Tag Archives: Islamic State

French Intelligence Thwart Beheading Plot

Three men suspected of plotting a terrorist attack were arrested in various locations across France on the morning of July 13th. Djebril A. (23), Antoine F. (19), and Ismael K. (17) have been accused of plotting an Islamic State-inspired attack on the French military base of Fort Bear in January of next year.

There, they planned to kidnap and decapitate a high-ranking military member, while filming the incident to put on the Internet, consistent with the numerous videos posted by IS members. Djebril formerly worked as a signalman in the French navy at a nearby military base, and the target of the plotted attack “is thought to have been his former boss”.

There was a fourth suspect arrested on Monday who was 16 years old, but he was released when the time allotted to hold him in custody expired. The other three suspects claim that he “had been dropped from the plot, because he was too young”.

Last night the three suspects were moved to Paris to appear before a judge today. Reportedly, prosecutor Francois Molins stated today that Ismael was previously told by an IS jihadist to, “hit France”.

All three suspects had previous plans to travel to Syria to undoubtedly pursue efforts to join the Islamic State. Ismael had already been under the watch of French intelligence personnel for his activity on social media and “connections to French jihadists in prison”, especially after his mother contacted authorities to report her son’s worrisome “radicalization”.

French Prime Minister Manuel Valls said on Thursday that, “We are facing a terrorist threat that we have never seen before-an external threat and an internal threat”. The Prime Minister was referring to the increase in jihadist terrorist attacks that have been conducted not by Islamic State jihadists themselves, but by sympathizers who have been targeted and recruited from overseas.

While this incident occurred in France, plots and attacks of this nature are just as concerning here at home. However, as Fred Fleitz from the Center discussed previously on Free Fire, our current administration has a destructive habit of refusing to acknowledge attacks of these nature for what they really are: attacks staged by the Global Jihad Movement. By referring to these attacks as “violent extremism” instead of intentional acts of jihadist terrorism, this only perpetuates the false narrative that violent jihadist Islam is not as significant a problem as it so clearly is.

This false narrative is potentially as destructive as the attacks themselves. The longer the Obama administration refuses to recognize the seriousness of the Global Jihad Movement here in the US, the longer violent jihadist attacks will persist and worsen with no adversarial force to stop it.

Islamic State Hits Egyptian Naval Ship with Missile

On July 16, the Islamic State affiliate in Egypt, Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province), fired a rocket or guided missile at an Egyptian naval vessel, causing the ship to catch on fire. The group, formerly known as Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, claimed responsibility for the attack on Twitter. It boasted that it had destroyed the boat, which was located in the Mediterranean Sea near the coast of Israel and Gaza.

Brig. Gen. Mohammed Samir, a spokesman for the Egyptian military, said that the vessel caught fire after a firefight with “terrorists.” The shots came from near Rafah, a town in North Sinai on the border of Egypt and Gaza, and a Gazan fisherman identified the ship as a gunboat approximately one nautical mile offshore. Samir gave no indication as to how much damage the ship sustained but stated that no members of the crew were killed. Other security officials said that crew members were injured, and a number of men jumped overboard to escape the fire.

The attacks conducted by the Islamic State affiliate are typically shootings or bombings and its July 16 attack marked the first time the group has staged a rocket or missile attack on the navy. According to its Twitter statement, the Wilayat Sinai used a guided missile to hit the ship. Some military experts have noted that photos of the attack suggest it may be a Russian-made Kornet Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM), which is an anti-tank weapon which has seen use by Islamic State in both Iraq and Syria. In November, 2014, Sinai-based jihadists believed to belong to Wilayat Sinai targeted an Egyptian naval vessel North of the port of Damietta, launching an assault from multiple fishing boats and killing several Egyptian sailors.

Wilayat Sinai has been targeting the Egyptian military since the 2013 military coup that removed President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood from power.

The July 16 attack came one day after the Egyptian military said it killed a militant trying to drive a car laden with 1,100 pounds of explosives into a military checkpoint on a highway linking Cairo to the Red Sea. Wilayat Sinai took responsibility for the attack on Twitter. The group said that a suicide bomber killed himself and a number of soldiers, a claim which the military denies. On July 11, it bombed the Italian Consulate in Cairo.

Wilayat Sinai’s use of rockets in attacks is not brand new: less than two weeks ago, it fired three rockets into Israel. However, if its claims that it used a guided missile to attack the ship prove true, it could present an even bigger threat to Egypt and Israel than it already does. Guided missiles can be used to attack targets from a distance, and they can be used to destroy tanks. Questions must be raised as to how the group acquired such weaponry, as it could have either gotten them from Islamic State proper or from Hamas, with whom it is reportedly collaborating. Regardless of where it obtained the missiles, its possession of them poses a threat to Egypt and Israel. Both of these countries are US allies, and the US must back up Egyptian efforts to crush this dangerous insurgency.

Islamic State’s Dabiq 10 Emphasizes Global Jihad over Islamist Nationalism

The Islamic State recently released the tenth issue of its online magazine, Dabiq, titled “The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men.” Dabiq 10, the magazine’s Ramadan edition, focuses primarily on the Islamic State’s Muslim opponents, whom the group accuses of disregarding the word of Allah.

Dabiq 10 addresses two audiences. The first is the general global Muslim population and the second consists of other Islamist and nationalist organizations who have fought against the Islamic State. The Islamic State is trying to convince both to join its campaign of jihad against non-Muslims.

To the global Muslim population, Dabiq 10 stresses the authority of the Caliphate. In its opening remarks, the magazine states that

The call to defend the Islamic State – the only state ruling by Allah’s Sharī’ah today – continues to be answered by sincere Muslims and mujāhihīn around the world prepared to sacrifice their lives and everything dear to them to raise high the word of Allah and trample democracy and nationalism.

Repeatedly, Dabiq 10 denounces nationalism and calls upon Muslims to pledge their allegiance to the Islamic State, which serves Allah above men and nations. The magazine emphasizes the importance of Shariah and points to a hierarchy within Islamic law; it sees itself as having a monopoly over the understanding of this hierarchy. For example, it talks of the Islamic duty to honor one’s parents. However, the magazine notes that children must disobey parents that order their children to defy Shariah,  specifically addressing situations when children are forbidden by their parents to participate in jihad, saying,

Ibn Qudāmah said, “If jihād becomes obligatory upon him then the permission of his parents is not taken into consideration because the jihād has become fard ‘ayn and abandonment of it is a sin. There is no obedience to anyone in disobedience of Allah.”

The Islamic State believes that it represents the only legitimate source of Shariah jurisprudence as a result of having established the Caliphate under AbuBakr Al-Baghdadi. As a result, its declarations “to the sincere Muslims around the world to march forth and wage war against the crusaders and apostates who seek to wipe out the Sharī’ah” carry with them the force of religious obligation and law.

Continuing on this theme of its religious superiority, Dabiq 10 specifically talks about Muslim women whose husbands are either not Muslim or who are Muslim but fight against the Islamic State. These women are instructed to abandon their husbands and family. According to the magazine,

It is not permissible for you in any case to remain under the same roof with someone who has removed the noose of Islam from his neck, and the marriage contract between you and him was nullified the moment when he apostatized from the religion of Islam. …As such, any relationship you have with him is a relationship that is impermissible according to the Sharī’ah. Rather, it amounts to zinā (fornication), so beware.

Fornication carries with it severe punishments, including possibly stoning, so this represents  a thinly veiled threat to both the Islamic State’s enemies, and their spouses.

When addressing other Islamist and nationalist organizations, Dabiq 10 is fiercely critical of the numerous Kurdish nationalist groups and Al Qaeda-affiliated groups. It acknowledges that Kurdish fighters have had some success against its own armies, but it says that Kurdish gains have come at the cost of complete submission to the American “crusaders.” It puts forth the additional point that these Kurdish victories will be short-lived because they have a nationalist, rather than Islamist, agenda. The magazine says,

It should be noted here that all nationalist agendas in the Muslim’s usurped lands are ultimately doomed to fail, even those that seek to unite the members of one nation, or even one ethnicity as in the case of the Kurdish murtaddīn. This includes the agenda of the “Islamist” nationalists, who would readily sacrifice their religion for the sake of temporary political gain, in contrast with the mujāhidīn of the Khilāfah who would readily cut off the heads of the murtaddīn from their own people in defense of Allah’s Sharī’ah.

Dabiq 10 uses a similar argument to criticize Jabhat al-Nusra, Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, its affiliate in Yemen. These groups are faulted for working with nationalist militias and for failing to enforce Shariah law in areas they control. It accuses these groups of following the laws of men and paying no heed to the laws of Allah, because

Some of those mentioned had fallen into apostasy… like those who permit partaking in the shirkī democratic elections, or those who seek intercession from the absent and dead, or those who take the Arab and non-Arab tawāghīt as well as the Crusaders as close allies, or those who deny some of the obvious, definite laws of the Sharī’ah.

Muslims fighting in nationalist groups against the Islamic State are called upon to “repent to Allah and wake up, for by Allah you are fighting the Sharī’ah whether you realize it or not. So gather your brothers, rise in unison, and kill those who order you to fight against those who rule with the Sharī’ah.”

The magazine focuses more closely on Jahbat al-Nusra, whom it calls the “Jawlānī front” in reference to the group’s leader Abu Muhammed Al-Joulani.  It calls Nusra out for Joulani’s recent interview with Al Jazeera, where he specifically stated that the group is not attacking the Druze in Syria. Dabiq 10 features its own interview with Abū Samīr al-Urdunī, a former member of the organization who defected to the Islamic State. According to Urdunī, Nusra fighters were tricked into fighting the Islamic State because they were deceived into believing that Islamic State fighters were members of the pro-Assad Syrian army. Urdunī provided an anecdote to this effect, saying,

One of the soldiers saw a signboard that had drawn on it the flag of the Islamic State. So he shouted, “The Islamic State will remain!” So Abū ‘Abbās stopped the convoy and said to the soldier, “What are you saying?” He said, “The Islamic State will remain. These are our brothers.” He said to him “Do you not know where you are going?” He said “I don’t know.” He said “How do you not know? You are going to fight the Islamic State…” The soldiers said, “We do not want to fight the Islamic State and we don’t agree with fighting it. They told us that we were going for ribāt at the 17th.”

Ribat typically refers to border or guard duty. The 17th is likely a reference to the 17th Syrian division, an Assad regime army unit which had been stationed at a base near the Islamic State’s capital of Raqqa.

The remaining Islamist organization that Dabiq 10 addresses is the Taliban. It publishes a question from a member of the Taliban who is unsure if he should remain loyal to the Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar, or if he should defect to the Islamic State. The article makes clear the Islamic State’s stance on the ongoing feud between the two groups over control of Islamist activity in Afghanistan. The magazine describes the Taliban as a nationalist movement, pointing out that Taliban leader Mullah Omar has been at best circumspect about his global ambitions, and never publicly declared his position as Caliph. In contrast, the Islamic State is a global movement which purports to have established the Caliphate, therefore rendering the Islamic State the supreme and ultimate authority. Also notable is the claim by the Islamic State that the Caliphate position must go to a Quraysh, which is the tribe of Islam’s prophet Mohammed. Mullah Omar has openly declared his ancestry, which is not Quraysh, and Al-Baghdadi claims (almost certainly falsely) that he is Quraysh and that he does meet this important requirement.

Throughout the entirety of Dabiq 10, the power of the Islamic State and its supreme authority over all of Islam is repeatedly emphasized. It is upon this mantle of religious authority as the reestablished Caliphate that the Islamic State claims the right to target and killed other Muslims who do not recognize their authority and so views even other dedicated jihadist organizations as apostates.

Saudi-backed Yemeni Forces Recapture Airport in Aden

On July 14, Saudi-backed Sunni Yemeni forces recaptured the international airport in Aden, a port city in the southwest. The forces, loyal to exiled President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, were also able to capture the city’s central district of Khormaksar. They were aided by airstrikes from the Saudi-led coalition of Arab states fighting to remove the dominant Houthis from power.

The Iranian-backed Shia Houthis captured Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, in September and the two sides have been fighting for control over the country ever since.

The Saudi-backed forces, known as the Popular Resistance, trapped the Houthi forces on a small peninsula jutting out from the city. A spokesperson for the Yemeni government said that he expected the Houthis to be completely cleared from Aden in the next few days.

The retaking of the airport in Aden (and the expected retaking of the city) marks the first significant achievement in the city for ousted President Hadi. After fleeing Sanaa last September, he had been living in Aden before being forced out of the country and into exile in Saudi Arabia in March. Additionally, Aden is incredibly valuable because the Saudi-led coalition can use its ports to ship military supplies and aid to forces on the ground.

A week-long ceasefire brokered by the UN went into effect at midnight on July 10 to allow humanitarian aid into the country, though it has been largely ignored by both sides. Yemen is running low on food, medicine, and fuel due to the blockade by the Saudi coalition and Houthi reluctance to let aid trucks into war-torn areas. Aden has been hit especially hard by the fighting.

Although the Saudi-backed forces’ success in Aden is a signal that the combination of Saudi airstrikes and Popular Resistance advancement on the ground is effective, problems in Yemen are far from being over. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the organization responsible for the Charlie Hebdo attack in January, has been inserting itself in amongst forces fighting the Houthis. The ongoing civil war has allowed the group to take control of entire regions in Yemen with no contest. In addition to AQAP’s presence, the Islamic State (IS) has also been stepping up attacks against the Houthis.

The West must be cognizant of the fact that, should the Saudi-led coalition win the civil war, Sunni terrorist groups such as AQAP and IS might increase their operations in the country as they operate with the consent of a civilian population grateful to be liberated from the Houthis. However, should the Saudi-led coalition get bogged down in ground operations against the  Houthis, there is a risk of continued instability which Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Iranian-backed terror groups are all likely to exploit.

Islamic State Claims Italian Consulate Bombing

At approximately 6:15am on July 11, a 450-kilogram car bomb laden exploded near the Italian Consulate in Cairo, Egypt. The Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement on Twitter.

A street vendor was killed. Ten civilians were hurt, including a police officer and four children. None of the casualties were Italian. The main entrance to the building was destroyed, windows were broken, and pipes burst, leaving the building flooded. Due to the timing of the attack, which was early in the morning on a day when the Consulate is closed, the casualty count could have been significantly higher. Following the attack, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi about Rome’s support of Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts. Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni is scheduled to meet with Sisi on July 13.

The IS affiliate in Egypt is known as Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province). The group, formerly known as Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem), was inspired by Al Qaeda but pledged allegiance to IS in November 2014. Though it is a part of IS, it reportedly also works with Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch, to facilitate attacks on Egyptian security forces.

The IS statement of responsibility did not give a reason as to why the group targeted the Italian Consulate, though an IS-linked Twitter account tweeted that Muslims should avoid areas like the Consulate because those are considered to be “legitimate targets.” The New York Times reported that the statement of responsibility came from “Islamic State, Egypt” rather than from “Sinai Province,” which Wilayat Sinai typically uses, raising questions as to the veracity of the claim.

Wilayat Sinai has a history of targeting foreigners. On February 18, 2014, the group warned all tourists in Egypt to leave the country by February 20, 2014 or they would risk getting attacked. The February 18 statement followed a bombing attack on a tourist bus two days prior that killed two South Korean tourists and the Egyptian bus driver. The threat caused travel agencies to advise travelers to stay inside their hotels and a decline in tourism numbers.

Wilayat Sinai has a history of targeting foreigners, an affiliation with IS, and has conducted numerous deadly attacks on Egyptian military targets in the Sinai Peninsula. The group is highly capable, but it chose to bomb the Italian Consulate at a time when very few people were there. Given these circumstances, the attack on the Italian Consulate on July 11 seems to serve as a similar warning to the February 2014 warning to tourists, a move that is not typical of IS but is standard with previous actions by this particular organization. It typically targets the Egyptian military and police but may be seeking to increase its attacks on foreigners, including governmental and tourist infrastructure, in the future.

Shia militias to fight for Fallujah, U.S. Backed Forces For Ramadi

Iraqi forces are preparing to face the Islamic State head on, in an attempt to take back Fallujah and Ramadi, two key Iraqi cities IS seized control of through their reign of terror in Iraq. The fight has divided Iraq’s military forces, with Iranian-backed militants taking the lead in Fallujah and US-backed counterterrorism forces setting their eyes on Ramadi. Successfully taking back these cities would be a huge win for Iraqi forces, however each city represents different challenges and poses different significance.

Although the timing of the move on Fallujah remains unknown, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, an Iranian-controlled militia responsible for thousands of attacks on American troops during the Iraq war, insists their operation will be a success. When IS seized Fallujah in January 2014, the seizure came as one of IS’s biggest wins thus far. Fallujah has since become a headquarters for IS leaders. Recently, Iraqi militias have staged attacks against IS in Fallujah, launching rockets into the city. A main motivation for recapturing Fallujah is its close proximity to Baghdad, making a successful re-seizure a huge military and strategic necessity for Iraqi militias. Effectively eliminating IS from Fallujah would enable Iraqi forces to help protect the capital, by cutoffing off main IS supply lines.

Ramadi, which fell to IS in May, also presents its fair share of challenges to Iraqi forces. IS’s capture of Ramadi was a huge loss for the Iraqis, as it is the largest Sunni populated city in Iraq. Additionally, there was a massive symbolic meaning behind their seizure of Ramadi. Throughout the United States’ military presence in Iraq in the early 2000’s, a group of US-funded Sunni militants, known as the Anbar Awakening, held Ramadi as the headquarters of their fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq. However, once the US withdrew its involvement in Iraq, AQI, now IS, set out to take Ramadi, the home of those who opposed them.

Tensions between the two forces are already growing, and Iranian-backed militias attempted to seize a Baghdad ministry building yesterday, before being forced out by Federal Iraqi units.

Questions remain about the likelihood of Iraqi forces retaking the two key cities and to hold them against IS counteroffensive. The Iran-backed militants heading the Fallujah mission, have been accused of war crimes, including their actions following the seizure of the town of Amerli last August, when they set out to “punish” Sunnis they accused of supporting Islamic State. Furthermore, the same Iranian supported militants struggled in forcing IS out of Tikrit, where they faced a significantly smaller number of IS militants. In order to finish the mission, the US had to step in and carry out airstrikes to help drive IS out of the city.

A recapture of Ramadi is also raising concerns, as the same troops that dropped their weapons and fled the city was IS arrived, are supposed to head up the newest operation. Recapturing Ramadi is high on the US priority list, as President Obama explained on Monday; the loss of the city to IS has reportedly motivated the US to speed up its training program of Iraqi forces, although the President did not lay out a timetable for the operation. The US has been closely working with Iraqi forces to develop a plan for Ramadi, including a plan for 6,000 Iraqi troops and police to take the city, and another 5,000 Sunni tribal troops to hold the city after IS is expelled. But training of Iraqi tribal forces has been slow going, and recruiting numbers are low, nowhere near the 5,000 tribal forces needed for the Ramadi operation.

Both operations face potential pitfalls. While motivated, and willing to take casualties, the Shia militia forces will lack advanced U.S. airstrikes, and are likely to advance on Fallujah with a heavy use of less than discriminate artillery. The advancing Shia forces in large measure represent the worst fears of much of Iraq’s Sunni population, and if forced to choose between Shia militias and Islamic State, we may expect to see substantial Sunni numbers siding with IS.

Alternatively, the Ramadi operation is expected to rely heavily on U.S. trained Iraqi, and particularly Sunni tribal forces, who remain willing to fight on behalf of a federal Iraqi government. Yet that preferred force has yet to materialize, as in Syria, where the U.S. has found vetting forces actually worthy of training a next to impossible task. The solution may require finding a suitable political carrot that properly motivates a prospective Sunni force, such as greater political autonomy and independence from Baghdad.

The outcome of fighting in both Ramadi and Fallujah will play a major role in both determining the outcome of the fight against Islamic State in Iraq, but also of what kind of Iraq will exist after Islamic State is expelled.

Twenty-One Members of IS Arrested in Turkey

On July 10, Turkish police arrested 21 people suspected of being members of the Islamic State (IS) in a major anti-terrorism operation. Three were foreigners, whose nationalities have not been released. Police also seized two hunting rifles, bullets, IS documents, electronics, and military uniforms. Arrest warrants had been issued for at least 30 people prior to the operation.

Several addresses in Istanbul, the Sanliurfa province near Syria, the Mersin province in the south, and the Kocaeli province east of Istanbul were raided. The Turkish suspects are believed to be helping IS recruit European fighters and helping them travel to Syria to join the group. The three foreigners were trying to go to Syria to fight for the group. All were taken to police headquarters in the provinces in which they were arrested.

The operation was conducted after a US delegation visited Turkey earlier this week. In discussions, Turkey promised to be more cooperative in the fight against IS. The delegation, headed by retired General John Allen, made steps toward reaching a deal with Turkey that would allow the US-led coalition forces to use the Incirlik military air base in the country’s southern Adana province to conduct airstrikes. In return, Turkey wants US help in establishing a safe zone in northern Syria near their border. The two countries have been negotiating over the details of these two points since last year.

Turkey, a member of NATO, has faced international criticism for not contributing to the fight against IS, and it has a number of reasons for not wanting to take part in the battle. It wants to see Syrian President Bashar al-Assad removed from office; fighting IS and subsequently stabilizing the country goes against its political interests. In the past, it has said that it will only join the fight against IS if the US helps to set up the buffer zone in northern Syria, which the US has been reluctant to do. Additionally, the Turkish government and IS both hate the Kurds, who are an incredibly effective on-the-ground fighting force against IS. Seeing the Kurds fall at the hands of IS would be a political victory for Turkish President Erdogan.

In an interview last year, a former member of IS going by the pseudonym Sherko Omer, who initially travelled to Syria to join the Free Syrian Army’s fight against Assad but found himself forced into joining IS, explained Turkey’s role in aiding the group. He said that Turkey actually provided support by not doing anything to stop its illicit activities. According to him, the Turkish army was providing IS weapons and ammunition while allowing the militants to cross the border with Syria, and IS military commanders openly discussed their collaboration with Turkish officials.

In a separate interview, Salih Muslim, the co-chairman of Syria’s Kurdish Democratic Union Party, talked about many of the same things as Omer. He acknowledged that asserting the Turkish government directly aids IS may be an overstatement, but he explained that the government clearly turned a blind eye to the operations of Turkish NGOs that have helped foreign fighters travel to Syria. As evidence of Turkish complicity, he talked of the Kurds finding Turkish travel documents on the bodies of IS killed militants, suggesting that they were purposefully given the papers to allow them to easily cross the Syrian border.

Given Turkey’s history of helping IS both directly and indirectly, the July 10 arrests raises two questions: why now? and how serious is Turkey about maintaining this tough stance on IS?

In answer to the first question, the arrests appear to be Turkey’s attempt at demonstrating that it has chosen to stop letting IS operate freely within its borders. Given their timing immediately after the departure of the US delegation, the July 10 operation seems to be a gesture of goodwill, providing evidence that Turkey truly wants to be a part of the fight to defeat the group.

The second question is more difficult to answer due to the fact that Turkey has aided IS in the past. The US-led coalition, which wants to use Turkey as a staging site for airstrikes, must keep in mind the political reasons why Turkey did not originally work to take down IS. Turkey must be closely monitored to ensure that it keeps its word and continues to help fight the group moving forward.

Islamic State Spreading To Sudan?

Libyan newspaper Alwasat reports that a convoy carrying over 70 militants has arrived in the Islamic State held Libyan city of Sirte. The convoy originated in Sudan, traveling through the border region of Al-Kufra, and is to reinforce the Islamic State militants present in the area. While unconfirmed, the report is not the first time aid to Libyan Jihadists has been sent by Sudan, as the Sudanese attempted to ship weaponry to the Muslim Brotherhood-backed Libya Dawn back in December.

Earlier on Free Fire we reported on several medical students in Sudan fleeing the country in order to join Islamic State in Syria, with the likely aid and blessings of the Sudanese government, known supporters of Islamist terrorism. Since then reports have surfaced of the students serving as medics in Islamic State territory. One of the students replied on Twitter that they were in Syria “for the sake of Allah” a term typical used to refer to jihad. Another of the students, using the nom de guerre of Abu Amir al-Muhajir, appeared in a video encouraging Muslims employed in the medical profession to head to Syria and enlist with Islamic State. The video with al-Muhajir displays the medical facilities available to Islamic State in the Deir Ezzor province of Syria. Of particular note is that al-Muhajir explicitly targets Muslim doctors in Britain and Sudan in his recorded address.

As of last year, an obscure Salafist group in Sudan, known as Al-Attasam belKetab wa al-Sunna, openly endorsed Islamic State. Al-Attasam belKetab wa al-Sunna was formerly associated with the Sudanese branch of Muslim Brotherhood until 1991, when it broke with the group. The group has also been linked to AQIM in the past as well.

Whether or not Al-Attasam belKetab wa al-Sunna’s sympathies are shared by the current government of Sudan is unknown, but it is known that Sudan has supplied Islamic State and other jihadist groups in the Middle East with arms. A report from The New York Times details Kurdish fighters using Norinco CQ rifles (a Chinese copy of the M16 rifle used by the US military, primarily intended for export) captured from Islamic State. These particular rifles, though their serial numbers were almost completely machined off of their receivers, were traced to being license produced in Sudan and distributed by the Sudanese intelligence service. The exact same model of rifle was used by anti-South Sudanese rebels supplied by the Sudanese government. With the revelation that at least some individuals within the Sudanese government had known beforehand of the medical student’s flight to Turkey and Syria, there’s reason to believe that Sudan may be playing a dangerous game with Islamic State.

Director of Mosque Linked to Muslim Brotherhood Seeks Release of Islamic State Supporters

In Minnesota, Federal prosecutors are attempting to fight a motion for pre-trial release of three defendants accused of attempting to join the Islamic State. ABC News reports:

Three men accused of trying to leave Minnesota to join the Islamic State group have not renounced the group’s violent ideology, and proposals for their pretrial release won’t adequately protect the community or guarantee that they’ll show up for court, prosecutors said in a court filing Tuesday.

The document was filed in advance of Wednesday hearings on defense attorneys’ proposals to release Hamza Naj Ahmed, 21, and Zacharia Yusuf Abdurahman and Hanad Mustafe Musse, both 19. The men, Americans of Somali decent, are among seven people recently charged with plotting to join the terror group in Syria.

The proposals were crafted by the defense with input from Somali community members and religious leaders. They include options for housing, religious education, volunteering and other activities that defense attorneys say are designed to steer the men in a positive direction, assure the community’s safety and ensure the men attend court hearings.

It will not surprise regular readers of the Free Fire Blog to learn that at least one of the community members involved in the effort to get Islamic State sympathizers out of jail has potential ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The ABC News story interviews Sheikh Abdisalam Adam, who “has filed papers supporting Musse’s and Ahmed’s plans and says his goal is to ‘try to redirect their desire for meaning and social engagement into something more productive here at home.'” While the ABC News article declines to mention Adam’s affiliation (noting only that he is the imam of “another mosque”), it would probably be of interest for readers to know that he is the chairman of the Islamic Civic Society of America (ICSA), which runs Dar al-Hijrah Mosque, in Minneapolis. Dar al-Hijrah is located at 504 Cedar Avenue, immediately adjacent to the site of a mysterious New Year’s Eve 2014 explosion at an apartment building owned by a Somali individual suspected by the Treasury Department of helping to finance Al Shabaab, according to watchdog group Judicial Watch.

As Judicial Watch notes in its April 2nd, 2015 press release the Dar al-Hijrah mosque posted a series of web links on its page, including to the Muslim Brotherhood’s main website Ikhwanweb.org. The website also linked to Al-Islah, the Muslim Brotherhood political party of Somalia, and multiple high profile Muslim Brotherhood leaders, including Tariq Ramadan, Yusuf Al Qaradawi and Tariq Suwaidan, as well as to known U.S. and U.K Brotherhood fronts, including the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), The Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), the Muslim American Society (MAS), and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). These links were present on the website from at least April 7th, 2007 to May 17th, 2014. During the same period Adam was listed as the Mosque’s Director, under the mosque’s “Biography” page.

Judicial Watch is currently engaged in a Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit against the Department of Justice in an attempt to acquire information regarding the investigation in the explosion.

In addition to his association with a mosque which openly directed web visitors to the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Abdisalam Adam was also a director of ARAHA, the American Relief Agency for Horn of Africa.  ARAHA partners with charities including the Zakat Foundation, the charity Baitulmaal (not to be confused with Baitumal Inc, a financial services company which engaged in support for Al Qaeda and Hamas), and Life for Relief and Development (LRD).

Interestingly, these organizations not only cooperate but have had interlocking leadership. ARAHA’s executive Director Mohammed Idris was also Vice Chairman of LRD from 2006-2014 while also serving as head of ARAHA, and the head of Baitulmaal, Abdallah Boumediene was a board member of LRD from June 2012, until at least December 2014, when he served as CEO.

LRD was raided by the FBI in 2006, and in part agents were looking for ties between LRD and Iraq’s Muslim Brotherhood party known as the Iraqi Islamic Party. Another target in the same raid was Muthanna Al-Hanooti, a LRD employee, formerly executive director of CAIR-MI and the son of the late Muslim Brotherhood leader Sheikh Mohammed Al-Hanooti.  The younger Al-Hanooti was alleged to have been working as an agent of influence for Saddam Hussein’s regime, and was eventually sentenced to 1 year in prison for violating sanctions law. Ironically current CAIR-MI executive director Dawud Walid would later join LRD as a board member.

Adam’s association with groups who themselves are tied to the Muslim Brotherhood certainly raises eyebrows, particularly as he attempts to intervene on behalf of terror suspects. Releasing such suspects on bail would never have been a good idea. But releasing them into the custody of “community leaders” who link themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood, is even more dangerous.

Only 60 Syrians have Received US Training to Combat Islamic State

On July 7, US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the US has only trained approximately 60 rebels in Syria to fight the Islamic State (IS). The number emphasizes growing concern over the efficacy of the US attempt to build up a local fighting force under American supervision.

Looking out at the Senate Armed Services Committee, Carter said, “I said the number 60, and I can look out at your faces and you have the same reaction I do, which is that that’s an awfully small number.”

Pentagon officials said they want to train 3,000 fighters by the end of 2015 and 5,400 by May 2016, but they are not on track to meet their goal. Though they have 7,000 Syrian volunteers, less than one percent has been able to successfully pass the strict vetting process thus far.

Carter talked about the difficulty in determining which volunteers should receive training, saying that “we make sure that they, for example, aren’t going to pose a green-on-blue threat to their trainers; that they don’t have any history of atrocities.” The vetting requirements dictate that the US must be able to ensure that those trained will focus solely on IS rather than on also fighting the soldiers defending the Assad regime. Additionally, Volunteers must pass a counterintelligence screening.

When Carter announced the $500 million training program was finally starting after a number of delays in May 2015, he said that 400 volunteers had been cleared to receive training. At the time of his May announcement, he noted that 90 Syrians had already begun the program and that another group would join them “in the next few weeks.”

Carter acknowledged in May that “this is a complex program” that is “going to have to evolve over time” and that “any continued support for [the fighters] would be strongly conditioned upon their continued good conduct.” However, the number of program participants he gave to the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 7 (60) is smaller than the number he gave in May (90), and clearly does not include the nearly 300 more that were originally supposed to join the training. No indication was given as to the reasons for the decrease in numbers.

The program was approved by Congress in October 2014. Before its approval, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, cautioned that “we have to do it right, not fast.”

The Pentagon must acknowledge that after a certain point doing it right becomes doing it fast. Currently, Kurdish forces have proven to be the most effective in combating IS. However, The US is working closely with the Iraqi government, which opposes an armed Kurdish force. This opposition has led the US to attempt to block Arab states’ efforts to directly arm the Kurds while also refusing to aid them itself. Everyone wants to defeat IS, but only IS is helped by these attempts to sabotage the Kurds, who are currently the most effective resistance to the group. After a certain point the US must consider whether or not vetting Syrian rebels is taking too long while also taking into account the possibility that large numbers of Syrian rebels may not actually be worthy of arming. In order to bring about real change in the fight against IS in Syria, the US should side with the already existing and effective fighters, rather than the ideal-but-imaginary force they want.