Tag Archives: Liberty Security & the Law

Treason’s first cousin: ‘Heads should roll’

Senator Jay Rockefeller, the top Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, seems to think it’s just spiffy if his staffers sabotage the war on terrorism.

As long as they’re plotting to politicize intelligence for partisan reasons and leak secrets to the press to undermine President Bush.

Responding to the scandal over a memo his staffers wrote to that effect, Rockefeller instead defended the plot and blamed Republicans for swiping the document out of the trash.

The conspiracy to abuse secret intelligence as part of the 2004 presidential campaign, he says, merely "reflects staff frustration with the conduct of the Senate Intelligence Committee investigation and the difficulties of obtaining information from the administration."

Rockefeller admitted that one of his three staffers wrote the memo.

Senator Zell Miller, a Georgia Democrat, is appalled. "Of all the committees, this is the one single committee that should unquestionably be above partisan politics," he said. "The information it deals with should never, never be distorted, compromised or politicized."

"If what has happened here is not treason, it is its first cousin. The ones responsible – be they staff or elected or both – should be dealt with quickly and severely," Miller added. "Heads should roll!"

"Beginning with Rockefeller’s," chimed a New York Post editorial.

We agree. The Center for Security Policy reminds readers that Senator Pat Leahy (D-VT) was forced off the Intelligence Committee for a much lesser offense.

Said Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), "First, Democrats sought to blame an unnamed staffer for this memo, saying it had never been approved by any Senators. Next they tried to argue the memo’s merits without accepting responsibility for it. Then, on CNN, Senator Rockefeller attributed it to his three staffers but claimed it was just one ‘option’ or ‘idea’ adding, ‘I disavow nothing.’"

The committee chairman, Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), says he feels burned after having worked so closely with Rockefeller. Yet he’s pre-emptively eager to mend fences with those bent on abusing the intelligence oversight process for political gain.

Click here for the full text of Senator Rockefeller’s staff memo.

Dr. Waller’s Senate testimony on terrorist infiltration

Thank you, Chairman Kyl, and members of the Subcommittee for holding this important series of hearings. Thank you also for inviting me to testify on the subject of terrorist penetration of the U.S. military and prison systems via corruption of the chaplain programs, and how it fits in with a larger foreign-sponsored campaign to build terrorist support networks inside this country.

 


Statement of J. Michael Waller
Annenberg Professor of International Communication
Institute of World Politics

Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security
Senate Committee on the Judiciary
14 October 2003

Thank you, Chairman Kyl, and members of the Subcommittee for holding this important series of hearings. Thank you also for inviting me to testify on the subject of terrorist penetration of the U.S. military and prison systems via corruption of the chaplain programs, and how it fits in with a larger foreign-sponsored campaign to build terrorist support networks inside this country.

I am testifying in my capacity as Annenberg Professor of International Communication at the Institute of World Politics, a graduate school of statecraft and national security in Washington. My expertise is in the political warfare of terrorist groups, not the theology of Islam.

Enemies of our free society are trying to exploit it for their own ends. These hearings ensure that policymakers and the public know and understand how our enemies’ operations work within our borders.

Chaplains are only one avenue terrorists that and their allies have used to penetrate and compromise the institutions of our civil society.

The recruitment and organization of ideological extremists in prison systems and armed forces is a centuries-old problem, as is the difficulty that civil societies have had in understanding and confronting the matter. While in tsarist prisons, Stalin and Dzerzhinsky organized murderers and other hardened criminals who would lead the Bolsheviks and their Cheka secret police. Hitler credited his time in prison as an opportunity to reflect and write Mein Kampf. Terrorist inmates and others communicate and organize among themselves and with the outside world via the rather open nature of our correctional system, and are known to do so in secret with collaborative lawyers by abusing the attorney-client relationship.

Chaplains are a vital part of military and correctional life, and until recently they have been above reproach. For several years, however, some of us have been alarmed that the small but important Muslim chaplain corps in the military has been harmed by those with an agenda that is more political than spiritual. This raises legitimate – indeed pressing – national security concerns.

The nation now finds itself with suspicions about the integrity of certain Muslim chaplains and how one or more may have been able to penetrate one of the nation’s most secure terrorist detention facilities at Guantanamo, Cuba, breaking through the heavy compartmentation that was designed in part to keep the detainees from communicating with one another and with the outside. That particular case is pending in the legal system, but its gravity is magnified by an important fact: the group that vetted the suspect chaplain was founded by a Wahhabi-backed member of the Muslim Brotherhood with a long track record of supporting terrorist leaders from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad to Hezbollah. It shares an office with him and, reportedly, even the same tax identification number.

My testimony will discuss:

 

• The foreign entities and individuals who created the Muslim chaplain corps for the United States military;

• The parties responsible for nominating and vetting Muslim chaplains for the U.S. armed forces;

• The issue of state-sponsored penetration of the U.S. military and prisons;

• Challenges to our ability to understand the nature of the problem; and

• The larger context of which the chaplain program is part.

Initial research findings

Our country’s security, intelligence and counterintelligence services missed a lot before 9/11, and have been so deluged with information since then that it is often hard to make sense of it even two years later. Those inside government, and those of us outside, are early in the analytical process. My testimony is based entirely on the public record, and is intended to help connect the dots among what can be a maze of confusing names and organizations. Much of the research has been done with the staff of the Center for Security Policy.

In short, this is what my colleagues and I have found:

• Foreign states and movements have been financing the promotion of radical, political Islam, which we call Islamism, within America’s armed forces and prisons.

• That alien ideology, with heavy political overtones, preaches intolerance and hatred of American society, culture, government, and the principles enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.

• Adherents to that ideology directly and indirectly spawn, train, finance, supply and mobilize terrorists who would destroy our system of government and our way of life.

• They have created civil support networks for terrorists at home and abroad, providing material assistance, fundraising operations, logistics, propaganda, legal assistance in the event of arrest or imprisonment, and bringing political pressure to bear on policymakers grappling with counterterrorism issues.

• The Islamists exploited the nation’s prison chaplancies and the created the Muslim chaplain cadre in the armed forces as one of several avenues of infiltration, recruitment, training and operation.

Toward understanding the problem

Before I begin, one should note that a great battle is taking place today within the Islamic faith around the world. Many Muslims have come to me and to my colleagues with information about how their mosques, centers, and communities have been penetrated and hijacked by extreme Islamists who have politicized the faith and sought to use it as a tool of political warfare against the United States. We would not know what we already know were it not for the active collaboration of Muslims from many countries and currents who fear the political Islamists, and it is clear that federal terrorism-fighters and the nation at large have benefited likewise.

As a society, we have not understood the nature of the problem. Some, such as the FBI leadership, have contorted themselves to unusual lengths to avoid honest discussion of the issue.

The testimony of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) before this subcommittee on 26 June of this year is a case in point, where the witness failed even to discuss the subject on which he was requested to testify, which was on growing Wahhabi influence in the United States. The FBI Director himself has a splendid staff of speechwriters who painstakingly avoid using the words “Islam” and “terrorist” in the same sentence. Such dissembling does a disservice to the American public and arguably has harmed efforts to protect the country from terrorism.

Part of the trepidation against honestly discussing the issue is the atmosphere of fear and intimidation surrounding part of the discourse. Oftentimes as soon as a non-Muslim notes that nearly 100 percent rate of terrorist attacks were perpetrated in recent years by those who call themselves Muslim, certain self-proclaimed Muslim “leaders” in the United States take to the airwaves, the press and the Internet to denounce the critic as being “racist” or “bigoted.” Some of their non-Muslim friends have done the same, creating a chilling effect on open discussion, leading to poor public understanding of the conflict at hand.

Curiously, there is no shortage of normal Muslims in this country who agree with the critics. However, they are not organized and often have felt too intimidated to speak out.

Significantly, our research shows the most virulent of the denunciations have come from the self-proclaimed Muslim “leaders” who are tied to foreign or domestic terrorist organizations; foreign – mainly Wahhabi – funding; and in crucial cases, the Muslim Brotherhood. As we will see, a reported Muslim Brotherhood member, who had built a political pressure group in Washington that the FBI certified as “mainstream,” frequently assailed the arrests of bona fide terrorists as bigoted actions that would harm the American Muslim community.

When we discuss the chaplain issue, we should keep it in a larger context. That context spans 40 years of Wahhabi political warfare as an element of religious proselytizing – or, some would argue, political warfare of which proselytizing is an element.

The strategic goal is twofold: to dominate the voice of Islam around the world; and to exert control over civil and political institutions around the world through a combination of infiltration, aggressive political warfare, and violence.

We see this happening globally: In Pakistan and Egypt, the United Kingdom and continental Europe, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, in Russia and Turkey; in Southeast Asia, parts of Africa and Latin America; and here in the United States.

This trend is one of the factors that unites so much of the world – including the Islamic world – in the Global War on Terrorism. And that factor helps to explain why some countries find it so difficult to cooperate to their full potential, and why other leaders have been nothing short of courageous.

Hearings this subcommittee held last June and September have illuminated the issue and started to connect the dots. Chairman Kyl, you said it exactly on September 10 that “we must improve our ability to ‘connect the dots’ between terrorists and their supporters and sympathizers. We must understand their goals, their resources and their methods, just as well as they understand our system of freedoms and how to exploit them for their terrible purposes.”

Part 1: Chaplains, the Wahhabi Lobby, and the Muslim Brotherhood

The process for becoming a Muslim chaplain for any branch of the U.S. military, currently involves two separate phases. First, individuals must complete religious education and secondly, they must receive an ecclesiastical endorsement from an approved body. As several recent media reports have noted, federal investigators long have suspected key groups in the chaplain program – the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS) the American Muslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Council (AMAFVAC), and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) – of links to terrorist organizations.

• The Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS) trains Muslim chaplains.

o Operation Green Quest investigators raided GSISS offices in March 2002, along with 23 other organizations. According to search warrants, federal agents suspected GSISS and the others of “potential money laundering and tax evasion activities and their ties to terrorists groups such as al Qaeda as well as individual terrorists . . . [including] Osama bin Laden.”

o Agents also raided the homes of GSISS Dean of Students Iqbal Unus, and GSISS President Taha Al-Alwani. Press reports identify Al-Awani as Unindicted Co-Conspirator Number 5 in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad case of Sami Al-Arian in Florida.

• The American Muslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Council (AMAFVAC) accredits or endorses chaplains already trained under GSISS or other places, like schools in Syria.

o AMAFAC operates under the umbrella of the American Muslim Foundation (AMF), led by Abdurahman Alamoudi.

o According to Senator Schumer’s office, AMAFAC and AMF share the same tax identification number, making them the same legal organization.

• The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) endorses trained chaplains for the military.

Religious education and ecclesiastical endorsement

As of 8 June 2002, nine of the fourteen chaplains in the U.S. military received their religious training from the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS) in Leesburg, Virginia.

Following training at GSISS or another religious school, the majority of Muslim chaplains receive their endorsement from the American Muslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Council (AVAFVAC).

ISNA provides ideological material to about 1,100 of an estimated 1,500 to 2,500 mosques in North America. It vets and certifies Wahhabi-trained imams and is the main official endorsing agent for Muslim chaplains in the U.S. military.

An organ of ISNA, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) has physical control of most mosques in the United States. NAIT finances, owns, and otherwise subsidizes the construction of mosques and is reported to own between 50 and 79 percent of the mosques on the North American continent.

Origin of military chaplain problem: Muslim Brotherhood penetration

One can trace part of the military chaplain problem directly to its origin: A penetration of American political and military institutions by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood who is a key figure in Wahhabi political warfare operations against the United States.

The Muslim Brotherhood is an international movement founded in 1928 that seeks the destruction of all state and geographic divisions, rejects the idea of the nation-state and all forms of secularization, and works toward creating a world pan-Islamic state with a government based on Muslim sharia law. Initially it was uncompromising in its rejection of secular society, but in recent years changed its strategy to renounce violence (“ostensibly,” in the word of the Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram), and to take over or dominate political parties, unions, and professional syndicates. It is technically banned in its home country of Egypt, but operates through cutouts. Al Ahram calls the Muslim Brotherhood a “political movement” because of its political goals.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s slogan is “God is our purpose, the Prophet our leader, the Qur’an our constitution. Jihad our way and dying for God’s cause our supreme objective.”

Following the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the Muslim Brotherhood became part of the international Wahhabi infrastructure, with the Saudis providing sanctuary and support. Its functional leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, is widely believed to al Qaeda’s second-in-command after Osama bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri is currently on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists list for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Alamoudi: The operations chief in the U.S.

In 1990 Abdurahman Alamoudi, an émigré from Eritrea of Yemeni descent and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, set up a political action organization in Washington called the American Muslim Council (AMC). This subcommittee heard testimony almost six years ago that the AMC, based at 1212 New York Avenue NW, was inter alia, the “de facto lobbying arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Earlier this month, AMC advisory board member Soliman Biheiri, whom federal prosecutors say was “the financial toehold of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States,” was convicted of violating U.S. immigration law.

Alamoudi is presently in jail on federal terrorism-related charges. He was arrested in late September 2003 at Dulles International Airport after British law-enforcement authorities stopped him with $340,000 in cash that he was trying to take to Syria. U.S. officials allege that the money may have been destined for Syrian-based terrorist groups to attack Americans in Iraq. Charges include illegally receiving money from the Libyan government, passport and immigration fraud, and other allegations of supporting terrorists abroad and here in the United States.

Since Alamoudi has not had his trial, it may be inappropriate in this Judiciary subcommittee setting to discuss the case further, other than to say that one of his attorneys, Kamal Nawash of Northern Virginia, spoke to the suspect after his arrest and called the case politically motivated. Nawash told reporters less than two weeks ago that Alamoudi “has no links whatsoever to violence or terrorism. On the contrary, he supported the U.S. war on terrorism.”

Alamoudi has a long public record that indicates why his instrumentality in founding and shepherding the U.S. Muslim military chaplain program unfortunately calls into question the integrity of the entire Muslim chaplaincy, and requires thorough investigation.

Alamoudi successfully burrowed into the American political mainstream until some of his extremist statements made him a public liability. My testimony will not discuss the details of his political activity other than to say that it included both main political parties and two administrations.

Alamoudi timeline

A timeline of events and statements shows that the Pentagon’s Muslim chaplain program was compromised at the start due to the fact that Alamoudi founded it and guided it, and nominated the first chaplains.

During the time he and his organizations were involved in the chaplain program, Alamoudi was a senior figure in Northern Virginia-based entities that were raided or shut down for alleged terrorist financing; he openly spoke out in support of Hamas and Hezbollah, he campaigned for the release of a Hamas leader, and he attempted to secure the release of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader convicted for his role in plotting to bring down civilian airliners and bomb bridges, tunnels, and skyscrapers in New York City.

1979: Abdurahman Alamoudi emigrated to the United States.

1985-1990: Alamoudi was executive assistant to the president of the SAAR Foundation in Northern Virginia. Federal authorities suspect the Saudi-funded SAAR Foundation, now defunct, of financing international terrorism. SAAR is the acronym for Sulaiman Abdul Aziz al-Rajhi, a wealthy Saudi figure and reputed financer of terrorism. Victims of the 11 September 2001 attacks allege in court that “The SAAR Foundation and Network is a sophisticated arrangement of non-profit and for-profit organizations that serve as front-groups for fundamentalist Islamic terrorist organizations.”

1990: Alamoudi founded the American Muslim Council (AMC) as a tax-exempt 501(c)(4) organization, based at 1212 New York Avenue NW in Washington. The AMC has been described as a de facto front of the Muslim Brotherhood. The AMC’s affiliate, the American Muslim Foundation (AMF), is a 501(c)(3) group to which contributions are tax-deductible. SAAR family assets financed the building at 1212 New York Avenue NW.

1991: Alamoudi created the American Muslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Council (AMAFVAC). Its purpose: to “certify Muslim chaplains hired by the military.” Qaseem Uqdah, a former AMC official and ex-Marine gunnery sergeant, headed AMAFVAC.

1993: The Department of Defense certified AMAFVAC as one of two organizations to vet and endorse Muslim chaplains. The other was the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS).

• March: Alamoudi assailed the federal government’s case against Mohammed Salameh who was arrested ten days after the first World Trade Center bombings in February: “All their [law enforcement] facts are – they are flimsy. We don’t think that any of those facts that they have against him, or the fact that they searched his home and they found a few wires here or there – are not enough.” Salameh was convicted in the bombing plot and is currently serving a life sentence in prison.

• In December 1993, Alamoudi attended the swearing-in ceremony of Army Capt. Abdul Rasheed Muhammad (formerly Myron Maxwell), the first Muslim chaplain in the U.S. military, and pinned the crescent moon badge on the captain’s uniform. “The American Muslim Council chose and endorsed Muhammad.”

From about 1993 to 1998, the Pentagon retained Alamoudi on an unpaid basis to nominate and to vet Muslim chaplain candidates for the U.S. military.

1994: Alamoudi complained that the judge picked on the 1993 World Trade Center bombers because of their religion: “I believe that the judge went out of his way to punish the defendants harshly and with vengeance, and to a large extent, because they were Muslim.”

• He began a public defense of Hamas: “Hamas is not a terrorist group … I have followed the good work of Hamas…they have a wing that is a violent wing. They had to resort to some kind of violence.”

1995: Alamoudi continued his Hamas defense, arguing that “Hamas is not a terrorist organization. The issue for us (the American Muslim Council) is to be conscious of where to give our money, but not to be dictated to where we send our money.”

• Alamoudi accompanies AMAFVAC chief Qaseem Uqdah on a tour of naval installations in Florida to assess the needs of Muslims in the U.S. Navy.

1996: In 1996, Alamoudi became a naturalized citizen of the United States. In so doing he swore to defend the Constitution against “all enemies, foreign and domestic.”

• Alamoudi spoke out in response to the arrest at New York’s JFK Airport of his admitted friend, Hamas political bureau leader Mousa Abu Marzook. Months after the arrest, Alamoudi blamed the February 25th Hamas suicide bombings of Israeli citizens on Marzook’s detention: “If he was there things would not have gone in this bad way. He is known to be a moderate and there is no doubt these events would not have happened if he was still in the picture.”

• He continued to defend Marzook: “Yes, I am honored to be a member of the committee that is defending Musa Abu Marzook in America. This is a mark of distinction on my chest … I have known Musa Abu Marzook before and I really consider him to be from among the best people in the Islamic movement, Hamas – in the Palestinian movement in general – and I work together with him.”

• May 23: Alamoudi became a United States citizen.

• As one point during the year, Alamoudi spoke at the annual convention of the Islamic Association of Palestine in Illinois, stating in Muslim Brotherhood terms:

o “It depends on me and you, either we do it now or we do it after a hundred years, but this country will become a Muslim country. And I [think] if we are outside this country we can say oh, Allah, destroy America, but once we are here, our mission in this country is to change it.”

o Alamoudi called on the president to “free Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman,” the Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader serving a life sentence for his role in the early 1990s of bombings and attempted bombings in New York, and for plotting to destroy civilian airliners.

• And again: “I know the man [Marzook], he is a moderate man on many issues. If you see him, he is like a child. He is the most gracious person, soft-spoken. He is for dialogue… [His arrest] is a hard insult to the Muslim community.”

• August 1996: Alamoudi was there when the U.S. Armed Forces commissioned its second Muslim chaplain, Lieutenant JG Monje Malak Abd al-Muta Ali Noel, Jr. “We have taken a long and patient process to bring this through,” Alamoudi said. He spoke of cultivating others to take posts in the political system and law enforcement: “We have a few city council members. We are grooming our young people to be politicians. We also want them to be policemen and FBI agents.”

• Alamoudi protested federal airline safety measures concerning terrorism.

1997: Back to Hamas: “I think [Hamas is] a freedom fighting organization.”

2000: Alamoudi publicly embraced not only Hamas but Hezbollah. At a videotaped protest in front of the White House on 28 October, Alamoudi shouted, “Anybody who is a supporter of Hamas here? Hear that, Bill Clinton. We are all supporters of Hamas. I wish they added that I am also a supporter of Hezbollah. Anybody who supports Hezbollah here?”

• Alamoudi described a two-track political approach, advocating prayer for the destruction of the United States, but counseled that while working within the U.S., his allies should try to change policy: “I think if we are outside this country, we can say oh, Allah, destroy America, but once we are here, our mission in this country is to change it.”

2001: In January, Alamoudi attended a conference in Beirut with leaders of terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda.

• November 2001: After NBC and other channels broadcast a 2000 videotape of him proclaiming support for Hamas and Hezboollah, Alamoudi told reporters, “I should have qualified what I have said. I should have said that we should support Hamas and Hezbollah in the effort for self-determination.”

2002: Alamoudi protested the arrest Imam Jamal Abdullah Al-Amin (formerly known as H. Rap Brown): “I think there is a witch hunt against Muslims.” Al-Amin, who held a former AMC post, was later convicted of murdering a Georgia law-enforcement officer.

• March: Federal agents raided Alamoudi’s American Muslim Foundation during Operation Green Quest, as well as several other organizations which Alamoudi had led, staffed, or otherwise been affiliated.

• April: Alamoudi reacted to the Department of Justice’s ordering of names of known or suspected terrorists to be added to federal, state and local police nationwide: “I really don’t understand a government that acts on suspicion instead of facts. America is no longer the land of the free.”

• Alamoudi modified his tone on Hamas: In an op-ed for the Orlando Sentinel on April 30, 2002, Alamoudi explained, “Hamas may be on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations, and may deserve that designation for some of its actions – such as unconscionable bombings of civilians – but this is not the ‘Hamas’ I support. What I support is the legal military defense of Palestine, and the political and humanitarian work of Hamas to provide representation to the occupied territories as well as medical, educational and other desperately needed social services to the Palestinian people.”

• June: AMC Executive Director Eric Vickers was asked on Fox News and MSNBC to denounce Hamas, Hezbollah, the Islamic Jihad and al Qaeda by name. Vickers would not In one instance, he stated that al Qaeda was “involved in a resistance movement.”

• The FBI announced that Director Robert Mueller would address the AMC’s second annual national lobbying conference. The FBI called the AMC “the most mainstream Muslim group in the United States.”

2003: In September, Army Capt. James “Yousuf” Yee, a Muslim chaplain who ministered to the 660 terrorist detainees at the U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba, was arrested and identified as having been “sponsored” by the AMAFVAC.

• Alamoudi was arrested by federal agents as he returned from a trip to Libya, Syria, other Arab countries, and the United Kingdom.

• At his bond hearing, attorneys May Shallal Kheder and Maher Hanania of the law firm Hanania, Kheder & Nawash represented him. The third partner of the firm, Kamal Nawash, spoke to him in jail and identified himself on October 1 as an Alamoudi lawyer.

Somehow despite all the above public events, the Pentagon found fit for Alamoudi to start and effectively run the Muslim military chaplains program. Somehow the State Department saw Alamoudi as an appealing representative of the United States in its public diplomacy activities, making him a “goodwill ambassador” to Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and elsewhere, as part of the USINFO program.

Saudi recruitment of American military personnel

U.S. counterintelligence is vigilant against recruitment of American military personnel by foreign intelligence services, but has been blind toward the possible recruitment of American officers into Wahhabi political extremism or Islamist terrorist networks. See Appendices 3, 5 and 6 for case study of Bilal Philips, a former Jamaican Communist Party member-turned-Saudi agent of influence who claims to have converted thousands of American soldiers from the Persian Gulf War period to the present.

Philips, recruited in the U.S. by Tablighi Jamaat, went to school in Saudi Arabia, was made a proselytization official by the Saudi Air Force. One of his greatest influences was Mohammad Qutub, who developed a political theory for Islamist revolution and who taught Osama bin Laden.

Value of religious conversions to terrorists

Islamists terrorists view conversions of non-Muslims to Islamism as vital to their effort. Europeans and Americans from non-Muslim backgrounds do not fit the terrorist profile. They know their societies far better than immigrant terrorists, and they blend in seamlessly. They also have Western passports. Some analysts view the conversions as a new generation of political and social protest against the West and toward the “Third World.” According to a recent report:

The young people in working-class urban areas are against the system, and converting to Islam is the ultimate way to challenge the system,” said Roy, a director of the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris. “They convert to stick it to their parents, to their principal… They convert in the same way people in the 1970s went to Bolivia or Vietnam. I see a very European tradition of identifying with a Third World cause.”

The converts are useful to a new al Qaeda strategy of “training the trainers,” a method that the increasingly decentralized organization used to export terrorism to other countries.

Part 2: Radical Islamist Domination of Muslim Prison Recruitment Efforts

Radical Islamist groups, most tied to Saudi-sponsored Wahhabi organizations suspected by the U.S. government of being closely linked to terror financing activities, dominate Muslim prison recruitment in the U.S. and seek to create a radicalized cadre of felons who will support their anti-American efforts. Estimates place the number of Muslim prison recruits at between 15-20% of the prison population. They are overwhelmingly black with a small, but growing Hispanic minority. It appears that in many prison systems, including Federal prisons, Islamist imams have demanded, and been granted, the exclusive franchise for Muslim proselytization to the forceful exclusion of moderates.

• The Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS) trains prison chaplains. It trained Imam Umar the Bureau of Prisons chaplain who was fired after the Wall Street Journal profiled his post-September 11th extremist rhetoric.

• The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) refers Muslim clerics to the U.S. Bureau of Prisons.

The Agenda

• “Yvonne Haddad, an academic who studies Muslims in America, noted in a lecture at Stanford University that the two loci of Islamic awakening in the United States are the university and the prison. It makes sense to connect these two centers of Islamic activity for sake of establishing Islam in the United States.”

Radical Imams

• “In the U.S., just two weeks after the September 11 attacks, Muslim Chaplain Aminah Akbarin at New York’s Albion Correctional Facility was put on paid administrative leave after telling inmates that Osama bin Laden should be hailed as “a hero to all Muslims” and that the terror attacks were the fault of President Bush….According to published reports, radical Islamists—Muslims who follow a rigid interpretation of the Koran called Wahhabism—have put a high priority on reaching disaffected inmates around the world and recruiting them for their own deadly purposes.”

• Some prison-oriented groups prey on that disaffection. A leader of the Chicago-based Institute of Islamic Information & Education (III&E) said after 9/11,

o “I know that Osama bin Ladin is a true Muslim with in depth knowledge of the Qur’an and teachings of the Prophet. I would never suspect that he would do anything against the teachings of Islam and harm anyone who is a civilian and has not taken up arms against Islam or Muslims….”

• “I would absolve the Taliban from any part of the air crashes at the WTC, the Pentagon and other place….”

The Islamist Appeal

• The prison recruitment question is occurring worldwide. “Dr. Theodore Dalrymple, a prominent psychiatrist who often works in British prisons, says Islam has assumed a presence disproportionate to the relatively small number of Muslim inmates (Four-thousand Muslims are among the 67,500 inmates)… ‘A visitor to our prisons might be forgiven for concluding that Britain was an Islamic country,’ Dalrymple wrote in London’s Daily Telegraph. ‘He would reach this conclusion because he would see a vast amount of Islamic literature . . . quite unmatched in quantity by any Christian literature, which is conspicuous mainly by its absence.’… Islam, Dalrymple says, is attractive to inmates ‘because it revenges them upon the whole of society…By converting to Islam, the prisoner is therefore expressing his enmity toward society in which he lives and by which he believes himself to have been grossly maltreated.’”

• “A key area of recruitment, the sources said, are U.S. prisons and jails, where al Qaeda and other organizations have found men who have already been convicted of violent crimes and have little or no loyalty to the United States… ‘It’s literally a captive audience, and many inmates are anxious to hear how they can attack the institutions of America,’ said one federal corrections official.”

Saudi Involvement

• “Islamic Affairs Department of [the Saudi Arabian] Washington embassy ships out hundreds of copies of the Quran each month, as well as religious pamphlets and videos, to prison chaplains and Islamic groups who then pass them along to inmates. The Saudi government also pays for prison chaplains, along with many other American Muslims, to travel to Saudi Arabia for worship and study during the hajj, the traditional winter pilgrimage to Mecca that all Muslims are supposed to make at least once in their lives. The trips typically cost $3,000 a person and last several weeks, says Mr. Al-Jubeir, the Saudi spokesman.”

Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)

The Islamic Society of North America is an influential front for the promotion of the Wahhabi political, ideological and theological infrastructure in the United States and Canada. Established by the Muslim Students Association, ISNA seeks to marginalize leaders of the Muslim faith who do not support its ideological goals. Through sponsorship of propaganda, doctrinal material and mosques, is pursuing a strategic objective of dominating Islam in North America.

ISNA provides ideological material to about 1,100 of an estimated 1,500 to 2,500 mosques in North America. It vets and certifies Wahhabi-trained imams and is the main official endorsing agent for Muslim chaplains in the U.S. military.

Politically, ISNA has promoted leaders of the American Muslim Council (AMC), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC).

Magnitude of the Threat

• “For many disaffected young people, their first contact with Islam comes in jail. Over the past 30 years, Islam has become a powerful force in America’s correctional system. In New York State, it’s estimated that between 17 and 20 percent of all inmates are Muslims – a number that experts say holds nationally.”

• “Currently, there are approximately 350,000 Muslims in Federal, state and local prisons – with 30,000-40,000 being added to that number each year….These inmates mostly came into prison as non-Muslims. But, it so happens that once inside the prison a majority turns to Islam for the fulfillment of spiritual needs… It is estimated that of those who seek faith while imprisoned, about 80% come to Islam. This fact alone is a major contributor to the phenomenal growth of Islam in the U.S.”

Notable Prison Converts

• Richard Reid (the Shoe Bomber) was converted by a radical imam (Abdul Ghani Qureshi at the suggestion of his father, a Jamaican-born career criminal who converted to Islam) in a British prison. British MP Oliver Letwin says that Reid’s conversion to Islam suggests that young inmates are being targeted by radical organizations.

• Jose Padilla (aka Abdullah al-Muhajir) – “the Dirty Bomber” – was exposed to radical Islam during time in American prisons, and from there was recruited into the al Qaeda network.

• Aqil converted to Islam while serving time in California’s boot-camp system. He went to an Afghani training camp with one of the men accused of kidnapping and murdering Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.

 


 

Appendix 1: Summary of Muslim military chaplain founder Abdurahman Alamoudi’s organizational affiliations

(asterisk * indicates the organization was raided in federal counterterrorism probes)

Executive Assistant to President of SAAR Foundation*
Regional Representative for DC Chapter, Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)
Acting President, Muslim Students Association, U.S. & Canada
Founder, former executive director, American Muslim Council (AMC)
President, American Muslim Foundation (AMF)
Board Member, American Muslim Council (AMC)
Founding Trustee, Fiqh Council of North America, Inc.*
Board member, Mercy International*
Secretary, Success Foundation*
Founding Secretary, United Association for Studies and Research*
Director, Taibah International Aid Association*
Board Member, Somali Relief Fund (Prominent Al-Qaeda operative, Wadih El Hage, now serving life in prison for masterminding 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, reportedly had Somali Relief Fund business card in his possession during a 1997 raid on his home by Kenyan officials.)
First Endorsing Agent for Muslim Chaplains, US Military
Board member, American Muslims for Jerusalem
President, Muslims for a Better America
Head, American Task Force for Bosnia (group founded by AMC and directed by Khaled Saffuri)
Board member, Interfaith Impact for Justice and Peace
Board member, the Council on National Interest Foundation (founded by Paul Findley www.cionline.org )

 


Appendix 2: Key Organizations Involved in Muslim Prison Recruitment

National Islamic Prison Foundation (NIPF) – Contact: Mahdi Bray; 1212 New York Ave. NW, Suite 525, Washington, DC 20005. This is the same address as the American Muslim Council (AMC).

• “Specifically organized to convert American inmates to Wahhabism.”

• NIPF “coordinates a coast-to-coast campaign to convert inmates to Islam. Foundation officials claim an average of 135,000 such conversions per year. More than 10 percent of the 2 million plus U.S. prison population is Muslim. When black American Muslims are released from prison with the customary $10, a suit of clothes and a one-way bus or train ticket, they know any mosque or masjid [Islamic center] will shelter and feed them and help them find a job.”

Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)

• “The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) have been bringing prison chaplains and volunteers together since 1998 in their “Islam in American Prison” conferences. These delegates deliberate on various ways of serving inmates, such as the provision of free literature within prison, helping the families of those incarcerated, building halfway houses for those released, and similar other beneficial measures.”

National Association of Muslim Chaplains – Contact: President, Imam Warithuddin Umar

• Founded by Warith Deen Umar, a radical prison convert, who offered his views of Isalm and the Sept. 11 attacks to the Wall Street Journal arguing that “The hijackers should be honored as martyrs, he said. The U.S. risks further terrorism attacks because it oppresses Muslims around the world.” He was later fired from his job as a contractual consultant with the U.S. Bureau of Prisons and barred from continuing his volunteer chaplaincy in New York State Prisons.
• “The Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences hosted the annual National Association of Muslim Chaplains conference in Leesburg, Virginia on May 31st through June 2nd, 2000. Seventy-five Muslim prison chaplains from New York, Maryland, North Carolina and other areas were present.”

The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR)

• “CAIR has recently dedicated more resources to assisting Muslims in prison. ‘We are meeting with the appropriate government agencies, researching case law and contacting more inmates to see how we can help Muslims practice Islam in prison with the limited rights they have,’ says CAIR Civil Rights Coordinator Hassan Mirza.”

Institute of Islamic Information & Education (III&E) – Contact: Managing Director, M. Amir Ali, Ph.D.; P.O. Box 410129, Chicago, IL 60641

• “There are indications that each piece of literature of the Institute sent to a prisoner is circulated and read by at least ten persons; based on this estimate the III&E is reaching out to more than 20,000 individuals a year in the prison system. The cost of correspondence is somewhere $25 to $40 per letter and enclosures, which includes management, rent, utilities, personnel, material and postage.”
• “Helping Hand to Other Islamic Organizations: From the beginning the Institute has adopted the policy of cooperation with other sister Islamic organizations and da’wah workers. Time to time some Islamic organizations have asked for the help of the III&E in handling correspondence with the prisoners. World Assembly of Muslim Youth, WAMY, headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, receives many letters from the U.S. WAMY used to refer all their letters from prisons to the III&E which were responded. All letters received by the III&E from Africa, Asia, Europe and South America are sent to WAMY because she has the resources to handle such letters. The Institute has handled letters referred to her by Muslim Community Center, Chicago (MCC), American Islamic College, Chicago, Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) but these organizations no longer refer their letters to the Institute. For the last one year Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) began sending some of the letters she receives to the Institute for responding. The Institute response to all referred letters begins with an introductory sentence to let the inquirer know that it was the response to their letter sent to so and so organization.”
• “Amir Ali, of the Institute of Islamic Information and Education, talked about the services his organization provides Muslim inmates, from prison visits to books to classes in Arabic and Islamic history. Groups also provide correspondence courses in other subjects, 24-hour toll free phones or collect-calling services for inmates to call family, mentorship programs for new converts and half-way houses to help re-integrate Muslim inmates into society after release. Amir Ali readily acknowledged the support of Saudi Arabia in providing these services.”
• “The Institute does not send copies of the Qur’an to individuals because of the lack of resources and all such inquiries are referred to the Saudi Embassy.”
• From an article appearing on III&E website: “the hearts of Americans and of similar nations will be filled with such an amount of dread of you (and you are more than one billion people) that will be many times the dread which is filling their hearts nowadays of Taliban regime (who are no more than a handful in a plain).”
• From the “Article Collection of III&E Managing Director Dr. Amir Ali, Ph.D.”:
o “I know that Osama bin Ladin is a true Muslim with in depth knowledge of the Qur’an and teachings of the Prophet. I would never suspect that he would do anything against the teachings of Islam and harm anyone who is a civilian and has not taken up arms against Islam or Muslims….”
o “I would absolve the Taliban from any part of the air crashes at the WTC, the Pentagon and other place….”
o “If [Hamas has] any justification for harming civilians, this would be limited to the Israelis living in Israel…”
o “Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yasser Arafat and the Arab world are coming under pressure to cooperate in arresting and handing over Osama Binladin to the American government. It would be wrong to arrest a Muslim leader and hand him over to the enemies of Islam….”
o “Phenomenal success was achieved for the Bush administration through success in the WTC terror.”

Islamic Prison Services Foundation – Contact: Nasir Shahid; 1709 4th St. NW, Washington, DC 20001.

Islamic Prison Outreach – Contact: Imam Alauddin Shabazz; 10326 S. Hoyne, Chicago, IL 60643.

Islamic Correctional Reunion Association – Contact: Mohammad Firdause; 6336 S. 66th Ave, Tinley Park, IL 60477

Islamic Prison Service Dawah – Contact: Ali Jabbar Hakkim; 4715 Fable St., Capitol Heights, MD 20743.


Appendix 3: Al Qaeda’s tactical use of Muslim converts

The following is a reprint of an article by Sebastian Rotella, “Al Qaeda’s Stealth Weapons,” Los Angeles Times, 20 September 2003.

The convicted terrorist has a hard-core moniker: “the blue-eyed emir of Tangier.”

But Pierre Richard Robert was once a French country boy, an athletic blond teenager living in a house built by his father among pastures here in the Loire region.

Robert liked drinking and fast bikes more than school. He got interested in Islam when he played soccer at the Turkish cultural center in a neighboring industrial town. He said he wanted to convert because Allah watched over him as he sped downhill into town on his bicycle.

“I told him it’s not like changing shirts,” said Ibrahim Tekeli, a leader of the Turkish community. “The imam told him, ‘I want you to reflect and talk to your family first.’ But Richard said: ‘I’ve already reflected… For months before I made my decision, I would run the red light on the big hill every day going real fast. I would always pray to Allah to protect me. And I never got hit by a car.’ ”

Fourteen years later, though, Robert has hit bottom. A Moroccan court sentenced him to life in prison Thursday after convicting him of recruiting and training Moroccan extremists for a terrorist campaign.

He joins an unlikely group of men with non-Muslim backgrounds that includes Richard Reid, the British “shoe bomber” convicted of trying to blow up an airliner; American Jose Padilla, an alleged Al Qaeda operative being held as an enemy combatant; and Christian Ganczarski, a German convert arrested in June by French police.

Robert and Ganczarski were not just foot soldiers, investigators say. They represent a dangerous trend as police chop away at Islamic networks two years after the Sept. 11 attacks: converts who assume front-line roles as recruiters and plotters.

The number of converts has grown as Islamic militants have struck a chord with young Europeans from non-Muslim backgrounds. These “protest conversions,” as scholar Olivier Roy calls them, have less to do with theology than with a revolutionary zeal dating to Europe’s ultra-left terrorist groups of the 1970s and ’80s.

“The young people in working-class urban areas are against the system, and converting to Islam is the ultimate way to challenge the system,” said Roy, a director of the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris. “They convert to stick it to their parents, to their principal… They convert in the same way people in the 1970s went to Bolivia or Vietnam. I see a very European tradition of identifying with a Third World cause.”

As demographics and immigration propel Islam’s spread in Europe, the number of French converts — the vast majority of them law-abiding — has increased steadily to about 100,000, Roy said.

Extremists of European descent worry police for the same reasons that Al Qaeda prizes them: their symbolic value, their Western passports and their fanaticism.

“Converts are the most important work for us right now,” a French intelligence official said. “They want to show other Muslims their worth. They want to go further than anyone else. They are full of rage and they want to prove themselves.”

The rise of the converts actually may be a sign of Al Qaeda’s weakness, a need to fill a vacuum as leaders are hunted down. The limited hierarchy of Islamic networks can make leadership a question of circumstance and initiative. A Spanish investigator said Al Qaeda has “many soldiers, some sergeants and the generals.”

Ganczarski and Robert were no generals, but they allegedly stepped up to plot attacks and recruit. And investigators say Ganczarski, 36, became a pivotal figure in Europe during the post-Sept. 11 period because of his alleged ties to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al Qaeda’s now-imprisoned operational boss, who turned increasingly to converts while on the run.

Ganczarski is being held in a French jail as a suspected conspirator in the bombing of a Tunisian synagogue that killed 21 people, including French tourists, in April 2002.

Investigators say Mohammed controlled the plot from Pakistan despite the vigilance of U.S. spy satellites that intercepted some of his coded conversations with accomplices. To elude detection, he used non-Arabs in Europe to support the Tunisian suicide bomber, Nizar Nawar, police say.

On the day Nawar blew himself up in a truck-bomb at the historic synagogue on the island of Djerba, he called Mohammed in Pakistan, investigators say, and Ganczarski’s home in Duisburg, Germany. A German wiretap recorded the latter call: As if addressing a mentor, Nawar asked Ganczarski for a blessing, investigators say.

Although the Germans lacked proof to arrest Ganczarski, who denied involvement in the attack, the widening investigation soon involved French, Spanish and Swiss police. It revealed Ganczarski’s access to Al Qaeda’s “hard core,” in the words of a Swiss intelligence report dated last December.

Ganczarski called Mohammed’s Swiss cell phone in Pakistan “numerous times” in the months before the Djerba attack, according to the report.

The phone call intercepts also pointed to a Swiss convert, Daniel “Yusuf” Morgenej, who had befriended the German in Saudi Arabia, authorities say. Swiss police questioned and released Morgenej. But Spanish and French investigators say he and Ganczarski remain suspected links in an intricate chain leading to the plot’s accused money man, a Spanish exporter.

Moreover, the Djerba plot appears to have been part of a larger effort led by Mohammed to deploy converts. Padilla, the American who allegedly schemed to set off a radioactive bomb, was arrested in Chicago in May 2002 after arriving from Switzerland. In the preceding weeks, Padilla placed four calls to the same phone number for Mohammed that Ganczarski had called, according to the Swiss intelligence report.

Ganczarski was born in Gleiwitz, Poland. His family moved to Germany when he was 9. He dropped out of school and found work as a metallurgist in the Ruhr Valley. It was on the shop floor that a fellow immigrant, a North African, introduced him to the Koran, officials say.

“Ever since his youth, it appears he was greatly preoccupied with questions of faith,” said a senior French law enforcement official.

His radicalization accelerated when he met a Saudi cleric visiting European mosques in search of Western-born acolytes. In 1992, Ganczarski received a scholarship to attend an Islamic university in Medina, Saudi Arabia, the senior official said.

Ganczarski spent three frustrating years in Medina. He took special courses to overcome his lack of schooling, but failed to enter the university, the senior official said. Yet his zeal did not seem to waver.

He traveled to Afghanistan in 1998 — the first of four sojourns — trained at an Al Qaeda camp and saw combat there and in Russia’s breakaway republic of Chechnya, officials say.

Ganczarski met Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders, who entrusted him with handling computers and communications, the senior official said. Bin Laden saw converts as “an especially potent weapon,” the official said.

Returning from Afghanistan after the Sept. 11 attacks, Ganczarski persisted in trying to organize plots even after the Tunisian case drew attention to him, officials say.

An alleged accomplice from Duisburg has told French interrogators that Ganczarski began preparations for an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Paris. Karim Mehdi said the two explored a technique developed by Mohammed in Afghanistan. It involved packing model planes with 3 or 4 kilos of explosives and diving them into a building by remote control, according to the senior French official.

“They got as far as acquiring material,” the official said. “They did a lot of research on planes in Germany. You can pilot these planes from a mile away. The embassy is a double target — you hit the French and Americans in one blow.”

U.S. officials declined to comment, citing a policy of not discussing threats to embassies.

Mehdi also admitted scouting targets for a planned car bombing at tourist sites on Reunion island, a French territory in the Indian Ocean, officials say. Mehdi said Ganczarski was an “organizer and the financier” of the plot, according to French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, who described the German as “a high-ranking member of Al Qaeda.”

Ganczarski found refuge for a time in Saudi Arabia, where he took his family last November. But after this year’s terrorist attacks on expatriate compounds in Riyadh put pressure on the Saudis, they expelled him to France. Under tough anti-terrorism laws, Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere has accused Ganczarski in the Djerba attack based on his alleged ties to the plotters, and has at least two years to bring him to trial. Authorities are also interested in the fact that Ganczarski had phone numbers for two imprisoned members of the Hamburg cell that planned the Sept. 11 attacks.

Ganczarski’s alleged access to the inner circle is not surprising. Al Qaeda has embraced true believers regardless of ethnicity. Just as many converts marry Muslim women, some terrorism suspects of Arab origin have European wives, who often equal them in ideological ferocity.

“The Ganczarskis, the Roberts, they show that the radicalization is here, not just in the Middle East,” said Roy, the French scholar. If Al Qaeda’s urbanized, globalized jihad continues to attract angry Europeans, the network could gain a “second wind,” he said.

Robert, 31, could be a case in point. Like Ganczarski, the Frenchman represents a breed of blue-collar convert — neither jailhouse recruit nor university radical.

He grew up in the French hamlet of Chambles. His studies ended at Anne Frank Middle School in Andrezieux, the industrial town just down the hill where his father worked at a glass factory. The teenager made Turkish friends doing spot jobs in textile plants and playing in the Turkish soccer league, which was popular with French and immigrant youths because it used the best field in town.

The Turks of Andrezieux, who describe themselves as moderate Muslims, remember Robert as a silent kid crouching off by himself in the mosque. Like many converts, he had struggled with “drinking, stupid things” and yearned for discipline and purpose, said Tekeli, 35, a veteran union activist.

“In Europe you have everything you need: work, health benefits, family,” he said. “Yet something is missing. People find it in religion. And Islam is the religion that is growing. The French young people are more open than their parents.”

Robert’s stunned father called his change of faith “a betrayal,” Tekeli said. But when Robert turned 18 and decided to study Islam in Turkey, his parents paid for the trip. Robert traveled to Konya, a center of tourism and religion that is a magnet for European converts.

When Robert returned to France in 1992, the French intelligence official said, he complained that Turkey was “too secular.”

He went to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, where in the mid-1990s he trained at a camp run by Al Qaeda, according to French and Spanish investigators.

He also married a Moroccan woman and began wandering between Europe and Morocco. They came to Chambles for an extended stay about seven years ago, living at his parents’ house before renting apartments around the nearby city of St. Etienne, a fading landscape of shuttered arms factories and abandoned coal mines.

Robert had acquired a beard, traditional Islamic garb and the name Yacub. During visits in 1999 and 2000 to an Islamic bookstore in St. Etienne, he impressed the manager with his Arabic and his religious knowledge.

“He knew more than me,” said the manager, Ahmed Abdelouadoud.

Robert’s aggressive ideas caused conflict even at fundamentalist mosques, the intelligence official said. He became an itinerant late-night preacher in housing projects, Tekeli said.

He also got involved in the used-car racket in which Islamic extremists are active, buying cars in Europe for resale in Morocco. In 1998, he was jailed in Belgium on suspicion of auto theft.

That was nothing compared with his clandestine activity in Tangier, the Moroccan smuggling haven where Robert, by then a father of two, spent most of his time the last two years. He was convicted Thursday of recruiting several dozen young men for terrorist cells he set up in Tangier and Fez.

Robert’s Al Qaeda credentials crossed cultural borders: The group made him its “emir.” He led weapons training sessions in forests and deserts, according to the court’s verdict.

Then came the May 16 suicide bombings that killed 45 people in Casablanca, the worst attack ever in Morocco, a kingdom that prides itself on its relative tolerance. Police rounded up hundreds of extremists, catching Robert in a forest at the wheel of a pickup truck with fake Dutch plates.

Authorities charged that he served as a leader of a network that had planned a coming wave of attacks on tourist and commercial targets. After initially confessing, Robert denied it all and said he had been tortured because police needed a foreign fall guy.

“I am the victim of a frame-up by the security services,” he said in a statement relayed by his lawyer.

Robert also testified during his trial that he had worked as an informant for French intelligence, a claim French officials denied.

Investigators say Robert was part of a strategy of “training the trainers” — a model of how an increasingly decentralized Al Qaeda will function. The network exported terrorism to Morocco through a handful of recruiters who quickly whipped locals into killing shape, officials say.

Robert also wanted to bring his war home to France, police say. He and Abdulaziz Benayich, a die-hard holy warrior with longtime ties to European terrorist cells, schemed about using a bazooka or rocket-propelled grenade on targets including a giant refinery and a plutonium shipment near Lyon, about an hour from Robert’s hometown, investigators say.

When Spanish police captured Benayich in June in Algeciras, across the strait of Gibraltar from Morocco, he had shaved off his body hair — as is done in a purification ritual that precedes suicide attacks.

“He was preparing for an attack,” a Spanish police commander said. “Benayich is very dangerous.”

Although some French officials feel Robert’s threat has been exaggerated, he narrowly avoided the death penalty that was requested by prosecutors.

His old friends have watched the news reports. Robert looked exhausted in court, a pale figure surrounded by guards. He had shaved his beard. One day he wore the red and yellow jersey of Galatasaray, a Turkish soccer team.

At that moment, the “blue-eyed emir” resembled the 17-year-old his friends remember: crouched over the handlebars on his way to town, praying to Allah, gathering speed.


Appendix 4: Tablighi Jamaat convert and Saudi agent of influence claims to have converted thousands of U.S. troops

Global News Wire
Inquires may be directed to NTIS, U.S. Dept of Commerce
World News Connection

August 3, 2003

JAMAICAN-BORN CANADIAN INTERVIEWED ON ISLAMIC MISSIONARY WORK AMONG US TROOPS

Interview with Dr. Bilal Philips, a Jamaican-born Canadian, by Mahmud Khalil in Dubai; date not given

(Khalil) How did you convert to Islam and when did that take place? (Philips) That was in 1972, four years after converting to communism in Canada out my belief in the establishment of justice and equality, only to discover that it was a mere verbal slogan that communism bragged about. During my search for a philosophy, through which I could apply justice and equality in words and deeds, I had the opportunity to learn about Islam. I traveled to London to study this religion under a missionary group (jama’at al-tabligh) for three months. But, I did not benefit much during that trip, as the group did not concentrate on the Islamic shari’a sciences. I returned to Canada and sought to obtain a scholarship in the land of the cradle of Islam.

I was admitted into the Faculty of Islamic Call (Al-Da’wah) in Medina for six years, during which I spent two years learning the Arabic language.

During this period, I attended lectures by Shaykh Nasir-al-Din al-Bani, Ibn-Baz, Abu-Bakr al-Jaza’iri, and Hammadi al-Ansari. I then obtain the M.A. in the creed from King Sa’ud University in Riyadh. At the same time, I worked as teacher of Islamic education in “Manart al-Riyad” schools. (Khalil) How did you switch from teaching to preaching Islam to the US Forces stationed in Al-Khubar? (Philips) The idea came from Ali al-Shammari who had a strong urge to convert US soldiers into Islam. But, he did not speak English well. So he sought my help in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain. Since that date, I began giving religious lectures to US soldiers on Islam.

(Khalil) Was the matter confined to giving religious lectures, or did it go beyond that to persuading US soldiers to convert to Islam. And, when precisely did you begin your call and how long did it last? (Philips) I can say that we began our campaign to convert US soldiers to Islam after the end of the war in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces. The campaign lasted five and a half months during which we formed a special team, which spoke fluent English. We set up a big camp in the US military barrack in Al-Khubar for this purpose called: “Saudi Camp for Cultural Information.” (Khalil) Were you doing that with the official permission of the Saudi authorities and the US Forces Command? (Philips) No, but a considerable number of US officers and men asked us to deliver such lectures. So I can say that the US Army welcomed our work.

(Khalil) Why, in your opinion, did some US officers welcomed giving such lectures on Islam to their soldiers? (Philips) I believe it was to divert their soldiers’ attention from other issues, as Saudi Arabia lacked entertainment places for these. The Christian missionaries accompanying the US forces tried, before the conversion of 11 US soldiers, to shut down the camp and stop the lectures we gave to the soldiers. In the meantime, the camp acquired the name of “conversion to Islam camp,” especially since the number of soldiers who converted to Islam daily were about 15 to 20. This is in addition to the fact that many US soldiers bought copies of the Holy Koran in the English language.

(Khalil) Who were the members of the team that helped you in your work? (Philips) It was a special team whose members spoke fluent English. I recall that we expanded our work at the time to the point of operating for 24 hours. We obtained an apartment in the barrack and divided the team into groups working on rotation.

(Khalil) What were the means and methods used to persuade US soldiers to convert to Islam? (Philips) At first we prepared the soldiers mentally. A member of the team with experience in broadcasting and American psychology undertook that job. He called in 200-250 soldiers. Once he prepared them psychologically, I began giving the lectures and opened the floor for discussion on different issues. In my answers to their questions, I often linked the topics to the call for conversion to Islam.

 

USA Patriot Act: Vital to protect our freedom

The USA Patriot Act and successor legislation are vital to provide the security that ensures our liberty.

The Manhattan Institute’s Heather MacDonald explains the laws magnificently in this issue of City Journal.

Leading the attack on the laws – designed in part to prevent terrorists from being able to kill – is a loose group that includes the ACLU, Hamas front groups operating as Arab-American or Muslim “civil rights” advocates, and a few elements in the libertarian and conservative camp, shepherded by GOP operative Grover Norquist, whose Islamic Institute has taken hundreds of thousands of dollars from Wahhabi sources in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

As MacDonald notes, the New York Times has been egging them on with “news” stories whose political bias and faulty analysis have twisted the truth and fueled the controversy, and set the group-think tone for much of the rest of the American media.

This combination of forces is trying to gut some of the most crucial counterterrorism laws passed since the 9/11 attacks, and to prevent Congress from passing follow-on legislation to allow law-enforcement not only to arrest people after Americans are murdered, but to prevent the attacks before they are perpetrated.

At stake right now are provisions in the 2001 USA Patriot Act and in new legislation the Bush Administration has pending before Congress. Some of the opposition is based on “misinformation about the law and misunderstandings about the real-world challenges the law-enforcement community faces in preventing future September 11ths,” as the Washington Times recently commented.

Preserving the Patriot Act and giving counterterrorism forces new legal tools are so important that Attorney General John Ashcroft has been touring the country to educate the public. The Justice Department also has an informative website, www.lifeandliberty.gov, that explains the laws – and the stakes – in detail.

Alexiev testifies on Wahhabi influence in US

As we near the second anniversary of 9/11, the U.S. war on terrorism has scored some impressive successes. After denying Afghanistan as a base of operations to Al Qaeda in the fall of 2001, the United States has been able to neutralize a number of its high-ranking operatives and disrupt its operations. The removal of the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein in Operation Iraqi Freedom has precluded that rogue regime from developing and using weapons of mass destruction or supplying them to fellow-terrorists. On the domestic front, significant strides have been made in shoring up homeland security and no serious terrorist incident has taken place on American soil since 9/11. Despite these very positive developments, it would be highly premature to claim that we’re close to winning the war. Indeed, recent terrorist attacks in Riyadh and Casablanca, as well as the putative conspiracy to blow-up Brooklyn Bridge, have shown unmistakably that terrorist networks and groups retain considerable ability to wreak havoc.


WAHHABISM: STATE-SPONSORED EXTREMISM WORLDWIDE

Testimony by Alex Alexiev
Senior Fellow, Center for Security Policy

U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security
Thursday, June 26, 2003

As we near the second anniversary of 9/11, the U.S. war on terrorism has scored some impressive successes. After denying Afghanistan as a base of operations to Al Qaeda in the fall of 2001, the United States has been able to neutralize a number of its high-ranking operatives and disrupt its operations. The removal of the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein in Operation Iraqi Freedom has precluded that rogue regime from developing and using weapons of mass destruction or supplying them to fellow-terrorists. On the domestic front, significant strides have been made in shoring up homeland security and no serious terrorist incident has taken place on American soil since 9/11. Despite these very positive developments, it would be highly premature to claim that we’re close to winning the war. Indeed, recent terrorist attacks in Riyadh and Casablanca, as well as the putative conspiracy to blow-up Brooklyn Bridge, have shown unmistakably that terrorist networks and groups retain considerable ability to wreak havoc.

This is the case because while the United States has been successful in inflicting strategic defeats on state sponsors of terrorism, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, it has not applied the same decisive strategic approach in dealing with the phenomenon of Islamic extremism, which is both the root cause and basic support structure of the terrorist phenomenon exemplified by Al Qaeda and others. It is worth reminding ourselves here, that Al Qaeda is not the cause, but rather the symptom of the malignancy called Islamic extremism and that even if we are able to defeat Al Qaeda totally, somebody else will almost certainly continue in its footsteps, as long as the underlying malignancy lives on.

Thus, most of the measures taken to defeat Islamic terrorism to date have been essentially tactical in nature and therefore of transitory effect. We have, for instance, attempted to block financial inflows to the terrorist networks, but have avoided taking a critical look into the real magnitude and nature of terrorist finances, especially with respect to the evidence of state sponsorship. The result is that despite some $117 million of frozen assets, the terrorists do not appear to be lacking in funds at all. We have attempted to come to terms with the psychology behind the terrorists’ murderous fury, yet refuse to examine systematically, let alone do something about, the effect and implications of daily indoctrination of hundreds of thousands if not millions of Muslims around the world into a hate-driven cult of violence. Similarly, we have tried and often succeeded in disrupting the terrorists’ tactical organizational structures and communications networks, but have paid scant attention to the huge world-wide infrastructure of radical Islam which breeds and nourishes violence.

Yet, without a critical consideration of these realities and the formulation of a forceful strategic response based on it, it is unlikely that we’ll make lasting progress in the war on terror. It is thus necessary to briefly examine the key factors that have made and sustained Islamic extremism as a daunting challenge to our liberal democratic order.

The Ideology of Extremism

It is difficult, indeed, impossible to successfully defeat a violent ideological movement, such as radical Islam, without understanding the ideology motivating it. And there has been no lack of scholarly attention to the subject from both the liberal Western and the Muslim perspective recently. Nonetheless, it is worth encapsulating the main doctrinal tenets of Islamic extremism here because they are regularly and consciously obfuscated by the extremists themselves and continue to be misunderstood.

Islamic extremism as an ideology is hardly new with the first movement that resembles today’s phenomenon, known as the Kharijites, appearing shortly after the birth of Islam in the 7th century. Later it was expounded on by various Islamic scholars, such as Ibn Taymiiya in the 13th century, but it did not become institutionalized until the mid-18th century when the theories promulgated by the radical cleric Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab were accepted and imposed as the state religion of his realm by the founder of the House of Saud. Wahhabism, as this creed got to be known, like most other extremist movements before it, believed that traditional Islamic virtues and beliefs have been corrupted and preached a return to the ostensibly pure Islam of the time of the Prophet and his companions. In reality, Wahhab’s extreme doctrines contradicted and stood on their head major tenets of traditional Islam and in a real sense represent an outright falsification of the Muslim faith.

To name just one egregious example, a key postulate of Wahhab’s teaching asserts that Muslims who do not believe in his doctrines are ipso facto non-believers and apostates against whom violence and Jihad were not only permissible, but obligatory. This postulate alone transgresses against two fundamental tenets of the Quran – that invoking Jihad against fellow-Muslims is prohibited and that a Muslim’s profession of faith should be taken at face value until God judges his/hers sincerity at judgment day. This extreme reactionary creed was then used as the religious justification for military conquest and violence against Muslim neighbors of the House of Saud. Already in 1746, just two years after Wahhabism became Saud’s religion, the new Saudi-Wahhabi state proclaimed Jihad against all neighboring Muslim tribes that refused to subscribe to it. Indeed, well into the 1920s the history of the House of Saud is replete with violent campaigns to force other Muslims to submit politically and theologically, violating yet another fundamental Quranic principle that prohibits the use of compulsion in religion.

Today, the Wahhabi ideology continues to be characterized by a set of doctrinal beliefs and behavior prescriptions that are often inimical to the values and interests of the vast majority of Muslims in the world to say nothing about those of non-Muslims. Non-Wahhabi Sunni Muslims (syncretic Muslims, Sufis, Barelvis, Bahai, Ahmadis, etc) are still considered illegitimate, at best, while the Shia religion is particularly despised as a "Jewish conspiracy" against Islam. The Wahhabis continue to believe and preach violence and Jihad as a pillar of Islamic virtue, rigid conformism of religious practice, institutionalized oppression of women, wholesale rejection of modernity, secularism and democracy as antithetical to Islam and militant proselytism.
This jihadist ideology par excellence, is by and large, also the worldview of radical Islam and it is not at all an exaggeration to argue that Wahhabism has become the prototype ideology of all extremist and terrorist groups, even those that despise the House of Saud.

How did this obscurantist, pseudo-Islamic creed manage to become the dominant idiom not only among the extremists but increasingly the Islamic establishment? The short answer is money and an acute legitimacy crisis in the Muslim world in the last quarter of the 20th century.

Regarding the latter, the progressive, centuries-long, gradual decline of Islam as a dominant force and civilization reached its nadir in 1924, when Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) simultaneously did away with the Caliphate and the Ottoman Empire by overnight transforming the latter into a secular Turkish republic. The unceremonious discarding of the symbol of the Muslim community (ummah), coupled with the establishment of European colonial rule over much of the Muslim world gave rise to revivalist movements and ideologies seeking to come to terms with Islam’s predicament and efforts to restore it to previous glories.

Beginning with the Muslim Brotherhood of Hassan el-Banna in 1928, followed by the movements founded by Islamist ideologues like Abul ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and the extremist Deobandi creed in South Asia, radical Islam established a strong presence in the Muslim world in the second half of the 20th century. Then in the 1970s and 1980s Islamic terrorist groups (Al Jihad and Gamaa Islamiya in Egypt, Front for National Salvation (FIS) in Algeria etc.) began appearing in the Middle East and South Asia, especially after the beginning of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. While none of these groups and movements were 100% Wahhabi originally, their ideological differences were insignificant.

As these movements were violently suppressed in places like Egypt and Algeria, the Saudis were quickly able to co-opt them by providing sanctuary and financial assistance to their members in both Saudi Arabia and outside of it. Thus, the economic and logistical dependence of many of these extremists on the Saudis, coupled with the ongoing radicalization of Wahhabism itself, created a highly synergistic relationship between the practitioners of terror and their Wahhabi supporters and paymasters despite the fact that many practicing jihadists like Osama bin Laden resented the Saudi regime.

While this ideological affinity between the Wahhabis and modern day radical Islam is undoubtedly of key import, it was vast amounts of money more than anything else that made Wahhabism the chief enabler and dominant influence of the Islamist phenomenon.

Financing Radical Islam

Saudi financing of Islamic extremism plays such a huge role in its emergence as a global phenomenon that a proper understanding of it is impossible without coming to terms with its dimensions. Simply put, without the exorbitant sums of Saudi money spent on supporting extremist networks and activities, the terrorist threat we are facing today would be nowhere as acute as it is.

While the Wahhabis have always been sympathetic to Sunni Muslim extremists and evidence exists that they have supported such people financially as early as a century ago, the real Saudi offensive to spread Wahhabism aggressively and support kindred extremist groups world-wide began in the mid-1970s, when the kingdom reaped an incredible financial windfall with rocketing oil prices after Riaydh’s imposition of an oil embargo in 1973. "It was only when oil revenues began to generate real wealth," says a government publication, that "the kingdom could fulfill its ambitions of spreading the word of Islam to every corner of the world."

There are no published Western estimates of the numbers involved, which, in itself, is evidence of our failure to address this key issue, but even the occasional tidbits provided by official Saudi sources, indicate a campaign of unprecedented magnitude. Between 1975 and 1987, the Saudis admit to having spent $48 billion or $4 billion per year on "overseas development aid," a figure which by the end of 2002 grew to over $70 billion (281 billion Saudi rials). These sums are reported to be Saudi state aid and almost certainly do not include private donations which are also distributed by state-controlled charities. Such staggering amounts contrast starkly with the $5 million in terrorist accounts the Saudis claim to have frozen since 9/11. In another comparison, it is instructive to put these figures side by side with the $1 billion per year said to have been spent by the Soviet Union on external propaganda at the peak of Moscow’s power in the 1970s.

Though it is claimed that this is "development aid" it is clear from the Saudi media and government statements alike that the vast majority of these funds support "Islamic activities", rather than real developmental projects. For example, a report on the yearly activities of the Al Haramain Foundation described as "keen on spreading the proper Islamic culture" are listed as follows: "it printed 13 million (Islamic) books, launched six internet sites, employed more than 3000 callers (proselytizers), founded 1100 mosques, schools and cultural Islamic centers and posted more than 350,000 letters of call (invitations to convert to Islam)" while the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), another key "charity," completed 3800 mosques, spent $45 million for Islamic education and employed 6000 proselytizers. Both of these organizations have been implicated in terrorist activities by U.S. authorities and both operate directly out of Saudi embassies in all countries in which they do not have their own offices.

The Saudi money is spent according to a carefully designed plan to enhance Wahhabi influence and control at the expense of mainstream Muslims. In Muslim countries, much of the aid goes to fund religious madrassas that teach little more than hatred of the infidels, while producing barely literate Jihadi cadres. There are now tens of thousands of these madrassas run by the Wahhabis’ Deobandi allies in South Asia and also throughout Southeastern Asia. In Pakistan alone, foreign funding of these madrassas, most of which comes from Saudi Arabia, is estimated at no less than $350 million per year. The Saudis also directly support terrorist activities in places like Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Chechnya, Bosnia and, as noticed above, most of the large Saudi foundations have been implicated in such involvement.

It needs to be emphasized here that contrary to Saudi claims that charities such as Al Haramain, the World Muslim League (WML), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) are independent and non-governmental, there is conclusive evidence from Saudi sources that they are tightly controlled by the government and more often than not run by government officials. It is also the case that as early as 1993, the kingdom passed a law stipulating that all donations to Muslim charities must be collected in a fund controlled by a Saudi Prince

Early on in the Wahhabi ideological campaign, the penetration of the Muslim communities in non-Muslim Western societies was made a key priority. The objective pursued there was slightly different and aimed to assure Wahhabi dominance in the local Muslim establishments by taking over or building new Wahhabi mosques, Islamic centers and educational institutions, including endowing Islamic chairs at various universities. Taking over a mosque, of course, means more than just the ability to impose the Wahhabi version of Islam. The imam and the leadership of the mosque are also responsible for the collection of zakat (the 2 ?? % yearly tithe Muslims must donate), which gives them the ability to contribute these funds to extremist organizations. Most Pakistani mosques in the United Kingdom, for instance, have reportedly been taken over by the Wahhabi/Deobandi group even though their members belong primarily to the moderate Barelvi creed. As a result, millions of their donations are said to be supporting terrorist groups in Pakistan.

While nobody knows for sure how much the Saudis have spent on getting a foothold in non-Muslim regions and especially in Western Europe and North America, the sums are clearly huge. According to official information, the Saudis have built over 1500 mosques, 210 Islamic centers, 202 Islamic colleges and 2000 schools for educating Muslims in non-Muslim countries. Most of these institutions continue to be on the Saudi payroll for substantial yearly donations assuring that Wahhabi control is not likely to weaken any time soon.

What have the Saudis been able to buy with this unprecedented Islamic largesse? Quite a bit it would seem. For starters, the Wahhabi creed which is practiced by no more than 20 million people around the world, or less than 2% of the Muslim population, has become a dominant factor in the international Islamic establishment through an elaborate network of front organizations and charities, as well as in a great number of national establishments, including the United States. In just one example, the venerable Al Azhar mosque and university in Cairo, which not too long ago was a paragon of Islamic moderation has been taken over by the Wahhabis and spews extremist propaganda on a regular basis. Two of their recent fatwas make it a religious duty for Muslims to acquire nuclear weapons to fight the infidels and justify suicide attacks against American troops in Iraq. The Wahhabi project has contributed immeasurably to the Islamic radicalization and destabilization in a number of countries and continues to do so. Pakistan, for instance, an important U.S. ally, is facing the gradual talibanization of two of its key provinces under Wahhabi/Deobandi auspices and the prospect of large-scale sectarian strife and turmoil. Riyadh-financed extremist networks exist presently around the world providing terrorist groups and individuals with a protective environment and support and even the recent terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia itself do not seem likely to bring about meaningful change.

Already Saudi officials have stated that they do not intend to either change their anti-Western curriculum or stop their "charitable" activities. Yet the evidence of conscious Saudi subversion of our societies and values as partly detailed above is so overwhelming that to tolerate it further would be unconscionable. Failure to confront it now will assure that we will not win the war on terror anytime soon.

 

Why was Sami Al-Arian in the Bush White House?

 What are we to make of the fact that a Muslim extremist (or "Islamist") named Dr. Sami Al-Arian was arrested and indicted last week on 50 counts, among them conspiracy to finance terrorist attacks that killed more than 100 people — including two Americans? One thing is sure: It is not, as Al-Arian claimed when federal agents led him away in handcuffs, "all about politics."

What’s Wrong With This Picture?

After all, this alleged leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad — an organization Attorney General John Ashcroft has described as "one of the most violent terrorist organizations in the world" — was allowed into the Bush White House on at least one occasion. According to Saturday’s Washington Post, in one of these meetings, he was among the front-row attendees at a briefing conducted by the man who is, arguably, Mr. Bush’s chief aide: Karl Rove. Generally, political foes do not receive such treatment.

The Post article was accompanied by a photograph taken of Al-Arian with Candidate George W. Bush and his wife, Laura, during a campaign stop at the Tampa Strawberry Festival in March 2000. Perhaps this photo op was a way of thanking Al-Arian and his wife for the efforts they claim to have made on Mr. Bush’s behalf "in Florida mosques and elsewhere because they thought him the candidate most likely to fight discrimination against Arab-Americans."

Al-Arian had particular reason to prefer Candidate Bush since the latter had pledged as part of his campaign’s "outreach" to the Muslim community to end the use of secret evidence against suspected terrorists. This goal was a particular priority for Al-Arian since his brother-in-law, Mazen al-Najjar, was incarcerated for three-and-a-half years on the basis of such evidence, prior to his deportation.

In the photo with Mr. Bush, Al-Arian was accompanied by his son, Abdullah, who Mr. Bush reportedly dubbed "Big Dude." Big Dude Al-Arian was himself admitted into the White House six days after his father’s June 2001 visit. Ironically, as the Wall Street Journal noted on Friday, "the Secret Service deemed Mr. Al-Arian’s son — at the time an intern in a Democratic congressional office [that of then-Rep. David Bonior of Michigan] — a security risk and ejected him from a meeting on President Bush’s faith-based initiatives program."

The episode precipitated howls of outrage from representatives of other Islamist groups who had been allowed to participate in this and other, high-level Administration meetings. It produced apologies from the President’s spokesman and the Secret Service. According to the Post, on August 2, 2001, Mr. Bush even wrote Mrs. Al-Arian expressing "‘regret’ about how her son was treated. ‘I have been assured that everything possible is being done to ensure that nothing like this happens again.’"

What’s Going On Here?

The question, in short, is not whether "politics" are responsible for Sami Al-Arian’s prosecution for aiding and abetting terror? The question is: What considerations, political or otherwise, prompted members of Mr. Bush’s staff to believe that Al-Arian was the kind of person they wanted on their team? Who bears responsibility for making those calculations? And are they continuing to do so with respect to other individuals and organizations that could, at the very least, embarrass Mr. Bush and, at worst, seriously undermine his efforts in the war on terror?

Obvious candidates include two individuals who have, at various times, had responsibilities in the White House for Muslim outreach: Suhail Khan, formerly with the Public Liaison Office, and Ali Tulbah, currently Associate Director for Cabinet Affairs. As it happens, their judgment about which people should be admitted to the President’s company might have been influenced by the fact that their fathers were, respectively, active in Islamist-associated organizations in California and Texas.

Alternatively, Grover Norquist, the founding co-chairman of the Islamic Institute — an organization that has played an important role in its own right in facilitating the Bush team’s outreach to groups whose leaders and activities have repeatedly excused terror and/or opposed the administration’s aggressive pursuit of the war against it — asserted in an interview circulated last week by NewsMax.com, that Messrs. Khan and Tulbah "were merely underlings carrying out decisions made by more senior White House officials….The people making decisions are Presbyterians and Catholics, not Muslims.’" The issue is not their faith; it’s their judgment.

At Odds With Bush’s Strategy

Whoever is responsible, their behavior has seriously disserved President Bush, and risks becoming more than a mere political liability if it is allowed to persist. In a recently released document entitled, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the Administration declares:

 

    Together with the international community, we will wage a war of ideas to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate….We must use the full influence of the United States to delegitimize terrorism and make clear that all acts of terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose. In short, with our friends and allies, we aim to establish a new international norm regarding terrorism requiring non-support, non-tolerance, and active opposition to terrorists. The United States will work with such moderate and modern governments to reverse the spread of extremist ideology and those who seek to impose totalitarian ideologies on our Muslim allies and friends. (Emphasis added.)

The Bottom Line

Sami Al-Arian — and those who share his extremist views, defend his conduct and have tried to legitimate him politically — are not on President Bush’s side in the war on terror. They should, therefore, be seen as unfit to be by his side in implementing his strategy for winning that war.

The Jayna Davis files

(Washington, D.C.): On Sunday, the New York Times breathlessly reported on its front page (above the fold, no less) that, “The Bush administration has begun to monitor Iraqis in the United States in an effort to identify potential domestic terrorist threats posed by sympathizers of the Baghdad regime.” According to the Times, “a large number of government agencies are part of the new operation, including the Pentagon, the F.B.I., the Central Intelligence Agency, the immigration service, the State Department and the National Security Agency….”

It’s About Time!

For those of us who have long been worried about the threat posed in this country by Iraqi intelligence operatives and their allies, it is heartening to hear an unnamed “senior government official” cited as saying that, “This is the largest and most aggressive program like this we’ve ever had. We think we know who most of the bad guys are, but we are going to be very proactive here and not take any chances.”

Unfortunately, it appears that at least some of the agencies charged with addressing the threat posed by Saddam’s operatives and their sympathizers fail utterly to comprehend the challenge the targeted groups and individuals constitute. For example, the Times reports that “according to the CIA,” there is no evidence that Iraq has engaged in terrorist activity against the United States” since 1993, when Iraqi agents tried to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush in Kuwait.

This statement is deeply disturbing. It not only suggests a lack of appreciation of the present danger. It also evinces an obliviousness to the historical record that raises a question as to whether the existing intelligence and law enforcement agencies are up to the task at hand.

A Bill of Particulars

That record includes the impressive investigative research conducted by Jayna Davis, a former reporter with Oklahoma City’s KFOR television station. Since the Murrah Building was destroyed in April 1995, Ms. Davis has been tirelessly collecting, sifting and analyzing evidence ( including some 80 pages of affidavits from more than twenty eyewitnesses and 2000 supporting documents) of precisely the sort that the CIA says does not exist. Among Ms. Davis’ more telling discoveries are the following:

  • While Timothy McVeigh, the man executed for his role in the bombing, was widely portrayed as no more than a disgruntled Army veteran, he expressed to friends and at least once publicly (on “60 Minutes”) his sympathy for Middle Eastern peoples he felt were victimized by American foreign policy. Shortly after McVeigh’s arrest, one of his acquaintances from the military told ABC’s “Prime Time Live” that “Tim always wanted to become a mercenary” preferably for a Mideast country because they “paid the best.”
  • On March 3, 1995, the House of Representatives’ Terrorism Task Force issued a warning that Mideast terrorists were planning attacks on the “heart of the U.S.,” identifying twelve cities as potential targets, including Oklahoma City. It reported that the terrorists had recruited two “lily whites” — individuals with no criminal history or obvious connections to the perpetrating organization — to carry out the bombing of an American federal building.
  • Six months prior to the bombing, an Oklahoma City-based Palestinian immigrant who had previously served time for a felony fraud conviction, hired a handful of former Iraqi soldiers to do maintenance work on some of the $4 million in rental property he owned. American co-workers reported their horror as these soldiers “expressed prideful excitement” at initial reports that Islamic extremists had taken credit for the Murrah bombing and “exuberantly pledged their allegiance to Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein.” Witnesses have put McVeigh and his convicted co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, in the company of these soldiers on one or more occasions.
  • Importantly, Ms. Davis has determined that one of these soldiers, Hussain Alhussaini, closely matches the composite picture of “John Doe 2” drawn on the basis of numerous eye-witnesses who claim to have seen such a heavy-set, dark-complexioned Middle Eastern man: in the Ryder truck used to destroy the Murrah Building minutes before the attack; putting diesel fuel — which, together with fertilizer, powered the explosion — into the vehicle that morning, (even though the truck’s own engine used unleaded fuel); at the scene of the crime getting out of the truck seconds before it blew up; and/or fleeing the site in a brown Chevy pickup. Other witnesses had previously seen such a truck parked at the Palestinian’s real estate offices before the attack.
  • Ms. Davis cites a former Chief of Human Intelligence for the Defense Intelligence Agency as saying that Alhussaini wears a military tattoo that suggests he had served in Saddam’s trusted Republican Guard and worked in Unit 999, “an elite group based in Salman Pak southeast of Baghdad and…tasked with clandestine operations at home and abroad.” Interestingly, after his time in Oklahoma City, Alhussaini found employment at Logan Airport in Boston — the take-off point of three of the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11.
  • Nichols had ties to Philippine locales known to be frequented by Middle Eastern terrorists. According to one of the founders of the Filipino Abu Sayyaf terror organization, Edwin Angeles, Nichols even met in the early 1990s with Ramzi Youssef — the mastermind of the World Trade Center in 1993 and brains behind a scheme to blow-up twelve U.S. airliners over the Pacific. (Iraq expert Dr. Laurie Mylroie has long contended that Youssef was an agent of Iraqi intelligence, implicating Saddam in the first attempt to take down the twin towers.)

The Bottom Line

This sampling does not begin to do justice to the work done by the intrepid Jayna Davis. Suffice it to say that there is evidence of Iraqi involvement in at least one and perhaps all three of most deadly terrorist attacks in the United States to date. It may or may not prove dispositive, but it can no longer safely be ignored. (To his credit, Senator Arlen Specter, stunned by the difficulty Ms. Davis has had getting government agencies to address her findings, has recently promised an investigation into the matter. Such an effort should be a case study as well for those who believe a new U.S. domestic intelligence agency, perhaps modeled after Britain’s famed MI-5, is required.) If the new Iraqi surveillance effort is indeed going to be “aggressive,” it would do well to start with the Davis files — especially since she believes some of the Iraqi soldiers she has identified are still at large in Oklahoma City.

For an extended treatment of this issue please read “Summary of Evidence of Middle Eastern Complicity in 1995 Oklahoma Bombing,” by Jayna Davis.

Who’s Trashing Ashcroft?

(Washington, D.C.): If the New York Times is to be believed, Attorney General John Ashcroft has lost the allegiance of the religious conservatives whose strong support helped secure his confirmation in early 2001. Unsurprisingly, liberal Democrats and like-minded interest groups who sought to block the Ashcroft nomination have not noticeably warmed to the AG since he took office. This would appear to set up the sort of Right-Left Washington mugging that often precedes a Cabinet member’s precipitous, and usually involuntary, departure from office.

Keeping the Faith

Don’t bet on it this time. For one thing, the Times’ dire assessment notwithstanding, most of the religious conservatives cited in the article are not gunning for John Ashcroft. They recognize him as a man whose extensive public service has been rooted in a profound Christian faith.

Paul Weyrich, who has long been and remains an influential figure in those circles, has made it known that he continues to support the Attorney General. Ken Connor of the Family Research Council said much the same thing last week to the Weekly Standard Magazine’s online edition, as did Gary Bauer, Chuck Colson of the Prison Fellowship Ministries and a representative of James Dobson’s Focus on the Family.

This is not to say that every one of these leaders of the Nation’s religious conservatives — or their followers — is uncritical of every aspect of the Attorney General performance on the job. The front-page New York Times article that appeared on July 24th could not be dismissed out of hand because a number of conservatives have openly expressed concern about legislative steps that Mr. Ashcroft initiated and FBI guidelines he relaxed as part of the war on terrorism, measures they fear could in the future be used by a hostile Justice Department to infringe upon their civil liberties.

Ashcroft the Principled Conservative

Still, religious conservatives — and, indeed, conservatives of every other persuasion — have at least two reasons to be deeply grateful that they were successful in helping President Bush to place John Ashcroft in the Attorney General’s job. First, he is certainly one of their own. And second, during his time in the United States Senate (which preceded his present tour at the Justice Department), Senator Ashcroft was among that chamber’s staunchest advocates of privacy rights and civil liberties.

The fact of the matter is that, in his present capacity and under current circumstances, Mr. Ashcroft has to make hard decisions every day about where to draw the line in balancing the need for enhanced security while trying to protect the free and open society that all Americans, and particularly those on the Right, hold so dear. Such decisions are rarely a clear call and the choices to be made are not easy. We are very fortunate that the man who, first and foremost, has to make them is as sensitive as John Ashcroft has proven himself to be to the risks to our liberties.

There are, to be sure, other complaints about the Ashcroft tenure at Justice being cited in the Times and elsewhere. For example, some critics contend that the AG was guilty of grandstanding when he announced from Moscow the apprehension of alleged would-be “dirty bomber” Jose Padilla. He has also been blamed for what is said to be the Bush Administration’s undue trumpeting of threats of imminent attacks on the United States. Some express displeasure that he allowed Justice bureaucrats and other law enforcement officials to turn the September 11th attacks into a pretext for forcing through previously sought, but long-rejected, enhancements to their power and authority, etc.

These charges seem to reflect legitimate disagreements about management style and judgment calls on substantive matters, rather than an itemization of firing offenses. Even if conservatives feel there are grounds for such disagreements, they should ask themselves: Would I have done differently if I had to walk in John Ashcroft’s shoes during these challenging times — when the American people need both to be warned of the magnitude of the terrorist threat and assured that progress is being made in contending with it, while enhancing on an emergency basis the government’s ability to do the latter?

Guess Who is Gunning for Ashcroft?

The Weekly Standard online noted last Wednesday that there is, however, one group of “religious conservatives” who are decidedly unhappy with John Ashcroft and who appear quite keen on having him removed from office: Wahhabi Islamists.

Individuals and organizations tied to the extremist and virulently anti-American Saudi strain of Islam recognize a formidable foe in the Attorney General. His Justice Department has already led raids on a number of their operations and funding sources. And it could end their audacious and thus far largely successful efforts to: recruit felons in U.S. prisons; select like-minded imams to serve as military chaplains and indoctrinate American servicemen and women; use Saudi-financed mosques and madrassas in this country (perhaps as much as 80% of all those in the United States) as instruments for fomenting anger against this country within the Muslim community; and mainstream radicals as legitimate interlocutors — indeed, the only ones — for the Administration’s Muslim-outreach agenda.

The Bottom Line

Such initiatives could give rise to a potent Wahhabi “fifth column” inside America at a time when we are obliged to wage war on its Islamist counterparts elsewhere around the world. These dangers demand in the Attorney General’s post a man of John Ashcroft’s competence, judiciousness and convictions. Patriotic conservatives — religious and otherwise — like the country as a whole, are fortunate to have him there and should pray that he will continue to serve for the duration.

Will The Hanssen Arrest Prompt The Bush Team to Correct Clinton-Era Inattention to Security?

(Washington, D.C.): The arrest of FBI counter-intelligence (CI) agent Robert Hanssen on espionage charges yesterday is not only a reminder, as Attorney General John Ashcroft noted this afternoon, that “our free society is an international target in a dangerous world.” It is a forceful warning that even rigorous CI procedures can be foiled by skillful, determined adversaries and their agents.

Damage Assessment

Hanssen was in a position to do immense damage to U.S. national security. Among other things, he could have provided Soviet and Russian handlers with:

  • Incalculably valuable information concerning U.S. intelligence operations; the indictment says that at least two American agents operating inside the KGB were compromised — presumably, “with extreme prejudice” — by his revelations. Many more may have had their lives or their missions put at risk.
  • Potentially lethal insights into the techniques and status of the United States’ counter- intelligence services. The Kremlin would have benefitted enormously if it could gauge what the FBI knew about its operatives — and the extent of American ignorance about them.

    Perhaps most damaging of all, a wealth of information about non-intelligence-related, but highly sensitive, programs he was assigned to protect from foreign espionage. As he would have been “read-in” on these programs, he could have compromised their most secret details, as well.

Given the demonstrated willingness of the Russian military and its defense industrial base to sell whatever they have for hard currency, it must be asked: Could such vital American secrets have wound up not only in the hands of the Kremlin but also in those of its clients — including all of the world’s most dangerous rogue states?

The Bottom Line

The Hanssen affair makes transparently clear the need for intensified attention to the continuing danger of espionage against the United States. Unfortunately, as grievous as the damage Mr. Hanssen might have done appears to be, even it could pale by comparison with the cumulative effects of eight years of malign neglect towards personnel, information and physical security that was the leitmotif of the Clinton-Gore Administration. Damage assessments of this vastly larger category of potential espionage disasters — and corrective actions — should be undertaken in parallel with those launched in the wake of Hanssen’s arrest.

The Bush-Cheney Administration now has not only the opportunity, but the obligation, promptly to implement the hundreds of recommendations that have been made by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), intelligence community and congressional panels and other official reviews in recent years aimed at shoring up the Nation’s defenses against espionage, technology theft, blackmailing and suborning of U.S. officials, etc. Should it fail to do so, the Bush team will henceforth share in the responsibility for the next, perhaps even more serious, compromises of U.S. national security.

Breaking the Code on the Encryption Debate: National Security Interests Are Being Jeopardized

(Washington, D.C.): With relatively
little fanfare, a truly momentous public
policy debate is taking place in
Washington. Unfortunately, all other
things being equal, it seems likely that
the outcome of this debate concerning the
domestic use, foreign export and
international regulation of encryption
techniques will do grievous harm to the
national security interests of the United
States.

‘You Can’t Tell the
Players…’

Such an extraordinary, and ominous,
result is in prospect due to several
factors:

  • By its very nature, encryption —
    a generic name for numerous means
    of encoding computer, voice or
    other transmissions of data so as
    to conceal the contents from
    unauthorized access — is one of
    the most complex and obscure of
    sciences. Given its direct
    relevance for the protection of
    classified U.S. government
    information and for the
    penetration of foreign
    governments and other entities’
    secure communications, the U.S.
    National Security Agency (NSA)
    has jealously tried to shield
    from public view as much as
    possible about the technology and
    techniques involved in encryption
    and code-breaking.
  • The necessary secretiveness
    associated with what NSA does and
    how the spread of encryption
    systems might affect the American
    ability to perform signals
    intelligence
    (SIGINT) by
    intercepting and monitoring
    foreign communications enormously
    complicates this debate.
  • Robust encryption at home
    contributes to national security
    as well as protecting American
    industry, critical information
    networks and citizens’ privacy.
    But
    a national information
    infrastructure also needs
    selective transparency on call to
    support users’ needs to get at
    their encrypted data.
  • U.S. law enforcement
    agencies in carrying out criminal
    investigations also need to be
    able to access voice
    communications, data records and
    data transmissions consistent
    with constitutional protections.
    The
    loss of this investigative
    technique, which is subject to
    strict judicial scrutiny — would
    be disastrous for law
    enforcement.
  • Widespread use of unbreakable
    encryption is exactly what
    terrorists, drug lords,
    pedophiles and their ilk want to
    see. But law enforcement needs a
    controlled window into this
    encryption as part of its
    responsibility to detect, prevent
    or prosecute criminal behavior. Experience
    with court-ordered wiretaps
    suggests that, by requiring
    judicial approval of such
    electronic monitoring, this
    function critical to the rule of
    law and a civil society can be
    performed without risk of serious
    abuse.
  • Due to advances in information
    techniques, the know-how
    and means for providing
    sophisticated encryption
    capabilities has proliferated
    dramatically in recent years
    .
    With the burgeoning use of the
    Internet and other electronic
    devices for conducting business,
    the demand for means to keep
    voice communications, data
    records and data transfers
    private has also grown
    tremendously.
  • U.S. manufacturers of computer
    software and hardware — many
    of whom have been key supporters
    of and enjoy great influence with
    President Clinton
    and his
    Administration — are demanding
    an opportunity to meet this
    demand with encryption products
    that will be exceedingly robust,
    if not impenetrable. They
    typically point not only to the
    trade benefits such sales would
    represent but to the prospect
    that foreign manufacturers of
    encryption technologies will
    gladly supply products not
    available from American sources.
    Similar arguments have proven
    effective in obtaining
    Administration support for the
    wholesale elimination of export
    controls on powerful computers —
    even supercomputers.
  • President Clinton has already
    issued an Executive Order
    substantially liberalizing the
    export of powerful encryption
    capabilities. Under its terms,
    encryption programs involving up
    to 40-bit keys (in layman’s
    terms, the number of variables
    used in combination to conceal a
    given piece of encrypted message
    traffic, one of several factors
    determining the robustness of an
    encryption program) can be
    exported without a license. The
    Executive Order also permits
    programs of any strength
    to be exported provided they have
    a “key recovery”
    capability (i.e., a code-breaking
    spare key has been created) —
    even if that key resides with the
    purchaser of such encryption.
  • Civil libertarians —
    including some conservatives with
    well-deserved reputations for
    concern about U.S. national
    security — have taken the
    position that techniques which
    impede or preclude government
    monitoring of electronic
    transmissions are highly
    desirable.
    Their
    enthusiasm for the most
    widespread proliferation of
    encryption techniques, both
    domestically and internationally,
    provides tremendous political
    cover for others with more
    suspect motivations.
  • Counter-culture opponents
    of U.S. government power
    ,
    including some holding high
    office in the Clinton
    Administration, appear untroubled
    by the diminution of American
    capabilities to perform signals
    intelligence — historically an
    area of decisive and
    strategically vital advantage for
    the United States. href=”97-D88.html#N_1_”>(1)
    Evidently, they are no more
    concerned by the other side of
    this coin: Thanks to the
    Clinton-approved transfer of
    American supercomputers and other
    powerful data processing systems,
    foreign governments are likely to
    have much enhanced capabilities
    to perform their own
    code-breaking operations, further
    reducing U.S. dominance in the
    field.

The Legislative Context

Against this backdrop, several bills
have been introduced reflecting two basic
approaches. The first sponsored by
Senators Conrad Burns (R-MT) and Patrick
Leahy (D-VT) in the Senate and by Rep.
Robert Goodlatte (R-VA) in the House
would essentially eliminate controls on
the export of encryption. This
legislation is favored by the computer
software and hardware industries and a
number of civil libertarians. Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott has thrown his
support behind the Burns-Leahy bill.

A bill recently introduced by Senator
John McCain, chairman of the Senate
Commerce Committee, presents an
alternative approach. It attempts to
“split the difference,”
addressing domestic law enforcement
concerns by way of creating incentives
for U.S. manufacturers to participate in
a key management infrastructure (i.e.,
establishing means whereby federal
agencies, with appropriate court orders,
can obtain the ability to read encrypted
communications). While the incentives to
do so are significant, the companies
would be under no requirement to take
part in this arrangement.

As a sop to the encryption industry,
however, the McCain legislation
would make several concessions that could
be injurious to the national security
.
First, it would raise the threshold for
unlicenced exports from 40 bits to 56
bits. This represents a dramatic increase
in the power of encryption programs that
will find their way into the hands of
hostile powers, international terrorists
and other foreign criminal elements —
and will add dramatically to the time and
computing power required by U.S.
intelligence to monitor their activities.

Second, the McCain legislation calls
for the creation of an
industry-government advisory board tasked
to consider and jointly develop
recommendations concerning future
standards for encryption exports. Such an
arrangement would put those responsive to
multinational stockholders on an
essentially equal footing with
government agencies responsible for the
national security. In addition, the bill
would mandate foreign-availability
assessments — a pretext frequently used
by industry to argue for even the most
irresponsible transfers of U.S.
technology.(2)

Parsing Out the Issues

There are, in fact, three
separate issues
involved in
the present encryption debate — issues
that have, to some extent, been
commingled by the Clinton Administration,
it appears in an effort to obscure what
is at stake for a vital national security
capability.

    1. Domestic Policy

Encryption products are the future for
the privacy and security of
communications and information. Americans
have a right to be secure in the
knowledge that their private
communications and information remain
private, and that they can conduct
electronic commercial transactions
reasonably safe from fraud or compromise.
Security embedded in consumer goods (as
well as in information systems) needs to
become a common part of how business
works in this country. There is
today no restriction on the use of
encryption within the United States.

Americans may import any encryption
devices and software into the U.S. There
are, however, restrictions on the export
of U.S. encryption items.

Unfortunately,
encryption in the hands of domestic
criminals can be a menace to American
business and society, enabling them to
hide illicit records and transactions. For
law enforcement today, encrypted
communications mean no electronic
surveillance.
Court-ordered
wiretaps may be unenforceable. Because of
the importance of court-ordered
electronic surveillance to law
enforcement, law enforcement agencies
across the country believe the impact of
widely proliferating encryption will be
disastrous for them, unless they have a
means of lawfully and promptly decrypting
communications and information of
criminal suspects.

Accordingly, the United States
requires common standards for accessing
encrypted data and communications
(known
as “key recovery”).
Importantly, such standards
are required not only by law enforcement
but in order to support commercial needs

(for example, companies need to be able
to get at their electronic records if the
person who encrypted them dies or turns
into a vindictive disgruntled employee).
Consumers also have a vested interest in
ensuring that standards exist whereby
they can be assured that encryption will
be reliable and easily interoperable
(e.g., to manage interfaces between
various network systems). A
domestic public key recovery
infrastructure is the answer to these
requirements,

A public key recovery infrastructure
is, however, particularly essential for
law enforcement. Increasingly, criminals
are utilizing techniques to encode their
phone calls, concealing their computer
transmissions and keeping their records
locked up in encrypted computer disks or
drives, rather than in file cabinets.
Subject to the limits of U.S.
constitutional guarantees, law
enforcement needs to be able to continue
to do its job in the information age.
Law enforcement does not need more
intrusive authorities or abilities than
it has now; it needs merely to be
able to continue to be able to make use
of the same investigative techniques
presently available with respect to
wiretaps.

Alternatively, if the government does
nothing but passively watch as encryption
proliferates with no standards to guide
it, law enforcement will lose
critical investigative capabilities
.
In all likelihood, it will be forced to
turn to more intrusive techniques
(microphones in the room or car rather
than taps on telephones), measures that
are more invasive of privacy and which
put more police officers’ lives at risk.
Criminals (drug dealers, kidnappers,
thieves) will enjoy safe havens they do
not presently have, and more good
citizens will find themselves victims of
unsolved crimes.

Regrettably, the Clinton
Administration has been unwilling to
stand up and say, here is what needs to
be done — perhaps out of a fear of
alienating a key constituency, the
computer industry.
The
Administration clearly appreciates the
need to support law enforcement (law and
order is, after all, good politics). But
when asked, its spokesmen say they are
afraid their endorsement of a domestic
policy would prejudice its chances of
enactment, citing their experience with
the public relations disaster of an
earlier encryption management initiative
known as the “Clipper Chip.”
The truth is that there is no one better
positioned than President Clinton to
provide leadership, given his well known
ties to the hardware and software
industries.

    2. Export Controls

In some respects, the Clinton
Administration’s policy has been worse
than doing nothing: It has tied the
domestic encryption issue to liberalizing
export controls on encryption techniques,
ostensibly in the hopes of buying the
support of the producers of encryption
products for greater cooperation with
regard to domestic key management
arrangements. This
is most regrettable since export
controls are the single most important
tool the United States has for protecting
sensitive national security interests in
this arena
.

The unavoidable
reality is that U.S. national security is
heavily dependent on being able to
collect intelligence by listening in on
what its adversaries — actual and
potential — are up to. This intelligence
saves lives, wins wars, and preserves the
peace. And in an era of
information warfare, having superior
information systems may be determinative
of military power
.

This reality was reflected until last
year by treating encryption technologies
as part of the State Department’s
Munitions Control List. President
Clinton’s Executive Order, however, moved
export controls on such technology over
to the much less rigorous Commerce
Department. It also further adulterated
the export controls regime by directing
that: 40-bit encryption programs may be
exported without a license; 56-bit
encryption programs may be exported
without a license provided the exporter
is working on a public key recovery
technology base; and any product that is
part of a public key recovery system may
be exported without a license.

American products should enjoy the
lion’s share of the market (U.S. software
has 75% of the global market today), but U.S.
exporters of highly capable
“crypto” — 40-bit and above —
should be required to get a license to
minimize the likelihood that their
products will fall into the wrong hands.
Any further weakening of export controls
would have a deeply debilitating impact
on national security
. With all
of the focus on domestic encryption
regime, and with no advocacy from the
Executive Branch, national security
interests are not being represented —
and are losing out.

    3. International Dimension

To make matters worse, the Clinton
Administration — under the
“leadership” of a controversial
former Carter Administration official, David
Aaron
, who has been designated
as its “Ambassador for
Encryption” — has come up with a
curious and dangerous gimmick:
It proposes to
“multilateralize” yet another
area of sovereign U.S. policy concern href=”97-D88.html#N_3_”>(3)
by getting OECD nations to take the lead
in an area it is reluctant to champion
domestically, namely in implementing
national key recovery regimes.

As in other issues — ranging from
environmental regulation to family
planning — the Administration appears to
hope that the creation of common
international practice and standards will
provide a basis for imposing arrangements
domestically that would otherwise be
highly controversial, and perhaps
politically costly. Not surprisingly, the
Administration has come under some
criticism from allies for the hypocrisy
of trying to make them go first with
respect to developing key recovery
infrastructures even as it declines to
step up to the issue at home.

But this is worse than simple
hypocrisy. It is flatly
inconsistent with American values for
U.S. officials to argue that foreign
governments — many of which do not
recognize the basic individual rights of
their citizens — should have unfettered
access to their private communications.

Few of these governments actually observe
the strict limitations on electronic
surveillance which pertain in the United
States. It is one thing for the U.S. to
have a domestic key recovery regime which
is subject to the rigorous and proper
constraints of its Constitution and
system of justice. It is quite another to
say that, as a foreign policy objective
of this country, Washington wants to guarantee
the ability of foreign governments to spy
on their own citizens, or (worse) on
Americans who may communicate with those
foreign citizens or travel within those
countries.

The Bottom Line

The Clinton Administration
appears once again to have gotten the
answers exactly wrong.
Their
efforts have confused the debate and
helped to divide the ranks of those who
generally are concerned with national
security — even as they are jeopardizing
vital national security interests,
evidently out of a desire to avoid
antagonizing major political donors.

Domestic policy, export controls, and
international accords concerning
encryption are different concerns, each
in need of understanding and debate on
the merits. And the vital American
national security requirement for
electronic intelligence abroad must be
supported. On an even more fundamental
level, those who traditionally are
sensitive to national security concerns
must not allow differing perceptions of
domestic law enforcement to translate
into legislation that may not only
endanger the defense of the United States
but undermine its rule of law
domestically. A lawless society is no
defender of American liberties.

The undeniable fact is that U.S.
national security is dependent upon our
ability to collect intelligence in
peacetime on foreign threats
,
from terrorist groups to the
proliferation of “weapons of mass
destruction” to the status of
thousands of nuclear-tipped missiles in
potentially unfriendly hands. Likewise,
success in foreign matters (from trade to
diplomacy to support for friends and
allies) requires intelligence to identify
opportunities for the U.S. officials to
act in defense of our values and
interests around the world.

The U.S. ability to gather SIGINT
therefore is not something about which
responsible Americans can afford to be
ambivalent. This is a vital national
security priority. And it is, to be sure,
one that must take precedence over the
commercial advantages of selling U.S.
software abroad.

– 30 –

1. During both
World War II and the half century of the
Cold War, SIGINT was far and away the
most important type of intelligence the
U.S. gathered. Without the ability to
collect and read enemy codes and ciphers,
the U.S. might well have lost the Second
World War. Without SIGINT, the Cold War
might have ended far differently and
might well have turned into a hot war at
critical junctures; certainly, the U.S.
would have been almost blind to many of
the Soviet Union’s malevolent activities.

2. It is unclear
on what basis other industries
selling sensitive products — for
example, the supercomputer, chemical and
biotechnology, machine tool, chip
manufacturers, etc. — would be denied
similar vehicles for demanding the
elimination of any remaining export
controls on the transfer of their
respective products. What is more, it not
self-evident that the national security
will be well served by advertising which
foreign encryption products are of
concern to the U.S. government, let alone
encouraging American manufacturers to
supply superior — i.e., less breakable
encoding techniques — in place of such
products.

3. See in this
connection, the Center’s Decision
Brief
entitled Truth
or Consequences #9: C.W.C. Proponents
Dissemble About Treaty Arrangements
Likely to Disserve U.S. Interests

(No. 97-D 46,
27 March 1997).

Why Tony Lake Is In Trouble In The Senate

(Washington, D.C.): As President
Clinton and his allies on Capitol Hill
turn up the heat on behalf of his
controversial choice to become the next
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
it is useful to review why Anthony Lake’s
nomination is in such trouble in the
Senate.

Poster Child for the
Clinton Follies

On one level, Mr. Lake’s
problem is that he personifies — indeed,
he could be the poster child for — much
of what is seen to be ailing the Clinton
Administration at the moment
.
For example, there is the question of a lack
of personal
accountability.
“Mistakes were made” is the
President’s refrain about campaign
financing “irregularities”;
Tony Lake declares “it was a
mistake” not to tell Congress that
the United States was facilitating
radical Islamic Iran’s penetration of
Europe via secret arms shipments to
Bosnia.

Then there is the business of sharp
practices when it comes to the law
.
The Clinton team evidently will contend
that the law permits renting the Lincoln
Bedroom, seats on Air Force One, tables
at the White House Mess, etc. to campaign
contributors as long as the settling of
accounts does not occur on government
property. Tony Lake’s defenders claim
that his National Security Council did
not “mislead” Congress about
the Iran-Bosnia scandal; it simply
refused to inform Members until two years
after the fact, which amounts — as Sen.
Jesse Helms correctly wrote in opposing
the Lake nomination on 25 February(1)
— to the same thing.

Insult is added to injury that such
behavior is brought to us by an
administration whose leader sees fit
publicly to denounce cynicism.
Certainly, such behavior does not inspire
confidence that a candidate for Director
of Central Intelligence will be fully
transparent and forthcoming toward the
legislative branch — for whom he also
works.

The Clinton team also appears to
believe that improper, if not
illegal, financial activities

can be absolved as long as the money is
given back when one gets caught.
Interestingly though, in the case of the
Democratic National Committee, the rule
is to give it all back (at least
eventually). In Mr. Lake’s case, he only
had to pay out $5,000 in fines for the
roughly $250,000 he made by holding onto
energy stocks — despite being formally
directed not once, but twice, to dispose
of them.

Can He Tell A Failure When
He Sees It?

Even those who may be inclined to
overlook these problems with the Lake
candidacy — there is, after all, the
Clinton Administration’s favored
exculpatory line “everybody does
it” — cannot ignore two other,
troubling aspects of this nomination:

First, as Jim Hoagland observed in a
scathing Washington Post column
last month, Anthony Lake seems
ill-suited to the task of conducting
“intelligence assessments and
operations with absolute integrity, even
if they cost Bill Clinton politically and
the CIA bureaucratically.”

After noting the credit the President has
given Lake as “the architect of U.S.
Bosnia policy” and “relaxing
opposition to China” — among other
dubious policies — Hoagland declares:
“I doubt King Solomon would have the
detachment and perspective needed to
disentangle such past advocacy from the
demands of an unbiased analysis.”

In this regard, it is particularly
ominous that Tony Lake has been party to
the sacking of the first two Clinton DCIs
on the grounds, at least in part, that
they dared to speak truth to power.
Hoagland mulls the implications of the
anger Lake reportedly felt toward the
second of these Directors, John Deutch,
for acknowledging that Saddam’s incursion
last fall into northern Iraq was not the
“U.S. success” Clinton had
declared it to be:

“Iraq is the scene of the CIA’s
greatest covert fiasco of this decade.
The agency’s failures in northern Iraq
and its continuing inability to organize
an effective program against Saddam
should be the focus of the questions that
matter in judging whether Lake will have
the detachment and perspective needed to
rebuild a wounded organization….If
Lake cannot get Iraq right, he is not the
man for the job of rescuing an
organization that has not only lost its
mission but, in Iraq, lost its way.

Will He Know Foreign Agents
When He Sees Them?

Second, since an important part of the
DCI’s job is overseeing U.S.
counterintelligence operations, it is
alarming that Tony Lake presided
as National Security Advisor over what
appears to be the most successful
penetration of the White House by an
unfriendly foreign government since the
British took the place in the War of
1812.
As Michael Kelly, the
editor of the New Republic,
recently observed, various documents
supplied in response to congressional
questions about China’s influence
operations in the Executive Office of the
President point up a “profoundly
troubling fact”: “In Bill
Clinton’s White House, the idea that
agents of the People’s Republic of China
were Democratic National Committee donors
who should be granted face-time with the
president was treated [by Lake’s NSC] as
very nearly business as usual.”
Face-time with the President is, of
course, the least of the problems that
have been discovered in the
still-unfolding drama of what the
Communist Chinese got through their
“strategic access” to the
senior-most reaches of the Clinton
Administration.(2)

The Bottom Line

Anthony Lake’s FBI file may or may not
shed light on the questions of policy
judgment, contempt for Congress,
independence and integrity that are at
the core of the controversy over his
nomination. As long as the raw data in
that file might do so, however, it seems
only prudent for the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence to insist that
its chairman and ranking member be
afforded an opportunity and sufficient
time to review that data, not just the
highly abbreviated — and reportedly
uninformative — summary produced in
support of the Lake nomination. Once such
a review is accomplished, the Committee
and the full Senate will be in a position
to weigh all the evidence supporting the
conclusion that Tony Lake is the wrong
man at the wrong time for the CIA.

– 30 –

1. See the href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_36at”> attached excerpts
of Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
Helms’ letter about the Lake nomination
which was sent last week to his
Intelligence Committee counterpart,
Senator Richard Shelby.

2. For more on the
security implications of the China
Connection, see the Center’s Decision
Brief
entitled The
China Card: Evidence of Beijing’s
Involvement in Democratic Fund-Raising
Raises Anew Security Concerns

(No. 97-D 26,
13 February 1997).