Tag Archives: ISIS

U.S. Rail Security and Terrorist Track Records

In response to renewed security concerns that al Qaeda is plotting to smuggle and detonate cell phone explosives on passenger aircraft bound for the United States, the Transportation Security Administration recently announcedthat passengers flying into the U.S. from overseas will have to power up their laptops and cellphones before boarding, and that those whose devices won’t turn on will not be allowed to board.

Amidst the attention this threat to aviation is receiving in the media, it is perhaps not surprising that a significant anniversary marking major attacks on other forms of passenger transport has gone largely unnoticed.  Nine years ago this week, al Qaeda jihadists detonated bombs in London on three subway trains and one double-decker bus, killing dozens of people and wounding hundreds.

Some analysts are warning that ground transportation systems in European cities may yet again be targeted as al Qaeda vies for primacy over its ISIS-rivals.  As Jamie Dettmer at the Daily Beast reports:

A senior European security official told The Daily Beast there are fears as well that jihadists recently returned from fighting in Syria with al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra are conspiring to detonate bombs on railways and buses in major European capitals such as London and Paris…

…[Washington Institute for Near East Policy scholar Aaron] Zelin says the most likely model for assaults on European transport systems would be the March 2004 Madrid train bombings and the coordinated suicide attacks in July 2005 in central London that targeted civilians using the London Underground and buses. The London bombings killed 52 civilians and wounded more than 700, while in Madrid the bombings of commuter trains killed 191 people and injured 1,800.

As some have observed, the volume of rail passengers entering trains from multiple locations, coupled with the challenge of monitoring disbursed infrastructure like tracks and tunnels, create significant challenges for preventing terrorist attacks on rail transport.  But as events in London nine years ago should remind us, we need to guard against attacks on the rails as vigorously as we are attempting to in our skies, if not more so.

The Iraq Crisis Is Not a US Intelligence Failure

Stories are being circulated by Obama officials and some former intelligence officers that the Obama administration was caught off guard by the recent offensive in Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group because of a failure by U.S. intelligence agencies to provide warning about the ISIS threat.

Some former intelligence officers are blaming this failure on a lack of human intelligence sources in Iraq and an over-reliance on technical intelligence collection.

Congressman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, disagrees. He says the Iraq crisis is a policy and not an intelligence failure.
Rogers says the signs were there about the ISIS threat and the deteriorating situation in Iraq but Obama officials ignored them. He contends that “It was very clear to me years ago that ISIS was pooling up in a dangerous way — building training camps, drawing in jihadists from around the world. We saw all of that happening.”
I agree with Chairman Rogers. There was a wealth of information in the news media over the last year that a sectarian war was brewing in Iraq and ISIS was gaining strength in both Iraq and Syria. I am certain U.S. intelligence agencies provided similar assessments to U.S. officials based on classified information.
The event that should have caused Obama officials to shift their approach to Iraq occurred last December when ISIS seized control of Fallujah and parts of the city of Ramadi. Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn issued a public warning about the significance of this development in February when he testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that ISIS “will attempt to take territory in Iraq and Syria to exhibit its strength in 2014, as demonstrated recently in Ramadi and Fallujah, and the group’s ability to concurrently maintain multiple safe havens in Syria.”
That sounds to me like a top U.S. intelligence official was doing his job by warning U.S. officials about major global security threats.
Some have claimed U.S. intelligence analysis about ISIS could have been better and that we lack enough human intelligence sources on the ground in Iraq. Secretary of State John Kerry claimed “nobody expected” ISIS to advance so rapidly against Iraqi forces” because “we don’t have people embedded in those units.” Kerry presumably meant CIA did not have sources within ISIS.
Intelligence in areas like Iraq is always going to be limited, especially in a country where there is no U.S. troop presence and high levels of anti-Americanism. Penetrating close-knit Islamist terrorist groups like ISIS is extremely difficult for CIA, especially when they operate in dangerous areas like Iraq and Syria.
Blaming intelligence agencies for not providing a precise warning about the ISIS assault on Mosul last month distorts the capabilities of intelligence analysts. While intelligence assessments often contain remarkable foresight, intelligence agencies don’t possess crystal balls and cannot predict future actions by human actors with 100 percent accuracy.
I believe the crisis in Iraq is a major U.S. policy failure due to the Obama administration’s failure to leave a small troop presence behind after the 2011 troop withdrawal and the repeated tendency by Obama officials to discount and downplay the continuing threat from radical Islamist groups. We saw this in September 2012 when Obama officials claimed the attacks on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi was the result of an anti-Muslim video and not an attack by radical Islamists.
The intelligence oversight committees should review classified analysis on Iraq, Syria, and ISIS produced over the last year to determine whether intelligence agencies failed to provide adequate warning of the ISIS threat. I believe such an inquiry will find that U.S. intelligence analysts provided the Obama administration with excellent analysis about ISIS and the deteriorating situation in Iraq but Obama officials ignored it.

A Kurdish opportunity

There is no question that modern-day Iraq is a fractured state. This should come as no surprise, since its basic historical foundation was always weak.

It was created in 1920 by the British and French after World War I as they carved up the old Ottoman Empire. Secretary of State John F. Kerry’s efforts to encourage the various political factions to put aside their sectarian and ethnic grievances, which go back hundreds of years, to prevent Iraq’s disintegration has little to no chance of success as Iraq has descended once again into a Sunni-Shiite civil war. Without putting “boots on the ground” (other than special forces), the dynamics of the current mess must be changed in a way that contributes to our long-term strategic interests. One political action that we could take would be to support a long-sought Kurdish objective of a sovereign state that would be a loyal U.S. ally in a sea of turmoil.

We need to face reality. The Nouri al-Maliki Shiite-led government in Baghdad is no friend of the United States. At this point, Prime Minister al-Maliki, a tool of the Iranian government, has squandered the political opportunity that was given him by the United States, which was bought and paid for with the blood and sacrifices of American and coalition military forces. As Massoud Barzani, president of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region, told Mr. Kerry in a clear message, “We are facing a new reality and a new Iraq.” For Kurdistan, this could be a long-awaited opportunity.

The Obama administration has put out “feelers” on how we might cooperate with Iran on Iraq’s unraveling. This makes absolutely no sense. Iran has been at war with the United States for more than 34 years and has caused the loss of thousands of American lives, including more than one-third of our military killed or permanently injured in the Iraq war. We should never forget Tehran’s role in supporting the Sept. 11 hijackers.

The fear that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the richest terrorist group in history, may annex a central swath of Iraq and Syria, and declare a caliphate, is real. While this should be of concern, the region already has one in Iran. That nation is the recognized world leader of state-sponsored terrorism and is on the cusp of achieving a nuclear-weapon capability.

The ISIS rapid advance in conquering territory in central Iraq and the city of Mosul opened a direct path to the oil-rich Kirkuk province and Kirkuk city. With the Iraqi army units deserting their installations, the Kurdish military Peshmerga once again answered the call and moved quickly to secure deserted Iraqi army facilities and the Kirkuk oil fields. They also provided protection from ISIS terrorists to Kirkuk city and surrounding Kurdish-dominated towns and villages. This move expanded the Kurdish semi-autonomous region by more than a third. Peshmerga forces are now defending a new 620-mile border against the ISIS army. It has also altered the political landscape, which will not be easily reversed. Clearly, the time for an independent, sovereign Kurdistan has never been more necessary.

The bold move by the Peshmerga to prevent ISIS fighters from capturing Kirkuk and the oil fields should be welcomed by the Obama administration. The Kurds are a proven friend in the region. In the run-up to the 1991 war in Kuwait, they cooperated closely with the United States. In the 2003 Iraq war, when Turkey refused to cooperate with the United States, the Kurds once again stepped up and cooperated with the U.S. After Baghdad was liberated, they backed the American-led effort to establish a constitution, a functioning central government and the rule of law. They have been a reliable partner.

Regrettably, this long and tested partnership has stalled for questionable reasons over the past several years. Ever since Mr. al-Maliki, an Iranian puppet, became prime minister, U.S. administrations have supported the Baghdad central government’s increasingly confrontational approach with the Kurdish region over core issues. These involve a fair share of oil revenues, control of new oil discovered in their region, and protection from historic injustices perpetrated byBaghdad. The Obama administration, in the current crisis, should recognize that the Kurdish Peshmerga now stand as the only viable military force confronting the ISIS juggernaut in the northern part of Iraq.

More importantly, the Peshmerga also stands as the only partner in the region whom we can fully trust. While Baghdad is struggling to form a government, the Kurds have just formed a unity government. It is a functioning, secular democracy with those values deeply imbedded in Kurdish society. This is the essential element for creating a democracy, but it was unattainable by Baghdad.

The Obama administration should provide political and material support to the semi-autonomous Kurdish region to ensure that it can continue to deter and, if necessary, fight ISIS. The administration should also rebuild our relationship with the Kurds to ensure we have a long-term ally in the region — one that is increasingly politically sophisticated, economically sound and shares our core values.

Clearly, it is time to support a viable, economically stable, sovereign Kurdish nation. Another strong, reliable democratic ally of the United States in this region would be most welcome, and it makes sense strategically. An independent, sovereign Kurdistan will certainly not be welcomed by Iran. It is thought that Kurdish relations with Turkey over an sovereign Kurdistan can be managed with U.S. assistance, particularly in view of Turkey’s significant economic investment there.

Don’t Call It A Caliphate, Yet: ISIS May Run Afoul of Islamic Law

The news over the weekend that the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) had declared as Caliph of the universal Muslim Ummah its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has shaken the Middle East (and the wider Muslim world).

In classic ISIS form, the jihadist insurgent army issued a communiqué, in multiple languages, including English, to explain their decision to make the announcement that Al-Baghdadi was now Caliph Ibrahim, and ISIS was now simply, “The Islamic State.”

According to the communiqué, Al-Baghdadi was invested with the position of Caliph through the oath of loyalty sworn to him by ISIS’s people of authority (ahl al-hall wa al-‘aqd). The communiqué notes:

…the Islamic State – represented by ahlul-hall-wal-‘aqd (its people of authority), consisting of its senior figures, leaders, and the shura council – resolved to announce the establishment of the Islamic khilafah, the appointment of a khalifah for the Muslims, and the pledge of allegiance to the shaykh (sheikh), the mujahid, the scholar who practices what he preaches, the worshipper, the leader, the warrior, the reviver, descendent from the family of the Prophet, the slave of Allah, Ibrahim Ibn ‘Awwad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Badri al-Hashimi al-Husayni al-Qurashi by lineage, as-Samurra’i by birth and upbringing, al-Baghdadi by residence and scholarship. And he has accepted the bayat (pledge of allegiance). Thus, he is the imam and khalifah for the Muslims everywhere.

Compare to Minhaj al-talibin written by Imam Nawawi, a shafi’i jurist of the 13th century, as cited in the Reliance of the Traveller (Book O. Justice, O.25.4):

The Caliphate may be legally effected by an oath of fealty, which, according to the soundest positions, is the oath of those with discretionary power to enact or dissolve a pact (ahl al-hall wa al-‘aqd) of the scholars, leaders and notables able to attend.

Other legal options for investiture as a Caliph would be appointment as a successor by the previous Caliph, or to seize the position of Caliph by force of arms, but both would seem to require a pre-existing caliph from whom to take power.

So the question of whether, under Islamic law as understood, Al-Baghdadi may be legitimately recognized as Caliph rests on whether or not the ISIS “people of authority” meet the legitimate definition for that position.

While there is a range of opinion of exactly what constitutes the “ahl al-hall wa al-‘aqd,” for this purpose, the commentary on Minhaj al-talibin included in Reliance notes that while the ruling is expected to be made by all people of authority able to attend, there is no such thing as a “quorum” and the presence or lack of any particular number of individuals is irrelevant.

A commentary by Muhammed Shirbini Khatib explains,

“…if the discretionary power to enact or dissolve a pact exists in a single individual, who is obeyed, his oath of fealty is sufficient.”

It’s unclear whether ISIS has at its disposal such a worthy dignitary. The quality of scholars supporting ISIS has always been a problem for the otherwise meteoric rise of the group once referred to as Al Qaeda in Iraq. While eminent Jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi wasonce a major supporter of founder Al-Zarqawi, the most notable scholars, including al-Maqdisi, sided against ISIS, in its dispute with Al Qaeda emir Ayman Al Zawahiri. If the “people of authority” are deemed to be those scholars most esteemed within the jihadi world, then ISIS’s appointment of a Caliphate lacks authenticity and legal backing. And that does not even consider the wider world of Shariah authorities, whether operating from within the Muslim Brotherhood’s orbit such as Yusuf Al Qaradawi’s International Union of Muslim Scholars (which has formally denounced the declaration), or in traditional venues like Al-Azhar University.

Despite a dearth of scholarship, ISIS can count on the fact that nothing succeeds like success. Two things are necessary for ISIS to win it’s gambit in declaring the Caliphate reestablished. The first is that it must continue to win. Continued territorial expansion fulfills its argument that ISIS is the implementer of the Shariah law over the largest and most historically relevant real estate.

Second, ISIS must succeed in winning the oath of loyalty of key elements of the global jihad. While ISIS has succeeded in gaining popular support among online jihadi communities, individual young mujahids are of no real consequence, except in as much as they serve as recruits to further conquest. What ISIS needs, ideologically, is the support of the emirs of major jihadi groups or the support of prominent scholars. So far this has not happened, although individual members have supported the call. Victory on the battlefield may lead to such oaths, as other jihadi groups look to take advantage of the boost in recruiting and fundraising that ISIS is receiving.

Still, it would be strategically useful to avoid unwittingly consecrating Al-Baghdadi’s claim to the position of Caliph while that issue remains open to (possibly bloody) debate in jihadist circles. ISIS is exceedingly conscious of media and particularly western media, and carefully formulates its message in terms most likely to terrorize, and appeal to media coverage (the logic of distributing both mass executions and crucifixion videos, and a jihad fighters holding cats Twitter account for example). They respond quickly to exploit opportunities that seem to affirm their caliphate status, as when ISIS supporters began to retweet a statement by DHS senior advisor Mohammed Elibiary that the Caliphate was “inevitable,” following ISIS’ success in Iraq. ISIS has capitalized on media coverage about their exploits, and claim in their communiqué that even the west recognizes their new status,

“They [referring to those Muslim groups with whom ISIS disputes] never recognized the Islamic State to begin with, although America, Britain and France acknowledge its existence.”

Given that ISIS is looking for legitimacy where it can find it, let’s not present ISIS’ declaration of Caliphate as a fait accompli. Instead to the degree the facts permit it, it would be advantageous to continue to point out that even within the legal context of shariah, ISIS is on shaky ground, that they are a relative newcomer, that in the grand scheme of the Islamic world they hold limited territory, and that they do not have the respect of key scholars or jihadi emirs. At the same time, we shouldn’t delude ourselves into thinking that these things may not change, especially if ISIS continues its winning streak. But for the meantime, ISIS is not a Caliphate… yet.

Originally appeared at Breitbart.com 

Who Lied About Iraqi WMD?

So, it turns out there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, after all. Indeed, unknown quantities of nerve gas and other toxic agents were left in place after we liberated the country.

At least some of that ordinance apparently is now in the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – the jihadist army that currently controls large swaths of both countries. Worse yet, some of Saddam Hussein’s former chemical weaponeers may be back in business under the new ISIS management.

It is unsurprising that leftists and other critics of the George W. Bush administration are not recanting their outrageous libel that “Bush lied” about WMD to justify a needless and murderous war. The unanswerable question is: Why are Bush partisans still allowing them to get away with it?

The Threat Is Blowback

Watching the undoing, in a week, of victories that US forces won in Iraq at great cost over many years, Americans are asking themselves what, if anything, should be done.

What can prevent the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – the al-Qaida offshoot that President Barack Obama derided just months ago as a bunch of amateurs – from taking over Iraq? And what is at stake for America – other than national pride – if it does? Muddying the waters is the fact that the main actor that seems interested in fighting ISIS on the ground in Iraq is Iran. Following ISIS’s takeover of Mosul and Tikrit last week, the Iranian regime deployed elite troops in Iraq from the Quds Force, its foreign operations division.

The Obama administration, along with Republican Sen. Lindsay Graham, views Iran’s deployment of forces in Iraq as an opportunity for the US. The US, they argue should work with Iran to defeat ISIS.

The idea is that since the US and Iran both oppose al-Qaida, Iranian gains against it will redound to the US’s benefit.

There are two basic, fundamental problems with this idea.

First, there is a mountain of evidence that Iran has no beef with al-Qaida and is happy to work with it.

According to the 9/11 Commission’s report, between eight and 10 of the September 11 hijackers traveled through Iran before going to the US. And this was apparently no coincidence.

According to the report, Iran had been providing military training and logistical support for al-Qaida since at least the early 1990s.

After the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, al-Qaida’s leadership scattered. Many senior commanders – including bin Laden’s son Said, al-Qaida’s chief strategist Saif al-Adel and Suleiman Abu Ghaith – decamped to Iran, where they set up a command center.

From Iran, these men directed the operations of al-Qaida forces in Iraq led by Abu Musab Zarqawi. Zarqawi entered Iraq from Iran and returned to Iran several times during the years he led al-Qaida operations in Iraq.

Iran’s cooperation with al-Qaida continues today in Syria.

According to The Wall Street Journal, in directing the defense of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria, Iran has opted to leave ISIS and its al-Qaida brethren in the Nusra Front alone. That is why they have been able to expand their power in northern Syria.

Iran and its allies have concentrated their attacks against the more moderate Free Syrian Army, which they view as a threat.

Given Iran’s 20-year record of cooperation with al-Qaida, it is reasonable to assume that it is deploying forces into Iraq to tighten its control over Shi’ite areas, not to fight al-Qaida. The record shows that Iran doesn’t believe that its victories and al-Qaida’s victories are mutually exclusive.

The second problem with the idea of subcontracting America’s fight against al-Qaida to Iran is that it assumes that Iranian success in such a war would benefit America. But again, experience tells a different tale.

The US killed Zarqawi in an air strike in 2006.

Reports in the Arab media at the time alleged that Iran had disclosed Zarqawi’s location to the US. While the reports were speculative, shortly after Zarqawi was killed, then-secretary of state Condoleezza Rice floated the idea of opening nuclear talks with Iran for the first time.

The Iranians contemptuously rejected her offer. But Rice’s willingness to discuss Iran’s nuclear weapons program with the regime, even as it was actively engaged in killing US forces in Iraq, ended any serious prospect that the Bush administration would develop a coherent plan for dealing with Iran in a strategic and comprehensive way.

Moreover, Zarqawi was immediately replaced by one of his deputies. And the fight went on.

So if Iran did help the US find Zarqawi, the price the US paid for Iran’s assistance was far higher than the benefit it derived from killing Zarqawi.

This brings us to the real threat that the rise of ISIS – and Iran – in Iraq poses to the US. That threat is blowback.

Both Iran and al-Qaida are sworn enemies of the United States, and both have been empowered by events of the past week.

Because they view the US as their mortal foe, their empowerment poses a danger to the US.

But it is hard for people to recognize how events in distant lands can directly impact their lives.

In March 2001, when the Taliban blew up the Bamiyan Buddhas statues in Afghanistan, the world condemned the act. But no one realized that the same destruction would be brought to the US six months later when al-Qaida destroyed the World Trade Center and attacked the Pentagon.

The September 11 attacks were the blowback from the US doing nothing to contain the Taliban and al-Qaida.

North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile tests, as well as North Korean proliferation of both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to rogue regimes, like Iran, that threaten the US, are the beginnings of the blowback from the US decision to reach a nuclear deal with Pyongyang in the 1990s that allowed the regime to keep its nuclear installations.

The blowback from Iran’s emergence as a nuclear power is certain to dwarf what the world has seen from North Korea so far.

Yet rather than act in a manner that would reduce the threat of blowback from Iraq’s disintegration and takeover by America’s worst enemies, the Obama administration gives every indication that it is doubling down on the disastrous policies that led the US to this precarious juncture.

The only strategy that the US can safely adopt today is one of double containment. The aim of double containment is to minimize the capacity of Iran and al-Qaida to harm the US and its interests.

But to contain your enemies, you need to understand them. You need to understand their nature, their aims, their support networks and their capabilities.

Unfortunately, in keeping with what has been the general practice of the US government since the September 11 attacks, the US today continues to ignore or misunderstand all of these critical considerations.

Regarding al-Qaida specifically, the US has failed to understand that al-Qaida is a natural progression from the political/religious milieu of Salafist/Wahabist or Islamist Islam, from whence it sprang. As a consequence, anyone who identifies with Islamist religious and political organizations is a potential supporter and recruit for al-Qaida and its sister organizations.

There were two reasons that George W. Bush refused to base US strategy for combating al-Qaida on any cultural context broader than the Taliban.

Bush didn’t want to sacrifice the US’s close ties with Saudi Arabia, which finances the propagation and spread of Islamism. And he feared being attacked as a bigot by Islamist organizations in the US like the Council on American Islamic Relations and its supporters on the Left.

As for Obama, his speech in Cairo to the Muslim world in June 2009 and his subsequent apology tour through Islamic capitals indicated that, unlike Bush, Obama understands that al-Qaida is not a deviation from otherwise peaceful Islamist culture.

But unlike Bush, Obama blames America for its hostility. Obama’s radical sensibilities tell him that America pushed the Islamists to oppose it. As he sees it, he can appease the Islamists into ending their war against America.

To this end, Obama has prohibited federal employees from conducting any discussion or investigation of Islamist doctrine, terrorism, strategy and methods and the threat all pose to the US.

These prohibitions were directly responsible for the FBI’s failure to question or arrest the Tsarnaev brothers in 2012 despite the fact that Russian intelligence tipped it off to the fact that the 2013 Boston Marathon bombers were jihadists.

They were also responsible for the army’s refusal to notice any of the black flags that Maj. Nidal Hassan raised in the months before his massacre of his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, or to take any remedial action after the massacre to prevent such atrocities from recurring.

The Muslim Brotherhood is the progenitor of Islamism. It is the organizational, social, political and religious swamp from whence the likes of al-Qaida, Hamas and other terror groups emerged. Whereas Bush pretended the Brotherhood away, Obama embraced it as a strategic partner.

Then there is Iran.

Bush opted to ignore the 9/11 Commission’s revelations regarding Iranian collaboration with al-Qaida. Instead, particularly in the later years of his administration, Bush sought to appease Iran both in Iraq and in relation to its illicit nuclear weapons program.

In large part, Bush did not acknowledge, or act on the sure knowledge, that Iran was the man behind the curtain in Iraq, because he believed that the American people would oppose the expansion of the US operations in the war against terror.

Obama’s actions toward Iran indicate that he knows that Iran stands behind al-Qaida and that the greatest threat the US faces is Iran’s nuclear weapons program. But here as well, Obama opted to follow a policy of appeasement. Rather than prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or stem its advance in Syria and Iraq, Obama treats Iran as though it poses no threat and is indeed a natural ally. He blames Iran’s belligerence on the supposedly unjust policies of his predecessors and the US’s regional allies.

For a dual-containment strategy to have any chance of working, the US needs to reverse course. No, it needn’t deploy troops to Iraq. But it does need to seal its border to minimize the chance that jihadists will cross over from Mexico.

It doesn’t need to clamp down on Muslims in America. But it needs to investigate and take action where necessary against al-Qaida’s ideological fellow travelers in Islamist mosques, organizations and the US government. To this end, it needs to end the prohibition on discussion of the Islamist threat by federal government employees.

As for Iran, according to The New York Times, Iran is signaling that the price of cooperation with the Americans in Iraq is American acquiescence to Iran’s conditions for signing a nuclear deal. In other words, the Iranians will fight al-Qaida in Iraq in exchange for American facilitation of its nuclear weapons program.

The first step the US must take to minimize the Iranian threat is to walk away from the table and renounce the talks. The next step is to take active measures to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration appears prepared to do none of these things. To the contrary, its pursuit of an alliance with Iran in Iraq indicates that it is doubling down on the most dangerous aspects of its policy of empowering America’s worst enemies.

It only took the Taliban six months to move from the Bamiyan Buddhas to the World Trade Center. Al-Qaida is stronger now than ever before. And Iran is on the threshold of a nuclear arsenal.

ISIS-Not “Mafia Tactics”- Jihad

An article in yesterday’s Foreign Policy discusses the self-funding tactics of the ISIS, as it continues to wage its brutal assault in Iraq. Author Yochi Dreazen begins his piece by stating:

When fighters from the Islamic State of Syria and al-Sham (ISIS) stole tens of millions of dollars from a bank in Mosul earlier this year, it wasn’t simply a startling symbol of the collapse of Baghdad’s control over Iraq’s second-largest city. The brazen theft was instead a stark illustration of one of the most alarming aspects of ISIS’s rise: the group’s growing ability to fund its own operations through bank heists, extortion, kidnappings, and other tactics more commonly associated with the mob than with violent Islamist extremists.

Unfortunately, far from being unassociated with “Islamic extremists”, the “mafia” practices of ISIS can be construed as in line with Shariah adherent practices regarding Jihad.

There is ample jurisprudence regarding the disposition of the spoils of war. For example, Reliance of the Traveller by Ahmad ibn Naqib Al-Misri, which includes legal rulings for both the personal booty of fighters who have slain an enemy and may take what he possessed for themselves (Book O. Justice, O.10.2) and for the collective use of spoils of war in order to pay for items of importance for the cause of the Islamic state such as, “fortify[ing] defense on the frontiers, salaries for Islamic judges, muezzins, and the like:” (Book 0. Justice 0.10.3)

Likewise, the apparent surprise shown by some experts of “violent extremism” when ISIS does indeed spend substantial money and manpower on just these sorts of governance projects is a result of the general failure to comprehend how jihadist groups abide by Shariah obligations.

Returning to “Mafia” tactics, is kidnapping for ransom is absolutely permitted under the Shariah during jihad. Al-Misri notes (Book 0 Justice O.9.14),

“When an adult male is taken captive, the caliph considers the interests and decides between the prisoner’s death, slavery, release without paying anything or ransoming himself in exchange for money or for a Muslim captive held by the enemy.” (Emphasis added.)

There are likewise legal rulings that would support what could be viewed as the extortion of money, especially from Non-Muslims in the form of the mandatory jizya tax. Even extortion of funds from Muslims may be justified by ISIS, since money to support fighters of Jihad is a legitimate allocation for Zakat (mandatory tithing). Given that ISIS purports to be the legitimate Islamic rulers of the territory they hold, their collecting these funds would reasonably be expected. Obviously, for those who do not uphold ISIS’s status as a legitimate Islamic state, these demands would be seen as little more then theft.

Nor is extortion from other Muslims  to fund terrorist activities rare, or limited solely to Sunni Islamists. Hezbollah is well known for engaging in extortion of Lebanese Shia abroad in order to finance its efforts.

Far from being divorced from the belief system which ISIS seeks to impose, such acts as bank robbery, kidnapping and extortion can be legal justified in the furtherance of their jihad.