Tag Archives: Islamic State

Man Arrested in NY for Providing Material Support to IS

On July 29, FBI Agents arrested Arafat M. Nagi for knowingly providing material support to a known terrorist organization, namely the Islamic State (IS).

Nagi was arrested in a home on Olcott Avenue in Lackawanna, New York. He is 44 years old and divorced with two adult children. He used to be employed as a deliveryman for a medical supply company but has not worked since 2009. He was previously arrested in 2013 for threatening to behead his daughter, who is now 21 years old.

In the criminal complaint lodged against Nagi, details are given as to the exact nature of the support he provided to IS. Nagi traveled to Turkey and Yemen multiple times in an attempt to enter Syria, and agents had probable cause to believe that he was able to join with IS operatives. He is believed to have used his family in Yemen as pretext to travel to the Middle East, giving him the ability to slip into Syria without drawing attention to himself. His now-defunct Twitter account offered praise to IS and to its proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The complaint also listed suspicious purchases he made online before his travels to Turkey, which included a tactical vest, combat clothing, and body armor.

Nagi’s defense attorney, Jeremy Schwartz, stated that the accusations against him are unfounded. Schwartz said, “He’s an American citizen, born here, and had no intention to engage in any terrorist activity.” Schwartz will plead not guilty on behalf of Nagi.

Lackawanna gained notoriety in 2002, when a group of six Yemeni-American men, known as the Lackawanna 6, was arrested for their association with Al Qaeda. The men had all traveled to Afghanistan, trained with Al Qaeda, and met Osama Bin Laden prior to the 9/11 attack in 2001. Nagi’s name appeared regularly in the early-2000s investigation of the Lackawanna 6. He apparently wanted to make the original trip with the 6 to Afghanistan, but was unable to do so, perhaps for financial reasons. He tried to take another, later trip but could not on account of the 9/11 attacks. According to Peter Ahearn, who ran the Buffalo FBI office that investigated the Lackawanna 6 in 2002, Nagi was never arrested or formally charged because “he never spent any money. He never provided the material support. He never really was able to get traction.”

The Lackawanna 6 were also connected to the Tablighi Jamaat Islamic movement. The movement is apolitical and mainly composed of South Asian Muslims, and it operates in 150 countries with somewhere between 70 and 80 million followers. It was designed to bring Muslims back to more orthodox roots. It is not violent by nature, but it does provide a conduit for violent, jihadist indoctrination because terrorist organizations use its message of calling Muslims back to their faith as a way to reach out to new recruits. Several Tablighi mosques operate in the US, and the movement’s US headquarters are in Queens, NY. The Lackawanna 6 was involved with Tablighi missionaries.

The criminal complaint filed against Nagi outlines years of hard work by the FBI to track his movements and learn about his sinister intent. Much of the information about Nagi’s activities in the Middle East is gleaned through conversations he had with family members, presumably his siblings. The complaint demonstrates the importance of the counterterrorism measures that exist in the US, but it also shows that the indoctrination of violent beliefs is not always an isolated event. Members of Nagi’s community, including close friends and family members, must be investigated too, lest they also try to run away to IS.

ISIS’s Newest Face-Lift

Are we about to see a kinder, gentler Islamic State (IS)? Probably not. But it seems the ruthless terrorist organization has decided that publishing videos of its members beheading civilians might be a little too damaging to its reputation. Arabic language publication All4Syria.info reported recently that IS has ordered its members to stop filming and posting beheading videos online because many Muslims find the scenes “disgusting” and because many children also find them scary. You don’t say!

Now that IS has seized substantial territory in Iraq and Syria and continues to recruit an estimate of 1,000 foreign fighters a month, the shock value of their videos might not be their top priority.

They collect millions of dollars a day through oil sales, taxes and extortion. They pave roads, set up medical clinics, pick up trash, operate power stations, and offer social welfare programs.

In their stronghold in Syria and Iraq, they have appointed nearly two-dozen governors and ministers, including one for finance and another for social services. They pay their soldiers even more than some nations in the Middle East.

Despite being targeted for nearly a year by a U.S.-led bombing campaign, IS is on a drive to establish a functioning, legitimate government. The territory under IS control continues to grow, which is a reality that challenges the Obama administration’s attempt to characterize the group as mainly a terrorist organization with no long-term legitimacy.

The U.S. intelligence community and the Obama administration’s wider foreign policy team are reluctant to acknowledge that the organization is succeeding in setting up the nuts and bolts of a functioning state.

According to private analyst, Thomas Joscelyn, IS leaders have taken a page out of the playbook of totalitarian dictatorships to subjugate millions of people to their authoritarian order. “Of course their tactics are brutal and violent; that’s what totalitarian governments always offer,” said Thomas Joscelyn at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “That’s what North Korea offers, are you going to say North Korea is not a government? You want to say the North Korean government hasn’t terrorized its citizens into submission? They rule by intimidation, and this is the same type of thing the Islamic State is doing.” Mr. Joscelyn goes on to say, “the fundamental flaw in our policy since 9/11 is that we keep treating these guys like terrorists, when in reality they’re political revolutionaries who use terrorism as a tactic or tool to achieve their goals, and their goal is to conquer territory and implement their radical version of Shariah law.”

Despite suggestions that IS has ‘peaked’ or is already in ‘decline,’ its concern for establishing a law-based political order indicates that the group has aspirations for long-term governance and these aspirations should be taken very seriously.

Taliban Leader Mullah Omar: Dead or Alive?

The Afghan government claimed on Wednesday that Taliban leader Mullah Omar died nearly two years ago. Omar became the Supreme Leader of the Taliban in 1996, and his government was toppled by US forces in 2001. Omar’s death, however, is suspect, as there have been various claims of his death over the years.

Additionally, the Taliban released a statement in relation to Omar claiming, “The news about Mullah Omar’s death is a conspiracy against the Taliban.” Although it is not advisable to automatically believe any claim from the Taliban, their most recent statement supports claims that Omar is not dead, as it is reasonable to assume that the Taliban would have released a martyrdom announcement if he were deceased.

In 2008, the BBC reported that a US missile strike killed Omar in Pakistan, however it turned out the Taliban member that was killed was a lower-ranking official of the same name. In June 2011, the National Post reported top level Taliban officials were doubting whether Omar was still alive. Suspicions of Omar’s death furthered when apparent text messages from Taliban leaders announcing Omar’s death were revealed. The Taliban was quick to deny the messages, claiming the messages were a hack.

In November 2014, the New York Times published an article about Omar’s “invisibility” as he had not been publicly seen since 2001. The article, however, suggested there was a general consensus amongst Afghan security forces that Omar was alive. The article went as far to quote an official explaining that Afghan security officials had, “a good understanding of where exactly he is.” If one were to base an argument on this evidence, it is extremely illogical for the Afghan government to claim Omar died over two years ago when just last year Afghan security forces believed he was alive and knew his whereabouts.

Another argument can be made that the latest claims of Omar’s death are deriving from Islamic State propaganda. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State, has ridiculed Omar on various occasions. Baghdadi declared himself as Caliph, while Omar’s supporters have declared him, “Emir of the Faithful” a term commonly used to refer to the Caliph.

By spreading propaganda of Omar’s death, Baghdadi could be attempting to gain support from individuals and organizations that had previously pledged bayah, or allegiance, to Omar. Those supporters include al-Qaeda, who recently renewed their bayah to Omar last July. It should be added that it is unlikely that al-Qaeda would renew their allegiance to Mullah Omar had he been dead.

The other main argument that can be made in favor of Omar not being dead as it could be an attempt by Taliban splinter group Fidai Mahaz to influence peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Earlier this month, a statement supposedly released by Omar expressed support for the talks in search of ending war in Afghanistan.

However, Omar’s approval of the negotiations were not reflective of the opinion of Taliban splinter groups such Fidai Mahaz who have expressed their opposition to the discussions. Claiming Omar was deceased, as Fidai Mahaz has done, would have the potential to undermine the Taliban’s stance in the peace negotiations.

Finally, recent activity suggests that the Taliban is continuing its aggressive and coordinated campaign against the Afghan government, and clearly the Taliban has robust leadership as they have ramped up attacks in Afghanistan.

Isn’t it reasonable to presume that that leader remains Mullah Omar?

The Islamic State Genocide of Christians and other Minorities

On Friday, the human rights group the 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative issued a report entitled “Edge of Extinction: The Eradication of Religious and Ethnic Minorities in Iraq”. This report discusses the terrible situations that religious and ethnic minorities such as the Christians and Yezidis now face in Iraq because of the Islamic State’s action.

In late January, a delegation from the 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative traveled to northern Iraq to document evidence of the ethnic and religious cleansing taking place by the hands of the Islamic State. The team met with local individuals, interviewed internally displaced Christians and Yezidis, met with senior Kurdistan Regional Government officials, received briefings from human rights organizations, and toured a frontline military location.

During their time in Iraq, the team learned that following the IS overtook Mosul in June, Islamic State expanded into the greater Nineveh Plain around early August. A particular village located about 20 miles from Mosul called Qaraqosh had a population of 50,000 and was Iraq’s largest Christian village. On August 6, 2014, a “night of terror” ensued. The village that had previously been promised protection by Kurdistan Regional Government forces (the Peshmerga) saw their “protectors” abandon them and flee as Islamic State militants approached. The residents, mostly Christian, had no choice but to flee from their village as well. “Thousands were displaced in a matter of hours in a modern-day Exodus”. Most who were fleeing had no choice but to leave behind food, extra clothing, cars, and other personal items. Those who stayed behind were forced to convert to Islam under threat of death.

Simultaneously, the Yezidi communities in Mosul and near the Sinjar Mountain were facing an equally as horrible situation.  Yezidi women were held captive, separated from their families and communities, and often transported to parts of Syria, forced to marry IS members or sold into sexual slavery. Additionally, Yezidi students were no longer able to attend the University of Mosul unless they converted to Islam.

As of April 2015, the estimated Islamic State civilian death toll is 15,000 men, women and children.

The Islamic State is not only destroying human lives and families, they are also destroying historic sites of religious and cultural heritage that have existed for hundreds of years. The gradual desecration and elimination of these religious and cultural aspects only further expedites the destruction of the peoples and their histories entirely.

In the Edge of Extinction report, 21 Wilberforce proposes six different recommendations to aid these persecuted people.

The first of these recommendations is to support the establishment of a Nineveh Plains Province uniquely designed for besieged minorities. The establishment of this province would allow for minority groups to represent a political majority. As in the Kurdistan Regional Government, a Nineveh Plains Province should receive a measure of autonomy from the Federal Iraqi government in order to govern their own affairs.

The second recommendation is to support the fledgling Nineveh Protection Units as  a genuine national guard capable of defending a Nineveh Plains Province. In order to enjoy security and protection, minority groups must be able to rely on their own defense forces. The US government should support directly arming this protection unit to ensure that arms aide is going directly where it ought to be. The US should also directly arm the Nineveh Protection Units and Kurdish Peshmerga, which has been the leading force in pushing back the Islamic State.

The third and fourth recommendations are to place pressure on Iraqi central government and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to help return properties to their rightful owners after areas are liberated from IS as well as support and strengthen the KRG’s efforts to protect human rights. If, as mentioned above, the US does indeed show meaningful support of the Kurds and their forces, it would most likely be easier for the US to place pressure to see the KRG fulfill human rights concerns.

The fifth and sixth recommendations are to support the bodies and organizations working to deliver immediate humanitarian aid and assistance especially in the areas of education and healthcare and “investigate, document, and prosecute the IS…for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and should it be determined-genocide”. While these are fairly straight forward and simple-sounding suggestions, they are equally as important as the others.

With so many displaced people and destroyed homes, food, water, medicine, and other daily necessities have become a dire need. And by formally declaring the behaviors of the Islamic State a “genocide”, this would require that official action be taken to properly address and punish those committed of the crime.

Former Congressman Frank R. Wolf recently sent a letter to President Obama and United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon questioning the hesitation to declare the actions IS has taken as genocide. In his letter he writes,

“Genocidal intent can clearly be seen in Islamic State’s ideology and mission which is directed towards the creation of a global caliphate that has been purged of every man, woman, and child deemed to be an ‘unbeliever’ through either forced conversion or death”.

Islamic State has engaged in what it considers a religious mandated mission is to eliminate millions of non-Muslims. This is clearly and unquestionably genocidal intent. As mentioned in 21 Wilberforce’s factsheet, international law dictates that a group accused of genocide must demonstrate the “intent to commit genocide”, that is to say the group must have a recognizable intent to destroy a certain group of people.

This criterion has already been met. Islamic State isn’t shy about its desire to kill Christians and other religious minorities viewed as believers.

Despite the horrendous human suffering, many residents of Nineveh believe they must return to their historical home. One woman who chose to remain anonymous told the Wilberforce team,

“Our heritage is back in the Nineveh Plains, where we have some places from the fourth century. So we need to go back to that place because that is our heritage”.

Hopefully soon, the US will help make that possible for these persecuted people to one day return home.

Turkey Using Islamic State as Excuse to Fight the Kurds

Turkey and the US have reportedly agreed to establish a “safe-zone” along the Turkey-Syria border in exchange for US use of the Turkish Incirlik Air Base, located 60 miles northwest of Syria. Under the terms of the agreement, the Islamic State (IS) will be pushed out of a 68-mile-long area along the border. With the use of Incirlik, overflight of Syrian territory will bring US aircraft closer to the forces of the Assad regime.

US use of Incirlik will extend the reach of its airstrikes in the direction of Aleppo, the largest city in Syria. Fighting in Aleppo has mostly been between the Syrian government and Syrian rebels, and the US has been reluctant to strike forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar Assad on behalf of the rebels. US officials do not intend to formally recognize the safe zone, which Turkey wants to establish as protected area for Syrian rebels and refugees.

Turkey has fought with the US over the terms of this agreement since last year due to disagreements over the creation of the safe zone where Syrian rebel fighters would theoretically be trained and based. The zone was a major source of contention, because Turkey insisted that Syrian rebels fighting Assad be based there. Turkey wants the US to focus less on battling IS and more on helping those fighting against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

In turn, the US has expressed concern over the groups that Turkey supports. Turkey backs a variety of Syrian Islamist militias. It has been openly accused of providing arms and support to Al Qaeda and permitting Islamic state fighters to travel back and forth across the Turkish border for medical treatment.

The problems with the establishment of the safe zone extend beyond the dangers associated with arming Al Qaeda-linked terrorist organizations. Though Turkey is claiming that the zone will help in the fight against IS, it is making no secret of the fact that its creation will bring Turkish forces into an area that has been predominately controlled by the Kurds. Turkey has been fighting the Kurds for decades. The peace process has been shaky at best, and the situation is devolving into all-out violence that has been spurred on by the fighting with IS.

On July 25, Turkey launched airstrikes against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) locations in Iraq. The airstrikes came in retaliation for PKK attacks last week, which came after IS bombed a gathering of Kurds and their supporters in Suruc, Turkey. The PKK blames Turkey for the Suruc bombing, saying that Turkey has previously allowed IS to attack Kurdish positions and to operate freely along the Turkey-Syria border.

Turkey has started launching airstrikes against IS in Syria, but the Turkish government has been treating its strikes against the Kurds as a part of the same operation. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced that “we have given instruction for a third series of strikes in Syria and Iraq. Air and ground operations are under way. No one should doubt our determination… We will not allow Turkey to be turned into a lawless country.”

While Turkey is bowing under pressure from NATO to fight IS, it is using its involvement against IS as an excuse to conduct operations against the Kurds. Along with airstrikes against the two groups, it has detained at least 851 people. 28 are suspected of being linked to IS, 74 are tied to the PKK, and the connections of the remaining 749 have not been announced. The vast majority are likely linked to Kurdish groups. To make matters worse, a Paris prosecutor announced last week that the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT) orchestrated the 2013 murder of three PKK leaders in Paris.

Turkish airstrikes against the Kurds have allegedly been accompanied by ground assaults. Forces from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria claimed on July 27 that Turkish tanks shelled them near Kobane, located in northern Syria near the Turkish border. Turkey has denied the reports.

However, the YPG has recently captured large amounts of territory in northern Syria from IS, and Turkey does not want to see the formation of an autonomous Kurdish state right across the Syrian border from its southwest region, where much of its own Kurdish population resides. Therefore, although the YPG has proven very successful in the fight against IS, Turkey does not want an effective Kurdish fighting force to exist along its border.

Turkey’s fight against IS is a pretext for attacking the Kurds, who are listed along with IS as a danger to the country’s security. The government has promised to continue attacking the Kurds, and Prime Minister Davutoglu said, “We will continue our fight… until we obtain a certain result.”

Davutoglu’s statement begs two questions: what does he mean by “a certain result?” and what is Turkey’s regional agenda?

The US must realize that Turkey’s political goals in the region are far different from American ones. Turkey aims to eradicate Kurdish influence while removing Syrian President Assad from power. In contrast, the US wants to defeat IS, and the two sets of objectives are mutually exclusive.

The best way to defeat IS in Syria is to help the Kurds. Turkey and the US are invested in completely different fights.

Saudi Talks with Hamas Point to Improving Relationship

Last week, Saudi King Salman held talks with Hamas leader, Khaled Meshaal, and other top Hamas officials. The Saudi monarchy has not officially acknowledged talks with Hamas for four years, though the two have maintained informal contact. The meeting demonstrates that the rapport between the two sides is improving after years of strained relations.

Hamas formed in 1987 as the Palestinian arm of the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood. Though Saudi Arabia and the Brotherhood had a good relationship throughout much of the mid- and late-twentieth century, the relationship devolved during the First Gulf War. The Brotherhood opposed the Saudi government’s allowance of American presence in the country and support for the US in the war. Though their relationship improved throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, it deteriorated again during the Arab Spring in 2011. The Saudi branch of the Brotherhood voiced its support for the Egyptian uprising that put Mohamed Morsi in power, and the government worried the branch would attempt its own political revolution.

Last year, the country designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. This caused concern amongst Hamas leadership because the designation was applied to the Brotherhood’s affiliates and front organizations, and much of the charity money and financial support that the group receives comes from Saudi Arabia. However, Salman, who became King in January, has been much more open to talks with the Brotherhood than his predecessor, and this likely led to last week’s meeting with Meshaal. The Saudi government recently stated that despite meeting with Meshaal, the official view  of the Saudi kingdom toward Hamas remained unchanged.

Saudi concerns with Hamas extend beyond its involvement in the Global Muslim Brotherhood. Iran, Saudi Arabia’s foremost regional competitor, is traditionally one of Hamas’ major funders. Hamas and Iran had a falling-out over the group’s refusal to support the Iranian-backed Assad regime in Syria when the Syrian uprising began in 2011, but relations started to improve again last year. Though Iran cut funding to Hamas in retaliation for supporting Syrian rebels against Assad in 2013, it reportedly transferred tens of millions of dollars to the group this year to help rebuild its tunnel network that was damaged in its 2014 war with Israel.

Saudi Arabia, a Sunni nation, is currently fighting a sectarian-based proxy war in Yemen against Shia Iran. A major motivating factor behind reopening talks with Sunni Hamas is the possibility of creating sectarian tension between the organization and Iran with the intention of weakening Iran’s regional influence. Earlier this month, the Iranian news agency Fars reported that Saudi Arabia asked Hamas to send 700 fighters to Yemen to assist the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis, who officially seized power from Yemen’s Saudi-backed President Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi in February. Meshaal rejected these claims, saying that they were unfounded; however, Hamas does formally support President Hadi. As Iran already cut ties with the Gaza-based Palestinian Islamic Jihad over its reluctance to support Iran and the Houthis in Yemen, an improving relationship between Hamas and Saudi Arabia could lead to another falling-out with Iran.

Saudi Arabia has also been a major contributor to the US-led coalition fighting against the Islamic State, which has established the Sinai Province affiliate in the North Sinai region of Egypt. Sinai Province is reportedly collaborating with Hamas in attacks on the anti-Brotherhood government of Egyptian President Al-Sisi, even while Hamas has been suppressing Islamic State activities in the Gaza Strip itself. Saudi Arabia may be trying to gain the support and loyalty of Hamas to ensure that the group stops aiding attacks on Egypt. If Saudi Arabia is able to do so, its already strong relationship with Egypt would continue to improve. As Saudi Arabia is currently worried about Iran and its sponsorship of Shia activity in Egypt, this would give it more influence in Egypt while additionally damaging Iran’s growing regional influence.

Hamas also stands to gain significantly from better relations with Saudi Arabia. Since Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi rose to power in a 2013 military coup, he has continuously promised to crack down on Islamist militancy. Egyptian troops destroyed many of the smuggling tunnels Hamas built between Gaza and and Egypt in 2013, and the group was officially banned from operating within Egypt’s borders in 2014. Saudi Arabia has been a strong backer and ally of Sisi, supporting his 2013 coup and giving billions of dollars in aid, so Hamas may try to leverage an improved relationship with Saudi Arabia to stop Egyptian suppression.

Importantly, Hamas is trying to maintain positive relationships with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. It will take money from any country that offers it, and it is clearly trying to walk a fine line between openly supporting either side, evidenced by its voiced support for Yemen’s president but refusal to assist in the fighting. Like Saudi Arabia, it is Sunni, but it has a history of receiving support from Iran and so is likely to continue courting both countries.

Unfortunately, Saudi involvement with Hamas, which has been designated a terrorist organization by the US, EU, Israel, Canada, and Japan, is just as bad as Iranian involvement. Hamas’ charter calls for the destruction of Israel, and it has fought almost continuously with Israel since its inception.

Israel and Saudi Arabia have never established formal diplomatic relations, but they revealed in June that they have been holding secret meetings to discuss the Iran nuclear deal, which both countries vehemently oppose. Increased Saudi support for Hamas may be detrimental to this budding Saudi relationship with Israel: Israel already has few allies in the Middle East and poor relationships with Hamas’ usual backers, Iran, Qatar and Turkey. Meanwhile Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence in the region is retracting, and it is growing estranged from its historical alliance with the US.

Closer ties between Saudi Arabia and Hamas could alienate Israel. However, Israel may decide that the threat of a nuclear Iran outweighs its irritation at Saudi Arabia for supporting for Hamas.

Shia Militias and ISF Continue Battle to Oust IS from Fallujah

Just over a week ago, Iraqi authorities declared their intention to begin the “battle to liberate the Anbar province” from Islamic State forces. This entails the recapture of Fallujah, and then the eventual recapture of Ramadi. The operation intends to utilize Iranian-backed Shia militias in Fallujah and US-backed forces in Ramadi. Fallujah has been under the control of Islamic State militants since January 1, 2014. Reportedly, recapturing Fallujah is the military operation’s main objective, largely to help counter Islamic State threats to Baghdad.

With Iranian-backed Shia Militias leading the fight in Fallujah, there’s a risk that the Sunni population may be further isolated from the Iraqi federal government. That’s particularly true if the operation results in heavy Sunni civilian casualties, as militias advance through the use of indiscriminate rocket and artillery fire, as has been previously noted on the Free Fire blog.

The situation in Fallujah is moving and changing at a very rapid pace, which makes obtaining a wide coverage of current events difficult. However, many individuals have sent updates and photos to Twitter which provides some insight into the status of Fallujah.

Brett McGurk, Ambassador/Deputy Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, posted on his twitter on July 16, that 31 new coalition airstrikes have destroyed ISIL units in numerous areas, including Fallujah. This is particularly significant because if true, it signifies US involvement in Fallujah. As mentioned above, the Shia militias fighting in Fallujah are backed by Iran. If the US is involved in Fallujah, it is essentially supporting Iranian proxy forces. The US has been in this sort of controversial position before in Tikrit when, “The decision to give air support to the Tikrit campaign pull[ed] the United States into a messy battle that puts the U.S. led-coalition…on the same side of a fight as Iranian-backed militia in a bid to support Iraqi forces…”.

Based on a number of sources, the majority of the action seems to be occurring to the north and east of Fallujah. Reportedly, events from these areas include: Iraqi Special Forces (ISF) and Shia militia forces have taken control over parts of Albo Sha’el which is directly north of Fallujah; ISIS defense lines north and east of Fallujah have been collapsed; Shia militias and ISF forces and seized Al-Erifa and Al-Dawaya which are both northeast of Fallujah; and Shia militias have also moved into the village of al-Jarrah, which lies northeast of Fallujah.

Islamic State forces are reportedly holding residents of Fallujah as hostages. IS has also conducted a suicide blast in Fallujah which left 22 dead. And according to a post that was uploaded just a couple hours ago, 113 Shia militia and ISF have been killed fighting the Islamic State north of Fallujah.

While the US is expected to be more involved in the operation to recapture Ramadi, but Fallujah remains an importance offensive. With Islamic State forces expelled from Fallujah, Iraqi forces will have relieved pressure on Baghdad. The expulsion would also help Iraqi forces to further cut off additional Islamic State supply lines. It remains to be seen how events in Fallujah will develop as the fight for the city continues.

Kurds Blame Turkey for Islamic State Violence

On July 23, one Turkish policeman was killed and another was injured in a shooting in Diyarbakir. They were ambushed while investigating a traffic accident. The attack comes one day after two Turkish policemen were killed in Ceylanpinar. The officers were shot in the head and later found in the house that they were sharing.

Both attacks took place in the southeastern province of Sanliurfa, which is near the Syrian border and is a predominately Kurdish area. No one has claimed responsibility for the July 23 shooting. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization by the US, EU, and Turkey, claimed responsibility for the July 22 attack, and three suspects have been arrested. The PKK has also been blamed for a separate series of attacks, including shootings and arson, on the Turkish military on July 22. The PKK, or a related Kurdish militant organization, is likely responsible for the July 23 killing as well.

The PKK said that the July 22 killing was in retaliation for the Islamic State’s July 20 suicide bomb attack in Suruc, near the Syrian border. The bombing targeted a group of approximately 300 people from the Socialist Youth Associations Federation, who had gathered before volunteering in Kobane, a Kurdish city on the Syrian side of the border that had been the focus of a number of Islamic State attacks. Initially, officials believed that the bombing was carried out by a young woman, but later reports indicated that a 20-year-old Kurdish man linked to the Islamic State carried out the attack.

Tensions have been rising between the Turkish government and its Kurdish minority. In the hours following the July 20 suicide bombing in Suruc, members of the PKK fought with Turkish police in Adiyaman and one soldier died. Also on July 20, demonstrators blaming the government for the bombing clashed with police at the funerals of those killed in Suruc. They threw fireworks at the police, who responded with water cannons and tear gas.

Turkey often faces international criticism for its treatment of the Kurds, with whom it has fought for decades. Kurdish officials say that the Turkish government allows the Islamic State to operate in Turkey and attack Kurdish targets.

In Turkey’s elections last month, the predominately Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) won 12 percent of the vote, surpassing the 10 percent necessary for a political party to enter Turkey’s parliament. The win for the HDP came at the expense of the ruling Justice Development Party (AKP), which no longer holds a super-majority. The AKP has been consolidating power under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, but the Kurds’ rise to prominence in politics suggests that the country is growing tired of the “increasingly authoritarian” AKP rule.

Following the Suruc bombing, Turkey has begun building a wall along its border with Syria to curb the flow of Islamic State militants between the two countries. On July 23, members of the Islamic State clashed with Turkish soldiers along the border, killing one Turkish officer and injuring five soldiers. One Islamic State fighter was also killed. Unconfirmed reports stated that the Turkish army is conducting an operation against the Islamic State. Additionally, Turkey has finally given the US permission to use the Incirlik Air Base in the Adana Province to conduct airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria after months of negotiations.

Turkey is only stepping up to fight the Islamic State under growing pressure from other NATO countries. Turkey has been noticeably unwilling to prevent the organization’s operations, and has been credibly accused of helping to arm Syrian jihadist groups, including Islamic State and Al Qaeda. The Kurds have been most successful in the fight against the Islamic State in Syria, and the Turkish government’s political problems with the Kurds could be solved if the Islamic State successfully defeated them. Fighting in Turkey will probably escalate in the near future, but there is an increasing risk that it will be between different groups: the Turkish military, the Kurdish militias, and the Islamic State, with each group fighting the others.

Violent Civil War in Yemen Rages On

Death tolls from attacks on the city of Aden in Yemen over the weekend, have reportedly risen from 43, to 57. The attacks came from the Iranian-backed Houthi Shiite rebels, who have been fighting against Saudi Arabian-backed forces loyal to the exiled Yemeni president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. Hadi was forced by the Houthis to flee Yemen in February.

The bombardment in Aden yesterday came just two days after Yemeni Prime Minister Khaled Baha declared the city to be “liberated” from the Houthis.

Yesterday’s attacks follow a recent series of gains made by the pro-Hadi forces. Last week, the Saudi-backed forces (known as the Popular Resistance) took back the international airport located in Aden. This took place after “months of deadlock in the city”. Pro-Hadi forces were also able to regain “other central areas” of Aden.

Since the Houthis’ capture of Sanaa (Yemen’s capital) last September, Yemen has essentially been “the battle ground of a proxy war between Sunni and Shia forces led by Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively.”

Amidst this proxy war conflict, the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) group has been expanding its power and presence over large parts of Yemen, including the coastal city of Al Mukalla. Although Saudi Arabia launched a coalition in March in support of anti-Houthi forces, Saudi Arabia has withheld from attacking AQAP forces “because the AQAP provides an ideological ally against the Shiite Houthis.”

Additionally, the Islamic State has begun to increase its presence and involvement in Yemen as well. Over the past five months the Islamic States has conducted attacks on Houthi rebel leaders, the capital of Sanaa, and also suicide attacks and car bombs.

Just today, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for detonating a car bomb outside of the historic al-Mahdi mosque on the outskirts of Sanaa. According to Vice News, the al-Mahdi mosque was a “place of worship for followers of Zaydism, a form of Shiite Islam largely unique to north Yemen”.

The Islamic State and AQAP have similar goals in Yemen: obtaining territory, power, and support from the country’s people. They have different methods of obtaining these goals, however. The Islamic State holds itself to be the one and only Sunni regime fighting for the true meaning of Islam against the opposing Shiite sect. AQAP on the other hand, pursues a route that “blends in”, and acknowledges that there are many Sunni forces opposing the rebel Houthis, of whom they are one.

U.S. policy ought to be based on achieving an end result for Yemen where it is not a safe haven for al Qaeda or the Islamic State, nor beholden to Iranian proxies. The US has supported the Saudi Arabi air strike coalition against Houthi forces. However this support for Saudi Arabia, has undoubtedly come into question as the latest developments with Iran over a nuclear deal, and advances of Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq indicate a different set of U.S. priorities. Given this less than coherent regional strategy, the Saudis are unlikely to be amendable to assisting in weakening Sunni jihadists grip in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia Announces 400+ IS Arrests As IS Launches Attack Outside Of Prison

According to Saudi Arabian officials, more than 430 Saudis have been arrested recently under suspicion to links with the Islamic State. Most of those arrested reportedly were involved in plots designated to further spread sectarian conflicts in Saudi Arabia by targeting minority Shiites.

Amongst the some-430 arrested, 144 suspects are accused of promoting IS’s teachings online and recruiting new members. Furthermore, 97 suspects are suspected to have been part of a cell that carried out a bombing in November that killed seven people at a Shiite mosque. Finally, 190 individuals are accused of being involved in various other Shiite mosque attacks.

Last November, IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi set his eyes on Saudi Arabia, and IS militants have since carried out numerous attacks in the Saudi kingdom. Targeting Saudi Arabia fulfills two of IS ideological aspirations, both targeting Shiites as well as the Saudi government which has been deemed the “greatest enemy of Islam” by IS leaders. The first attack, in May of this year, left 21 dead after a suicide bomber detonated himself outside of a Shiite mosque. Most recently, last Thursday a suicide bomber detonated a car bomb outside of Saudi Arabia’s highest security prison, which has hundreds of Islamist terrorist detainees. After the attack, Islamic State released a statement saying:

“The Muslim prisoners in Ha’er and everywhere should know that we won’t tire and we won’t rest until we end their detention, God willing.”

The Islamic State’s strategy forces the Saudi government both to be viewed as defending the Shiites and imprisoning jihadists.

The announcement of mass arrests highlight the genuine fear the House of Saud must hold of the thousands of Saudi subjects who have joined the ranks of IS. According to a poll last year, “92 percent of Saudi Arabians believe that, “IS conforms to the values of Islam and Islamic law.” This could prove to be a major issue, since the House of Saud relies heavily on credentials as an Islamic state which has implemented Sharia for their own legitimacy.

There are also questions regarding how effective Saudi forces would be against a genuine Islamic State offensive. The majority of the Saudi army is made up of regular subjects, which leads to the potential of a similar situation as that in Iraq when Iraqi forces proved unwilling to fight on behalf of the Iraqi government. The Saudis are likely to increasingly rely on the National Guard, who are more strenuously vetted for loyalty and tribal affiliation.

While the Islamic State is clearly not in a position to conduct such an assault at this time, they clearly are intensifying their targeting of Saudi Arabia.  The recent boasting of counterterrorism successes and persistent reassurance that the House of Saud has everything under control is less than convincing in the face of a Saudi population that overwhelming views the Islamic State as equally, or perhaps more legitimate than their own rulers.