockpile is a great victory. It isn’t. If Iran sells this enriched uranium (which the president said today is enough to make 10 nuclear bombs if enriched to weapons-grade), it will receive natural uranium in return. This will solve a problem Iran has concerning access to natural uranium. (Iran has little natural uranium and its mines are running out.) If Iran dilutes this enriched uranium, it can be enriched to higher levels in several months. Moreover, since the agreement allows Iran to continue to develop advanced centrifuges, Tehran will have the capacity to quickly replaced its enriched uranium stockpile.

It is crucial that the U.S. Congress send a message to the world by decisively rejecting this agreement and making it clear that a future Republican president will reject it on his or her first day in office.

Iran has agreed to replace the core of its under-construction Arak heavy-water reactor so it produces less plutonium and to send the spent fuel rods of this reactor out of the country. This is a significant reversal of pre-2013 U.S. policy that work on this reactor be halted permanently because it is a serious nuclear proliferation threat. Because of this provision, Iran will develop its expertise on operating and building heavy-water reactors during this agreement.

As a result of these provisions, this deal will actually shorten the timeline to an Iranian nuclear bomb and enable Iran to produce many more nuclear bombs than it currently can construct using enriched uranium and plutonium fuel.

This is not a verifiable agreement. The IAEA will only have 24/7 access to declared nuclear facilities. The IAEA can “press” for access to military and suspect nuclear sites. Provisions for access military and suspect military sites are extremely weak and provide for no consequences against Iran if it fails to grant access to IAEA inspectors.

In his press conference today, Secretary Kerry tried to explain away the agreement’s lack of anytime, anyplace inspections of non-declared nuclear sites by claiming Iran will be prevented from pursuing a nuclear weapons program since Iran’s declared nuclear supply chain will be subject to monitoring. This will not reassure Iran’s neighbors since the agreement will do nothing to stop activities such as warhead development and possibly covert uranium enrichment at undeclared sites.

Sanctions relief will be fairly easy for Iran to reach. UN, EU, and US sanctions will be “terminated” on “implementation day” – when the IAEA certifies Iran has complied with specified commitments in the agreement. These commitments are fairly easy for Iran to meet. There are provisions for dispute resolution and re-imposing sanctions due to Iranian non-compliance, but it is hard to imagine Russia or China will agree to this. Moreover, given President Obama’s obsession for a nuclear agreement with Iran and his administration’s failure to hold Iran accountable for cheating on its commitments during the nuclear talks, I believe there is no chance this administration will stand in the way of declaring Iran in compliance with the new agreement. This means Iran is likely to soon get access to an estimated $100 billion in frozen assets.

Some of the most stunning concessions concern lifting embargoes on conventional arms and ballistic missiles. The conventional arms embargo will stay in place for five years and the ballistic missile embargo would be in place for eight years unless the IAEA definitively clears Iran of any current work on nuclear weapons. However, the IAEA is very unlikely to find evidence of current nuclear weapons work since it won’t be allowed to inspect non-declared nuclear sites where this activity is taking place. This means these embargoes could be lifted much sooner.

These are stunning US concessions. Under this agreement, a state-sponsor of terror that currently is sponsoring terrorist groups and destabilizing the Middle East, will gain free access to the international arms market. In addition, Iran, which refuses to sign ballistic missile arms control treaties, will be freed of restrictions on its missile program which expert believe is being designed as a nuclear weapons delivery system Iran’s missiles could currently hit Europe and it is believed to be developing ICBMs that could strike the United States.

Former Senator Joseph Lieberman said at a House Foreign Affairs Committee Tuesday morning about the Iran nuclear agreement:

“What began as an admirable diplomatic effort…dissolved into a bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability. The agreement…ultimately allows Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, and indeed legitimizes Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons capability… This is a bad deal for America, a bad deal for Iran’s neighbors in the Middle East, and a bad deal for the world.”

Lieberman is right. This is a terrible agreement that will endanger US and international security. This deal will increase the risk of nuclear proliferation since other regional states are likely to begin enriching uranium and building heavy-water reactors. Saudi Arabia reportedly may buy nuclear bombs from Pakistan. Israel may decide it has no choice but to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.

It therefore is crucial that the US Congress send a message to the world by decisively rejecting this agreement and making it clear that a future Republican President will reject it on his or her first day in office.

Iran Talks Nearly Finished

July 9, 2015Secure Freedom Radio

Secure Freedom Radio is made possible by listeners like you.

With Fred Fleitz, Amb. Yoram Ettinger, Nolan Peterson, Joe Guzzardi

FRED FLEITZ, Senior Vice President at the Center for Security Policy, and former CIA analyst:

How the nuclear deal will legitimize the Iranian regime
Likelihood that Obama’s deal with Iran will pass on Capitol Hill
Presidential candidates’ views on the nuclear deal
Verifiability of the nuclear agreement

Amb. YORAM ETTINGER, formerly the Minister for Congressional Affairs to Israel’s Embassy in Washington, DC:

Defining “Stage One Policy Thinking”
Obama administration efforts to establish an Iranian hegemony in the Middle East
Legitimizing the regime in Tehran
Should American Jews support President Obama’s nuclear talks with Iran?

NOLAN PETERSON, foreign correspondent at The Daily Signal

An insider account of the so-called “ceasefire” in Eastern Ukraine
Vast financial backing and technical expertise of the pro-Russian Separatist forces
Deterring Putin’s aggression against the rest of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states
Dangerous flash-points possible between Russia and NATO

JOE GUZZARDI, Media Director and Senior Writing Fellow at Californians for Population Stabilization:

How the recent tragedy in San Francisco puts the spotlight on the controversial idea of “sanctuary cities”
Using California as a case study in illegal immigration trends
Evidence for a correlation between illegal immigration and California’s historic drought
A pair of dangerous bills currently in the California State Legislature

Podcast: Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

Podcast (podcast2): Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

Podcast (podcast3): Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

Podcast (podcast4): Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

Iran’s Nuclear End Game

July 2, 2015Secure Freedom Radio

Secure Freedom Radio is made possible by listeners like you.

With Rep. Martha McSally, Mauricio Claver-Carone, Fred Fleitz, and Chris Farrell

MARTHA McSALLY, U.S. Representative (AZ-2) and Retired Air Force Colonel:

An update on the nuclear negations with Iran and possible end-results
The Iranian regime’s threat of an EMP attack on the U.S. electric grid
President Obama’s military strategy to defeat ISIS
Thoughts on allowing American servicewomen to serve on the front lines

MAURICIO CLAVER-CARONE, Executive Director of Cuba Democracy Advocates:

Arguments against the newly normalized diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba
Why the U.S.’s legitimization of Cuba hurts democracy in the Western Hemisphere
Are Russian spies operating in Havana–again?

FRED FLEITZ, Senior VP for Policy and Programs, and former CIA analyst:

The question of “managed inspections” of Iranian military facilities
IAEA’s role in any enforceable deal along with John Kerry’s misleading statements concerning verification
Will Congress have a serious quality-control check if any deal is struck with Tehran?

CHRIS FARRELL, Director of Investigations and Research at Judicial Watch:

Findings in the Hillary Clinton emails newly released through FOIA requests
Redactions of Clinton’s State Department emails
Huma Abedin’s role in selecting which emails were released
The Obama administration’s attempts to suppress freedom of expression

Podcast: Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

Podcast (podcast2): Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

Podcast (podcast3): Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

Podcast (podcast4): Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

It’s Not “Absurd” That Obama Will Give In to Iran’s Demands

June 30, 2015Fred Fleitz

According to press reports, U.S. officials have said the Iran nuclear talks will be extended to about July 9 so Congress can begin a 30-day review if an agreement is reached. Under the Corker-Cardin bill, Congress has 60 days to review an Iran deal if it is submitted to the Hill after July 9.

The inability to reach an agreement by a June 30 deadline appears to be due to backtracking by Iran. The New York Times reported today that U.S. officials have warned Iran that a nuclear deal must stick to an April 2015 framework agreement. This suggests Tehran is moving away from the framework to extract more U.S. concessions.

The framework agreement contained major (and I believe unacceptably dangerous) concessions to Iran, allowing it to operate 5,000 uranium centrifuges, develop advanced centrifuges, and keep all of its nuclear infrastructure, including a plutonium-producing reactor which would be modified to produce less plutonium.

According to a June 30 Washington Post article, a senior Obama official balked yesterday at accusations that the administration will give in to Iranian demands as “absurd.” According to the Post, the official said:

“Why would we put ourselves through this, why would our teams be here for as long as they have been, why would we be spending the hours doing this in the way we are if we were to just say, ‘Whatever you want, you got’?” the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the closed-door talks. “This is a very tough negotiation.”

My colleague Clare Lopez wrote in an June 29 Newsmax article that the Obama administration began to make concessions to Iran in 2009 to lure it to the negotiating table which included releasing Iranian prisoners. Since that time, there have been a series of huge U.S. concessions on Iran’s nuclear program, including allowing it to enrich uranium and permitting Iran to develop advanced enrichment centrifuges. According to recent press reports, the Obama administration is prepared to cave on “any time, any place” inspections of Iranian nuclear sites and settle for “managed” inspections of some Iranian military facilities. There also have been recent press reports that the Obama administration is prepared to write off an IAEA dossier on Iran’s past nuclear weapons-related work.

Based on these and other U.S. concessions to Iran since 2009 to get a nuclear agreement, it is far from absurd that President Obama will give in to Iran’s remaining demands.

Obama’s Nuclear Surrender to Iran

June 29, 2015Fred Fleitz

With the clock winding down on a June 30th deadline for a nuclear agreement with Iran, Obama administration critics fear a potential deal is worsening by the day as U.S. concessions accelerate in the final days of the negotiations.

But as bad as these last-minute U.S. concessions appear – such as a reported U.S. offer to write-off Iran’s past nuclear weapons work and giving Iran advanced nuclear technology – they ultimately will not reduce the chances of getting a “good” nuclear deal due to a huge U.S. concession made before the negotiations began: allowing Iran to enrich uranium.

This was more than a concession. It was an American surrender to Iran on its nuclear program.

Uranium enrichment is a dangerous dual-use nuclear technology because it is very easy to use an enrichment program intended for peaceful purposes to produce nuclear weapons fuel. After secret revelations about Iran’s nuclear program emerged in 2002, the Bush administration tried to stop the spread of uranium enrichment. Congress endorsed this approach on a bipartisan basis and pressured the Bush administration to require the UAE to forswear uranium enrichment (and plutonium reprocessing) from an agreement to share American nuclear technology. This agreement was signed and strengthened by the Obama administration in 2009.

Over the objections of Congress, the Obama administration in 2011 backed away from this strict standard barring enrichment and plutonium reprocessing from nuclear technology sharing agreements and decided to approach these issues on a case-by-case basis.

It is impossible to see how the Obama administration can justify Iran as a case to allow uranium enrichment, since its nuclear program was begun in secret and developed in defiance of six UN Security Council resolutions and Iran’s treaty obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran is also refusing to come clean on past nuclear-weapons related work or allow IAEA inspectors access to all of its nuclear sites.

Iranian leaders claim their uranium enrichment program is peaceful, but they have been unable to provide a convincing explanation for why their nation needs to enrich. Iran has only 19,000 enrichment centrifuges, far short of the 200,000 it would need to enrich enough uranium fuel for its Bushehr power reactor. Iran has too many centrifuges for other peaceful purposes such as producing medical isotopes.

Desperate for a nuclear agreement with Iran and frustrated that Iranian leaders would not budge on the enrichment issue, the U.S. offered to allow Iran to enrich uranium during multilateral talks in Baghdad in May 2012. This huge U.S. concession was incorporated into a November 2013 interim agreement and the current nuclear talks that began in early 2014.

This U.S. surrender conceded to Iran the “right” to enrich uranium and effectively conceded the nuclear bomb to Tehran. Diplomatic efforts since that time have amounted to negotiating the terms of this surrender.

Negotiations on the terms of the Obama nuclear surrender to Iran have not gone well. The number of centrifuges Iran would be permitted to operate grew from a reported 500 in 2012 to 5,000 by April 2015. According to an April 2, 2015 State Department fact sheet, none of Iran’s 19,000 centrifuges (or any of its nuclear infrastructure) will be destroyed or removed from the country. Iran will be allowed to develop advanced centrifuges during an agreement which will shorten the timeline to an Iranian nuclear bomb. Iran also will not be required to send its stockpile of reactor-grade enriched uranium out of the country. This enriched uranium could be used to make a nuclear weapon in two to three months and is enough to fuel about nine weapons.

Obama administration officials and their supporters claim the enrichment concession was justified because a nuclear agreement with Iran is impossible without it, since Iranian leaders refuse to give up their enrichment program. This is a rationalization to explain away the reality that when Iranian leaders said they would not give up their uranium enrichment program, they were also saying they had no interest in an agreement to halt or significantly delay their capability to produce nuclear weapons.

Obama officials have claimed the proliferation risks of allowing Iran to enrich uranium during a nuclear agreement will be checked by robust, intrusive and “snap” IAEA inspections. While this is a dubious claim, since Iran would be allowed to improve its enrichment expertise while an agreement is in effect, we now know there will be no robust and intrusive inspections, since Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Iranian Parliament have declared military facilities and non-declared nuclear sites off-limits to IAEA inspectors.

By allowing Iran to enrich uranium, the United States conceded an Iranian nuclear infrastructure that has no purpose other than producing nuclear weapons. This concession also set the stage for an agreement that will legitimize the nuclear program of a state sponsor of terror with a long record of cheating on its nuclear treaty commitments.

America also abandoned a principled stand against a dangerous dual-use nuclear technology that it has refused to allow friendly states to pursue. As a result, Iran’s neighbors are certain to start their own uranium enrichment programs. It also will be difficult if not impossible for the U.S. to exclude uranium enrichment from future agreements to share peaceful nuclear technology with other states if this deal with Iran is concluded.

Congress must recognize that the nuclear talks with Iran were lost before they began because of the Obama surrender on uranium enrichment. This made the nuclear talks so fundamentally flawed that a meaningful agreement to halt or significantly slow Iran’s nuclear weapons program became impossible. It is therefore imperative that Congress, on a bipartisan basis, reject any agreement produced by the nuclear talks and impose new sanctions on Iran until it complies with its nuclear treaty obligations and all UN Security Council resolutions, especially on its uranium enrichment program.

I am hopeful that the next U.S. administration will restart a diplomatic process with Iran to seek a meaningful agreement to resolve international concerns about the Iranian nuclear program. To get such an agreement, we will need a president who is not obsessed with getting a legacy nuclear agreement with Iran and who will categorically rule out the continuation of Iran’s uranium enrichment program.

President Obama’s Dismal Diplomacy

June 25, 2015Secure Freedom Radio

Secure Freedom Radio is made possible by listeners like you.

With Amb. Michael Oren, Garland Tucker, John Sitilides, Fred Fleitz

Amb. MICHAEL OREN, Former Israeli ambassador to the United States and Author of Ally: My Journey Across the American Israeli Divide:

An analysis of President Obama’s ideological formation
Israel’s view of President Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran

GARLAND TUCKER, author of Conservative Heroes: Fourteen Leaders Who Shaped America, from Jefferson to Reagan:

Character traits and defining qualities of conservative heroes
The Judeo-Christian philosophical origins of the United States
Who are the modern conservative heroes?

JOHN SITILIDES, Principle in Trilogy Advisors, LLC:

Recent negotiations between the European Union and Greece
Implications of a Russian bail out for Greece and NATO
Strategic importance of stopping Russian influence in Greece

FRED FLEITZ, Senior VP for Policy and Programs at the Center for Security Policy, and former CIA Analyst:

Does the Administration really know all possible military connections of the Iranian nuclear program?
The need for on-the-ground inspectors verifying declared and undeclared sites in Iran
The President’s new policy for dealing with U.S. hostages

Podcast: Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

Podcast (podcast2): Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

Podcast (podcast3): Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

Podcast (podcast4): Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

After Khamenei Rejects Key U.S. Concession, Kerry Concedes It Anyway

June 19, 2015Fred Fleitz

I wrote in a June 15 NRO article about how the Obama administration, in a bid to resolve a deadlock in the nuclear talks with Iran, reportedly proposed closing the book on past Iranian nuclear weapons-related work and limiting IAEA inspections to declared, non-military facilities. In exchange, Iran was to agree to token inspections of a handful of military and suspect nuclear sites. Instead of inspecting non-declared nuclear sites and military sites, Obama administration officials proposed using intelligence means to monitor them. Iranian supreme leader Khamenei reportedly rejected this proposed U.S. concession.

Yet in spite of Khamenei’s rejection, Secretary of State John Kerry has apparently decided to go ahead with at least part of this concession. NR’s Patrick Brennan wrote in the Corner yesterday that Kerry said to reporters during an April 16 video call: “We are not fixated on Iran specifically accounting for what they did at one point in time or another. We know what they did.”

Kerry also said in response to a question from a reporter: “We have absolute knowledge with respect to the certain military activities they were engaged in.”

Brennan noted how the Wisconsin Project, a well-regarded arms-control think tank, believes a meaningful nuclear agreement with Iran is impossible unless it owns up to its past nuclear weapons-related research. IAEA inspectors need a baseline for nuclear inspections — they also need to know where to inspect.

I agree, but I would add that it was extremely foolish for Kerry to assert that the United States knows what Iran did concerning covert nuclear-weapons activities. The truth is that U.S. intelligence has a poor record in detecting covert nuclear activities. We only know about several previously secret nuclear sites in Iran because they were disclosed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group. In late 2010, the U.S. Intelligence Community was forced to reverse its position that North Korea probably was not pursuing uranium enrichment after North Korean officials showed a fully operational uranium enrichment facility to a visiting team of former U.S. officials and academics.

The Silverman-Robb WMD Commission said it its 2004 report, “Across the board, the intelligence community knows disturbingly little about the nuclear programs of many of the world’s most dangerous actors.” Based on my experience working on this issue for CIA, the State Department, and the House Intelligence Committee staff, I believe this is still the case for nuclear-weapons programs in Iran and North Korea.

One final observation. Although Kerry did not say in his April 16 video call that the United States will drop inspections of military and non-declared suspect nuclear sites and instead use intelligence means to monitor such sites, I believe his statements indicate the U.S. will also make a one-sided concession on this point.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu got it right when he said on Sunday, “To our regret, the reports that are coming in from the world powers attest to an acceleration of concessions by them in the face of Iranian stubbornness. From the outset, the agreement being put together looked bad. It looks worse and worse with each passing day.”