Tag Archives: Hugo Chavez

The State Department and Chavez

The Undersecretary of State for Interamerican Affairs, Dr. Thomas Shannon, once again expressed a positive attitude towards President Hugo Chavez by talking about the possibility of strengthening relations between Venezuela and the US. Shannon optimistically offered Chavez cooperation between the two countries on drug-traffic control.

This generous offer came after John Walters, Director of The National Drug Control Policy Office, pointed out that Chavez was becoming a major facilitator of cocaine trafficking to Europe and other parts of the hemisphere. To add to this, former US Ambassador to Colombia, Myles Frechette reported that the US government has clear evidence, based on information provided by radar technology that airplanes loaded with heroine depart from Venezuela to the United States and other parts of the world.  Frechette added that this is a fact and there is no basis to dispute it. Moreover, Frechette added that the US Administration has known about this activity for years.

Interestingly enough, this information came out days after the liberation of the hostages by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) which confirmed the complicity between Hugo Chavez and the FARC. This complicity was made clearer when Chavez appealed to the international community to remove the FARC from the international list of terrorist organizations. It is also a well-known fact that the FARC is linked to drug-trafficking cartels. In addition, Shannon’s statements came days after Chavez denounced Uribe as being a mafia gangster and after accusing Bogotá and Washington of trying to launch a war between Colombia and Venezuela.

As Chavez’s hostility continued, Shannon made a second conciliatory statement by ruling out the possibility that a war between Colombia and Venezuela could ever happen. Moreover, Shannon expressed his desire to get closer to Hugo Chavez and pointed out that the "relationship between Colombia and Venezuela is so deep that they will find a way to offset their differences". This was a curious remark given Chavez’s open hostility to "Plan Colombia" (aimed at combating drug-trafficking) and to President Alvaro Uribe whom Chavez sees as a puppet of the American empire. These statements also came just one day before Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Colombia to garner support for the yet to be ratified free trade agreement between the US and Colombia. One has to wonder what has prompted Mr. Shannon in his now conciliatory stance towards the Venezuelan president.

The undersecretary first offered Chavez cooperation on matters related to drug trafficking when Chavez himself has provided more than enough evidence of his involvement in drug trafficking. Indeed, Chavez has facilitated the trans-shipment of drugs through Venezuelan territory and airports as well as openly supporting commercialization of coca (as in Bolivia where President Evo Morales is a close Chavez ally).

However, this is not the end of Shannon’s poor judgment. He speaks loudly of cooperating with Hugo Chavez and has expressed confidence in the possibility of accommodation with him at the same time when Chavez is suffering political serious setbacks at home.

Chavez’s agenda was defeated in a December 2nd referendum that would have approved a constitutional reform that –among other things-would have virtually given Chavez unlimited powers. The meaning of that defeat is manifold. On the one hand, these elections delivered a leader long awaited by millions of Venezuelans in a political situation where the opposition had been weak and highly ineffective. That leader was General Raul Baduel, a former Secretary of Defense and former Chief of staff of the Venezuelan Armed Forces who not only denounced Chavez’ authoritarian project but also encouraged an intimidated Venezuelan population to vote against Chavez. That defeat generated a momentum that the state department bureaucracy failed to understand. Also, last week political parties and groups from the opposition announced a proposal that would unite all of them in a common front to defeat Chavez in the October 2008 regional and municipal elections.   The object of that unity is to create a democratic alternative to Chavez’s authoritarian rule. The groups and parties that are part of this front include old and new parties, liberal, centrists and socialists. They are all united with the purpose of striking a second electoral blow to Hugo Chavez.

General Baduel has issued a number of statements publicly contradicting Hugo Chavez in a heroic attitude of defiance. First, he stated publicly that the armed forces of Venezuela were confused over the apparent support of Chavez to the FARC and the use of Venezuelan territory by the group. Baduel stated- after meeting with top army officers- that the army understands that the FARC is a guerilla group and as such should not be allowed to operate on Venezuelan territory. Baduel also criticized Chavez’s direct contact with the FARC during the hostage crisis, because the Venezuelan President tried to act on his own by bypassing the authority of the Colombian president. In addition, Late last week Baduel publicly called on the Colombian government to ignore Chavez’s statements, according to which the US and Colombia are trying to cause a war between Venezuela and Colombia. Moreover, Baduel courageously accused Chavez of trying to draw public political support by staging a hypothetical external threat and thus "appealing to a despaired nationalism at a time when the people are beginning to sense an internal crisis".  This was a brave act of public criticism by Baduel which should have elicited another kind of reaction. Instead, Shannon and the State Department bureaucracy totally failed to understand the momentum that the December 2nd referendum generated and thus appeared to be among Chavez’s few friends.

But Chavez has already rejected Shannon’s offers to hold a dialogue, which comes as a slap in the face to the State Department. It seems that the US foreign policy establishment has failed to understand that the Chavez’ regime is oppressing its citizens, its media, its private sector, its constitutional guarantees and its legal system. What is worse the SD has not captured Chavez’s essence as a stubborn ideologist, the opposite of a pragmatist seeking accommodation with the United States. Instead of helping to strengthen the opposition by supporting those who are fighting Chavez’s authoritarianism, the Department of State has betrayed Chavez’s opponents by acting in a most clumsy way.

Indeed, an astonished Colombian journalist questioned Shannon about why is he opening up to Chavez after Chavez asked for international recognition of the FARC. Shannon replied that "there is no evidence that the Venezuelan government has any intentional policy to promote drug and arms –trafficking through the Colombian-Venezuelan border". In fact he said that it is more likely that this was the result of (private) "smuggling". Shannon may have forgotten that the Bolivarian Circles- which are groups created by and loyal to Hugo Chavez- are believed to be involved in activities that allegedly include drug-trafficking as well as blackmailing and kidnapping. Maybe this is the non-governmental activity that Shannon refers to. If this is the case Chavez managed to create an illusion of distinction between him and his loyal followers.

In last week’s Americas Report, John Thomson, who lives in Colombia and has researched this issue carefully, stated that Venezuelan authorities have enabled some 300 hundred tons annually of Colombian cocaine to be shipped for re-export through Venezuela to Europe and the US. This is a highly profitable business for both Chavez and the FARC. The question is why the top person responsible for our Latin American policy at the State Department has managed to misinterpret the facts and by so doing has undermined the Venezuelan opposition and further reduced US credibility in the region.

The State Department and Chavez

The Undersecretary of State for Interamerican Affairs, Dr. Thomas Shannon, curiously expressed a positive attitude towards President Hugo Chavez by talking about the possibility of strengthening relations between Venezuela and the US. Shannon optimistically offered Chavez cooperation between the two countries on drug-traffic control even after John Walters, Director of The National Drug Control Policy Office, pointed out that Chavez was becoming a major facilitator of cocaine trafficking to Europe and other parts of the hemisphere. Shannon’s offer came days after the liberation of the hostages by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) which confirmed the complicity between Hugo Chavez and the FARC. Why the top person responsible for our Latin American policy at the State Department has misinterpreted the facts undermining the Venezuelan opposition and further reducing US credibility in the region.

Main News:

  • Washington rejects Chavez’s accusations of military assault against Venezuela.
  • Bush Calls for Passage of Colombia, Panama Free Trade Agreements.
  • Colombia : President Alvaro Uribe with 80% popularity. Condoleezza Rice to visit Uribe. Uribe calls for investigation into alleged Venezuelan Mayor-FARC links. France asks Colombia for caution regarding siege on the FARC. Massive March In Opposition to the FARC Planned.
  • Venezuela : Baduel rejects belligerent status for FARC. Venezuelan Pleads Guilty in Cover-Up of Suitcase of Cash. Venezuela prevents smuggling of 5,000 tons of food. Pdvsa, govn’t face debt maturities at USD 8 billion. Chávez to visit Russia and Belarus in February or March.
  • Peru rejects Chávez’s and Ortega’s criticisms. Canada and Peru seal free trade deal.
  • Argentina expects Chávez’s financial aid. Venezuelan diplomat accused of illegal car trading in Argentina.
  • Chávez’s proposed ALBA Army rejected in Nicaragua. Venezuelan aid to Nicaragua at USD 385 million.
  • Bolivia investigates missing funds from ALBA.
  • Mexico : Calderón Meets with Top-Level Mexico-France Group.

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For any questions, comments, or those interested in receiving this report in the future or seeking to have their email removed from our list please contact Nicole M. Ferrand at our new e-mail address: themengesproject@centerforsecuritypolicy.org. If you have news stories that you think might be useful for future editions of this report please send them, with a link to the original website, to the same e-mail address. If you wish to contribute with an article, please send it to the same address, with your name and place of work or study.

Chavez to Colombia: the FARC be with you

Uribe is succesfully battling the Chavez-backed FARC. (AP Photo)

In the ongoing saga between Venezuelan despot President Hugo Chavez and Colombian democratic President Alvaro Uribe, Chavez for the moment appears to have the upper hand.   He basks in the glow of – finally – securing the release of two female hostages from the narco-trafficking and kidnapping terrorist FARC [the Spanish abbreviation of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] organization.  However, analysts in Caracas and Bogotá, the countries’ capitals, are betting Chavez has overplayed his hand and that Uribe will prevail not only against his Venezuelan nemesis but also in his war of attrition against Colombia’s guerrilla gangs.

Uribe ended 2007 with the powerful revelation that one reason FARC’s once bruited, oft delayed Christmas release of three hostages had not taken place was that Emmanuel – born in captivity – was in fact already in a Bogotá foster home.  Undoubtedly under great pressure from an embarrassed Chavez, the release of the two ladies, both prominent politicians and one Emmanuel’s mother, ultimately took place the week before last.

The cracks in the Chavez–FARC peace façade are already appearing: less than 72 hours following the two ladies’ release, FARC gunmen kidnapped six others from a beach on Colombia’s Pacific coast. At the same time, Chavez’s plea for FARC and ELN, the two leading guerrilla groups, to no longer be called "terrorists" but belligerent combatants was rejected out of hand, not just in Bogotá and Washington but also by the European Union, indicating how low the once romanticized revolutionary "freedom fighters" have fallen.

Leftist Colombian political figures are separating themselves from Chavez’s attempt to legitimize the FARC.  Carlos Gaviria, head of the far left Polo Democratico party, as well as Senator Gustavo Petro, a Polo Democratico leader and close friend of Chavez, have both deplored the Venezuelan’s call to end the guerrillas’ terrorist designation.

All sides are holding Afro-Colombian Senator Piedad Cordoba accountable for her ardent support of Chavez and, implicitly, the FARC.  A prime factor: several weeks ago, more than five million citizens marched in the streets of the country’s main cities, demanding that the kidnapping stop and those held be released.

The Chavez-FARC alliance is not new.  The FARC has enjoyed safe haven basing rights in the western jungles bordering Colombia for its troops and safe houses in Caracas for its leaders for many years. More recently, Venezuelan authorities have enabled some 300 tons annually of Colombian cocaine through the country for re-export to Europe and the U.S. – a highly profitable arrangement for both FARC and Chavez.

As important, there are strong indications that significant amounts of Russian arms purchased by Venezuela are being transshipped to FARC camps for use in their "liberation movement".

Colombia ‘s Alvaro Uribe seeks to implement a multi-faceted effort to free more hostages and to strengthen his country’s anti-guerrilla position:

  • Surprisingly, Uribe has acquiesced in Hugo Chavez serving as a clearly biased "mediator" in hostage relief efforts.  With more than 700 hostages, results to date are miniscule, but every release or escape is widely welcomed by the Colombian people, whatever the reason.
  • A strong government effort to win over guerrillas has been spectacularly successful, especially with the ELN, the second most powerful terror organization.  Inducements to lay down their arms include cash as well as technical training programs sponsored by America’s Plan Colombia.
  • Simultaneously, Colombian military efforts to eliminate guerrilla leaders and encampments are steadily progressing.
  • Critical to the Colombian strategy is approval by the U.S. Congress of the pending free trade agreement.  To date, Democrats and their labor union allies have offered multiple excuses for holding the agreement hostage [big labor has committed to spending $200 million in support of Democrats during the 2008 election cycle].  In an effort to offset the pull of American labor bosses, Colombia has shown several Congressional delegations the results of the Uribe administration’s ongoing efforts to curb violence, quell the narcotics trade and curtail what have always been minimal human rights abuses.

Unfortunately, the latest group of Washington travelers ended their visit with a carefully balanced pair of utterances. Representative James McGovern [D-Massachusetts] earned positive points by demurring from Chavez’s call for Colombia’s guerrilla groups to be legitimized as belligerents. However, Rep. George Miller [D-California], chairman of the House Education & Labor Committee, said it was not an appropriate time to take up the free trade agreement, because of "new realities" facing the U.S. economy, including rising unemployment and recession fears.  Sadly, Miller ignored the economy-strengthening fact that the FTA allows more than 90 percent of American products and services duty free status, which combined with the undervalued dollar, provides significant export growth potential.  This was the Democrats’ fifth rationale for refusing to take up the bilateral trade deal since its agreement by both parties in late 2006. 

Such a position is extraordinarily frustrating to Colombians in and out of government, because very few of the country’s existing and prospective exports – key among them coffee and fresh flowers – prove a threat to U.S. producers.  That said, encouraging legitimate agricultural exports is a strong means of discouraging farmers from cultivating the coca plant, the source of 90 percent of the world’s cocaine.  Given a little help from its friend to the north, Colombia has a very good chance of achieving the Uribe government’s ambitious plans.  

Despite Hugo Chavez’s current coup in the freeing of two FARC hostages, it can be hoped that truly bipartisan Congressional consideration of the free trade agreement will result in its passage, to the benefit of both countries and a particular boon to efforts to stabilize Colombia.

Geopolitical analyst John R. Thomson writes frequently on bilateral and regional affairs in the developing world.

 

This is the real FARC: Compelling video of the atrocities of this terrorist group. Viewer discretion is advised: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PSpJpn1Djqk.  

  1. We encourage you to watch the video and since it’s in Spanish we have prepared a translation of each slide:
  2. The FARC: army of the people?
  3. The FARC are liars.
  4. While the FARC want to take power by force against the will of the Colombian people, our nation must still suffer from their terrorist attacks such as car bombings, kidnappings, drug dealing, land mines and other crimes.
  5. We Colombians are very aware that the FARC never accepts responsibility for the crimes it commits.
  6. Terrorism: Domination through terror; Successive acts of violence executed to spread fear.
  7. This is the real story.
  8. February 25, 1999. The FARC kidnapped and then murdered three Americans who were defending the rights of the indigenous population.
  9. On March 4 the slaughtered bodies of Terence Freitas, Ingrid Washinawatok and Lahe’ ena’e Gay, were discovered with their hands tied.
  10. The FARC denied any involvement but later they had to accept it.
  11. May 16, 1999. FARC members placed a "bomb necklace" around the neck of Elvira Cortez…the victim had to pay the FARC the "monthly security fee" and the terrorists detonated the explosive using a remote control.
  12. December 29, 2000. Diego Turbay Cote, chief Peace Commissioner of the Colombian Congress was detained by the FARC while traveling with five people including family members… They were forced out of the vehicle and murdered.
  13. September 29, 2001, Consuelo Araujo, former minister of Culture was kidnapped and murdered by the FARC. A relative Simon Trinidad was captured in Ecuador for participating in her murder.
  14. March 16, 2002. Monsignor Isaias Duarte, archbishop of the archdiocese of Cali who led a movement against kidnapping, was assassinated by the FARC terrorists.
  15. The FARC targets women, children and the civil population in general.
  16. February 7, 2003: FARC attack: Car bomb explodes in nightclub "El Nogal," killing 36 people and wounding 172.
  17. June 24, 2003: Former Miss Colombia, Doris Gil Santamaria and her husband Helmut Bickenbach were kidnapped and murdered by the FARC.
  18. In a failed rescue attempt, the FARC assassinates former minister Gilberto Echeverry, the governor of Antioquia and eight soldiers they held hostage. In a barbaric act, the FARC leader that held them captives orders the execution of the hostages when he hears airplanes flying over the area.
  19. April 14, 2005. FARC members attack two towns, killing innocent civilians including children, women and the elderly of an indigenous community.
  20. In this image you can see a FARC terrorist preparing a mortar to attack a community.
  21. February 26, 2006. The FARC murder nine Municipal Counsels in the town of Rivera while they were at a meeting. They never claimed responsibility knowing the Colombian people would repudiate such an act.
  22. April 6, 2006. The FARC terrorists attack a train "Transmilenio" where 20 people were injured and one 9 year old child was killed. (Friends appear crying).
  23. The FARC attack the Military Academy and the School of War, were 25 people were killed. As always, they denied any involvement.
  24. October 28, 2006. The FARC detonated a car bomb in Villavicencio. Two people died.
  25. The FARC asked taxi driver Leonardo Baron Martinez (30) to deliver a package to the Fourth Division of the Armed Forces. He never imagined he was carrying explosives which were detonated by remote control. Officer Milton Cesar Guevara (21) was killed in the attack.
  26. March 1 and 3, 2007: In an attempt to kill the mayor of Neiva the FARC placed two bombs that exploded unnecessarily injuring many people including Captain Carlos Alberto Cardona and police officers, Alexander Peralta, Robinson Lonono Sanchez and John Jairo Valdivia. The explosion also injured 8 other people, destroyed the surroundings and set a bus ablaze.
  27. From June 22 until June 24: The FARC attacked the town of Buenaventura killing 2 people including a 2 year-old girl and severely injuring several others. 27. June 28, 2007: The FARC announced via Internet that they have butchered 11 of the 12 Congressmen being held hostage since 2002. The entire country now calls the FARC: Assassins, Terrorists. See the faces of their leaders:
  28. First: Manuel "Tiro Fijo" Marulanda. Second: Manuel "Tiro Fijo" and "Mono Jojoy" Briceño. Third: Ivan Marquez. Fourth: Raul Reyes. Fifth: Timo Chenko Sixth: Alfonso Cano. Seventh: Diego Montoya, a.k.a. ‘Don Diego.’ Eighth: Rodrigo Granda. Ninth: Simon Trinidad.

Chvez to Colombia: the FARC be with you

In the ongoing saga between despot Hugo Chavez and Colombian democratic President Alvaro Uribe over the hostage crisis due to the formers ‘alleged’ friendship with the terrorist group FARC and even though the release of the hostages actually occurred, the cracks in the Chavez – FARC peace façade are already appearing: less than 72 hours following the two ladies’ release, FARC gunmen kidnapped six people. At the same time, Chavez’s plea for FARC and ELN, to no longer be called "terrorists" but belligerent combatants was rejected out of hand. Why it is time for the US Congress to ratify the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia: It would encourage legitimate agricultural exports discouraging farmers from cultivating the coca plant, the source of 90% of the world’s cocaine and could help a crucial US ally in the region in his plans to stop the FARC and Chavez’s dangerous "Bolivarian Revolution."

VIDEO: This is the real FARC: Compelling video of the atrocities of this terrorist group.

Artículo: "Chávez a Colombia: Que las FARC estén con Ustedes."

En este pulso continuo entre el déspota Venezolano, Hugo Chávez, y el Presidente demócrata de Colombia, Álvaro Uribe sobre la crisis de los rehenes debido a la ‘aparente’ amistad entre Chávez y las FARC y aunque la liberación de las dos señoras   efectivamente ocurrió,   las fisuras en esa farsa de paz, que han montado Chávez y las FARC,   ya están apareciendo: a menos de 72 horas tras   la liberación de las dos damas, unos insurgentes armados   de las FARC secuestraron a seis personas. Simultáneamente, de plano fue rechazada la intercesión de Chávez abogando a favor de las FARC y el ELN. Por qué ya es tiempo que el Congreso Norteamericano ratifique el TLC con Colombia: Incentivaría las exportaciones agrícolas legítimas, una poderosa forma de frenar el cultivo de plantaciones de coca, que son la fuente del 90% de la cocaína que se consume en el mundo y ayudaría a un crucial aliado de Estados Unidos en la región en sus planes de frenar a las FARC y la peligrosa "Revolución Bolivariana" de Hugo Chávez.

VIDEO: Estas son las verdaderas FARC. Video de las atrocidades cometidas por este grupo terrorista.

Main News:

  • IMPORTANT: "Hold Chavez accountable for fueling narco-terrorism." Venezuelan opposition launches pact for unity. Pdvsa debt was USD 16 billion in 2007. Colombian intelligence: Venezuela is providing ammunition to the FARC. Radars detect planes loaded with drug leaving Venezuela. Colombian officer: The FARC and ELN are holding hostages in Venezuela. Chavez: Uribe is a "coward" after comments by US drug Tsar Walters. Venezuela ponders further purchases of Argentinean debt. Opposition leader argues Chávez violated anti-drug law: He consumed coca paste. EU rejects deleting the FARC from black list.
  • Ecuador to open trade office in Iran in February. Ecuador President Reshuffles Navy. Ecuador President Reshuffles Navy. Correa Loses Support Again in Ecuador.
  • Food supply in Colombia secured.
  • FTA between Peru and China ready before APEC 2008 Summit. Peru seeks FTA with European Union. Lima, Peru Stock Market Seriously Affected by Shaky US Economy. Peru plans to sell about $263 million in sol-denominated bonds next month.
  • Half Content with Cristina in Argentina. Argentina’s economy expanded 9.6 percent in November from a year earlier.
  • Mexico will increase aid to farmers. Mexico arrests senior drug cartel member.
  • Political crisis deepens in Bolivia.

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For any questions, comments, or those interested in receiving this report in the future or seeking to have their email removed from our list please contact Nicole M. Ferrand at our new e-mail address: themengesproject@centerforsecuritypolicy.org. If you have news stories that you think might be useful for future editions of this report please send them, with a link to the original website, to the same e-mail address. If you wish to contribute with an article, please send it to the same address, with your name and place of work or study.

Argentina’s Kirchner, ally of Chavez

The recent release of hostages Consuelo Gonzales and Clara Rojas after six years in captivity has been an orchestrated victory for Hugo Chavez. Chavez has used his years-old complicity with the very dangerous guerilla insurgency known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to achieve a number of goals already pointed out in the last issue of the America’s Report (see Nicole M. Ferrand, "Colombia’s Uribe Unmasks the FARC"). 

Chavez tried to weaken Colombia’s President, Alvaro Uribe, showing his own ability to release the hostages while Uribe could not. Chavez also tried to enhance himself as an effective mediator and a "true" leader of Latin America. Chavez lost the December 2nd referendum over his proposed constitutional reform. Thus, wounded by that defeat, he proceeded to strengthen his very ambitious foreign policy which consists of increasing his own regional power, spreading his ideas throughout the region while destroying US allies.

[More]President Uribe is a symbol of enmity to Chavismo because he sees the US as an ally and exercises a most legitimate rule over Colombia while being committed to an economic liberal and politically democratic form of government. Colombia is an obstacle to Venezuela’s influence in the region as England and France was an obstacle to Germany prior to World War II. The FARC, on the other hand, is a violent leftist group whose forty year asymmetric war against the Colombian government fascinates Chavez, an enemy of liberal democracy and a promoter of authoritarian socialist regimes.  

However, the other country that showed its dark side most ominously in this episode is Argentina. Indeed the former Argentinean President and husband of the current Argentinean president, Nestor Kirchner, joined Hugo Chavez in what was supposed to be the release of the hostages held by the FARC. This act, as we said, was supposed to bring glory and leadership to Chavez and Kirchner who were both there to celebrate. As we stated in the America’s Report a number of times, Kirchner was an ally of Chavez not only because Chavez provided cheap oil to Argentina and bought part of its debt but also because Kirchner’s Peronist party’s historical populism finds affinity with Chavez and his style. The Peronist-wing, represented by the Kirchners, supports economic nationalism and state-socialism and is strongly "anti-imperialist" as has been demonstrated by Nestor Kirchner’s numerous expressions of scorn for western leaders who visited Argentina during his presidency.    

 

 

For standing with Chavez during the hostage crisis, the Argentinian opposition called Kirchner "immoral". But Kirchner, like his wife, is too shameless to be embarrassed by having linked himself to Chavez. Both deeply admire Hugo Chavez. 

Of course, another interesting episode preceded this dishonorable situation. Before the last Argentinean elections that took place in October, Cristina Kirchner, the current Argentinian President, traveled to the United States. There she flirted with American officials who are always open and naïve enough to be impressed by the magic of such an enchanting woman. She also delivered a very charming and friendly speech to the Jewish community in Venezuela, which has been frightened by the anti-Semitism of the Chavistas and by the harassment of the Chavez government. Ms. Kirchner’s actions were largely interpreted-and this was probably Ms. Kirchner’s intention- as a sign that she will not be as close to Chavez as her husband was. (The Menges Project at the Center for Security Policy was not one of them. To the contrary it correctly stated that Ms. Kirchner is and will continue to be a Chavista. (See America’s Report in this website "The AMIA Bombing: A Case of Deception and Negligence", by Luis Fleischman, August 2, 2007).

Now this double game is over as the US Justice Department is investigating the transfer of $800,000 from the Chavez government to Ms. Kirchner’s presidential campaign. The FBI collected evidence by providing Guido Antonini Wilson, whose bag carrying the money was confiscated by the Argentine customs authority after he landed in Buenos Aires in a plane accompanied by high officers of the Kirchner government. The FBI gave Wilson the status of protected witness. After a short period of "absence", Wilson returned to Miami. In Miami the FBI wiretapped him and thus uncovered a plot by three businessmen working at the service of Hugo Chavez who threatened Wilson that they would kill his children if he disclosed the origin and destiny of that money. The evidence seems to confirm that the money was from Hugo Chavez and destined for Ms. Kirchner’s presidential campaign.

After this incident, the reaction of Ms. Kirchner’s government was more than pathetic. Her chief of staff Alberto Fernandez wrote an editorial in the daily La Nacion where he accused the United States Justice Department of trying to create a rift between Venezuela and Argentina. However, his editorial is very significant as it reflects the nature of Ms. Kirchner’s philosophy and foreign policy. Thus, Mr. Fernandez explained that the regional integration of Latin America, the US loss of control over Venezuela and Bolivia’s energy resources, and Brazil and Argentina’s increasing independence from (US) economic manipulation, has made America uneasy. The reason for this is that these events undermine American plans to "exercise hegemonic power in the region". This type of discourse is a less vulgar but is analogous to Chavez’s anti-yanqui rhetoric.

In the same editorial, Fernandez took a rather defensive position by saying that Argentinian authorities knew about Wilson’s money because it was the Argentinean government that caught it (in reality it was the Customs Administration that did and Cristina Kirchner allegedly lost her temper, attacked her husband and broke a glass when she found out that Wilson was caught. (See America’s Report, "The Suitcase Scandal Linking Kirchner with Chavez" by Nancy Menges and Nicole Ferrand, September 6, 2007). According to Fernandez, the US should have responded to the Argentinian request to extradite Mr. Wilson so that he could be investigated in Argentina. Instead the US chose to investigate the case because it tries to recover its "hegemony" by undermining relations between Venezuela and Argentina. Fernandez claims- based on the recent scandal involving the firing of several US Attorneys – that in the US, prosecutors are political appointees and respond to Presidential policies not to objective justice. This comment is as interesting as it is boldly insolent. During his tenure, Nestor Kirchner moved to establish control over the judiciary (see America’s Report "The Meaning of Kirchner’s Defeat in Recent Municipal Elections" by Luis Fleischman, July 19, 2007).

According to sources in the US Department of Justice, the Argentinean authorities lost interest in the extradition. The US Department of Justice stated that the Argentinean authorities first let Wilson leave the country and second showed no interest in bringing him back. The Department also claims that the US interest in the case is based on the Patriot Act, an anti-terror law enacted after the 9/11 attacks. The law extends US jurisdiction over money laundering operations carried through the US.

 

 

 

More so, knowing the history of Argentina’s legal and political corruption, a hypothetic extradition and investigation of Wilson would have led to nothing but a cover-up, particularly when current evidence suggests that the money was directed to the Kirchner campaign.

 

Kirchner’s reaction was defiant by all accounts. The joint Chavez-Kirchner appearance on the hostage crisis was part of this defiance. But there is more, the Kirchners have once again embraced the piquetero leader and former Kirchner cabinet member, Luis D’Elia. D’Elia is the same man who was ousted from Kirchner’s government over his stand in defense of Iran after a court declared Iran responsible for the 1994 terrorist attack on AMIA. D’Elia is also one of the non-Venezuelan grassroots Chavistas who with the help of Chavez’s encouragement and funding attended seminars in Iran.

 

If we had any doubts where the Kirchners are in the international arena, these doubts have been dissipated by now. Any separation between husband and wife is misleading and artificial. Cristina Kirchner is and should be considered an ally of Hugo Chavez.

This alliance is not only one of convenience but an ideological alliance as wel l. Just this week Roberto Lavagna, former Minister of Economy and Production under Nestor Kirchner, declared that Argentina’s current policies are being dictated by the "impulses of Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez." When asked to explain the reasons for his statement, he said "you have to ask the former President Kirchner and the incumbent, Cristina." [1] What kind of consequences this alliance will have for the region and for geo-political security remains to be seen but we will continue to watch closely and report the ramifications of this relationship as it matures.

[1] "Somos furgón de cola de Chávez." January 13, 2007. La Nación, Argentina.

Gordon England’s war

In darkened theaters around the country, millions of Americans have been getting a civics lesson. In a somewhat romanticized and selective rendering of "Charlie Wilson’s War," they have seen how a colorful congressman managed to work behind closed doors to fund a project — arming Afghans fighting Soviet invaders — with momentous consequences, both intended and unintended.

Today, decisions perhaps equally momentous are again being made behind closed doors in official Washington. Many are driven by a single man, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, with a zeal worthy of Charlie Wilson at his prime, if little of his panache.

The Pentagon’s No. 2 has traditionally run "the Building," managing its vast bureaucracy and effectively being the ultimate allocator of funds among its competing programs and responsibilities. Mr. England has the unenviable task of playing such a role at a time when defense funding is substantially larger in real terms than over much of the last few decades yet — thanks to extensive, and expensive, worldwide combat and combat-support operations around the world — woefully inadequate to meet the military’s recapitalization requirements.

Matters have been made worse by the fact that neither this nor previous administrations have invested the huge sums required fully to modernize the Army and Marine Corps’ armored forces, the Navy’s fleets and all three services’ air arms. To varying degrees, recapitalization programs have been pursued, but most have been delayed, dramatically reduced and, in some cases, canceled outright.

The result has been to leave the armed forces fighting today’s wars with yesterday’s weapons. While many have been improved and their useful lives extended with more contemporary technology, our troops are handicapped — and exposed unnecessarily to peril — because they are operating outdated and even obsolescing equipment.

To some extent, this travesty is obscured by the nature of today’s wars. Counterinsurgency operations place a premium on different weaponry and tactics than would conflicts with what are now euphemistically called "peer" or "near-peer" competitors. In this case, however, it is not the generals who blinded by thoughts of "fighting the last war."

In fact, most in uniform appreciate that countries like Russia and China are demonstrating a determination to field militaries comparable to, and capable of inflicting great harm on, the best of our armed forces. Worse, they are both proliferating advanced weapon systems designed for that purpose to others who wish us ill, from the mullahs in Iran to Kim Jong-il’s North Korea to Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.

The best way to contend with these and other emerging threats is to dissuade such adversaries from believing that conflict with the United States could ever redound to their benefit. Toward that end, this country should field wherever possible decisively superior military equipment. A case in point is the Air Force’s F-22 Raptor.

This plane is quite simply the best fighter aircraft in the world. Thanks to a combination of "stealthy" characteristics that make it very difficult to detect and target, the ability to operate for sustained periods at supersonic speeds and its extraordinary agility, the Raptor seems likely to secure for years to come something Americans have taken for granted in every conflict since World War II: air superiority essential to victory on the ground. In operational testing and deployments to date, the "Fifth Generation" F-22 has demonstrated the ability to defeat the best adversary aircraft and most sophisticated air defenses of the kind Russia has just agreed to sell Iran.

Yet, in Gordon England’s Pentagon, the Raptor is an endangered species. Charlie Wilson labored in secret to secure funds to provide more and better arms to the Afghans. The "DepSecDef" adamantly insists in the closed-door budget deliberations over which he presides that production of the world’s best fighter be terminated next year.

Fortunately, many of Charlie Wilson’s successors on Capitol Hill have begun to engage on the question of whether to keep open the production line for the F-22. A bipartisan group involving some 200 members of the House and Senate representing nearly every political stripe wrote Mr. England’s boss, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, last month urging that the Raptor line be kept open.

It seems obvious that the momentous decision of whether to terminate the F-22 at just 180 aircraft — one that could prove fateful in deterring a future conflict with increasingly hostile and aggressive adversaries — should be made not by a lame-duck presidency but a newly mandated one. In practical terms, this will require Mr. England to stop waging war against the F-22, allowing more than $500 million now earmarked for termination costs to be applied instead to long-lead procurement of one more block of 20 Raptors and permitting the Air Force to budget the substantially larger sums required in fiscal 2010 fully to fund them.

Ultimately, the decision whether America will be able to deter future conflicts, and to wage them successfully if deterrence fails, will depend on a comprehensive recapitalization of every one of the armed services.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are calling for a sustained allocation of more resources — specifically, at least 4 percent of gross domestic product. Now is the time to determine whether the candidates to be our next commander in chief will pledge to do so.

The Colombian hostage crisis

Ever since Colombian police officer, John Frank Pinchao escaped from the narco-terrorist insurgency inside Colombia, known as the FARC on April 28, 2007, there has been growing pressure on President Uribe to work for the release of the remaining 60 hostages. The most famous among them is Ingrid Betancourt, a dual French-Colombian citizen who has been held since 2002 when she entered FARC territory against government advice. At the time of her capture she was running for president against Uribe. After his escape, Mr. Pinchao gave a chilling account of the inhumane treatment suffered by the hostages and specifically said that Betancourt was being forced to sleep chained by her neck as punishment for having tried to escape five times.

In understanding this story, it is important to grasp the nature of the FARC and what President Uribe is up against in trying to broker a deal with them. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was established in 1964 as a Marxist group that follows a Maoist strategy of protracted peoples’ war with the long term aim of overthrowing the Colombian government and establishing a Marxist state.1 It has a fighting force of approximately 12,000-15,000 and since its inception forty years ago has been led by septuagenarian, Manuel Marulanda a.k.a "Tirofijo."2 The FARC has financed itself through extortions from kidnapping as well as revenues generated from extensive drug trafficking. Since becoming president in 2002, Alvaro Uribe has been successful in containing the FARC and bringing a sense of security to the Colombian population that did not exist prior to his assuming the presidency.

Manuel Marulanda, a.k.a "Tiro Fijo." Source: Jornada, Mexico. Due to Betancourt’s French citizenship, the FARC made it known that they would like French President Nicolas Sarkozy to help broker a deal for her release in late May this year. This coupled with pressure from Betancourt’s family led the French President to try to make a deal to free FARC hostages in exchange for jailed FARC members. He, in turn, pressured Uribe to start a dialogue with the FARC to release her. In addition, Sarkozy thought it would be a good idea to involve Chavez in the negotiations. This past June, over 150 imprisoned FARC terrorists were transferred from prisons to a temporary holding center as part of a unilateral prisoner release that Uribe hoped would speed up an exchange and prompt the FARC to free many hostages they were holding in remote jungle camps across the country. Aside from Betancourt, the 60 so-called political hostages include members of the armed forces and local politicians as well as three U.S. contractors.

On June 4th, the Colombian government released terrorist leader Rodrigo Granda, FARC’s "foreign chancellor," with hopes that he would play an important role in mediating an agreement. But Uribe’s move was promptly rejected by the FARC, which called it a "farce" and a "smokescreen." In a press release, the FARC’s second-in-command, Raul Reyes, rejected the idea of a humanitarian prisoner exchange unless the government first established a demilitarized zone in two southwestern Colombian municipalities.3 The Colombian government has repeatedly refused to concede a safe haven to FARC terrorists as a venue for possible talks. In fact, the government is trying to regain control over previous territory, (known as the Despeje) given to the FARC. Uribe understands that having the Despeje, a 42,000 square kilometer territory in central Colombia was a failed policy because it gave the FARC the ability to arm its forces and build and consolidate significant portions of the drug trade. It is now estimated that there are over 4,000 people being held in captivity in Colombia by illegal armed groups and common criminals.

 

During Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s ill-fated mediation effort to win the release of the hostages, the French and Colombian governments had demanded evidence the captives were still alive. The FARC never delivered the material and matters deteriorated further when Colombian President Alvaro Uribe abruptly ended the Venezuelan leader’s mediation role saying Chavez had overstepped his bounds and violated their agreement by directly contacting the head of Colombia’s army.4 There are even allegations that Chavez tried to secure an open area so that he and FARC members could meet without the Colombian government permission. Even worse, it was alleged that Chavez wanted to bribe the military members to stage a coup against Uribe. The commander in chief went directly to Uribe and told him that Chavez wanted to stage a coup using the military and turn Colombia into a FARC country.

At the end of November, Colombian officials released newly seized videos of FARC-held hostages, including images of Ms. Betancourt and three U.S. defense contractors. Also recovered were a series of letters apparently written by the hostages, including what appeared to be the will of U.S. contractor, Thomas Howes. The videos were apparently recorded as recently as late October. The videotapes, which were played at a news conference without sound, showed an extremely gaunt Betancourt apparently chained and in front of a jungle backdrop. Betancourt has long hair and stares blankly at the ground. These were the first pictures since 2003 that provided evidence that the captives might be alive. The tapes were seized during the arrest in Bogota of three suspected urban members of the FARC. The Americans were abducted by the FARC after their surveillance plane went down in a southern Colombian jungle in 2003.5 Sarkozy supported Uribe’s abrupt ending of Chavez’s intervention because the proof of life had come from the Colombian armed forces and not from Chavez. Chavez called that a betrayal and said if he were allowed to continue mediating, FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda, would almost certainly have turned over some hostages by Christmas. Uribe accused Chavez of pursuing an "expansionist" plan in the region. Chávez then called Uribe a "liar and cynic" who "does not want peace", adding that Colombia "deserves a better president."6

Uribe, in turn, accused Chavez of seeking to "build an empire based on his (oil-rich) budget" and of wanting Colombia to be "a victim of a FARC terrorist government". That prompted Chávez to call Uribe "a sad pawn of the empire" (the United States), saying that he was putting relations with Colombia "in the freezer" and recalled his ambassador in Bogotá. Chavez then said he would have "no type of relationship" with Uribe or his government.7 Amid the diplomatic pressure, Uribe just this month reiterated his offer to allow the first face-to-face meeting between officials of his government and rebels, monitored by international and Roman Catholic observers. He said there would be no police and no troops in the 95-square-mile meeting zone and again insisted that mediators arrive unarmed. Uribe is adamant that his government is doing all possible to resolve the hostage issue, but said the response they have had from the FARC is the assassination of several hostages.8

In addition, Colombian police just this month foiled a FARC plot to kidnap President Uribe’s two sons as his government came under pressure to reach a deal securing the release of FARC members in jail. "With this strike, we’ve avoided a terrorist tragedy," police chief Gen. Oscar Naranjo said. "These criminals had declared the president’s sons military targets." Police played an audiotape of conversations they said revealed two guerrillas belonging to the FARC’s elite Teofilo Forero unit talking in code about Uribe’s sons, Jeronimo and Tomas.9

Meanwhile Congresswoman Piedad Cordoba, a self – declared Chavista and opposition Colombian senator who helped facilitate Chavez’s original mediating role, said that the Venezuelan president was willing to forget the past if he could help. Chavez told her "that if in any moment his presence was required by president Uribe, to help with the humanitarian exchange, he would forget the things that have happened and would be ready to contribute," Cordoba told reporters.

In another related development, Chavez ally, Nicaraguan President, Daniel Ortega, last week accused Colombian President Alvaro Uribe of effectively condemning to death a well-known hostage held by Colombian leftist rebels by suspending talks for her release. In his speech, Ortega referred to the leader of Colombia’s FARC as a "dear brother." At the same time as Chavez is trying to foist himself onto the world stage as an honest negotiator and peacemaker, he reportedly gives sanctuary to the FARC inside Venezuela, provides them with safe houses and arms and views them as a viable political party instead of a long established Marxist insurgency. It seems that President Uribe fully understands where Chavez is coming from and said in a recent speech:  

"Your words, your attitudes, give the impression that you aren’t interested in peace in Colombia, but rather that Colombia be a victim of a terrorist government of the FARC," he said in the town of Calamar. The truth is President Chavez, we need mediation against terrorism, NOT to legitimize terrorism… and I reject the idea of Colombia’s tragedy being used in the expansionist projects of Chavez…We want help, but we do not accept expansionist projects…the law cannot be substituted by personal whim…You cannot set ablaze the continent like you do and mistreat Spain, the US, Mexico, Peru and other countries."10

In the next months, it is likely that the hostage situation will be used by Chavez and other Latin American heads of state like Ortega in Nicaragua to bring pressure on Uribe to make a deal that favors the FARC but is detrimental for the political stability of Colombia.

 

Notes

  1. Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks, The Rand Corporation,2007,p. 253.
  2. Ibid, p. 254.
  3. Despite Uribe’s Controversial Release of FARC Prisoners, Colombian Hostage Standoff Continues. June 21, 2007. World Politics Review.
  4. Colombia seizes, releases video of rebel-held hostages, possible evidence of life. November 30, 2007. Los Angeles Times.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Sad pawn sent to freezer. November 29. The Economist.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Mother of captive Colombian says hostage breakthrough more likely from rebels than president. December 12, 2007. IHT.
  9. Rebels attempt to kidnap Uribe’s sons. December 20, 2007. Buenos Aires Herald.
  10. Uribe estalla y emite durísimas declaraciones contra Hugo Chávez. November 27, 2007. Noticias 24.

The Colombian hostage crisis

Ever since Colombian police officer, John Frank Pinchao escaped from the narco-terrorist insurgency inside Colombia, known as the FARC on April 28, 2007, there has been growing pressure on President Uribe to work for the release of the remaining 60 hostages. The most famous among them is Ingrid Betancourt, a dual French-Colombian citizen who has been held since 2002 when she entered FARC territory against government advice. At the time of her capture she was running for president against Uribe. After his escape, Mr. Pinchao gave a chilling account of the inhumane treatment suffered by the hostages and specifically said that Betancourt was being forced to sleep chained by her neck as punishment for having tried to escape five times.

In understanding this story, it is important to grasp the nature of the FARC and what President Uribe is up against in trying to broker a deal with them. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was established in 1964 as a Marxist group that follows a Maoist strategy of protracted peoples’ war with the long term aim of overthrowing the Colombian government and establishing a Marxist state.1 It has a fighting force of approximately 12,000-15,000 and since its inception forty years ago has been led by septuagenarian, Manuel Marulanda a.k.a "Tirofijo."2 The FARC has financed itself through extortions from kidnapping as well as revenues generated from extensive drug trafficking. Since becoming president in 2002, Alvaro Uribe has been successful in containing the FARC and bringing a sense of security to the Colombian population that did not exist prior to his assuming the presidency.

Manuel Marulanda, a.k.a "Tiro Fijo." Source: Jornada, Mexico. Due to Betancourt’s French citizenship, the FARC made it known that they would like French President Nicolas Sarkozy to help broker a deal for her release in late May this year. This coupled with pressure from Betancourt’s family led the French President to try to make a deal to free FARC hostages in exchange for jailed FARC members. He, in turn, pressured Uribe to start a dialogue with the FARC to release her. In addition, Sarkozy thought it would be a good idea to involve Chavez in the negotiations. This past June, over 150 imprisoned FARC terrorists were transferred from prisons to a temporary holding center as part of a unilateral prisoner release that Uribe hoped would speed up an exchange and prompt the FARC to free many hostages they were holding in remote jungle camps across the country. Aside from Betancourt, the 60 so-called political hostages include members of the armed forces and local politicians as well as three U.S. contractors.

On June 4th, the Colombian government released terrorist leader Rodrigo Granda, FARC’s "foreign chancellor," with hopes that he would play an important role in mediating an agreement. But Uribe’s move was promptly rejected by the FARC, which called it a "farce" and a "smokescreen." In a press release, the FARC’s second-in-command, Raul Reyes, rejected the idea of a humanitarian prisoner exchange unless the government first established a demilitarized zone in two southwestern Colombian municipalities.3 The Colombian government has repeatedly refused to concede a safe haven to FARC terrorists as a venue for possible talks. In fact, the government is trying to regain control over previous territory, (known as the Despeje) given to the FARC. Uribe understands that having the Despeje, a 42,000 square kilometer territory in central Colombia was a failed policy because it gave the FARC the ability to arm its forces and build and consolidate significant portions of the drug trade. It is now estimated that there are over 4,000 people being held in captivity in Colombia by illegal armed groups and common criminals.

 

During Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s ill-fated mediation effort to win the release of the hostages, the French and Colombian governments had demanded evidence the captives were still alive. The FARC never delivered the material and matters deteriorated further when Colombian President Alvaro Uribe abruptly ended the Venezuelan leader’s mediation role saying Chavez had overstepped his bounds and violated their agreement by directly contacting the head of Colombia’s army.4 There are even allegations that Chavez tried to secure an open area so that he and FARC members could meet without the Colombian government permission. Even worse, it was alleged that Chavez wanted to bribe the military members to stage a coup against Uribe. The commander in chief went directly to Uribe and told him that Chavez wanted to stage a coup using the military and turn Colombia into a FARC country.

At the end of November, Colombian officials released newly seized videos of FARC-held hostages, including images of Ms. Betancourt and three U.S. defense contractors. Also recovered were a series of letters apparently written by the hostages, including what appeared to be the will of U.S. contractor, Thomas Howes. The videos were apparently recorded as recently as late October. The videotapes, which were played at a news conference without sound, showed an extremely gaunt Betancourt apparently chained and in front of a jungle backdrop. Betancourt has long hair and stares blankly at the ground. These were the first pictures since 2003 that provided evidence that the captives might be alive. The tapes were seized during the arrest in Bogota of three suspected urban members of the FARC. The Americans were abducted by the FARC after their surveillance plane went down in a southern Colombian jungle in 2003.5 Sarkozy supported Uribe’s abrupt ending of Chavez’s intervention because the proof of life had come from the Colombian armed forces and not from Chavez. Chavez called that a betrayal and said if he were allowed to continue mediating, FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda, would almost certainly have turned over some hostages by Christmas. Uribe accused Chavez of pursuing an "expansionist" plan in the region. Chávez then called Uribe a "liar and cynic" who "does not want peace", adding that Colombia "deserves a better president."6

Uribe, in turn, accused Chavez of seeking to "build an empire based on his (oil-rich) budget" and of wanting Colombia to be "a victim of a FARC terrorist government". That prompted Chávez to call Uribe "a sad pawn of the empire" (the United States), saying that he was putting relations with Colombia "in the freezer" and recalled his ambassador in Bogotá. Chavez then said he would have "no type of relationship" with Uribe or his government.7 Amid the diplomatic pressure, Uribe just this month reiterated his offer to allow the first face-to-face meeting between officials of his government and rebels, monitored by international and Roman Catholic observers. He said there would be no police and no troops in the 95-square-mile meeting zone and again insisted that mediators arrive unarmed. Uribe is adamant that his government is doing all possible to resolve the hostage issue, but said the response they have had from the FARC is the assassination of several hostages.8

In addition, Colombian police just this month foiled a FARC plot to kidnap President Uribe’s two sons as his government came under pressure to reach a deal securing the release of FARC members in jail. "With this strike, we’ve avoided a terrorist tragedy," police chief Gen. Oscar Naranjo said. "These criminals had declared the president’s sons military targets." Police played an audiotape of conversations they said revealed two guerrillas belonging to the FARC’s elite Teofilo Forero unit talking in code about Uribe’s sons, Jeronimo and Tomas.9

Meanwhile Congresswoman Piedad Cordoba, a self – declared Chavista and opposition Colombian senator who helped facilitate Chavez’s original mediating role, said that the Venezuelan president was willing to forget the past if he could help. Chavez told her "that if in any moment his presence was required by president Uribe, to help with the humanitarian exchange, he would forget the things that have happened and would be ready to contribute," Cordoba told reporters.

In another related development, Chavez ally, Nicaraguan President, Daniel Ortega, last week accused Colombian President Alvaro Uribe of effectively condemning to death a well-known hostage held by Colombian leftist rebels by suspending talks for her release. In his speech, Ortega referred to the leader of Colombia’s FARC as a "dear brother." At the same time as Chavez is trying to foist himself onto the world stage as an honest negotiator and peacemaker, he reportedly gives sanctuary to the FARC inside Venezuela, provides them with safe houses and arms and views them as a viable political party instead of a long established Marxist insurgency. It seems that President Uribe fully understands where Chavez is coming from and said in a recent speech:  

"Your words, your attitudes, give the impression that you aren’t interested in peace in Colombia, but rather that Colombia be a victim of a terrorist government of the FARC," he said in the town of Calamar. The truth is President Chavez, we need mediation against terrorism, NOT to legitimize terrorism… and I reject the idea of Colombia’s tragedy being used in the expansionist projects of Chavez…We want help, but we do not accept expansionist projects…the law cannot be substituted by personal whim…You cannot set ablaze the continent like you do and mistreat Spain, the US, Mexico, Peru and other countries."10

In the next months, it is likely that the hostage situation will be used by Chavez and other Latin American heads of state like Ortega in Nicaragua to bring pressure on Uribe to make a deal that favors the FARC but is detrimental for the political stability of Colombia.

 

Notes

  1. Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks, The Rand Corporation,2007,p. 253.
  2. Ibid, p. 254.
  3. Despite Uribe’s Controversial Release of FARC Prisoners, Colombian Hostage Standoff Continues. June 21, 2007. World Politics Review.
  4. Colombia seizes, releases video of rebel-held hostages, possible evidence of life. November 30, 2007. Los Angeles Times.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Sad pawn sent to freezer. November 29. The Economist.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Mother of captive Colombian says hostage breakthrough more likely from rebels than president. December 12, 2007. IHT.
  9. Rebels attempt to kidnap Uribe’s sons. December 20, 2007. Buenos Aires Herald.
  10. Uribe estalla y emite durísimas declaraciones contra Hugo Chávez. November 27, 2007. Noticias 24.

China’s assymetrical strategy

The impressive conventional military strength post-industrial states have procured in the past half-century has helped to determine the shape and nature of modern warfare. In a geostrategic environment where conflict continues to persist between advanced militaries and their substandard adversaries–either rogue states or terror cells–the latter have been forced to develop asymmetric ways of challenging the superior with the inferior.

The extent of America’s sweeping success during the Persian Gulf War had the unintended consequence of convincing would-be adversaries that they must reconstitute new strategies in order to compete with and challenge U.S. power. In essence, American military predominance had become so extensive that it has altered the face of the battlefield by forcing others to adapt–to prevent America from playing the game but its rules.

This is evident in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the U.S. continues its struggle to contain disconnected networks of al-Qaeda militants and Shia militias armed with AK-47s and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). As much as the United States had hoped it could defeat extremist elements using sophisticated weapons and other advanced technologies, the supposed superiority of network-centric warfare proved insufficient against Islamist tactics. Similarly, Venezuela and its despotic leader Hugo Chavez, who frequently warns of a pending invasion by the United States, has placed asymmetric warfare at the center of his countries national defense doctrine. Former Venezuelan General Alberto Mueller has argued in favor of the doctrine, "because conventional war is ceasing to exist."

Although it is terrorism–and in the case of Venezuela, "guerilla war"–that is so often discussed in the realm of asymmetric warfare, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has also embraced the precepts of this strategy to counter American superiority. As Robert Kaplan has explained, terrorists and their crude tactics fall on the low end of asymmetric strategy. For America, the even greater challenge will be those states like China that are able to confront the United States at the high-tech end of the unconventional sphere.

While in the coming decades China anticipates that the continued success of its economic expansion will allow it to take a much more assertive geopolitical posture–projecting force far beyond its coastal waters–in the near-term the issue of Taiwan will remain the primary focus for Chinese policymakers. While ensuring Taiwan does not entertain ambitions of secession from the mainland, PLA military planners will also be forced to concern themselves with defeating a U.S. military that remains committed to the defense of Taiwan.

Just how does the PLA believe it can achieve this? Chinese strategists are not naive. They recognize that their military is only a decade or two removed from operational obscurity. And a Chinese conventional force able to challenge the United States is at least another decade away by the estimates of the most generous analysts. In summary, Chinese leaders face a strategic quandary where their interests in Taiwan are at risk, yet for the foreseeable future they cannot obtain the traditional military capabilities to secure those interest.

Should either a political or military event threaten the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. will respond by diverting a Carrier Strike Group to the region. Chinese analysts understand that if this is allowed to happen, the United States will almost certainly achieve its objectives, emerging victorious should hostilities commence.

To deal with this dilemma the PLA has chosen to put its trust in an asymmetric strategy aimed at battlespace denial, or anti-access as it is more commonly known. Rather than confront the United States directly, the PLA believes it can acquire the capabilities to deter an American entrance into the Taiwan Strait, or, should this fail, delay U.S. forces the freedom to operate within the theatre.

Some observers have concluded that China’s development of anti-access capabilities neither undermines U.S. sea control nor contributes to a war-wining capability. Such assertions may have been accurate as recently as earlier this decade, but at present, and increasingly in the next several years, this conclusion will appear to be guided more by an overconfidence in American capabilities than by pragmatic realism.

Consistent with the teachings of ancient Chinese warfare, anti-access is comprised of both military and political elements. The Chinese theoretician Sun Tzu wrote that, "supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting." This would appear to be the primary aim of anti-access: successful diplomatic coercion through expanded asymmetric capabilities.

In attempting to defeat a technologically superior adversary such as the United States, China does not need to control the sea or achieve ultimate military victory. A truly efficient implementation of anti-access doctrine would use the weapons systems at China’s disposal in a manner that translates into a bloodless political victory.

Over the last decade China has committed itself to a deliberate and focused expansion of the PLA’s capabilities, aimed primarily at acquiring the necessary platforms to serve this area-denial strategy.

Due to the importance of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups, the PLA has chosen to focus much of their attention on deterring and, if need be, delaying the entry of these floating sea bases into the Taiwan theatre. At the center of this effort is the PLA submarine fleet, which is growing at a rapid rate and, with the increased sophistication of its submarine classes, could pose a significant threat to American carriers. In the past decade China has commissioned 31 submarines. The majority of these are of the Song– and Yuan-class, which are outfitted with the ‘air-independent propulsion" system that permits them to operate underwater for up to 40 days. In addition to enabling conventional submarines to avoid the costs of nuclear technology, the system allows the submarine to remain virtually undetectable to U.S. anti-submarine surveillance efforts. The sophistication of these new submarines became evident in October 2006 when a Chinese Song-class submarine was able to surface within torpedo range of the USS Kitty Hawk off the coast of Okinawa.

China also has three new nuclear-powered submarine designs and construction programs. The Type-093 Shang-class nuclear attack boat and the Type-094 Jin-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine, represent the basis of the nuclear submarine programs. The Type-095, a larger version of the Shang/Jin-classes, is also under construction. These numerous programs represent a submarine development campaign that is unprecedented in peacetime.

The development of maneuverability reentry vehicle (MaRVs) technology, capable of allowing ballistic missiles to destroy moving targets, will also contribute to expanding and overlapping the layers of the PLA anti-access strategy. These missiles, in coordination with a maritime surveillance and targeting system, could pose a direct threat to U.S. carriers patrolling in the Asia-Pacific. According to Pentagon estimates, Chinese missiles armed with MaRV technology could be deployed as early as 2015. China has also purchased Russian-built SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-27 Sizzler anti-ship cruise missiles, designed specifically for targeting U.S. carrier strike groups and defeating the Aegis anti-missile system.

Chinese strategists, including PLA Major General Dia Qingmin, have written extensively on battlespace-denial, arguing that the true dominance of the U.S. military is in fact the result of its impressive integrated network of command, control, and communications systems. America’s C4ISR network provides everything from target detection and identification to navigational information.

But just as this capability is its greatest asset, in the realm of asymmetry, it is also its greatest vulnerability. For this reason, the PLA has concluded that attacking information systems could offset U.S. capabilities much more efficiently than attacking traditional combat systems. In the event of a pending conflict in the Taiwan Strait, destroying a series of U.S. satellites–the central node of U.S. networks–could effectively paralyze U.S. combat capabilities, denying them the initiative on the battlefield and leveling the operational playing field. China’s January 2007 anti-satellite test, which displayed the ability of the PLA to target and destroy satellites in orbit, represents a significant achievement for PLA anti-access capabilities.

The capability to severely disrupt America’s C4ISR network, coupled with the deployment of advanced submarines and anti-ship missiles, presents a new form of strategic deterrence that is only recently receiving the attention it deserves. In a scenario where it is suspected China may play a belligerent role, the United States would be faced with a difficult decision concerning its commitments to Taiwan’s defense. Acting too aggressively could trigger a Chinese preemptive attack on American satellite and communication systems, potentially disrupting the U.S. military’s war-making ability in the Taiwan Strait and seriously jeopardizing ongoing operations around the globe. Alternatively, too weak of a response by the United States may only invite a more offensively inclined approach by the PLA, further increasing the potential danger facing the island democracy. The inevitable hesitation on the part of America may provide Beijing the time and space it needs to secure its objectives.

Should it come to war, Chinese strategists have determined that they need only inflict sufficient costs to force the United States to lose its willingness to continue the conflict. Chinese analysts Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, among others, have concluded that "smashing the adversary’s will to resist" is now more important then defeating its military forces–a maxim that resonates across the entire asymmetric sphere.

Both the civilian and military leadership in the United States begrudgingly recognize the opportunity cost phenomenon that affects democratic societies at war. If the PLA were to preemptively invade Taiwan, while conducting simultaneous battlespace-denial operations against the United States, how would American leaders respond after several weeks of costly engagements? When the United States eventually breaks through, would it then look to liberate Taiwan, or, more likely, conclude that risking a wider war with China over the small island democracy falls far outside its calculated national interest?

PLA officer Jiang Lei analyzed the opportunity cost scenario further in his doctoral dissertation: "it is possible for the side with inferior equipment to strive to gain the initiative on the battlefield [ ] and compel the superior enemy to pull out of the conflict. Because the superpower must cope with the influence of its other fundamental strategic interest, the level of its intervention is limited; moreover, it will seek to win victory in the war at minimum cost." Successful area-denial operations, therefore, would enable Beijing to achieve its primary political objectives through a concerted effort to restrain America’s will to fight an escalated war.

Clearly, a competitor armed with the ability to challenge America at the high-end of asymmetrical warfare poses a substantial dilemma. Is the United States prepared? Over the past decade anti-access has been accounted for and increasingly discussed in almost all high-level military documents. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review committed the U.S. military to countering "political anti-access and irregular warfare challenges." Indeed, the Navy’s "Sea Shield" concept–part of its Seapower 21 vision–is solely intended to ensure continued freedom of access by countering enemy anti-access threats.

In addition to identifying the increased potential of area-denial strategies, the United States has invested itself in a number of political and military measures to ensure it remains adequately prepared in the coming years.

To help search out and destroy China’s growing fleet of submarines, the United States has turned to the P-8A Poseidon, a modified Boeing 737-800 able to conduct area-wide anti-submarine warfare. The innovative capabilities of the Poseidon ensure it will be at the center of America’s effort to counter China’s area-denial efforts.

The Pentagon has also announced a $225 million upgrade for its Raytheon-built MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), a radar controlled gun designed to defend against low and high flying, maneuvering anti-ship missile threats. The Phalanx is also being sold to Australia as part of the deal, extending the anti-missile defensive capabilities of one of America’s most important Pacific allies.

Finally, the U.S. and Australia have agreed to partner in the deployment of the Wideband Global Satellite Communications system (WGS). The Wideband satellite constellation, which will include six satellites by 2013, aims to provide advanced communications capabilities for U.S. and Australian warfighters. By jointly operating and owning the WGS system, the United States will not only increase its interoperability with a steadfast ally, but it will also create a geostrategic dilemma for China by forcing the PLA to target both U.S. and Australian military satellites in order to comprehensively paralyze American’s command and control network. This implicit attempt to bind the space-based capabilities of both the United States and Australia is an example of the shrewd maneuvering the Pentagon must continue to make to stay ahead of the anti-access curve.

These measures represent only a variety of the steps being taken to deal with the anti-access threat. Because of the susceptibility of U.S. information networks, perhaps the greatest preparations the United States can make is to conduct military exercises without the use of continuous, high-bandwidth communications between units. This would enable the various military components (carriers, battleships, submarines and aircraft) to experience acting independently, or in a semi-autonomous state, more adequately preparing them to meet the requirements of a C4ISR-less environment.

While Washington continues to debate the potentiality of China becoming a "responsible stakeholder," the ways in which to successfully ‘manage" its rise, and how best to increase PLA transparency, the PLA has remained committed to modernizing, expanding, and deploying an increasingly sophisticated military capable of seriously challenging American power. In the near term, instead of concerning themselves with the strengths of the U.S. military, PLA planners have diverted their attention to its weaknesses. In Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting an enemy that has deliberately exploited America’s military and political weaknesses has proven to be an arduous task. Is America prepared to face the high-end asymmetric strategies being deployed by a Chinese state readying itself at all levels–political, military, and economic–to challenge U.S. predominance? The answer to this question will undoubtedly shape the geostrategic environment of the Asia-Pacific theater in the coming decades.

This article appeared in today’s Weekly Standard.

Quietly following Chavez’s lead

 

 

While the international community was focusing on the recent Venezuelan referendum, another equally problematic situation was developing in Bolivia. On December 9, 2007, the constituent assembly approved the text of a new constitution which faces fierce opposition from certain groups including six of Bolivia’s nine provinces. The approval of a draft constitution requires two thirds of the votes of the constituent assembly which President Evo Morales does not have.

When the assembly was convened on Saturday, Morales’ party, the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) decided to change the rules and say that the approval of a constitutional text does not require two thirds of the total members but two thirds of the total members present. Of course, the only people who were there to vote were the supporters of Evo Morales. Only 160 assemblymen out of a total of 255 were present at the vote. That was the solution the supporters of Morales found to the problem of political stagnation he has been facing for the last several months. Assemblymen invented on the spot a new law that enabled them to pass major text for a constitutional reform that must be ready by December 14 and be subject to a popular referendum.

The plans by President Morales, a staunch Chávez follower, to revamp Bolivia’s constitution have reignited long-running conflicts between more indigenous Andean regions, where Morales has his support base, and wealthier lowland areas. There have been violent protests in Bolivia for and against a new draft constitution. In what appeared to be an effort to address the conflict, Morales proposed a referendum to decide whether he and nine regional governors should remain in their posts. Six of the country’s nine regions are controlled by his opponents. Morales says the reforms will give poor Bolivians a voice in running the country but his opponents argue they give the President too much power. Speaking on television, Morales said he would be sending a proposal to Congress to put his leadership to the popular vote. [1] Many criticize Morales’ actions since he took office as President as being divisive. His policy to nationalize the oil and gas industries has alienated foreign governments and investors. His so-called "democratic revolution" which promises a transfer of wealth and power from Bolivia’s elite to the mainly Andean Indian poor, has alarmed the more affluent eastern provinces.

Why are the governors protesting?

These states form a giant half-moon across Bolivia’s relatively prosperous eastern half, an area dominated by a largely mestizo and white population that has began to see with skepticism the newfound influence of the Aymara and Quechua Indian population of Bolivia’s western Andean highlands. Their frustration is rooted in years of living under Bolivia’s heavily centralized government. The protesters want the right to elect local officials now appointed by La Paz, along with more government money for health, education and infrastructure. [2] In addition, the governors of these affluent provinces are afraid of Morales’ evident plan to turn Bolivia into a Socialist state, nationalizing all sectors of the economy, following in Chavez’s footsteps and they don’t want to help Evo’s "project." They have the resources and don’t want Morales to finance his Bolivarian Revolution in their country with the money these provinces generate. They want Bolivia to become economically viable and that is why they are seeking autonomy. They have said that they will "declare de facto autonomy" on December 14.

As stated six provinces announced they will not respect this measure. They began a hunger strike and called for civil disobedience. Controversy around constitutional reforms in Bolivia has been in high gear since the constituent assembly was elected in mid 2007. Indeed, Morales considered his election in December, 2005 as a mandate to transform Bolivian society. Morales was brought to power by a majority of previously excluded sectors, mainly indigenous populations. By the same token, he felt that the vote indicated non-confidence in the old political institutions and parties associated with an obsolete system. The protest social movements that preceded those elections provided this sense that everything that belongs to the past could be swept away to give birth to a "re-foundation" of the Bolivian state. This sense of having a mandate encouraged Morales to exercise power based on the simple principle of majority rule.

Thus, the constituent assembly is an idea that merges as popular social movements advanced in the political arena. The call for a constitutional assembly was negotiated between Morales and the opposition. At the same time a referendum on the autonomy for the Bolivian provinces was negotiated at the request of the opposition. The idea was to leave certain provinces in the hands of the old elite to continue controlling resources in the provinces and so avoid the expansion of the socialist revolution proposed by Morales. A national referendum was conducted with the majority voting against provincial autonomy except for residents of the provinces of the lowlands (eastern provinces).

The new proposed constitution recognizes the pre-colonial right of the indigenous people to their territory, to autonomy and to self-rule. The constitution adopts the moral principles of the indigenous people of the highlands. It establishes that the hydrocarbons are property of the Bolivian people thus declaring null and void all the contracts that violate this principle.  Those who violate these principles will be considered "traitors to the nation". The constitution also establishes the principle of private property but leaves open the possibility of expropriation in case there is any public need that requires it.

The constitution, contrary to the intention of the assemblymen in November 2007 does not secure the indefinite re-election of the President and does not deal with the issue of land distribution. Land distribution and federalization of local province natural resources was an element of antagonism as residents of the lowlands were afraid of nationalization. The constitution provides power to the indigenous population (which constitute about 55% of the population) and to the Bolivian state apparatus. The laws for the Indians have generated the perception that Bolivia will become a de-facto national state of the Indians, making indigenous people first class citizens above the mestizos and the white populations. Due to nationalistic and chauvinistic ethnic voices in the Indian population, anxiety is increasing as they attempt to redraw the current maps in favor of some sort of restoration of pre-colonial Indian sovereignty.   Regarding private property and other rights it leaves citizens vulnerable to the arbitrariness of state power that can make decisions based on what they consider to be state interests.

This is why these proposed reforms have generated a movement in six provinces to become autonomous from the national state. These provinces want to keep their resources and are afraid of a totalitarian take over by Morales.  

Undoubtedly, there is a lot to be done to correct the problem of the marginal sectors of society in Bolivia, more so when the problem of poverty and scarcity is overwhelming. However, Morales from the beginning tried to impose a project while ignoring an electoral minority with a real power on the ground. Instead of negotiating, Morales moved to impose his vision on others like a bulldozer, as did Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez. The difference between him and Chavez is that Chavez was able to enlist supporters thanks to his oil-rich resources which enabled him to bribe a population unwilling to think about the long term consequences of his despotic rule. Morales counted on Chavez’s help which he received but was not sufficient in bringing him the power he wanted.   In Bolivia, the followers of Morales are not an overwhelming majority and the opposition defending their attacked interests did not remain passive.

Street confrontations rightly pushed Morales into negotiations but quickly Morales bypassed all the rules in order to obtain what he really wanted: which was a constitutional reform whose legitimacy will take the form of a contract between him and the indigenous populations while excluding the mestizo and white populations of the country. This move is simply not constitutional by any definition and is not legal under current Bolivian law (which Morales has nothing but contempt for).

Bolivians are now up in arms. They are also encouraged by Chavez’s recent defeat in the referendum over constitutional reforms since Chavez has always been a source of inspiration for Morales. What is more ominous, Morales’ definition of the conflict inevitably creates an indigenous/non-indigenous clash that could end up in civil strife involving dangerous interethnic and interracial dimensions.  This can spread like a spiral into other areas in Latin America where indigenous racial nationalism movements exist (Peru, Chile) and consequently could have serious implications for regional stability. The recent public slaughter of two dogs by an indigenous group in Bolivia was perceived as a clear message to the opposition and reflects the validity of the point in question. This type of bloody and dirty conflict that Morales is encouraging represents Hugo Chavez’s dream of making Latin America chaotic so that it will require a continental savior like himself. Having said so let us not underestimate the striving potential of the new grassroots nationalistic and populist movements that have emerged in South America in the 1990’s, particularly in the indigenous community.  

 

  1. Bolivians set for a historic vote. December 6, 2007. NY Daily News.

  2. Morales faces middle-class protests in Bolivia. January 28, 2007. Los Angeles Times.