Tag Archives: Germany

Clinton Legacy Watch #34: A Sovereign Palestinian State, A Weakened U.S.-Israeli Relationship, A Greater Danger of War

December 14, 1998Center for Security Policy

(Washington, D.C.): For many Americans, Bill Clinton’s latest foray into Middle East
diplomacy
may amount to little more than a distraction from the crisis enveloping his presidency at home.
For the United States’ most reliable friends and most important allies in the region — the Israelis —
however, Mr. Clinton’s conduct in the Gaza Strip today casts an ominous shadow over their
security and the prospects for a real and durable peace.

A Fraud By Any Other Name

That state of affairs is ironic, even surreal, given the day’s carefully choreographed effort to
conjure up the appearance of peace. Yasser Arafat talked of peace incessantly during his address
to the Palestinian National Council and representatives of other organizations (including, among
the audience, known murderers of American citizens). Those present even stood on his command
and raised their arms in what was interpreted — in accordance with the script — by President
Clinton, by the press and even by the Israeli government as, in Mr. Clinton’s words, “fully, finally
and forever” disposing of the thorny problem of the Palestinian Charter.

In fact, this amounts to one of the greatest diplomatic frauds in history.
Without striking one
word, without adopting a single phrase of alternative text, the Palestinians have “reaffirmed”
earlier, equally vacuous declarations that the provisions of their 1964 Covenant that call for the
destruction of Israel have been “revoked.” Since 30 out of the 33 provisions of this Charter
espouse the elimination of the Jewish State and/or attacks on its people, such a step would, if
genuine, seem to necessitate that a new Covenant be drafted and formally adopted to take its
place.

Now, imagine if Hitler’s National Socialist Party had, part way through the Holocaust,
proclaimed
that unspecified sections of Mein Kampf that blamed the Jews for Germany’s troubles
no longer
represented its guiding philosophy. Would people of the Jewish faith or extraction living in
Nazi-controlled Germany have been wise to accept this pronouncement at face value — without
the promulgation of any revised text or statutes, to say nothing of a wholesale redirection of
Hitler’s policies?

Is it reasonable to ask a people who have repeatedly been the victims of state-sponsored
genocide
and who are confronted with much evidence aside from the Covenant that the new Palestinian
state will be equally committed to the destruction of the Jews and their nation, to settle for less
than a clear-cut, formal and unbegrudging rejection of the PLO’s hateful Charter? Obviously not.

Yet, Israel’s American allies insist that much less is needed. And so, we have the spectacle of
President Clinton lending the moral authority of the United States with his presence and his words
to a subterfuge. There was no roll call vote, there were no concrete measures taken to strike
offending passages or to replace them with commitments to peaceful coexistence with Israel.
Worse yet, as the Associated Press reported before the event, “Palestinian negotiator
Hassan
Asfour said, ‘We will raise our hands and stand up and applaud’….Despite the show of
hands, this should not be considered a formal vote, he added.”

The U.S. role in perpetrating this fraud is made no less reprehensible by the fact that the
Israeli
government felt it must accept what the President has legitimated. The unalterable reality,
however, is that irrespective of what Prime Minister Netanyahu chooses to say about today’s
version of Palestinian theater-of-the-absurd, the PLO has not amended — let
alone stricken —
the offensive passages.

This takes on particular import when there is so much evidence that the reason is not
Palestinian sensibilities about being tutored on parliamentary procedures. Rather, it is an
abiding determination on the part of both Arafat’s faction and most of his opponents to
achieve the goal defined by the 1964 Covenant: the destruction of the State of Israel. href=”#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾

Encouraging a Palestinian State

Mr. Clinton’s trip to Gaza and the West Bank also is regrettable in that it amounts to the first
state visit by a foreign leader to the incipient Palestinian nation. Despite Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright’s absurd efforts to dismiss the unmistakable symbolic import of the
President’s itinerary, the flames of Palestinian nationalism are being enormously
fanned by:
his arrival and ribbon-cutting ceremony at the newly opened “Gaza International Airport”; the
photo opportunity during his meeting with Arafat in his headquarters under a picture of the city
the Palestinians claim will be their capital, Jerusalem; and his address to the proto-legislature in
the Gaza Strip.

Even Mr. Clinton’s public rhetoric is deliberately inflating Palestinian aspirations. Today, Mr.
Clinton actually announced that “the Palestinian people now have a chance to determine their own
destiny on their own land.” He has complained with approximately the same fervor about Israeli
and Palestinian failures to fulfill their commitments — declaring that “neither has a monopoly on
pain or virtue.”

Such expressions amount to acts of moral equivalence that are not only unjustified
on their
face; they serve further to distance the United States from its most reliable friend and
important ally in the region. Steps like these can only embolden Israel’s enemies.

Meanwhile, Mrs. Clinton is doing a fair amount of damage in her own right. At this writing,
the
First Lady is still scheduled to visit a Palestinian refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, an action in
keeping with — though even more incendiary than — her earlier public call for a Palestinian state.
After all, it will not only serve as a propaganda field-day for those who blame Israel for the
deplorable condition of the residents of such camps throughout the Arab world. It will also
directly insert the United States into the explosive issue of what the Palestinians call the “right of
return of refugees,” the millions of people (many of whom have never set foot in “Palestine”)
who may be interested in populating a new Palestinian state and willing to help liberate what they
see as the rest of its territory, namely Israel.

The Bottom Line

This is not the path of a genuine and durable peace. It may produce “progress,” all right, but
the
movement is in a direction that will not result in security for Israel or serve U.S. interests in the
region. In the words of a preeminent analyst of Middle East affairs, Douglas J. Feith, in the
January 1999 issue of Commentary Magazine: “The Administration’s current policy
— increasing
U.S. aid to the Palestinian Authority while winking at its violations of Oslo and its human rights
abuses — simply reinforces the [Palestinian] regime’s most dangerous traits. Down that road lies
further misery for the Palestinians and, for Israel, war.”⁽²⁾

– 30 –

1. See Center Decision Briefs entitled Bibi’s Choice:
Allow The Palestinians To Acquire A Real
— And Threatening — State Or Just A ‘State Of Mind’ ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=98-D_126″>No. 98-D 126, 9 July 1998); and
Clinton Legacy Watch #24: An Odious Ultimatum To Israel ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=98-D_78″>No. 98-D 78, 6 May 1998).

2. For additional excerpts from Mr. Feith’s essay, see Center
Decision Brief entitled Clinton,
Stay Home! President’s Ill-Advised Trip To Mideast Will Contribute To
Conflict — Not A
Durable Peace (No. 98-D 198, 11 December
1998).

Excerpts from a Presentation by Roger W. Robinson Jr. before the Heritage Foundation Symposium on ‘The Meaning of the Russian Financial Bailout’

August 14, 1998Center for Security Policy

Washington, D.C.

23 July 1998

As mentioned in Ariel’s kind introduction, my earlier experience as an East-West banker with
responsibilities for Chase Manhattan’s portfolio in the former Soviet Union and the region was
particularly helpful when I went to work at the National Security Council. Indeed, it is the nexus
between global finance and national security which I would like to focus on during these brief
remarks.

First, it is worth underscoring the predictability of the $22.6 billion emergency rescue package
for
Russia forged by the U.S. and International Monetary Fund (IMF) just a few days ago.
When a
country has some $1.3 billion in short-term debt obligations coming due per week on
total
hard currency reserves of some $12-15 billion, it does not take a banker to recognize the
sharp escalation in the bailout amount which will ultimately be required.

Initially, the IMF appeared to understand that its past disbursements of the existing $9.2
billion
facility for Russia had been largely politicized by Washington and other G-7 capitals. To its
credit, the Fund at least tried to hang tough against Russia’s rhetorical pledges of
reform in the
interest of preserving its already damaged institutional integrity….It demanded that meaningful
systemic change be implemented by Moscow before it would commit to new multibillion-dollar
outlays. Regrettably, it was again not to be.

***

During this relatively brief six week period, the cost of the IMF portion of the bailout
doubled,
from $5.6 to $11.2 billion. This sad state of affairs — particularly for U.S. and other Western
taxpayers — was eerily reminiscent of the countless warnings concerning the unsustainability of
the Soviet debt structure which went unheeded in the late 1980’s.

In fact, my first Heritage lecture in February 1986 was on the subject of why Moscow would
ultimately be unable to service its hard currency debt owed Western governments and commercial
banks due primarily to a lack of systemic transformation, capital flight, the outflow of hard
currency to support an aggressive foreign policy and strategic modernization efforts and the
undisciplined, unconditioned and largely non-transparent lending practices of Western creditors.

Russian Bonds

In the current circumstances, however, there exists an important additional complication,
fortunately not as evident in the Soviet era — namely, the use of bond offerings as a
principal
means of offsetting revenue shortfalls and advancing Moscow’s economic and political
agenda. Unlike loans from Western governments and commercial banks (nearly the
only forms of
Soviet borrowing) bonds cannot be rescheduled. [Issuing bonds] also permits Moscow to tap into
a large number of new lending sources including: Western securities firms, pension funds,
insurance companies, corporations and even individuals.

The funds Russia attracts via bond offerings is also so-called “general purpose” or
“balance-of-payments” financing, with no specific underlying trade transactions or projects which
would
potentially advance the country’s economic vitality. In short, it is simply cash disbursed
with
few, if any, questions asked concerning where the money is going or how it is being used —
a proven formula for a financial train wreck.

Make no mistake, the Russian leadership is keenly alert to the political windfall of
this new
borrowing method: the creation of politically-powerful new constituencies throughout the
U.S. and the West which would henceforth have a vested financial interest in opposing the
imposition of economic sanctions or other penalties against Russia for its proliferation and
other global misdeeds and supporting future bailouts.

Accordingly, I concur with Marshal Goldman’s assessment that we have not seen —
nor will we
see in the next few critical months — the kind of systemic transformation necessary for the
$22.6 billion package to gain sufficient traction to turn around Russia’s structural crisis.

Neglecting the National Security Dimension

Not surprisingly, amid the flurry of discussions about Russian debt restructuring, tax
collection,
budget deficit reduction, privatizing energy and other monopolies, property rights and the
construction of genuine commercial and legal codes, virtually no G-7 or IMF attention
has
been directed to the funding of sophisticated Russian military programs and associated
expenditures. Similarly, no Western cash flow calculations appear to have been made
with
respect to the hard currency costs of the robust and belligerent “Primakov Doctrine” which
governs Russian foreign policy.

[The fact is that] Russian foreign policy adventurism and strategic force modernization
continue
apace, in some cases with more than adequate budget allocations. For these and other reasons,
my guess is that Moscow will return to the West for a bailout “supplement” or an official
request for the acceleration of disbursements before the end of the year — well short of the
minimum two year period the $22.6 billion package is advertised to cover….

[A] partial list alone [of Russian military modernization programs] involves expenditures of
probably as much as $10 billion or more — an amount representing roughly half of the
$22.6
billion bailout package. Perhaps the Congress is operating under the assumption that
these
questionable military expenditures were a significant agenda item in the configuring of
IMF conditionality or, at minimum, the “quiet diplomacy” of G-7 capitals with Moscow. If
so, they should ask some tough questions of the Clinton Administration, and be prepared
for some disappointing answers.

Regrettably, there is an equally ominous list associated with
Russian foreign policy priorities and
attendant financial outlays. Among these priorities are: the political sheltering of Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction programs and a reported commitment to provide a multi-billion dollar credit
line to bolster Baghdad’s oil production as soon as UN sanctions are lifted; the transfer of
sensitive ballistic missile technology and components to Iran as well as providing at least two
nuclear reactors to Tehran; a concerted effort to destabilize the Western-oriented, secular Muslim
states in the oil-rich Caspian Sea region (i.e. Azerbaijan and Turkey); and monopolize regional
pipeline routes (notably, through Georgia); the fostering of a crisis on Cyprus with the scheduled
November delivery of S-300 missiles to the Greek Cypriots; and efforts to disrupt U.S. and
NATO responses to the crisis in Kosovo.

Moreover, in recent months the Kremlin has renewed its commitment to complete an
irretrievably-flawed nuclear reactor complex in Juragua, Cuba, and continued its large-scale
sharing of military technology and intelligence with China. Unfortunately, these and other
malevolent Russian actions (e.g., supplying military equipment to North Korea and fueling
tensions on the Indian sub-continent and the Middle East) are threatening American interests as
well as geopolitical stability throughout the world. How is it that the insidious portfolio of
Yevgeni Primakov goes almost completely unchallenged at a moment of unique Western financial
leverage? Clearly, this must change when Congress reconvenes.

The Gazprom Bond Precedent: A Case Study

For those who doubt that national security issues are impacting on the global capital markets
as
never before, consider what befell the huge Russian natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, in the
United States in October and November of last year. Put simply, in the summer of 1997,
Gazprom came under withering pressure to pay as much as $4 billion in tax arrearages to the
Russian government in order that it might, in turn, pay back wages to miners, pensioners and
other workers. This action left Gazprom in a liquidity bind that they sought to remedy by
concluding two major international financings in the November time-frame. The first was a
syndicated loan collateralized by natural gas receivables (primarily those of Gaz de France and
Germany’s Rhurgas) and the second was a $3 billion bond offering in the U.S. market.

In the immediate window of the bond offering, Gazprom signed on as 30% shareholder in a
consortium configured by the French oil company Total to develop Iran’s South Pars offshore gas
fields. This action was judged to be in violation of U.S. law under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
(ILSA). The Senate Banking Committee subsequently convened hearings on this subject on 30
October 1997 and a Senate Banking subcommittee held companion hearings on November 5.
Gazprom was confronted with the withdrawal of a roughly $750 million U.S. ExImbank credit
line to facilitate U.S. equipment supplies, among other penalties.

What the company did not count on, however, was a blistering critique of its intention to go
forward in the U.S. bond market with a $3 billion-plus offering. The level of security-related
concerns expressed by members of the Senate Banking, Foreign Affairs and Intelligence
Committees — combined with some deterioration in market conditions — were sufficient to cause
the withdrawal of the Gazprom bond, even though its activities in the private U.S. capital markets
were not covered by the statute.

While there are many who argue that Gazprom and its lead U.S. investment bank were solely
reacting to adverse market conditions catalyzed by the Asian financial crisis, the facts prove
otherwise. In short, Gazprom desperately needed those funds and was not stepping back to await
more favorable borrowing terms and conditions. Indeed, when it became apparent that
U.S.
congressional opposition to the bond offering was serious, Gazprom abandoned the bond
issue and increased significantly the amount of its more expensive collateralized syndicated
loan in Europe which was being readied for market at the same time as the U.S. bond
offering. Coincidentally, the ultimate amount of this eight-year syndicated loan brought
to
market on 4 November 1997 was $3 billion. A managing director of a major commercial bank
who followed these transactions closely termed the congressional hearings of 30 October 1997 on
the ILSA legislation ” the coup de grâce” for the Gazprom bond.

To my knowledge, this was the first major foreign bond offering in the private U.S. capital
markets ever derailed by primarily U.S. national security considerations. As such, it is an
immensely important precedent in demonstrating that foreign governments and enterprises cannot
expect to enjoy completely unfettered access to the U.S. capital markets when engaged in
activities harmful to U.S. security interests.

Conclusion

It is highly unlikely that the two-year $22.6 billion Russian rescue package will be sufficient to
restore investor confidence, allow the implementation of requisite radical reform measures or to
restructure the maturities of the country’s large remaining short-term debt (roughly $28.5 billion
of which is coming due by the end of this year). In part, this pessimistic prediction
ispredicated
on the continued unwillingness of the IMF and G-7 leaders to press Moscow to reallocate the
multibillion-dollar sums currently earmarked for strategic modernization programs and Mr.
Primakov’s aggressive, global foreign policy initiatives.

Accordingly, the Congress must begin immediately to scrutinize Russia’s hard currency cash
flow
— that is, all sources and uses of cash — as well as its activities on the U.S. debt and
equity
markets — on a routine basis. It should be recalled that U.S. taxpayers are still being
penalized
for undisciplined, imprudent Western lending practices with regard to the former Soviet
Union which resulted in roughly $100 billion disappearing into long-term debt
reschedulings concluded over the past five years in the London and Paris Clubs. Under
these circumstances, continuing to neglect to integrate relevant national security considerations
into provisions of future funding measures for Russia and the IMF would be unwise and
counterproductive.

Finally, U.S. and other Western financial policy-makers — as well as private
investors and
lenders — should include existing and emerging national security issues in their future due
diligence and creditworthiness evaluations, despite their seeming antipathy for this
potentially
“disruptive” portfolio of concerns. Past efforts to construct a firewall between global finance and
national security are no longer sustainable or desirable. For example, the current push by the U.S.
business community on Capitol Hill to eviscerate economic sanctions as a policy response to
dangerous geopolitical behavior on the part of foreign governments (or their surrogates) in the
name of market stability and “engagement” is misguided and irresponsible.

Borrowers like Russia and China will continue to take actions which periodically endanger
American interests and those of our allies. When they do, the American people, the Congress and
the media will demand a swift and credible U.S. reaction which will, more often than not, disrupt
trade flows and the markets more than would have been the case if national security concerns had
been taken into account at the outset. In short, no firewall can hold up against the
advent of
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems, not
to mention other security-related challenges of the 21^st century. Regrettably, the
costs of
denying this reality have been high — and are rising.

— End of Excerpts —

Be wary of bailing out the IMF

July 27, 1998Center for Security Policy

By Steve Forbes
Washington Times, 27 July 1998

When a doctor is guilty of malpractice, you don’t let patients’ worsening conditions justify
renewing the doctor’s license and raising his pay. Yet that is exactly what the Clinton
administration wants Congress to do with the International Monetary Fund: shovel over more
money ($18 billion to be exact) to the agency that helped instigate and deepen the very crisis the
White House is using as the chief justification for our ponying up more money. Rarely in modern
times is an agency to be so richly rewarded for such lethal incompetence.

The Republican Congress should not let itself be stampeded. At the very least, if Congress
votes the money, it should attach substantive conditions. It has an obligation to ask basic
questions: What is this money being used for? Are American taxpayers being asked to bailout
sophisticated lenders? Are we subsidizing disastrous policies that are beginning to hurt even the
mighty U.S.?

The administration and the IMF urged Thailand last year to devalue the bhat. When the
Thais
took this poisonous prescription, the Asia contagion began. The IMF routinely advises nations to
devalue. Trouble is, when markets realize a country won’t defend its currency, everyone heads for
the exits. We should have learned from the experience of Weimar, Germany, in the early 1920’s,
what happens when a currency collapses. Internally you get a rip-roaring inflation, which is what
is unfolding in Indonesia, South Korea and elsewhere. With a sudden, major inflation, workers
wake up and find their wages effectively cut in half or more and their savings destroyed; otherwise
solvent businesses are bankrupted and unemployment rises; political and ethnic tensions rise; and
trade patterns are distorted. In Indonesia, the collapse led to murderous pogroms against the
Chinese minority. Incredibly, in several countries, the IMF also advocated doing away with fuel
and food subsidies, just at the time when millions of people could no longer afford the necessities
of life. The IMF also pushes for tax increases which is like telling a pneumonia patient to sit in
the snow without a coat.

The Asia debacle not surprisingly has led to speculative currency attacks against Latin
American countries such as Brazil. To prevent an Indonesian-like disaster, Brazil and others are
being forced to tighten monetary policy. No wonder Russia, already in deep trouble, finds itself
under new assault. These countries face a terrible choice: defending their currencies will lead to
recessions; not defending them will lead to depressions.

The IMF’s supreme arrogance and recklessness came when it kiboshed Indonesia’s attempt
to
establish a currency board several months ago. The currency board concept has worked
wonderfully in Hong Kong, enabling that city to preserve its currency during the crisis. But it has
also worked well with once-troubled nations such as Estonia, Argentina and Bulgaria. When
Indonesia announced that it was considering a currency board, overnight the rupiah jumped 30
percent in value.

Like the proverbial Bourbons who remembered everything and learned nothing, the IMF
remains haughtily unhumbled by these disasters. In Russia, it did urge the Kremlin to defend the
ruble but it is still beating President Yeltsin and company over the head to “improve” tax
collections. If Moscow actually did collect all the taxes owed under its utterly convoluted “code”,
the government would be owed more money than the entire national income! Despite recent
blustering that it is cracking down on tax evaders, the Kremlin pretty much leaves alone
Mafia-controlled businesses and instead harasses and crushes honest entrepreneurs.

Why can’t the U.S. and IMF suggest tax simplification a la Hong Kong which has a
variation
of the flat tax? Sadly we know the answer: They couldn’t do it for American domestic political
reasons. Most of that money for Russia will end up in overseas bank accounts of Russian Mafiosi
and their allies. Russia will continue to deteriorate. The Kremlin shows no sign of real reform.

The latest Russian bailout also underscores another deplorable IMF practice — propping up
favored political leaders and routinely undercutting others. Indonesia’s Suharto was considered by
U.S. Treasury Department and IMF pooh-bahs to be unacceptable. The screws were tightened
until he was ousted.

The question is what should Congress do? There are four basic principles of economic
progress: sound money, low taxes, the rule of law (especially for property rights and commercial
contracts) and non-bureaucratic interference in setting up and running businesses. Simple,
time-tested concepts. Yet the U.S. and IMF witch doctors routinely violate them and practice
economic medicine around the globe.

A panic stricken Congress should not sign a blank check. Instead it should escrow that $18
billion until those four principles are translated into actual prescriptions for stricken nations. Thus
instead of devaluations, the IMF would now recommend Hong Kong-style currency boards.

In addition our national legislators should demand true transparency for this agency. Who
in
our Treasury Department and in that agency did what and when before the Asian crisis exploded a
year ago this summer?

Given the IMF penchant for higher taxes, Congress should stipulate that from now on IMF
employees, particularly Americans, should not be reimbursed for all the taxes they are liable for on
their incomes. Incredibly, the IMF routinely pays those people any money its people owe in
income taxes on their salaries. Why should these witch doctors be, in effect, given tax-free
incomes?

Finally Congress should force the IMF to practice the principle of being responsible for
one’s
own behavior. In other words, IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus and Executive
Director Stanley Fisher should be asked to pursue new career opportunities. Also, by the way,
should Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers who has also been a prime orchestrator of this
bloody debacle.

While Congress is at it, it should pass a resolution urging troubled Japan to do what Ronald
Reagan did nearly 20 years ago when America was suffering from malaise: wide, deep and
permanent tax cuts; deregulation and a more stable monetary policy.

Here at home the Federal Reserve should be advised to recognize that the dollar is an
international currency and therefore our central bank should cease its increasingly deflationary
monetary policies. Real, short-term interest rates are at extra high levels. As usual, farmers first
feel the brunt of a monetary deflation because commodity prices plummet.

This is no time for Congress to abdicate its responsibilities.

Steve Forbes is editor-in-chief of Forbes magazine and honorary chairman of
Americans for
Hope, Growth and Opportunity.

Clinton Legacy Watch # 28: ‘Peace In Our Time’ With China

July 6, 1998Frank Gaffney, Jr.

(Washington, D.C.): Sixty years ago in September, the leader of the free world returned from
a
visit to the homeland of a potential adversary. Neville Chamberlain gushed about his ability to
work with Adolph Hitler. He promised his people “peace in our time.” And in a turn of phrase
more important for its metaphorical import than its literal meaning, he urged those who
enthusiastically welcomed him back from his Munich meeting with the Fuhrer to “go home and
get a nice quiet sleep.” History may well treat Bill Clinton’s 1998 trip to Communist
China
with the same contempt as is now reserved for Prime Minister Chamberlain’s catastrophic
diplomatic mission to the Third Reich in 1938.

A Bill of Particulars

While there are, to be sure, differences — most notably, the President’s televised, if tempered,
comments about the benefits of democracy — consider a few of the eerie parallels:

Hyping Sitzagreements: The most palpable similarity is the
placebo agreement reached by
the President and his hosts to de-target ballistic missiles aimed at each others’ nations. As was
true of Hitler’s promise at Munich to confine himself to gobbling up Czechoslovakia’s
Sudetenland, this commitment is of no strategic value. We cannot verify that the Chinese have
stopped pointing at us the thirteen-or-so ICBMs which U.S. intelligence believes are targeted
against American cities. Even if they were actually to do so, within a few seconds — or, at
most, a few minutes — the original coordinates could be re-entered.

The effect of this accord, however, will — like the deal with Hitler that Chamberlain
represented as “peace for our time” — be to encourage Western publics to “get a nice
quiet sleep,” by discounting an emerging danger.⁽¹⁾ Like
their British counterparts two
generations before, Americans today want desperately to believe that conflict can be
avoided with Communist China. Nothing makes the people of democracies happier
than the soporific assurances of their leaders that no threats exist. They understandably
welcome representations to the effect that sacrifice will not be needed to transform a
potential foe into a reliable “strategic partner.” Unfortunately, this is rarely the case
and does not seem to be so in this instance.

Abandoning a Fellow Democracy: In China, President Clinton effectively
abandoned
Taiwan in much the same way that Chamberlain in Germany turned his back on democratic
Czechoslovakia. While experts debate whether the formulation he used went beyond the
rhetoric of appeasement of Beijing dating back to the 1972 Shanghai Communique, the
practical effect was unmistakable: The United States will support the hegemonism of the
Communists on the mainland over the aspirations for self-determination of the people of
Taiwan.

The Clinton Administration is now in the absurd, not to say strategically inane, position
of signaling its willingness to see an entity without appreciable territory or resources
become a Palestinian state, despite the considerable threat such an entity will
pose to
a valued democratic ally, Israel. At the same time, the Administration is denying
Taiwan — a democratic nation in all but name, which enjoys both territory and
considerable resources (indeed, it has some of the largest hard currency reserves of
any country in the world) — the right to be recognized as an independent sovereign
state, in deference to the largest despotism on the planet.

Legitimating a Despot: The President went to considerable lengths to
legitimate Jiang
Zemin, in much the same way as the Prime Minister in 1938 felt obliged to invest in Hitler a
stature that went beyond the requirements of diplomatic politesse. One could almost hear
echoes of Chamberlain’s enthusiasm for the man who was modernizing Germany while acting
as his partner in avoiding war as Mr. Clinton gushed that Jiang is “imaginative,” “an
extraordinary intellect,” a man of “very high energy” and the “right leadership at the right time”
for China.

Undermining Alliance Relationships: In a manner reminiscent of
Chamberlain’s disregard
for his French allies in the run-up to Munich, President Clinton has exacerbated the strategic
problem posed by China’s rising influence in Asia through his stiff-arming of America’s
regional allies: Japan, South Korea and the Philippines — to say nothing of Taiwan. Madeleine
Albright’s banal post-facto assurances that U.S.-PRC relations will not be improved at the
latters’ expense are unconvincing. In any event, they are unlikely to dissuade American friends
in the Pacific Rim from seeking to reach their own accommodations with the ascendant
dictatorial power. If history is any guide, and it generally is, such accommodations will only
serve to make conflict more likely.

Buying Time for the Dictators: Finally, with his equivalent of the “Good
Housekeeping Seal
of Approval” on Communist China, Mr. Clinton has (like Chamberlain before him) bought time
for a potentially fatal disease to metastasize. According to the President, there is no need to
rethink the wisdom of transferring U.S. and other Western dual-use technology to
China’s military; we need not worry about the policy of allowing the People’s
Liberation
Army access to America’s capital markets (where it is raising inexpensive, undisciplined
funds for its ambitious modernization program); and since he believes the biggest threat we
face from the PRC is an environmental one, we can safely allow the further “hollowing
out”
of our own military⁽²⁾ — even as theirs becomes
better able to conduct devastating, if
“asymmetric,” attacks against U.S. forces and infrastructure. The contrary is true in each
case.

The Bottom Line

In short, chances are that President Clinton’s trip will be seen historically for what it was: an
exercise in appeasement. Jiang Zemin may be no Hitler (any more than he is a visionary
democratizer), but the government he leads has the potential to be every bit as dangerous a
problem for the Western democracies as was the Third Reich, if not considerably more so.

Should this potential be actualized, Mr. Clinton’s conduct — both while paying court abroad
as
well as while policy-making at home — is likely to be held substantially responsible for the tragedy
to come, in much the same way as his British counterpart’s behavior continues to be six decades
after the fact.

– 30 –

1. For more on President Clinton’s deliberate effort to mislead the
American people about the
missile threat, see the op.ed. article by J. Michael Waller published in today’s
Washington Times entitled “No nukes pointed this way? Think again.”

2. The splendid “Inside the Ring” column in today’s Washington
Times reports that a powerful
briefing entitled “Averting the Defense Train Wreck” prepared by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies’ Dan Gouré and Jeffrey Ranney is making the rounds of Pentagon
leaders to
generally favorable reviews. This study adds further urgency to the warning issued to President
Clinton in a private letter sent last week by Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott. According to
news reports, Sen. Lott offered a “flat-out condemnation” of the current state of the U.S. military.
See in this connection Clinton Legacy Watch # 22: More Evidence of a Hollow
Military (No.
98-D 62, 7 April 1998) and Clinton Legacy Watch # 17: Dangers of a ‘Hollow
Military’ (No.
98-D 23, 5 February 1998).

Summary of The William J. Casey Institute of the Center for Security Policy’s Symposia on Vital U.S. Security Interests in Cuba

May 7, 1998Center for Security Policy

Coral Gables and West Palm Beach, Florida
12 and 13 March 1998

In the wake of Pope John Paul II’s historic visit to Communist Cuba, the Center for Security
Policy’s William J. Casey Institute held two informative and exceedingly timely Symposia in south
Florida. The purpose: to discuss vital U.S. security interests in Cuba and to explore policy
prescriptions for normalizing relations with the Castro regime that are now being advanced with
increasing insistence.

The Casey Institute Symposia held on 12 and 13 March 1998 in Coral Gables and West Palm
Beach, respectively, however, offered powerful reasons why such recommendations
should be
rejected, lest Castro’s regime secure a new lease on life in political, economic and
moral
terms — and the abiding threats to the U.S. posed by that regime be actualized.

Between the Coral Gables event, held at the historic Biltmore Hotel, and the Symposium in
West
Palm Beach’s Governors Club the following day, roughly 150 people participated including: a
leading Member of Congress, Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL);
several former
senior American policy-makers; defectors and other refugees from Castro’s Cuba; representatives
of the Coast Guard in Miami and U.S. Southern Command; and a number of leading national and
local journalists.⁽¹⁾ (See the attached Lists of Participants
from Coral Gables and West Palm
Beach.)

The following pages summarize many of the important insights regarding the threats that
continue
to be posed by Castro’s totalitarian regime — threats to his own people, to their neighbors in the
United States and to other vital American interests. Where possible, edited versions of direct,
albeit unattributed, quotes from participants are provided; the passages not in quotation marks
paraphrase key points made during the Symposia.

While no effort was made to formalize a consensus, the clear sentiment of most of those
participating in these events was that, under present circumstances, were the United States to
liberalize trade or otherwise begin to normalize bilateral relations, the effect would be to:
legitimate Castro’s historic enmity toward this country; provide economic life support to his
government; and abandon those seeking its removal from power in favor of a democratic and
peaceable government subject to the rule of law.

The Nuclear Reactor Complex Abuilding at Juragua, Cuba

One of the most serious, if for the moment latent, threats posed by Cuba today
arises from
recently resumed construction of two Soviet-era nuclear reactors at Juragua, near the city of
Cienfuegos, Cuba. A discussion of the near-certainty that these reactors will, if allowed to be
brought on-line, result in nuclear accidents was led in both of the Symposia by the holder of the
William J. Casey Chair, Roger W. Robinson, Jr. Mr. Robinson served as
Senior Director of
International Economic Affairs at the National Security Council under President Reagan, and is
one of the pre-eminent American critics of Castro’s nuclear program. Importantly, his warnings
about the dangers posed by a potential Chernobyl-style catastrophe 180 miles upwind from the
U.S. mainland were endorsed by Pelayo Calante, a Cuban engineer who
worked on quality
control and assurance aspects of the Juragua complex for seven years prior to his defection.
Among the highlights of this section of the Casey Symposia were the following:

The Juragua Complex’s Fatal Flaws

Some of the reasons why this reactor complex is a Chernobyl-like disaster off our shores,
ready to
happen if it is completed and fueled, include the following:

“It is estimated on the part of defectors from Cuba who were actively working on the plant
itself in their nuclear industry that 60 percent of the Soviet/Russian-supplied materials
used
thus far in construction are defective. Even more disturbing, the critical welds
in the
cooling systems and other vital systems, of which there are at least 5,000 in the auxiliary
pumping units alone, it is estimated that some 15 percent of those wells are also
defective, due to a host of reasons.”

“Those defects became evident on x-rays that the Cubans themselves conducted, but
according
to these defectors, Cuban intelligence destroyed those x-rays, erased all of the
serial
numbers where they were placed in order to insure that the International Atomic Energy
Agency and other regulators that would come into the picture on the safety side, would have
no clue as to where they are and where repairs are needed.”

one defective weld in the United States takes down a
nuclear reactor

“In addition, the reactor dome cannot withstand anywhere near the over-pressures
that
would be involved in a nuclear accident of the meltdown variety like Three Mile Island.
There are many technical considerations here, but just to give you orders of magnitude, we
require 50 pounds- per-square-inch safeguards against these over-pressures. Cuba has built in
seven percent. That is obviously flawed on the face of it.”

“The Soviet VVER 440 reactor design is the same nuclear reactor of which there were four
in
East Germany. All were closed within days of the reunification of Germany, because of their
inherent dangers and flaws. NBC News reported that one of those reactors was near
meltdown at the time it was closed. In Bulgaria and Slovakia, the same reactor design had to
be shut instantly because obviously, it cannot hope to meet standard operating procedures as
we know them in the West.”

“The status of the nuclear facilities in Cuba are very poor. Conservation of the
nuclear
reactor and the other facilities is very bad.“

“The other thing is, that the training for the nuclear reactor operation was very
poor.
Much of it was done in Russia in a facility that was not similar to the nuclear reactor in Cuba.”

“When the construction was stopped in 1992, the reactor base and the other equipment were
exposed to the sea air, and corrosion is continuing in these reactors. And in the case if we put
this reactor now together with the other facility, the probability that there will be an
accident is almost 100 percent.“

For these and other technical reasons, this reactor complex cannot be repaired.
It would
have to be razed to the ground and started over with a Western design and, of course,
world-class safety standards in place.

Why Is Fidel Proceeding With This Dangerous Scheme?

“[The bottom line is that] this complex is absolutely required if Cuba is going to
make up
some 15 to 20 percent electricity shortfall on the island — a shortfall that must be
overcome
if Castro is to realize his hopes for new, direct foreign investment from our Canadian and West
European friends, as well as certain countries in Latin America. Obviously, you cannot expand
a tourism industry or build a robust mining industry if experiencing brown-outs and black-outs
several hours a day, which is the case today.”

“New life-support has been offered the Juragua reactor complex [which] began construction
in
1982. For a time, it moved along at a very brisk pace, with Cuba and Russia investing
some
$1.2 billion in that complex. To give you a sense of the scale of this
investment, remember
that Cuba’s total hard currency income today totals $1.7 billion. You get a sense why
the
Castro regime, not to mention Moscow, would be loathe to walk away from that gigantic
project.”

The Russians are anxious to sell nuclear reactors to others around the world. It is not
conducive to such sales to show themselves unable to bring on-line two of their power
plants.

Russia is releasing to Cuba a $350 million line of credit

“There are other reasons why Castro would proceed with this project despite the dangers.
It
is…a very potent distraction for the United States, a Cuban missile crisis without the
missiles.”

“What does it say about a government that would willfully proceed with a program that
would
just be a catastrophe for its own people? I suggest to you that, that indifference to the
welfare of the Cuban people is one of the greatest indictments against the Castro regime
and one of the reasons why we feel very strongly that there can be no deals with Castro.
There can be no life support extended to Castro. There can be no perpetuation — at least, at
our hands — of this regime and the tyranny that it entails.”

What is at Stake?

“Consider the findings of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, which
has done elaborate mapping in terms of what would happen if a radioactive plume emanated
from an accident in Cuba — an event that the General Accounting Office states
is a question
of when, not if:

the
summer east to west trade winds would carry radioactive pollutants over all
Florida and portions of Gulf States as far west as Texas in about four days.

could move the pollutants toward the east, possibly as
far north as Virginia and Washington, D.C. in about four days.

“In case of an accident, a nuclear accident and the people were irradiated, the Cuban
government will not make this public.”

What Can Be Done About the Cuban Nuclear Threat?

“Some urge us to negotiate with Castro to allow inspectors — U.S. inspectors and United
Nations inspectors and Organization of American States inspectors — to monitor whatever is
being done there until the facility is functioning. Will we accept that deal? My short
answer
is, “No deals.” This reactor complex cannot be made safe by any infusions of technical
support out of the United States or efforts in the safety categories from the United Nations.
That is a function of technical and construction-related reasons and reasons of design.”

We are not going
to be extorted by that kind of nuclear terror.

“In the next 90 days the Congress is going to be acting upon approximately $1
billion in
U.S. taxpayer aid flows to Russia. And I don’t think we had in mind that money being
sluiced to create a Chernobyl-like disaster 180 miles upwind from the American mainland.
We
need to make it clear to Moscow that, all 350 million of those dollars are coming off of
the $1 billion that they are seeking from U. S. taxpayers in the next 60 to 90 days on
Capitol Hill. One thing we can certainly do in this gathering is to come away with a new
conviction that that is simply not on. Moscow is not going to have it both ways.”

“I recommended that we impose or threaten import controls against any Western
supplier for the reactor scheme — France, Germany, Italy, Brazil and even the U.K. have
all
expressed interest in playing the role of suppliers. The bottom line is, that a choice has
to be
made. It’s going to be the Cuban market or the American market. But it can’t and
shouldn’t be both.”

“We have had naval blockades and the like before when our country was in clear
and
present danger of a nuclear threat from Cuba. I suggest to you, we are facing that clear
and present danger today.“

warn Moscow that they are not to fuel that
reactor

— prior
to that reactor being fueled and becoming a ‘dirty,’ as they say in the trade,
radioactive site — it’s F-117 time.

⁽²⁾

Status of Cuba’s Armed Forces

At both Symposia, Commander James McKenzie of the U.S. Coast Guard
led discussions of
the status and readiness of the Cuban military. In addition, several members of the U.S. Southern
Command participated in the 12 March session. While making clear the decline in the size and
readiness of Castro’s military, this discussion offered a more nuanced assessment of its residual
potential for trouble-making than some other recent estimates. href=”#N_3_”>⁽³⁾ Among its highlights were the
following:

Castro’s Unchanged Military Philosophy

“Looking at the philosophy of the Cuban armed forces over the past 38 years, one can see
that
Castro has repeatedly vowed that if the U.S. dares attack Cuba, that his military and supporters
would be ready to wage a scorched earth campaign. According to this strategy, the military [is
expected] to fight a highly mobile and sophisticated defensive war that takes advantage of the
island’s geography. Any type of invasion would be met with resistance from all of the people,
again, a war of all the people — which Castro has frequently referred to — with the
result being
a bitter, costly, timely and deadly engagement. This wartime consciousness that Castro has
built among the people forces them to always be ready to repulse any aggression or violation
of Cuban sovereignty.”

“Castro has been for a long time trying to convince the military that the end of the
regime is the end of the armed forces. The end of the regime means that, many of the
officers will go to prison or will be executed or that kind of thing.”

“The philosophy and the doctrine that Fidel Castro has established, has been
practiced
for over 38 years and he has not backed away from it in the least bit.“

The Cuban Military’s Reduced Condition

“Cuban armed forces currently numbers around 150,000. That includes 75,000 conscripts.
Another 35,000 reserves receive instruction and training. So, you have a total of about
285,000 active duty and reservists. The armed forces budget for the Cuban armed forces totals
somewhere between $325 and $600 million, depending on what source you look at.”

“What that translates into is, limited food supplies for soldiers and sailors — which we have
seen as the military now grows a large percentage, if not all, of their food supply. We see
extremely limited fuel and lubricants and spare parts for equipment. That places an even
greater pressure on the need for hard currency.”

training and actual operations are limited to an as-necessary
basis.

“Lack of maintenance of their railways, lack of maintenance for the major
highways, the
major seaports falling into disrepair result in widespread deterioration and reduced
readiness to support a major military campaign.“

The Future of the Cuban Military

“The threat that returns with any improvement in the economy is a return of
economic
resources to the military budget and with that, an increased threat to the U.S. and the
regional neighbors in the Caribbean.“

“I think it’s important for the United States and for others to try to get information into
Cuba,
because if one looks at the role of the military and other transitions to democracy, whether in
Chile or in Spain or in Central America or in Poland, the military play a very important role in
the transition. They open the door to the negotiated settlements with the Church and with
other elements in civil society to permit a transition that is not bloody and one in which most of
the military remain in place.”

The Threat Posed by Russian/Cuban Electronic Espionage Operations in
Cuba

The Symposia also examined the danger posed by the massive Russian and Cuban
signals-intelligence facilities in the vicinity of Lourdes, Cuba. This huge
electronic-eavesdropping
complex involves some 28 square miles of radio dishes used to intercept telecommunications
throughout the Eastern United States — including the fax, e-mail and telephone transmissions of
U.S. businesses and government agencies alike. The following were among the most important
points made about the offensive character of such activities:

“All of our private conversations can be swept up by these sophisticated computer systems
at
Lourdes …. In 1996, an $85 million upgrade of Lourdes took place because of the
post-Soviet
degradation of Moscow’s overhead intelligence collection systems — affecting both their
imaging and eavesdropping capabilities — that has made the Russians increasingly
dependent on the Lourdes facility.“

“Our most secret battle plans for the Gulf War — including the ‘Hail Mary pass’ that
ultimately outflanked Saddam Hussein’s forces — had all been picked up by the Lourdes
facility and communicated to Moscow. They could have been passed on to Saddam
Hussein
by the man who was then Russia’s foreign intelligence chief, and is now its foreign minister, a
notorious thug by the name of Yevgeny Primakov.”

“Today, we have our men and women on the ground in the Persian Gulf and on our carriers
poised for attack if necessary to address another Saddam-induced crisis and remember, their
lines of communication are being monitored by Lourdes. Incredibly, the Clinton
Administration actually calls the Russian operation there ‘helpful’ since it allegedly
advances the verification of arms control agreements.” href=”#N_4_”>⁽⁴⁾

Following the Casey Symposia, the Miami Herald reported that the most
senior defector
from Soviet/Russian military intelligence, Col. Stanislav Lunev confirmed the extent to which
Lourdes collection assets permitted the penetration of even secret U.S. military communications
during Operation Desert Storm. Additional concerns have also been raised recently about the
inherent capacity of these assets to engage in information warfare attacks against the United
States.⁽⁵⁾

Castro’s Continuing Contribution to International Instability

The Cuban regime no longer enjoys the multi-billion dollar annual subsidies from Moscow
that
once enabled it to serve as the USSR’s Foreign Legion in Africa and Latin America and as a
proxy for the Kremlin in the subversion of democratic and other, pro-Western governments
throughout the Western Hemisphere. Participants in the Casey Symposia, however, noted that
Castro has, to some degree, offset this diminished revenue stream by allowing Cuba to be used as
a staging area for narco-trafficking under the protection and with the assistance of the Cuban
military. Several made reference to evidence that Castro was still involved in this Hemisphere’s
leftist insurgencies, as well as its drug cartels.

In this connection, one of the most influential Members of Congress with respect to U.S.
policy
toward Cuba, Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, supplied a copy of an 18 November 1996 letter he and
two other congressional leaders on U.S.-Cuban issues — Reps. Dan Burton
(R-IN) and Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) — sent to Gen. Barry McCaffrey, President
Clinton’s Director of the
Office of Drug Control Policy. It states, in part:

Overwhelming evidence [including a number of cases cited in the letter] points
to ongoing involvement of the Castro dictatorship in narco-trafficking.

Another participant said: “Smuggling, drug trade, money laundering,
including
laundering through non-traceable capital market transactions and shady deals through
third countries produced the bulk of Castro’s financial muscle to support his repressive
apparatus.“

Two other observations from the Symposia bear mentioning in this connection:

“[In early March,] Castro-inspired leftist guerrillas inflicted heavy casualties on the army of
Colombia in order to derail the elections in that country.”

“The cultural violence continues to flow from Castro’s terrorist niche into Latin America and
the United States.”

Castro’s Capacity for Biological Warfare

At the West Palm Beach Symposium, Rep. Diaz-Balart challenged the notion that a so-called
“small and insignificant” island like Cuba could — under a ruthless dictator like Fidel Castro —
pose a threat to the United States. He expressed particular concern about Cuba’s suspected
biological weapons (BW) program. Particularly noteworthy was the following intervention by
Rep. Diaz-Balart:

existence of a cover up on the
biological weapons reality.

there is not to be made public any possible concern that could
affect the national security of the American people from Castro’s Cuba.
That is a policy of the Clinton Administration.

Other participants noted that the Castro regime certainly has the potential to field
fearsome
biological weapons. The technology involved is very well understood worldwide. And people,
like the Cubans, with long-standing relations with the Kremlin — which has acknowledged
maintaining an illegal BW program during the Cold War (and is suspected of continuing to do so)
— certainly had access to both the necessary technology and know-how to produce and deploy
biological weapons.⁽⁶⁾

Castro’s Brutal Tyranny

Critical perspective on the persistent malevolence of the Castro regime was provided by a
number
of participants in the two Casey Symposia who had personal experience with Fidel’s totalitarian
rule. Among these was José Basulto, President of Brothers to the
Rescue, who led an
impassioned discussion in the course of the 12 May meeting. Some of the highlights of the
relevant portions of both days’ proceedings include:

The Character of the Castro Regime

“[Since he came to power,] Castro has ruled by the reason of force, in place of the
force of
reason.“

“Repression in Cuba is state terrorism. It is perhaps the worst violation
of human rights,
physical and mental torture institutionalized since the very inception of the tyranny, to attempt
to uproot Cubans from their culture and beliefs and convert them into robots. Its objective is
to control the minds and souls of citizens and condition their behavior to act within the
parameters of the official doctrine, continuously re-interpreted and even contradicted by the
state to serve its own purposes.”

The Character of ‘Support’ for Castro’s Regime

“The people of South America or Latin America in general support the aspirations
of the
Cuban people. They know what it was like to live under Pinochet or under the
Argentinian
generals. They understand that the Cubans, like the Haitians, would also like to have some
basic human rights.”

The Latin American governments use
Cuba
as a political ploy to show their independence of the United States.

It should be noted, in addition, that at least some governments in the region are prompted to
lend support to Castro by their perception that his regime remains capable of supporting
subversive elements within their countries — in other words, a sort of protection
racket is
operating in Cuba today.

“More people have voted for [Reps.] Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for Lincoln Diaz-Balart and for
Bob Menendez (D-NJ) in the last 40 years than have had the opportunity to
vote in Cuba for
anybody, because in Cuba, there are no real elections. In Cuba, there are no
candidates.
In Cuba, there’s no media.“

“Lamentably the moral problem of Cuba can be traced down to one issue, and that is
the lack
of legitimacy of the Cuban regime. There is a crisis of legitimacy in Cuba. Leaders
must
have authority to govern; Castro has power but not authority or legitimacy.”

only one remaining source of legitimacy
and
that is the undeniable, unquestionable charismatic nature of Fidel Castro.

“The Cuban people feel abandoned and betrayed by the Free World,
which for the past
39 years has basically sided with the oppressor by overlooking the suffering and the abuses
committed against the entire nation. This has significantly contributed to enhance and
perpetuate the tyrant’s capacity for repression.”

“[In response to a question about why people who are facing the sort of repression meted
out
by Castro’s regime do not] take matters into their own hands — particularly when they have, in
theory, at least, some base of support within the military — is, of course, not an issue narrowly
confined to Cuba. We’re seeing very much the same question arise in connection, for example,
with Iraq.”

One simply cannot underestimate effectiveness of a totalitarian regime in
suppressing dissent

psychologically

physically

but very little opportunity in practice

The Effects and Future of the Embargo

One of the liveliest topics of discussion during the Symposia concerned the U.S. economic
sanctions on Fidel’s Cuba. With an unequaled pool of experience in attendance at each of the
Symposia — including: Roberto Weill, founder and President of La Universidad
Latinoamericana
de la Libertad Friedrich Hayek; Frank Calzon, Director of the Center for Free
Cuba;
Ambassador José Sorzano, former Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
and U.S. Representative to the United Nations — the conversation offered a wealth of insights
into the value of the embargo today and the implications for U.S. interests should it be weakened
or eliminated while Castro remains in power. Highlights included the following:

“The explanation of Cuba’s woes is idiotically simple. ‘It’s socialism,
stupid.’ The
socialists obviously blame the U.S. embargo. It is an infantile alibi, not consistent with
socialism’s record of systemic poverty generation.”

over $100 billion

The World Bank reported in 1996 that Cuba’s GDP per capita was
$61, the lowest in the world, compared to $400 in 1959.

down to the level of Haiti

Cuba in 1959, by Latin American standards, was a
prosperous society, with a GDP of $2.6 billion versus $880 million in 1998.

“After 1959, Castro stole 161 sugar mills. Of these, 35 were owned by American
companies.
In the late 1950s, they were producing between six and seven million tons of raw sugar
annually, a ton per Cuban inhabitant. Today, double the population, Cuba hardly produces
three to four million tons per year.”

“One of the arguments that have touched the hearts of many people is the idea that sanctions
are responsible for the lack of medicine of Cuban children. If that were the case, I would be
the first to be knocking on Senators doors to make a change in the law. That is simply not
true. It is the kind of disinformation that many of us are familiar with from the Soviet Union in
the 1950s and 1960s.”

Cuba has a sizeable industry, what they call health tourism.

lack of medicine is a result of Castro’s policies, not the result of
the American embargo.

“Often a question asked is whether the embargo should be lifted and they try to force the
Cuban-Americans or anybody else to say ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ I think that the question should be,
under what conditions should the embargo be lifted, for what purpose, under what
kinds of plans.“

“Economic sanctions are, in fact, a weapon of mass destruction. We tend to adopt them
because we prefer to punish a great many people who are not responsible for the policies we
don’t like, rather than deal with the person or relatively small numbers of people who are.”

“If we could say that an American business could go to Cuba and function in Cuba as if you
were in Costa Rica or in Madrid, I would agree. That is not what Castro wants to do
and
that is not what he is suggesting.“

In the absence of Castro accepting something else, then all you are doing is
providing hard currency for a government that has demonstrated that,
whenever they have hard currency, they have used a big part of it to
promote anti-American interests around the world.

“The investment that we have been making, nominally in our interest, has not
transformed the
political systems in countries which whom we have been ‘engaging.’ You can argue about
how much it has changed the economic system in China, but it certainly has not created the
liberty, the freedoms to say nothing of democratic institutions that have often been promised as
the inexorable result of engagement — if only capitalism is allowed to work.”

even if some small subset of America were to benefit economically
from this sort of investment, I really believe that it will not translate into, on net,
a positive result for the country as a whole. It certainly is not going to help the
people of Cuba.

“[When] America’s friends…vote consistently against the United States, it seems to me, that
on
those issues, the White House has not placed an adequate priority. If Washington is dealing
with Country X and there are seven or eight issues involved, they might decide that, well, the
Cuba issue is not that important as long as the other government goes along on other matters.
It is not that the U.S. does not have any influence. It is that sometimes American
governments either don’t have the political will to exercise it or it is a question of
priorities.“

“Fidel Castro wants to lift the embargo because he wants to be able to re-energize his
legitimacy …. If the United States were to officially scrap its embargo, what arguments
would the U.S. representatives to the World Bank, to the IMF, and the Inter-American
Development Bank use in order to exclude Cuba from those multilateral lending and
granting institutions?“

The Need for Surrogate Broadcasting to Cuba

One of the most promising ways of counteracting Castro’s tyranny would be to redouble
efforts
to counter his determination to control popular access to news and information. This can best be
accomplished by enhancing surrogate broadcasting service to the people of Cuba. In recent years,
the value of such broadcasting to countering repressive regimes has earned increasing attention
and political support in Washington — both with respect to the contribution made by Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty to promoting freedom in their respective listening areas and the hope
that a similar contribution might now be made by Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Iran and a Radio
Free Iraq.

In this regard, the 12 May Symposium benefitted from remarks by Herminio San
Román,
Director of Radio/TV Marti. Mr. San Román discussed the systematic repression of
independent
sources of news and information by the Castro regime and the role being played by his surrogate
broadcasting units, both in countering the Cuban government’s propaganda and disinformation
and in creating an essential building block for the transition to functioning democracy. In the
latter regard, he noted that — even where Castro’s determination to deny his people access to
Radio/TV Marti’s broadcasts — these services are making a contribution by preparing an
experienced team of journalists and broadcasters for the day when their services will be needed by
a Free Cuba.

Conclusion

As the foregoing summary makes clear, the Casey Symposia established that the United States
does indeed have vital interests in Cuba. The conversation over the two days demonstrated that
the American government minimizes the abiding threat from Castro’s regime — to say nothing of
giving that regime a new lease on life through normalization of economic and/or diplomatic
relations — at its peril.

— End of Summary —

1. Portions of the Symposia were broadcast into Cuba by Radio/TV
Marti — the vital surrogate
broadcasting operation that is, as was made clear by its Director in the course of the first day’s
discussion, serving a unique purpose in providing the sort of news and other programming in
Spanish that is denied the Cuban people by their government.

2. The first step toward preparing such an option may have been
signaled in a letter dated 6 May
from Secretary of Defense William Cohen to Senator Strom Thurmond formally transmitting the
DIA estimate of the Cuban threat. It read, in part: “I remain concerned about…the
environmental health risks posed to the United States by potential accidents at the Juragua
nuclear power facility.“

3. For more on such low-ball estimates, see the critique of retired
Commander-in-Chief Atlantic
Command Gen. John Sheehan’s comments on the subject contained in the Casey Institute’s
Perspective entitled Castro’s Cuba: A Classic ‘Asymmetric’
Threat (No. 98-C 59, 3 April
1998).

4. To his credit, Secretary of Defense Cohen did, in his recent letter
to Sen. Thurmond
transmitting the DIA intelligence report on Cuba, write that: “I remain concerned about the use
of Cuba as a base for intelligence activities directed against the United States.”

5. See No Apologies To Castro: Politicized Pentagon
Study Misses Abiding Nature of Threat
From Cuba, Promotes Wrong Response (No. 98-C
54, 30 March 1998).

6. In his 6 May transmittal letter to the Congress, Secretary Cohen
wrote: “I remain concerned
about Cuba’s potential to develop and produce biological agents, given its biotechnology
infrastructure.”

Clinton Legacy Watch # 22: More Evidence of A Hollow Military ⁽¹⁾

April 7, 1998Center for Security Policy

(Washington, D.C.): Yesterday’s Washington Times published a
chilling snapshot of the
deplorable — and worsening — condition of elements of five of the U.S. Army’s 10 divisions. The
data cited from a recent General Accounting Office study by Ernest Blazar, editor of the
newspaper’s valuable “Inside the Ring” feature (see the attached)
should be grounds for urgent
corrective action even if they prove to be unrepresentative of wider trends throughout the Army
or the military more generally. If, on the other hand, these data offer an accurate picture
of
the overall condition of the armed forces, nothing less than an effort comparable to recent
congressional action on the highway bill may be in order to restore the military to its
required levels of combat readiness.

In the Danger Zone

The GAO report presented to a 20 March hearing of the House National Security Committee
revealed that significant numbers of units are seriously undermanned. For example:

“Col. William B. Caldwell, who commands the 1st Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division,
confirmed for Congress that one-third of his infantry squads and all his anti-tank units are
unmanned. There are three brigades like Col. Caldwell’s in a division.”

“Within the 1st Infantry Division’s 2nd brigade, located in Germany, 21 of its 48 infantry
squads had no personnel assigned. From the remaining 27 squads, the brigade sent five
squads’ worth of soldiers outside their jobs to do maintenance, supply or office work. That
means instead of having 48 squads with nine soldiers, or 432 troops, the brigade instead has
only 22 squads with seven soldiers each, totaling 154 infantrymen.”

“At the [1st Armored] division’s 3rd brigade, only 16 of the unit’s 116 MI1A1 tanks had full,
four-man crews qualified to meet their wartime tasks. In one of that brigade’s two armor
battalions, 14 of 58 tanks had no crew members assigned because all were deployed to
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the division’s German-based engineer brigade, 11 of its 24
bridge-building teams had no personnel assigned.”

Scarcely less worrisome than the shortfalls in personnel in these combat units is the fact
that
the Army is experiencing serious undermanning of non-commissioned officer
positions. As
one commanding officer put it: “We are in danger of becoming an ‘Army of Privates.'” Such an
Army is unlikely to be able to fight — let alone prevail in — the Nation’s future wars.

The Bottom Line

The concluding paragraphs of Mr. Blazar’s column should be a wake-up call for those
responsible
for assuring that America’s military is prepared to provide, as the Constitution requires, for the
“common defense”:

“That means things may get worse, not better.”

– 30 –

1. See two previous Center Decision Briefs in the
“Clinton Legacy Watch” Series: # 2: The
Re-Emergence of a Hollow U.S. Military (No.
97-D 105, 25 July 1997) and # 17: Dangers of a
‘Hollow Military’ (No. 98-D 23, 5 February 1998).

Army of privates

April 7, 1998Center for Security Policy

By Ernest Blazar
The Washington Times, 06 April 1998

The Army’s got big problems, Congress’ investigatory arm found in a recent study.

The General Accounting Office looked at five of the Army’s 10 divisions that would deploy
in
a second wave to an overseas war.

These divisions – the 1st Armored, the 1st Infantry, the 4th Infantry, the 10th Infantry and
the
25th Infantry – are kept at a slightly lower level of readiness than the Army’s first five divisions,
which form the Army’s quick-deployment force.

This second batch of five Army divisions is key to fighting and winning the second of two
nearly simultaneous wars. Even considering their planned lower level of readiness, the five
divisions’ actual shortages are alarming. The GAO report was delivered to Congress during a
March 20 hearing of the House National Security Committee.

Many of GAO’s findings were backed by testimony from Army officers and soldiers.

The study and testimony suggests that, if not reversed, half of the active duty Army may go
hollow.

Among the examples:

10th “Mountain” Infantry Division – Only 138 of 168 infantry squads in this division were
fully
or minimally filled, investigators found. Of those, 36 of the filled squads were not qualified to
execute their wartime tasks, investigators found. An infantry squad is supposed to have nine
or 10 soldiers, but many have only four or five.

Col. William B. Caldwell, who commands the 1st Brigade of the 10th Infantry
Division,
confirmed for Congress that one-third of his infantry squads and all his anti-tank units are
unmanned. There are three brigades like Col. Caldwell’s in a division.

25th Infantry Division – In the 2nd and 3rd brigades of this division, 52 of 162 infantry
squads
were “minimally filled or had no personnel assigned,” the GAO report found.

1st Infantry Division – The division’s 1st brigade had only 56 percent of the infantrymen it
needs to fill its Bradley armored vehicles. Overall, the brigade’s top enlisted soldier, Command
Sgt. Maj. Michael L. Gravens, calls his unit’s overall strength “satisfactory.” But he told
Congress recently that not having enough soldiers with the right training “clearly takes a toll on
our readiness.”

Within the 1st Infantry Division’s 2nd brigade, located in Germany, 21 of its 48 infantry
squads had no personnel assigned. From the remaining 27 squads, the brigade sent five squads’
worth of soldiers outside their jobs to do maintenance, supply or office work. That means instead
of having 48 squads with nine soldiers, or 432 troops, the brigade instead has only 22 squads with
seven soldiers each, totaling 154 infantrymen. Moreover, the brigade suffers from a shortage of
226 noncommissioned officers, 17 percent below what the unit requires.

NCOs are the senior enlisted soldiers that make up the Army’s backbone. Most of the
Army’s
enlisted shortage is in the rank of sergeant, the first-line supervisor for junior troops.

1st Armored Division – At the division’s 3rd brigade, only 16 of the unit’s 116 MI1A1 tanks
had full, four-man crews qualified to meet their wartime tasks. In one of that brigade’s two
armor battalions, 14 of 58 tanks had no crew members assigned because all were deployed to
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the division’s German-based engineer brigade, 11 of its 24
bridge-building teams had no personnel assigned.

4th Infantry Division – No fewer than 13 of 54 squads in this division’s engineer brigade had
either no personnel assigned or fewer personnel assigned than required.

Col. Edwin W. Chamberlain III, a fourth-generation professional soldier who
commands
this division’s 3rd brigade at Fort Carlson in Colorado, told Congress there are problems.

“We are already seeing a trend in the brigade … recently where we have a shortage of
NCOs
and an abundance of privates,” he testified March 20, referring to the junior-most enlisted
soldiers.

That is a dangerous sign.

“The adverse readiness impact, should this trend continue, will be real on the battlefield and
will be evidenced by higher casualties due to a lack of junior leader experience. We saw this
happen at the beginning of the Korean War, and near the end of the Vietnam War,” he said,
relying on the memories of his father and grandfather who served the Army before him.

“We are in danger of becoming an ‘Army of Privates’ in the line units.”

When GAO investigators compared what they found in these five Army divisions against
official Army readiness reports, they found that in many cases, Army officers overstated their
units’ readiness.

In one example, an engineer battalion commander told investigators “his unit had lost the
ability
to provide sustained engineer support to [his] division.” That reflected what the GAO suspected
because all company and battalion-level training had recently been canceled for four months and
because the unit had only between 33 percent and 55 percent of its positions filled.

Nevertheless, the commanders rated his battalion ready to go to war if given only 20 days
to
train his troops. “This does not seem realistic,” the GAO reported, “given the shortages we
noted. We found similar disconnects between readiness conditions as reported … and actual unit
conditions at other armor, infantry and support units.”

The Army is trying to fix these problems.

Acting Army Secretary Robert M. Walker acknowledged to Congress on March 26 that
“we
face readiness challenges.” But as for infantry shortages, he said, “We have been able to begin
turning that around … We are refilling those squads today.”

But he may be swimming against the tide.

The Pentagon’s plan today is not to spend more money on units like these five Army
divisions.
It’s to squeeze more money – more than $10 billion – from them over the next four years to buy
new, high-technology planes, radar, computers and helicopters.

That means things may get worse, not better.

Clinton Legacy Watch # 19: Will Gore-Chernomyrdin At Last Put a Halt to Russia’s Dangerous Nuclear Sales to Cuba, Iran?

March 6, 1998Center for Security Policy

(Washington, D.C.): Next week, the United States will host the tenth in a series of secret
meetings in which high-level representatives of the U.S. and Russian governments strive to find
ways to advance the bilateral relationship. All too often, these meetings of what has
come to
be called the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) after its two principals, Vice
President
Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, have proven to be forums for
the
United States to paper over real differences with and otherwise make concessions to
Moscow. The American delegation must use this session to break the mold — by
insisting that
the Kremlin halt activities that pose real threats to U.S. interests and/or
citizens: Russia’s
dangerous nuclear cooperation with Cuba and Iran.

The Russians Breathe New Life Into a Nuclear Nightmare in
Cuba

Such an agenda has become all the more essential within recent days. In the wake of bilateral
meetings last month between Cuban and Russian government and non-government officials, (the
appropriately titled) Russian Minister of Emergency Situation, Sergey Shoygu, announced:
“Russia has decided to extend the $350 million line of credit opened by Moscow in 1994
to
finance the supplies of Russian materials and equipment to Cuba for the construction
and
overhaul of 12 highly important installations.”⁽¹⁾

Most notable among these installations is the partially completed nuclear power
complex at
Juragua, near Cienfuegos, Cuba — 180 miles upwind from the U.S. mainland. Moscow
and
Havana launched this ambitious two-reactor venture in 1982 using designs (the obsolescent
VVER-440), equipment and financing provided by the former Soviet Union and a predominantly
Cuban workforce to perform the construction.

In 1992, following the collapse of the USSR — and the attendant disruption in the Kremlin’s
ability to underwrite such dubious, colonial ventures — Castro announced that this project was
being suspended. As the Center for Security Policy predicted at the time, this was merely a stay
of execution for the millions of Americans downwind from the Juragua reactors href=”#N_2_”>⁽²⁾: Fidel simply
had too much invested (nearly the equivalent of one year of Cuba’s total hard currency
income)
and too much riding (in terms of personal prestige and future economic
viability) on completion
of this high visibility program not to insist that one (or both) of these power plants be
brought on-line eventually, despite the inherent flaws that virtually assure they will suffer
catastrophic failures.

The magnitude of this danger has been confirmed by, among others: congressional
committees;
the General Accounting Office; defectors who previously were responsible for the so-called
“quality control” program and other aspects of the Juragua construction; and American nuclear
and national security experts.⁽³⁾ They have identified the
following as among the most ominous of
these reactors’ irremediable flaws:

Sixty percent of the Soviet-supplied materials used in these reactors are
defective. Soviet
advisors reportedly told Cuban officials they could not guarantee that valves installed in the
reactor’s emergency cooling system would function under certain conditions.

Much of the reactor’s equipment — including the reactor vessel, six steam
generators, five
primary coolant pumps, twelve isolation valves and other sensitive gear — was left
exposed to
the elements and sea air after the project was discontinued — a total of some five years
at
this writing.

In a number of cases, equipment designed for one specific function has been used
for
other purposes when the appropriate components were unavailable. This sort of
jury-rigging
increases the chances of systemic failures.

Construction supporting primary reactor components contains numerous
structural
defects.

The first reactor’s dome would not be able to contain overpressures associated
with
meltdown conditions. The upper portion of the containment dome has been designed to
withstand pressures of seven pounds-per-square-inch — versus some 50 pounds-per-square-inch
required of U.S. reactors.

As many as fifteen percent of the 5,000 welds in the reactor’s auxiliary plumbing
system,
containment dome and spent fuel-cooling system are known to be flawed. According to
Vladimir Cervera, the senior engineer responsible for overseeing quality control at the Juragua
reactor, X-rays showed welded pipe joints weakened by air pockets, bad soldering and heat
damage. Bear in mind that, if a single weld in a U.S. reactor were suspected
of being
defective, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would suspend its operations.

Cuba’s human and technological infrastructure is inadequate to build and operate
this
nuclear facility.

Even if there were no construction problems, the Juragua reactors’ design would be a serious
liability. According to an April 1992 report by the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness ,
“The
VVER design is very different [from Western counterparts] and does not meet Western
safety standards.” In fact, the German government was so concerned about the four
VVER-440 reactors it inherited from East Germany that it shut them down within days of
reunification. None too soon, according to NBC News, as one of these same reactors was
perilously close to a “meltdown.”⁽⁴⁾

Taken together, these defects make it impossible to create safe
nuclear power plants out
of the partially constructed Juragua facilities. No amount of sophisticated Western
instrumentation, know-how or training — let alone that available from Russia — will rectify
deficiencies that can, as a practical matter, only be corrected by razing the site and starting afresh.

A Mortal Threat to the U.S. Mainland

Should one or more of these defects cause a failure of the cooling system in a
Juragua
reactor, there would likely be a nuclear meltdown and release of substantial quantities of
radioactive pollution. Such fallout would not be confined to Cuba. Indeed, according
to a
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency analysis href=”#N_5_”>⁽⁵⁾:

east-to-west trade winds would carry radioactive pollutants over all Florida and
portions of Gulf states as far west as Texas in about four days. In winter, when
trade-winds are weaker and less persistent, pollutants would encounter strong
westerly winds that could move the pollutants toward the east, possibly as far
north as Virginia and Washington, D.C., in about four days.

Damage to human life would be further exacerbated by the pollution of many thousands
of
square miles of rich ocean fishing grounds in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.
Immediate
steps must be taken to assure that such a catastrophe never occurs.

Exit Mikhailov, Enter Adamov

A further impetus for Vice President Gore to use the upcoming GCC meeting to demand that
Russia stop helping Cuba pose this nuclear threat to the United States should be the announced
choice for a successor to Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov — Yevgeny
Adamov. In his previous capacity as head of the Research & Design Institute of Power
Engineering, Adamov was best known for being the main designer of the RBMK power reactor
that failed catastrophically in Chernobyl in April 1986. He has spent much of the succeeding
years explaining away that human and environmental disaster and arguing against shutting down
sister reactors before the end of their design life.

As the trade publication Nucleonics Week reported in its 30 July 1992 edition:

The stronger Adamov’s position, the longer those reactors
will stay on line and pose a safety threat

Meanwhile, Back in Iran

If the Cuban nuclear time-bomb were not bad enough, the Russian government is pressing
forward with its assistance to Iran’s nuclear program. On 22 February, the Washington
Post
reported, “Russia has decided to expand its role in building a controversial nuclear power station
in Iran, despite objections from the United States and Israel that the technology could be
useful
in creating a nuclear weapons program.” (Emphasis added.)

The renewed effort is the continuation of a 1995, $780 million deal to finish a nuclear reactor
in
Bushehr, Iran which was started back in 1974 with German assistance. Recent press reports and
statements by high-level Russian MINATOM officials, including Mikhailov, indicate that the
project is running behind schedule and its completion was in jeopardy. This latest infusion of
capital and, more importantly, scientific expertise represents a concerted effort on the part of the
Russians to push ahead and finish the reactor. “Iran is not able to cope with its share of the
work,” Mikhailov told a news conference when announcing the expanded Russian role. “In order
to meet the deadline Russia should take charge of everything, and the Iranian side has agreed to
this.”

As the New York Times reported yesterday, there is reason to believe that
Adamov will happily
follow Mikhailov’s lead:

Mr. Adamov, 58, a nuclear engineer, went to Teheran last month with Viktor
N.
Mikhailov, the minister who was ousted Monday, to meet with Iranian officials.

“His abrupt removal on Monday raised hopes that Russia’s aggressive nuclear
marketing might end. But the selection of Mr. Adamov is widely seen as an
indication that Mr. Mikhailov’s spirit will live on.” (Emphasis added.)

The Bottom Line

Vice President Gore is on the record as believing that the Bushehr reactor project to be a
vehicle
for Iran to acquire materiel and know-how needed to realize its ambitions to become a nuclear
weapons state. For example, on 23 September 1997, Mr. Gore declared, “…It is obvious
that
there is a vigorous effort by Iran to obtain the technologies that it needs to build a ballistic
missile and to build nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear weapons in the hands of a state-sponsor of terrorism, like the prospect of a
Chernobyl-in-
the-making upwind from millions of Americans, are questions of vital American
interests. If
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin is determined to press forward with these projects, Vice President
Gore must present him with a stark choice: Russia can do business with Iran and Cuba
or it
can do business with — and receive assistance from — the United States, but not
both.
Failure to do so now will make the Vice President complicit in the tragedies sure to ensue from
Russia’s reckless nuclear cooperation with America’s adversaries.

– 30 –

1. It is interesting that Russia is somehow able to extend
multi-hundred million-dollar lines of
credit to Cuba at the same time it is desperately seeking new cash infusions from the IMF and
other Western sources.

2. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled
Castro’s Potemkin Nuclear Shutdown: Chernobyl
at Cienfuegos Still in Prospect (No. 92-D
108, 10 September 1992).

3. For example, see: Report to the Chairman, Concerns about
the Nuclear Power Reactors in
Cuba (GAO/RCED-92-262), September 1992, prepared for the Subcommittee on Nuclear
Regulation, Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate; testimony before the
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, Concerns about the Nuclear Power Reactors in Cuba
(GAO/RCED-95-236, 1
August 1995); statement by Richard J. K. Stratford, Director of Nuclear Energy Affairs, U.S.
Department of State before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on
International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 1 August 1995; and testimony by the
former Senior Director of International Economic Affairs at the National Security Council, Roger
W. Robinson, Jr., before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, “Cuba and the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant,” 1 August 1995.

4. NBC Nightly News, 29 May 1991.

5. Transport and Dispersion for a Potential Accidental Release
of Radioactive Pollutants From
the Nuclear Reactor at Cienfuegos, Cuba, Jerome L. Heffter and Barbara J. B. Stunder,
NOAA,
Air Resources Laboratory (August 1992)

Saddam’s Lessons In Arms Control

March 4, 1998Center for Security Policy

By Fred C. Ikl&eacute
Wall Street Journal, 04 March 1998

Let us admit fairly, as a business people should,
We have had no end of a lesson: it will do us no end of good.
Not on a single issue, or in one direction or twain,
But conclusively, comprehensively, and several times again. . . .
–Rudyard Kipling

Those who seek to promote international arms-control regimes have much to learn from the
continuing crisis in Iraq. The Iraqi lessons are more fundamental and more troubling than the
hoary “lesson of Munich” for which Neville Chamberlain continues to be blamed. Chamberlain
tried to avert or postpone a war with Nazi Germany for which England and France were ill
prepared, hoping perhaps that Hitler would attack the Soviet Union first, or that the West might
gain time to rearm and contain Germany. Whatever can be said with the benefit of hindsight,
Chamberlain’s thinking at Munich was not totally unreasonable. But much of today’s thinking on
international arms control is totally unreasonable–especially the legalistic American approach that
dominates world diplomacy. We can now say so based on abundant evidence, thanks to Saddam
Hussein’s many object lessons.

Lack of Penalties

That no violation goes punished under international arms-control regimes is a lesson that
Saddam
has patiently tried to teach us for a long time. In the 1980s, he used his chemical weapons in the
war that he had started against Iran. There was no lack of verification and there could be no
shadow of doubt that this act had violated one of the oldest arms-control treaties, to which Iraq
was also a party–the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which even Hitler did not violate. Instead of
imposing a severe penalty, the world “community” averted its gaze from the incontrovertible
evidence, those photographs of gruesomely injured Iranian soldiers. Despite this atrocity, the U.S.
even stepped up its technology transfers to Saddam.

Evidently, the world had not learned the lesson, so the great teacher Saddam patiently tried
again.
He used poison gas to rub human rights violations into the skin and eyes of Iraq’s own people, all
there in the open, for the international media to film and to smell. The great teacher thought this
would make it plain that the real problem with international arms treaties was not a lack of
verification but a total lack of penalties once violations have been detected.

To no avail. The world “community” chose not to learn the lesson. Instead, the arms-control
professionals did what they do best–they held a conference. In January 1989, after all the
photographs of gassed Iranian soldiers and Kurds had been filed in the chanceries of the
enlightened nations, the world’s diplomats gathered in Paris and resolutely resolved to negotiate
another treaty that would prohibit chemical weapons. Blithely they ignored the fact that the use of
chemical weapons had been prohibited since 1925, yet Iraq had just used them. Aye, but this
time
it will be different; our new treaty will set up an elaborate international verification system,
the
assembled could be heard to declare. Not a single one of the diplomats present had the courage to
stand up and shout: The emperor has no clothes! We have verified Iraq’s use of poison gas
and
don’t need more verification. We need to punish those violations.

After the Gulf War, the great teacher prepared an even more demonstrative lesson. He kept
asserting that Iraq no longer had any of the prohibited weapons until, one day, his son-in-law
defected and began to reveal facts to the contrary. Then suddenly, Saddam called the world
community’s bluff: He admitted he had lied, he let United Nations inspectors seize and destroy
some of his chemical weapons (having sworn before that he had kept none)–and he suffered no
penalty. The U.N. inspectors bravely continued looking for the prohibited weapons that Iraq again
maintained did not exist. Thus the great teacher had demonstrated once more that, verification or
not, no arms-control violation goes punished.

Knowing that repetition is the mother of learning, Saddam again tried to teach this lesson.
During
the past few months he has demonstrated that international weapons inspectors can be denied all
access for a long period of time and then–as a gesture of peacefulness–be readmitted in exchange
for a big reward. The reward Iraq now has been encouraged to expect is the lifting of the oil
export embargo, which was meant to force Iraq not only to give access to U.N. inspectors but
also to comply with other important provisions of the cease-fire agreement that ended the Gulf
War.

This lesson was meant to teach us how a violator can come out ahead by blocking
international
inspections he is treaty-bound to allow. Put simply, it is as if the violator stole a whole loaf, kept
us agonizing for a while, and then gave us back half a loaf provided we give him five new loaves.
Had we been attentive we could have learned about this gambit earlier, from North Korea.

In 1993 Pyongyang refused to allow international inspectors access to its nuclear waste sites,
in
clear violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it had signed. After some huffing and
puffing the Clinton administration agreed to deliver the five loaves in exchange for getting back
half a loaf. That is to say, it undertook to donate to North Korea two large plutonium-producing
reactors (pressuring Japan and South Korea to foot most of the bill) plus give Pyongyang half a
million tons of fuel oil each year. In exchange, North Korea agreed to stop running its smaller
reactor and promised to allow the previously blocked international inspections, but only at some
time in the future.

Saddam also taught us another important arms-control lesson: that “impartial” international
verification cannot work. International inspection schemes put cops and robbers on the same team
and often give them access to the same sensitive data. These arms-control schemes distinguish
between parties and nonparties, not between law-abiding countries and rogue countries. The
International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitors compliance with the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, used to employ Iraqis in sensitive positions. According to the agreed
rules, citizens from all member states are supposed to act as international civil servants. Thus, an
Iraqi must not take instructions from Baghdad. Yet, after the Gulf War it was discovered that
these “international civil servants” misused what they had learned at the lAEA to teach their
fellow Iraqis how to outwit the lAEA inspections.

Any small-town detective would think it ridiculous that he should team up with a bunch of
narcotics dealers to ferret out illegal drug sales. Yet, astonishingly, this elementary wisdom has
not yet penetrated the American and European bureaucracies that keep churning out lengthy
international arms-control treaties. The nuclear test ban, which the Clinton administration wants
the Senate to ratify, is to be verified by such an “impartial” internationally staffed organization.
Iranian or Chinese seismologists working within it are supposed to be as objective and impartial
as, say, an Australian seismologist.

Rogues’ Tutor

President Clinton has also announced that he wants to “strengthen” the existing treaty
prohibiting
biological weapons “with an international inspection system to help detect and deter cheating.”
Anyone with any experience in these areas has to admit that biological weapons can be so easily
concealed that a dictatorship intent on hiding them could not be found out. However, the
international verification system will not only be incapable of catching determined violators, it will
also tutor the participating officials from rogue nations in how better to conceal their violations
and, as part of their international tour of duty, let them in on the latest ideas for making more
lethal biological weapons.

Thank you, Saddam Hussein, for you imparted to us no end of a lesson. It is cause for deep
sadness that we are incapable of learning what you so diligently taught us.

Mr. Iklé, undersecretary of defense in the Reagan administration, is with the
Center for Strategic
and International Studies.

Open Letter to the President

February 24, 1998Center for Security Policy

Committee for Peace and Security in the
Gulf

1615 L Street, N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20036

19 February 1998

Dear Mr. President,

Many of us were involved in organizing the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf in
1990
to support President Bush’s policy of expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Seven years later,
Saddam Hussein is still in power in Baghdad. And despite his defeat in the Gulf War, continuing
sanctions, and the determined effort of UN inspectors to fetter out and destroy his weapons of
mass destruction, Saddam Hussein has been able to develop biological and chemical munitions.
To underscore the threat posed by these deadly devices, the Secretaries of State and Defense have
said that these weapons could be used against our own people. And you have said that this issue
is about “the challenges of the 21st Century.”

Iraq’s position is unacceptable. While Iraq is not unique in possessing these weapons, it is the
only country which has used them — not just against its enemies, but its own people as well. We
must assume that Saddam is prepared to use them again. This poses a danger to our friends, our
allies, and to our nation.

It is clear that this danger cannot be eliminated as long as our objective is simply
“containment,”
and the means of achieving it are limited to sanctions and exhortations. As the crisis of recent
weeks has demonstrated, these static policies are bound to erode, opening the way to Saddam’s
eventual return to a position of power and influence in the region. Only a determined program to
change the regime in Baghdad will bring the Iraqi crisis to a satisfactory conclusion.

For years, the United States has tried to remove Saddam by encouraging coups and internal
conspiracies. These attempts have all failed. Saddam is more wily, brutal and conspiratorial than
any likely conspiracy the United States might mobilize against him. Saddam must be
overpowered; he will not be brought down by a coup d’etat. But Saddam has an Achilles’ heel:
lacking popular support, he rules by terror. The same brutality which makes it unlikely that any
coups or conspiracies can succeed, makes him hated by his own people and the rank and file of his
military. Iraq today is ripe for a broad-based insurrection. We must exploit this opportunity.

Saddam’s long record of treaty violations, deception, and violence shows that diplomacy and
arms
control will not constrain him. In the absence of a broader strategy, even extensive air strikes
would be ineffective in dealing with Saddam and eliminating the threat his regime poses. We
believe that the problem is not only the specifics of Saddam’s actions, but the continued existence
of the regime itself.

What is needed now is a comprehensive political and military strategy for bringing down
Saddam
and his regime. It will not be easy — and the course of action we favor is not without its problems
and perils. But we believe the vital national interests of our country require the United States to:

Recognize a provisional government of Iraq based on the principles and leaders of the
Iraqi National Congress (INC) that is representative of all the peoples of Iraq.
Restore and enhance the safe haven in northern Iraq to allow the provisional government
to extend its authority there and establish a zone in southern Iraq from which Saddam’s
ground forces would also be excluded.
Lift sanctions in liberated areas. Sanctions are instruments of war against Saddam’s
regime, but they should be quickly lifted on those who have freed themselves from it.
Also, the oil resources and products of the liberated areas should help fund the provisional
government’s insurrection and humanitarian relief for the people of liberated Iraq.
Release frozen Iraqi assets — which amount to $1.6 billion in the United States and Britain
alone — to the control of the provisional government to fund its insurrection. This could
be done gradually and so long as the provisional government continues to promote a
democratic Iraq.
Facilitate broadcasts from U.S. transmitters immediately and establish a Radio Free
Iraq.
Help expand liberated areas of Iraq by assisting the provisional government’s offensive
against Saddam Hussein’s regime logistically and through other means.
Remove any vestiges of Saddam’s claim to “legitimacy” by, among other things, bringing
a war crimes indictment against the dictator and his lieutenants and challenging Saddam’s
credentials to fill the Iraqi seat at the United Nations.
Launch a systematic air campaign against the pillars of his power — the Republican Guard
divisions which prop him up and the military infrastructure that sustains him.
Position U.S. ground force equipment in the region so that, as a last resort, we have the
capacity to protect and assist the anti-Saddam forces in the northern and southern parts of
Iraq.

Once you make it unambiguously clear that we are serious about eliminating the threat posed
by
Saddam, and are not just engaged in tactical bombing attacks unrelated to a larger strategy
designed to topple the regime, we believe that such countries as Kuwait, Turkey and Saudi
Arabia, whose cooperation would be important for the implementation of this strategy, will give
us the political and logistical support to succeed.

In the present climate in Washington, some may misunderstand and misinterpret strong
American
action against Iraq as having ulterior political motives. We believe, on the contrary, that strong
American action against Saddam is overwhelmingly in the national interest, that it must be
supported, and that it must succeed. Saddam must not become the beneficiary of an American
domestic political controversy.

We are confident that were you to launch an initiative along these line, the Congress and the
country would see it as a timely and justifiable response to Iraq’s continued intransigence. We
urge you to provide the leadership necessary to save ourselves and the world from the scourge of
Saddam and the weapons of mass destruction that he refuses to relinquish.

Sincerely,

Hon. Stephen Solarz
Former Member, Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representatives

Hon. Richard Perle
Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute;
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense

Hon. Elliot Abrams
President, Ethics & Public Policy Center;
Former Assistant Secretary of State

Richard V. Allen
Former National Security Advisor

Hon. Richard Armitage
President, Armitage Associates, L.C.;
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense

Jeffrey T. Bergner
President, Bergner, Bockorny, Clough & Brain;
Former Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Hon. John Bolton
Senior Vice President, American Enterprise Institute;
Former Assistant Secretary of State

Stephen Bryen
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Hon. Richard Burt
Chairman, IEP Advisors, Inc.;
Former U.S. Ambassador to Germany;
Former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Hon. Frank Carlucci
Former Secretary of Defense

Hon. Judge William Clark
Former National Security Advisor

Paula J. Dobriansky
Vice President, Director of Washington Office, Council on Foreign Relations;
Former Member, National Security Council

Doug Feith
Managing Attorney, Feith & Zell P.C.;
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy

Frank Gaffney
Director, Center for Security Policy;
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces

Jeffrey Gedmin
Executive Director, New Atlantic Initiative;
Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Hon. Fred C. Ikle
Former Undersecretary of Defense

Robert Kagan
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Zalmay M. Khalilzad
Director, Strategy and Doctrine, RAND Corporation

Sven F. Kraemer
Former Director of Arms Control, National Security Council

William Kristol
Editor, The Weekly Standard

Michael Ledeen
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute;
Former Special Advisor to the Secretary of State

Bernard Lewis
Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern and Ottoman Studies, Princeton University

R. Admiral Frederick L. Lewis
U.S. Navy, Retired

Maj. Gen. Jarvis Lynch
U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

Hon. Robert C. McFarlane
Former National Security Advisor

Joshua Muravchik
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute

Robert A. Pastor
Former Special Assistant to President Carter for Inter-American Affairs

Martin Peretz
Editor-in-Chief, The New Republic

Roger Robinson
Former Senior Director of International Economic Affairs, National Security Council

Peter Rodman
Director of National Security Programs, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom;
Former Director, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State

Hon. Peter Rosenblatt
Former Ambassador to the Trust Territories of the Pacific

Hon. Donald Rumsfeld
Former Secretary of Defense

Gary Schmitt
Executive Director, Project for the New American Century;
Former Executive Director, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Max Singer
President, The Potomac Organization;
Former President, The Hudson Institute

Hon. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution;
Former Counsellor, U.S. Department of State

Hon. Caspar Weinberger
Former Secretary of Defense

Leon Wienseltier
Literary Editor, The New Republic

Hon. Paul Wolfowitz
Dean, Johns Hopkins SAIS;
Former Undersecretary of Defense

David Wurmser
Director, Middle East Program, AEI;
Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Dov S. Zakheim
Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense

Organization affiliations given for identification
purposes only. Views reflected in the letter are endorsed by the
individual, not the institution.