By Robert T. McLean

Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, many remain surprised that a coalition of states has not formed to balance the power of the United States.  Authors such as Randall L. Schweller of Ohio State University continue to offer theories towards explaining the supposed state of affairs and attribute much of the unbalance to domestic political factors that discourage the necessary efforts to ultimately challenge American primacy.  But the last decade has witnessed something quite different as two powerful states have emerged to present the first post-Cold War challenge to a United States centered unipolar world.

Both Russia and China have exceedingly different foreign policy aims than the United States, and domestic complexities inevitably have distanced Moscow and Beijing from Washington on a series of pressing international matters.  The common aspiration to produce a multipolar world has driven Russia and China to effectively align against the United States incorporating a skilled approach of realpolitik that often results in support for actors that undermine the global security environment.  

One must look no further than the present crisis with Iran to come to terms with the fact that Moscow and Beijing have been rather unhelpful in pressuring the world’s most nefarious regimes to behave in a more responsible manner.  The unwillingness to apply sanctions or even mention the use of force only emboldens Tehran, giving the impression that serious negotiations are unnecessary because serious consequences will likely be avoided.  Likewise, North Korea’s nuclear threats may have never materialized had the Russians and, to a greater extent, the Chinese not provided economic aid and diplomatic protection to this communist holdover.  Unfortunately, the contemporary struggles in reaching a consensus on Iran and North Korea are neither new nor unusual.  In fact, from the time of its inception, the Sino-Russian alliance has been the facilitator of not only rogue regimes, but also the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations.

The Origins of the Nexus

In 1996 Russia saw a fundamental shift in its foreign policy.  Yevgeny Primakov assumed the reign of the Foreign Ministry, and Boris Yeltsin wrestled with a Russian Federation weakened by the war in Chechnya.  Apprehensions over territorial integrity and the eastward march of NATO provided an impetus for the Kremlin to refocus its energies on promoting its national interests in more assertive tones.   

At the same time Beijing was experiencing a heightening of tensions in the Taiwan Strait resulting in President Clinton’s eventual deployment of two carrier battle groups in an effort to clearly warn the mainland against any escalation of military provocations toward Taipei.  Having observed the advances of the United States in missile technology during the Gulf War, the Chinese were also becoming desperate to obtain the advanced weapons and technology needed to modernize their military forces.  

While Russia resumed selling arms to China in 1990 as a product of improved relations derived from an altered Soviet foreign policy towards the end of the Cold War, it was not until 1996 that mutual suspicions began to seriously thaw.   This was essentially reflected in the transfers of Russian arms and technology to China.  According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), in the seven years from 1990 through 1996 Moscow exported $3.8 billion in arms to Beijing, with $2.5 billion of that occurring in 1996 alone.  This trend has largely continued as China currently accounts for about forty-five percent of Russian arms sales.  

The event that likely contributed more than any other to the strengthening of ties between Russia and China, however, was the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.  Moscow and Beijing maintained a position that is rather consistent with how they have approached recent international exigencies.  An emphasis on diplomacy and consensus was the order of the day, and any action taken without a UN Security Council resolution was deemed illegal.  However, such denunciations of the use of force appear rather hollow when analyzing the rapid deployment of Russian forces to Chechnya just several months later.    

Yet the motivations for the Russians and Chinese were palpable.  Besides Moscow’s close relations with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, both the Kremlin and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) feared ethnic separatist movements in their own respective countries and neither had the desire to set a precedent for uninvited foreign intervention.  The rapid escalation of ethnic conflict and the subsequent intervention by foreign powers provided a paradigmatic illustration of the fate that could fall on their own respective countries should such a likely scenario emerge.

If not the decisive turning point, it is clear that Kosovo represented a catalyst for pushing the leaders in Beijing and Moscow toward the conclusion that mutual cooperation to counter the West would be needed in the future.  Dr. Sergei Troush, a NATO Democratic Institute Fellow, stated at the time: "If earlier, foreign policy elites in both Russia and China had serious reservations to the thesis of ‘strategic partnership’ and different understanding of this partnership, now, the necessity to develop such partnership for countering ‘hegemonism’ and ‘military dictate’ of NATO outweighs all other arguments." Thus, the alliance was solidified, as was the policy of ending the American-led international order.  

This is a point that has largely been missed by both security policy practitioners and their observers in the media and academia.  Whereas a resurgence of proclamations reminiscent of those following the collapse of the Soviet Union labeling the United States an unchallenged superpower of the sheer dominance not seen since the Roman Empire occurred after September 11, 2001, it has become increasingly popular in the last several years to declare that America’s reign as the leader of a unipolar world will inevitably come to an end in the not-too-distant future.  

In fact, Coral Bell, a widely respected authority on power politics in the international arena, made the case in the Winter 2006 issue of The American Interest that we have indeed reached the "twilight of the unipolar world."   However, while Bell accurately stated that a foreign policy based on balance of power is both dangerous and likely to produce informal alliances against the United States, while acknowledging that such a scenario "would be the worst possible outcome for Washington’s diplomacy," she – reminiscent of countless other analysts – fails to recognize that this is precisely what has been taking place for the last several years.  This, along with the prevalence of colliding national interests, has inevitably provided the basis for the diplomatic difficulties experienced by both the Clinton and Bush Administrations when dealing with Moscow and Beijing.  

Guardians of the Rogues

Perhaps the most recognized element of Russia and China’s disturbing behavior has been their support for rogue regimes.  However, most references of the inability to get the Russians and the Chinese to side with the United States in the Security Council fail to include the dynamics behind the deadlock.  Rarely are the motivations of Beijing and Moscow articulated, and even less frequent have been any offerings of the dramatic impact that these nations’ policies have on the world. 

While the vast majority of publicized differences between the permanent members of the West and our eastern counterparts in Security Council relate to the weapons programs of both Iran and North Korea, the problem runs much deeper than that.   In an extensive list of rogue regimes that either or both Russia and China support it is apparent that many of these would certainly have their days numbered without the political and economic support of Moscow and Beijing.  The unfortunate fact is that these two powers have used their vast resources to sustain some of the world’s worst regimes in an effort to both serve their interests and to ensure that the United States is undermined wherever possible.  The scope of these relationships is far too vast to copiously encompass in this essay; nevertheless, it is worth examining just a few of the more noteworthy examples.

In Latin America Hugo Chavez has used his oil wealth and anti-American rhetoric to establish rather concrete partnerships with Russia and China.  Besides for an arms supplier in Russia and an alternative energy market to the "American fascists" provided by China, Chavez’s anti-American positions and anti-imperialist rhetoric made him the favorite in both Beijing and Moscow to a assume Latin America’s de facto designated seat on the UN Security Council.  The well documented sale of Russian arms to Caracas and Chinese investment in Venezuela’s hydrocarbon infrastructure only partially explain the motivations behind Moscow and Beijing’s expanding ties with Hugo Chavez’s regime.  

Commenting on the PRC’s view of its involvement in the Western Hemisphere, Chinese senior legislator Cheng Siwei told Xinhua in early October: "All being developing countries, China shares many common ground with Latin American countries."  He then clarified with a rather palpable reference to the United States: "We have all experienced the fight against imperialism and colonialism and the struggle for independence. All of these have forged the political basis for bilateral cooperation."  Just months prior, while referring to Chavez’s late July visit to Russia, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Kamynin expressed similar sentiments emanating from the Kremlin as he told the Moscow-based news agency Interfax that the "two countries’ positions on most international issues are similar or identical."  Considering the exhaustive list of outrageous public pronouncements by the Venezuelan leader, such a claim by a Russian spokesperson should be ample evidence that Moscow shares few of the same interests as the United States and envisions a quite different international order.

Beyond North Korea in Asia, the dictatorships in Burma and Uzbekistan have maintained their firm grip on power as a result of powerful relationships with both Beijing and Moscow.  After Uzbek President Islam Karimov had demonstrators massacred in Andijon in May 2005, the United States decisively responded and condemned the government’s actions.  This turn of events presented Russia and China with the opportunity to consolidate their relations with Karimov and have United States forces expelled from Uzbekistan.  However, the human rights situation in Burma is far more severe, and Washington has had sanctions on the military junta for the most of nineteen years to virtually no avail.  On January 12, the United States and its allies were finally able to put the issue to a vote at the UN Security Council. The failed draft resolution called for the Burmese regime to restore fundamental freedoms and engage in political reforms.  It is of little surprise, however, that it was both Russia and China that joined to veto the resolution.  

In Africa, the regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe continue to receive political, economic, and military support from Beijing and Moscow.  The sense of vulnerability without Russian and Chinese support was illustrated when Zimbabwe’s president Robert Mugabe thanked the two countries in last year’s Heroes’ Day ceremony "for standing by us in the Security Council and fending off the threats from the West."  China, likewise, currently maintains that no United Nations peacekeeping forces should enter Sudan until the genocidal regime extends an invitation. Meanwhile, Mugabe continues to be propped up by Beijing’s financial assistance despite a disastrous economic policy that has resulted in the confiscation of land from both the country’s poor urban and white farming communities, thus resulting in inflation rates soaring above 1,000 percent.  

In Sudan hundreds of thousands are raped, murdered, and forced from their villages as the West’s efforts to improve the situation are undermined by unconditional support for the regime in Khartoum from Beijing and Moscow.  While Russia has refused to abandon its aid to the Sudanese military, China continually matches this effort with political and diplomatic endeavors of its own.  In fact, just as outgoing UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for a hearing on the human rights abuses in Darfur in late November, the PRC had officials stationed in Khartoum for a meeting of the Sino-Arab Friendship Association celebrating the shared policy of "no interfering in internal affairs of other countries."  

Further north, despite the political assassinations in Lebanon likely conceived in Damascus, the Kremlin has maintained its traditionally strong relations with Syria and continues to provide them with various weapons systems and their components.  The sale of advanced SA-18 surface-to-air missiles in late 2005 is just one example.  Similarly, prior to Libya’s late 2003 disclosure and abandonment of its weapons of mass destruction programs, China and Russia fostered strong political and economic ties with the distinguished terror master Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.  As a consequence of its continued defiance of international norms, Libya fell under harsh penalties in the mid 1990’s with Congress and the Bush Administration deciding to renew the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act in the summer of 2001.  This drew sharp criticism from Russia, whose companies faced penalties for continued cooperation with Tehran and Tripoli.  A source in the Russian Foreign Ministry told Interfax at the time that Washington was "once again trying to give its internal legislation an extra-territorial character and put pressure on the other countries on an invented pretext."  The official also accurately claimed that these sanctions would not stop cooperation with either regime.  

Indeed, both Beijing and Moscow continue to maintain extensive economic ties with Iran.  Hard currency, natural resources, arms, and diplomatic support are the basis for this strategic triangle.  In 2005, Russia ran an approximate $1.8 billion trade surplus with Iran through the export of primarily arms, technology, heavy machinery, and steel.  While bilateral trade decreased in the first quarter of 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has gone on the record to state that any possible placement of sanctions on Iran will fail to dissuade Moscow from continuing its military cooperation with Tehran.

To provide a glimpse into the military assistance the Iranians are receiving from Moscow, it is worth offering just a few examples in this vast arena of advanced weapons that have been, and continue to be, transferred to the increasingly problematic regime in Tehran.  In November 2005, Russia agreed to sell Iran 29 Tor-M1 air defense systems capable of destroying both aircraft and cruise missiles.  These were only one part of a reported $1 billion package that also included MIG fighter jets and patrol boats.  Moscow has also recently engaged in negotiations with Tehran regarding the S-300PMU1 long range air defense systems, radar stations, and T-90S tanks.  The British defense journal Jane’s Intelligence Digest reported in the spring that the Russian sale of highly advanced S-300PS surface-to-air missiles to Belarus may windup being secretly transferred to Iran as part of a trilateral agreement between Moscow, Minsk, and Tehran.  

But what is it that drives Moscow and Beijing to provide such substantial assistance to regimes such as that in the Islamic Republic of Iran?  The CCP Central Committee in a subsidiary publication of the People’s Daily published an article on in late August that makes all too clear the position held in Beijing on a series of international issues.  The newspaper, Huanqiu Shibao, has strong ties to the Chinese military, and lucidly makes the case that the United States is on the decline.  Commenting on the current difficulties with Iran, the publication celebrates that "Iran has seen through the US strategic situation and her pragmatic nature of ‘bullying the weak’ and ‘fearing the strong."  Such conclusions by Beijing are not only worrisome because they demonstrate a sense of solidarity with Tehran, but they also could be dangerous for the fact that a display of impotence with Iran on Washington’s part could well lead the PRC to the conclusion that the United States may be little more than a paper tiger.  

Again, it is worth emphasizing that the Russians and Chinese are not driven purely by national interests irrespective of the United States.  In fact, as was noted above, the interests of the nexus not only happen to differ from those of the United States on myriad international issues, but those interests are often centered upon the goal of weakening the United States’ relative power.  The bipartisan U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission presented similar conclusions in November with the release of its annual report to congress when it noted the following:

China’s regional activities in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East and around East Asia are beginning to assume the character of a counterbalancing strategy vis-à-vis the United States.  That is, China’s support for rogue regimes and anti-American governments and groups in vital regions serves an international purpose: to balance American power, create an alternative model of governance, and frustrate the ability of the international community to uphold its norms.

What the report fails to mention, however, is that Beijing’s regional initiatives are all the more potent and ominous with Moscow acting as co-chair of this global enterprise.  This has not only been demonstrated in both bilateral and trilateral relationships, but also in well established multilateral institutions.  The Russian and Chinese led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the most alarming example of these as this expanding alliance has both in its stated objectives and in practice demonstrated its desire to create a new world order based on multipolarity.  While one of the stated central objectives of the SCO is to counter regional terrorism, Iran has not only become an observer nation in the organization, but the alliance is contemplating offering Tehran full-member status despite its widely held reputation as the world’s leading state sponsor of terror.  The contradictory nature of Iran’s association with the SCO is just one of the many illustrations of Russian and Chinese complicity with both rogue regimes, and even more critically, terrorists and their supporters.

Terrorism and Realpolitik

The basic presumption for most in the West is that while Beijing and Moscow may not be the most helpful partners, they at least share the common goal with the United States of eradicating terrorism.  Sadly, this is not true.

Hamas, Hezbollah, and even al Qaeda have benefited from actions out of the Kremlin and the Chinese security establishment.  It is no secret that Yaser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization were heavily supported by the Soviet Union in the seventies and eighties, and Moscow’s healthy relationship with Palestinian leadership is one of the many elements that survived the death of the Soviet Union.  The Kremlin’s rapid recognition of the Hamas dominated government in the Palestinian territories drew sharp criticism in various circles in the West, but it was the diplomatic support of Hezbollah in its recent standoff with Israel that all too clearly demonstrated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to work with terrorists if it improves Russia’s position in the Middle East and helps undermine the United States and its allies.

In fact, Hezbollah’s use of the Russian made Kornet-E anti-tank laser-guided missiles against Israeli forces in Lebanon displays that Moscow’s promiscuity in its arms export’s to rogue regimes has a direct impact on the forces terrorist organizations can employ.  Russia is know to have sold Syria these weapons and claimed to be shocked when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) provided substantial evidence that Hezbollah used them in the July and August fighting in Southern Lebanon.  As noted above, Moscow also provides Tehran with advanced weapons despite the fact that Iran is a major supporter of Hezbollah.  The Russian foreign ministry has defended such weapons sales by stating: "Russia always limits its exports to Iran to arms used only for defense and [they are] not capable of destabilizing the situation in the region."  As we have seen, this explanation is rather unconvincing as many of these rogue states simply act as intermediaries in forwarding those weapons to third parties, not excluding terrorist organizations.  

Regrettably, Beijing has been an even greater enabler of terrorism than Moscow.   This was most clearly established after the United States fired cruise missiles into Afghanistan and Sudan following the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.  A significant number of the missiles that landed in Afghanistan never exploded and Osama bin Laden and his cohorts were left with valuable technology that they had little capability of capitalizing on themselves.   Fortunately for al Qaeda, a buyer quickly emerged.   

Although Beijing denies the claims, European intelligence sources believe that the Chinese purchased several Tomahawk missiles from bin Laden to reverse engineer soon after the unexploded missiles landed in Afghanistan.  Both the Washington Post and The Guardian reported in October 2001 that Italian counter-terrorism officers essentially confirmed earlier reports through the bugging of an apartment of a local al Qaeda cell.  The papers obtained a transcript of the secretly recorded conversation in which the al Qaeda operative revealed that several "Chinese businessmen" paid as much as $10 million for the missiles.  

While the CIA has revealed little publicly on this matter, after the stories broke in the fall of 2001 a spokesman for the agency admitted that unsubstantiated evidence about this transaction had circulated since 1998, but it was unlikely that bin Laden received $10 million.  This explanation is far from comforting.  Beijing’s desire to obtain state-of-the-art missile technology coupled with their support of the Taliban at the United Nations – on December 19, 2000, China elected to abstain from UNSC Resolution 1333 which called on states to end their assistance to the Taliban – provide a solid foundation for the plausibility that the intelligence was accurate.  If indeed true, such a wanton act of providing Osama bin Laden with millions of dollars to further fund his terror campaign certainly needs to be addressed more thoroughly when examining who are Washington’s real partners in the War on Terror.   Considering the 9/11 Commission Report’s assessment that the operations that led to that fateful day cost about $400,000 to $500,000, it is not inconceivable that some of the money that may have been provided by Beijing could well have later helped finance the planning and execution of al Qaeda operations since 1998.  

It is also worth bearing in mind that bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other wanted terrorists are believed to be hiding in northwest Pakistan.  While the regime of Pervez Musharraf has consistently refused to permit American military operations in the region or take strong actions themselves, it is also true that the Chinese have more influence than anyone in Islamabad.  Were Beijing to apply pressure on Musharraf to cooperate to a greater degree with the United States and join Washington in its criticisms of the placating peace treaty with the Taliban in Waziristan, the Pakistani leader might become a little more accommodating to plans to capture or kill bin Laden and his associates rather than claiming that such wanted terrorists persist in hiding out in Afghanistan.  It is more likely, in fact, that Beijing has been obstructive in this regard as they neither want a United States military presence in neighboring Pakistan, nor do they want offensive operations in Waziristan to lead toward instability throughout the country.  As long as Beijing can keep its approximate ten million Muslims in Xinjiang relatively isolated from extremist groups – as is the case with Moscow, the fear of ethnic separatism remains prevalent – the Chinese will have little concern with appeasing America’s enemies in Pakistan.  

While the United States is winning the War on Terror, things could be going considerably more smoothly had Russia and China truly been on our side.  Weapons, foreign terrorists, and Iranian agents have obstructed coalition efforts in Iraq – an integral part of the War on Terror – facilitated by Moscow and Beijing’s continued support of Tehran and Damascus.  

Neither Russia nor China desires to see a United States defeat in Iraq and for that country to descend into chaos and civil war.  Such a scenario would destabilize the entire region and provide a launching ground for future terrorist attacks throughout the region and the world.  However, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao are cautiously satisfied as the United States has been drawn into a counterinsurgency that challenges the vary foundations of an internationally assertive United States, let alone one that seeks to transform the Middle East through the promotion of democracy.  As Fyodor Lukyanov stated in The Moscow Times in mid-September, "Moscow bases its modus operandi exclusively on national interests and a balance of power more appropriate to the classical geopolitics of the 19th century," and thus, "[h]umanitarian and ideological motivations behind the actions of others are interpreted as an attempt to conceal the genuine intent."  This is as true in Iraq as it is in Russia’s near-abroad.  Whether Beijing’s suspicions are as real as Moscow’s in this regard is somewhat hard to determine, but the CCP’s one-party rule inevitably puts it at odds with a Washington that supports human freedom and democracy.

IT HAS NOW BECOME UNMISTAKABLE that from the last dictatorship in Europe to the first major foreign attacks on the continental United States since the War of 1812, both rogue regimes and terrorist entities have witnessed the benefits of a Sino-Russian effort to create a multipolar world.  While Moscow and Beijing rarely actively encourage rogue states and their terrorist counterparts to initiate regional or global confrontations, their failure to join responsible nations in efforts to confront and curb dangerous behavior provides encouragement enough.  When measured by historical standards, Russia, and even China, fall nowhere near the level of others that could truly be classifieds as evil states.  Thus, it would certainly be inappropriate to label them as such.  Yet, it must be kept in mind that every regime that has earned itself that distinction has the support of at least one, if not both, of the members of the nexus.  

The aforementioned August commentary published by the CCP Central Committee eerily warned when referring to a perceived relative deterioration of American power: "The mantis stalks the cicada, unaware of the oriole behind.   And the hunter is even targeting the oriole.  A new ‘hunter’ has shown up."  Regrettably, a majority of those in the West remain unaware of the predators that seek to destroy the current American-led international order.  The United States will not hypothetically be faced with competition for primacy at some uncertain time in the future; rather, it is being challenged at the current moment led by both Russia and China.  As long as this remains the case, Washington will continue to experience immeasurable difficulties in implementing a largely successful foreign policy.  The first step in meeting these challenges will be realizing that other major powers often have conflicting interests with the United States and some, regrettably, actively labor towards assisting its decline.  Democrats by and large fail to recognize that foreign policy difficulties reach beyond the current White House, while the Bush Administration, for its part, has failed to formulate creative policies for dealing with these complex dynamics.  It is in America’s interests that both parties come to fully understand that this nexus knows few limitations in the means in which they will employ to advance their interests and recreate a multipolar world.  

This essay by CSP Research Associate Robert T. McLean appeared on January 31, 2007 in Global Politician.