Tag Archives: Menges Hemispheric Security Project

China displaces the U.S. at Ecuador’s Manta Base

The Manta Air Base in Ecuador is currently used by the United States Air Force (USAF) division of the United States Southern Command for operations against illegal cocaine trafficking in northwestern South America. U.S. operations have attracted little attention, until Ecuador’s 2006 presidential election campaign, when President-elect, Rafael Correa, pledged not to renew the U.S. lease in 2009. This would mean losing a strategic drug war position for the United States. To learn more, please open the attachment.

Main News:

  • Ecuador defense minister resigns.
  • State Oil Industry’s Future Sets off Tussle in Mexico.
  • Wide Net Cast by Lobby for Colombia Trade Pact.
  • Peru to investigate Venezuela’s interests in "Houses of ALBA."
  • French FM to Go to Colombia in Effort to Free Hostage. Sarkozy asks Argentina’s Kirchner "to hold back" Chávez.
  • Venezuela to take over at least 60% of Cemex, Holcim and Lafarge Cement Companies. Chavez nationalizes steel sector partly owned by Argentina (TECHINT). Belarus experts to help build new air defense system in Venezuela. Venezuela to buy nine Russian submarines. Chávez to enact national police law.
  • Protesters Ask for Release of All Hostages in Colombia.
  • Bush Sends Colombia Free-Trade Bill to Congress.
  • Bolivian Senate chair denounces Venezuela’s "meddling".

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For any questions, comments, or those interested in receiving this report in the future or seeking to have their email removed from our list please contact Nicole M. Ferrand at our new e-mail address: themengesproject@centerforsecuritypolicy.org or to themengesproject@gmail.com. If you have news stories that you think might be useful for future editions of this report please send them, with a link to the original website, to the same e-mail address. If you wish to contribute with an article, please send it to the same address, with your name and place of work or study.

 

Chavez moves into Peru

For some time now, we have been reporting the interventions of Hugo Chavez into several countries in Latin America such as Peru, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Colombia and Ecuador.  In July and August 2007 the staff of The Americas Report published two articles regarding this matter: Chavez’s dangerous intervention in Peru and Peru’s reaction against Venezuelan intervention by Nicole M. Ferrand.

This past February, we followed a story regarding protests that were occurring in Cuzco, Peru which resulted in that beautiful city losing its status as one of the twelve venues for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) meetings. This was due to violent clashes between the police and some groups of farmers believed to have been promoted by former Presidential Candidate, Ollanta Humala, and financed by Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez. (Please read The Americas Report from February 28, 2008 titled: "Danger in the Region: Who’s behind the Protests in Peru." By Nicole M. Ferrand).

[More]As Luis Fleischman pointed out last week: "Hugo Chavez is the leader of a new plan that goes beyond Venezuela. He advocates not merely socialism but also a totalitarian project. This totalitarian vision is not only aimed at Venezuela but also towards as many Latin American countries as possible, forming alliances with regimes that have mastered the art of violence." (Please read "The Americas Report March 27, 2008 – The US must be able to Identify and support forces of Democracy and geo-political stability in Latin America. By Luis Fleischman.) Here is what is happening in Peru: recent evidence has come to light showing the Chavez – Humala menace is more dangerous than previously thought.

What are the "Houses of ALBA?"

The Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America (ALBA) is a joint Venezuelan-Cuban initiative based on, according to its founders, "fair trade" in opposition to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Agreements with several countries in Latin America. With initial financing of more than US$1 billion provided by Venezuela, this initiative has created the Bank of ALBA ( formed as alternative to IMF and World Bank) , which claims "to promote projects of economic integration and infrastructural development as well as progress in social, educational, cultural and health programs in member nations. It also aims to eliminate the economic weaknesses of these countries and eradicate economic asymmetries as a result of the process of financial globalization", Venezuelan economist Jesús Faría explains.[1]

ALBA in Peru

In Peru, the staunchest defender of ALBA and Chavez is Hernan Fuentes, the regional president, or governor, of the province of Puno (please see map to see closeness with Cuzco and neighboring country, Bolivia). Fuentes wears bright red shirts, mimicking Chavez’s trademark color of choice, calls himself a proud foot soldier in Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution and in his private office there is a life-size photo of the Venezuelan leader. Fuentes visited Caracas last year to attend the annual summit of Chavez’s regional union. Meanwhile, ALBA houses have proliferated in Peru’s southern highlands, serving as dissemination points for chavismo. Government officials say that these so-called "anti-poverty centers" have sprung up across Peru to promote political agitation which may have fueled protests against the government’s free market economic policies. Many centers were linked to a radical leftist organization known as the Continental Bolivarian Committee.[2]

There are an estimated 200 "Casas del ALBA" operating in Peru. The residences, mostly private homes with an ALBA sign on the front, have been described by Peruvian officials as meeting places for pro-Chávez radical leftist and coca-grower groups which in many cases have ties to armed terrorist groups. Apparently, they do "charity work," including sending nearly 5,000 Peruvians for eye operations in Venezuela over the past year.

The Peruvian Congress unanimously voted to investigate whether these pro-Chávez meeting points have ties with violent groups or another government that is interfering in the country’s internal affairs. There is evidence that "Chavista" agents from Venezuela and Cuba came through Bolivia to Peru using local hospitals and the offices of ALBA to co-opt sympathizers to destabilize the country. There is proof regarding the presence of Venezuelan military and civilian personnel and that this has been accomplished by the existing friendship between Fuentes and Chavez. "Some authorities in Puno want to mortgage out Peru to a foreign power," Prime Minister Jorge del Castillo has declared adding that "President Chavez wouldn’t tolerate outposts of my political party in Venezuela. Why are photos of Chavez in the ALBA centers?" [3] The installation of the ALBA offices has not been authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, therefore is illegal.

ALBA, Humala and Chavez – New evidence

Peruvian police arrested seven suspected Peruvian militants on March 29, 2008 on the border with Ecuador as they returned to their country after participating in a meeting of the Bolivarian Continental Coordinator (CCB) which took place in Quito, Feb. 24-28. The CCB is a public forum that brings together civil society organizations interested in promoting the "Bolivarian Revolution" in Latin America. The Bolivarian Revolution, inspired by Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, calls for Latin American unity, socialist political ideals and the promotion of widespread protest activities as a means of resistance to global capitalism. According to media reports, some participants in the Quito CCB meeting discussed protesting the Latin American-European Union (ALC-UE) and Asian Pacific Cooperation (APEC) international summits to be held in Peru in May and November, respectively. The seven, members of the CCB Peruvian chapter (CCB-P), were detained under suspicion of "Affiliation and Collaboration in Terrorism." Their names are: Arminda Valladares Saba, Melissa Rocío Patiño Hinostroza, Guadalupe Alejandrina Hilario Rivas, Maria Gabriel Segura, Carmen Mercedes Asparrent Riveros, Roque Gonzáles La Rosa and Damaris Velasco Huiza . They allegedly received cash and directions from Venezuela via leftwing allies in Bolivia and Ecuador in order to create chaos inside Peru. Most of the detainees are said to be former members of the terrorist group known as the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Roque Gonzalez, a former high-ranking member of the MRTA, is charged with forming part of an international terrorist group with ties to Chavistas and the FARC with the mission of bringing down the current Peruvian regime.

Authorities say that Gonzalez paid for members of a pro-Venezuela group to travel to an international leftist conference in Ecuador last month, and that he purchased multiple tickets all under his name to hide their identities. "How did Roque Gonzalez, a prominent member of the MRTA who does not have any kind of employment, buy 15 tickets for his group to travel to Ecuador and back?" Peruvian Prime Minister del Castillo said he suspects Venezuela of providing "under the table" funding, but stopped short of accusing Chavez directly. "There is evidently a hand that’s financing this," Del Castillo said. "I won’t venture to single out anyone for now, to say ‘Hugo Chavez,’ for now." Del Castillo said Peru will not tolerate any foreign meddling and would exercise its "right to defend its sovereignty" if the allegations are confirmed.[4]

Some of the suspects expressed their gratitude to Venezuela’s president saying that this would boost support for Ollanta Humala, Chávez’s Peruvian protégé who narrowly lost the presidential election in 2006 and has vowed to run again. "We’re all Chavistas on this bus. Viva Humala!" said one suspect. There is no doubt Chávez is seeking to project his influence across South and Central America and the Caribbean. Opposition movements in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua claim Chávez has made clandestine payments to their governments to consolidate his anti-American alliance.[5] Prosecutors in the United States are investigating the case of a suitcase filled with U$800,000 in cash allegedly destined for the election campaign of Argentinian President Cristina Kirchner, a Chávez ally. More seriously, Colombian authorities revealed that Venezuela’s President gave US $300 million to the FARC to help topple Colombia’s Uribe regime.

In addition, Peruvian Interior Minister Luis Alva Castro said he has evidence that the "Houses of ALBA" are linked to extremist groups encouraging violent protests that intend to boycott international summits to be held this year in Peru. Alva Castro told radio station CPN that the Peruvian government is in possession of some checks a country – which he would not name – paid, which "clearly state the purpose and the receiver." While he avoided pointing to Venezuela as the place where the funds are coming from, he said the police are concerned about the participation of some radical and extremist organizations in social protests in the country. Alva Castro said that what is known so far allegedly establishes a connection between the Houses of ALBA and the Bolivarian Continental Coordinator (CCB).[6]

On March 10, 2008, the congressional investigation concluded that Venezuela actually is funding Peruvian radical leftist groups. They looked into the bank and telephone records of 88 "humanitarian centers" for suspected ties to protests, road blocks and boycotts organized against Peruvian President, Alan Garcia.

The Humala – Fuentes – Chávez Link

Ollanta Humala’s popularity remains robust in some parts of Peru, especially in the southern highlands. Anti-government protests regularly shut down roads and cities, including one last month that closed the tourist city of Cuzco. Peruvian officials say that Humala and Chavez sympathizers are behind all this. According to Governor Fuentes "We in Puno are like another country…We don’t see the economic bonanza of Lima. The benefits are not felt here."

Ollanta Humala remains a threat to democracy and a free market economy due to his socialist and nationalistic rhetoric. Some people remain convinced that he continues to receive financial support from Chavez and that he is quietly campaigning in many provinces. According to the newspaper "Expreso" from Peru, it is said that Humala receives more than $600,000 dollars a month from Hugo Chavez to finance demonstrations and promote social unrest to destabilize the country. In fact, the violent clashes between some groups of farmers and the police are believed to have been promoted by Humala who has organized "The People’s Social Summit", which is to take place from May 13 – 15, the dates on which world leaders will come to Lima for the European Union-Latin America and Caribbean (EU-LAC) Summit. Money is apparently being sent through Bolivia from Venezuela to pay people to carry out attacks against government facilities. Peru and Colombia now constitute a headache for Chavez’s socialist revolution as they are examples of functioning democracies, with strong economic growth.

Both the Executive Branch and the Congress are investigating ALBA, its operations, activities and funding, as well as other pro-Chávez groups. According to Defense Minister Antero Flores-Aráoz, "the Houses of ALBA have reportedly become centers where the people are indoctrinated to reject the Peruvian government. Further, the houses are now promoting subversive acts." While the minister clarified that there was no certainty that Venezuela or pro-Chávez players were funding the Houses of ALBA in Peru, "there is the incident of the cash-filled suitcase" that US-Venezuelan businessman, Guido Antonini unsuccessfully tried to smuggle into Buenos Aires last August. "We should presume that this method is used in Peru too," he added. The Peruvian government says that while the charity houses offer help to the poor, they also provide heavy doses of leftist ideology.[7]

Chavez is funding ALBA to boost his "Bolivarian Revolution" and a Chavista Region

Peruvian officials say that Venezuela is funneling support for ALBA homes through Bolivia. Peruvian President Alan Garcia claims that Chavez plans to build a seven-story office in La Paz, the Bolivian Capital, to serve as a "general headquarter" to coordinate Venezuela’s joint operations in the region with its leftist allies Cuba and Nicaragua. Their ultimate goal is to destabilize Peru so that the country adheres to their type of thinking, which would lead to the downfall of the Andean nation. The accusations come in the context of a regional showdown over alleged Venezuelan and Ecuadorian attempts to destabilize Colombia’s U.S.-backed government.[8]   Peruvian officials believe the building, in the Obraje neighborhood, will be used for military training of young Indian people from southern Peru.

Peruvian Prosecutors are accusing Puno’s Governor Fuentes of corruption for misusing public funds; allegations that surfaced days after he decided to declare independence from Peru’s central government. He maintains there is nothing seditious or radical about his proposal to turn Peru into a federated union of state governments, similar to the United States. Fuentes is considering seeking asylum in Venezuela or Bolivia for what he calls "political persecution by the central government" and is in deep trouble: apart from being accused of mismanaging public funds, there are reports he is receiving cash from Venezuela to finance protests against the Garcia regime. Locals are accusing him of living the "high life," and of paying family members and friends for their loyalty, all this with funds coming from the government of Venezuela. Either way, according to del Castillo, Fuentes wants to leave Peru because he is scared: There is an article in the Peruvian Penal Code that is related to the behavior of Mr. Fuentes, which states "A person who practices an act intended to separate a part of the Republic will be reprimanded with a prison sentence of no less than 15 years." If Fuentes doesn’t leave, he risks prosecution and imprisonment.

The Americas Report has written extensively about Chavez’s actions and interventions into other sovereign states. Chavez has promoted or taken advantage of any indication of social unrest in other Latin American countries by buying support or using one of his cronies, and then stepping in to agitate people, promoting and pushing for what he calls "The Bolivarian Revolution." He did it in the recent conflict between Ecuador and Colombia, where, out of nowhere, he sent ten battalions to Venezuela’s border with Colombia and was threatening to start a war with the help of the FARC to overthrow Uribe. He did not succeed since Reyes, the terrorist groups second in command and leader of the FARC’s operations was killed. Thus, Chavez’s plan to destroy the Colombian regime fell through. Plus it is said that the Venezuelan army didn’t want to fight due to their disenchantment with Chavez. Now he is using a similar strategy in Peru. Luckily, authorities were quick enough to discover his deeds and the Fuentes factor.

Chavez knows his popularity is diminishing in his own country and in the region. His strategy to promote an Indian uprising in South America and create an "Aymara Nation" which would bring Bolivia, southern Peru and northern Chile together into one single nation for his "Bolivarian Project" is losing support. It is now up to the Peruvian government to remain vigilant against attempts by Chavez to destabilize their country and even dismantle the Casas del Alba if they are Chavez supported and the cause for social unrest inside Peru.


[1] "Summit of the Bolivarian Alternative (ALBA) Concludes in Venezuela," January 30, 2008. Center for Research on Globalization.  

[2] "Agentes chavistas captan a peruanos en el altiplano," July 2, 2007. Diario Expreso, Perú.

[3] Ibid.

[4] "Peru claims interference of pro-Chávez groups is notorious," March 17, 2008. El Universal.

[5] "Peruvian leaders cry foul as Chávez exports healthcare," March 24, 2008. The Guardian.

[6] "Houses of ALBA" linked to extremists in Peru. March 3, 2008. El Universal.

[7] Ibid.

[8] "Megaembajada bolivariana se instala en La Paz," March 19, 2008. La Razón, Bolivia.

Chavez’s move into Peru with Casas del Alba

For some time now, we have been reporting the interventions of Hugo Chavez into several countries in Latin America such as Peru, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Colombia and Ecuador. This past February, we followed a story regarding protests that were occurring in Cuzco, Peru which resulted in that beautiful city losing its status as one of the twelve venues for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) meetings. This was due to violent clashes between the police and some groups of farmers believed to have been promoted by former Presidential Candidate, Ollanta Humala, and financed by Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez. Here is what is happening in Peru: recent evidence has come to light showing the Chavez – Humala menace is more dangerous than previously thought. To learn more, please open the attachment.

Main News:

  • Reyes Files Suggest Venezuela Bid to Aid Colombia FARC.
  • Bogotá rules out Chávez’s role in mission to help Betancourt. Colombia says it found uranium linked to FARC. FARC rules out unilateral release of Betancourt.  FARC-related news agency brands Sarkozy as "naïve".
  • Bolivian Political Dialogue Uncertain.
  • Venezuela  IAPA rejects judicial harassment against reporters and media. Washington concerned about Venezuela’s arms purchases. Pdvsa’s debt compromises 28.5 percent of assets.
  • Letters suggest FARC gave money to Correa. Ecuador Illegalizes Foreign Bases. Ecuador admits Colombia airspace violation.
  • Argentine farmers suspend strike.
  • Putin: Politic Dialogue and Cooperation with Cuba. Cuban President Meets Russian Minister.
  • Former Mexican President Fox: "Chávez is putting money in the FARC."
  • Chávez signs energy agreements in Brazil. Lula’s administration most popular since 1990 in Brazil. Brazilian military joins battle against dengue epidemic.

View the full version of the Americas Report (PDF)

For any questions, comments, or those interested in receiving this report in the future or seeking to have their email removed from our list please contact Nicole M. Ferrand at our new e-mail address: themengesproject@centerforsecuritypolicy.org or to themengesproject@gmail.com. If you have news stories that you think might be useful for future editions of this report please send them, with a link to the original website, to the same e-mail address. If you wish to contribute with an article, please send it to the same address, with your name and place of work or study.

Supporting the forces of democracy

Throughout the numerous articles written on the pages of the Americas Report, and in recent testimony given by the Center for Security Policy’s Hemispheric Security Project, we stated our vision of the current Latin American problem.

To sum up, Hugo Chavez is the leader of a new plan that goes beyond Venezuela. He advocates not merely socialism but also a totalitarian project. This totalitarian vision is not only aimed at Venezuela but also towards as many Latin American countries as possible.

In order to achieve this Chavez interferes in his neighbors internal politics and establishes direct connections with groups who share his goals. In order to accomplish this he has established alliances with violent groups that have the potential to destabilize a particular country’s government. This need for violence leads him to form alliances with regimes that have mastered the art of violence such as Cuba and Belarus and countries that know how to convert violence into systematic terrorism like Iran.

[More]Latin America is already experiencing a situation of violence and international instability as the recent confrontation between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela has shown. Recent meetings sponsored by the Organization of American States in Santo Domingo were aimed at reconciling the parties and as such attempted to be evenhanded. However, it is abundantly clear that it is Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa who should be held responsible for supporting and enabling an ominous anti-Colombian terrorist organization (the FARC). However, Correa would not have dared to host terrorists in his country if it weren’t for the previously mentioned regional tactics of Hugo Chavez.

Therefore, in the name of regional peace in Latin America and geo-political security, it is crucial that the United States government as well as other governments in the Western Hemisphere help those who can be effective in counterbalancing these developments. Venezuela is the epicenter of the Latin America earthquake and as long as Chavez is in power these threats will continue.

We depart from the assumption that if the Chavez regime collapses the revolutionary intensity and potential international escalation in the region will significantly decline. All those who believe that Chavez’s regime is facing major economic problems which he will not be able to survive forget that a regime can survive even under economic hardship.   It is enough to look at what Fidel Castro has done for the last five decades, what the Soviet Union did for seven and a half decades and what the Iranians have done for three. Paraphrasing writer Isaac Bashevis Singer we can say "Between dying and dead there is long leg."

Illusions and hopes will not bring us results but taking a good look at the forces operating in Venezuela today may provide a better understanding of the situation and help us act accordingly. In Venezuela, like in many countries in Latin America, the natural vehicles of political debate and opposition-the political parties- have become weak as a result of ongoing corruption, disconnection from the public, aloofness from sources of societal support, and lack of social and political vision. The virtual collapse (but not total disappearance) of the two traditional parties, the AD and COPEI, that ruled Venezuela for forty years gave way to a plethora of political parties, none of them capable of properly challenging Chavez. Moreover, attempts at unity between the parties to form a single front against Chavez have often ended in disunity and collapse of coalitions.

Non-political elements such as business, workers and oil associations have played a role in opposing Chavez, particularly before the recall referendum of August 2004. These groups comprised the most active opposition by organizing strikes and massive protests against the government. Newly mobilized groups that collected signatures during the recall referendum and other groups who demanded electoral transparence joined them.

However, these groups as well as the political parties lost importance as they experienced major defeats during the 2004 recall referendum, parliamentary elections in 2005 (where the political parties’ abstention determined the virtual elimination of a real opposition in parliament) and the Presidential elections in 2006. These events strengthened Chavez’s position and left behind a demoralized and passive opposition that waited for another round of elections to win. However, it was General Raul Isaias Baduel who turned events around in Venezuela when he publicly denounced the December 2, 2007 Referendum on Constitutional Reform as an attempt by Chavez to carry a coup d’etat and perpetuate himself in power. During the campaign Baduel loudly urged Venezuelans to vote against the reform. The referendum ended in a major defeat for Hugo Chavez.

 

General Raul Isaias Baduel turned events around in Venezuela when he publicly denounced the December 2, 2007 Referendum on Constitutional Reform as an attempt by Chavez to carry a coup d’etat and perpetuate himself in power. Source: Diario Critico.

The importance of Baduel’s intervention was manifold. First, he denounced the Chavez reform as an attempt to take power away from the people and he did it publicly. The fact that Baduel was a military man, a former Chavez chief of the Venezuelan army and a former defense minister sent a message to the people of Venezuela that Chavez’s power system was being challenged from within. Consequently, Venezuelans lost fear and defeated an otherwise self-confident Chavez. By the same token, Baduel’s actions motivated disenchanted Chavistas to join forces against their former master. Such action was followed by other actions. During the hostage crisis in Colombia last February when the Colombian narco-guerilla group known as the FARC negotiated, with Chavez mediation, the release of Colombian hostages, Baduel publicly criticized the President’s complicity with the FARC.

Following Baduel’s statement, the army, a source of silent support for Chavez, expressed uneasiness with the Venezuelan leader’s association with the FARC sending a clear signal to Chavez. At the same time, Baduel also urged Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe to dismiss Chavez’s threats against Colombia. Early in March after a Colombian incursion in Ecuador killed a senior FARC leader, Chavez threatened to unleash war. Baduel then courageously called on the Venezuelan army not to fight and defended Colombia, in open defiance of Hugo Chavez. In that instance, the General also openly accused Chavez of inventing an external enemy to encourage nationalistic feelings in order to hide the internal failures of the Bolivarian regime.

General Baduel has demonstrated his effectiveness by having challenged Chavez’s unquestionable authority and arrogant behavior. He was effective because he aborted Chavez’s totalitarian project. Totalitarians want to show omnipotence. Baduel took that away from Chavez after the December 2nd election. Despite these brave actions, General Baduel’s motives are now being questioned. Is General Baduel an opportunist looking for recognition and personal gain? Or is h e for real? Should we trust him ? Should the Venezuelan people trust him? If yes, what role could he play in Venezuelan politics? Is he another military man that will depose a civilian and impose a bloody regime? Or can he become a leader of a civilian political party and defeat Chavez via constitutional means?

Let us take a look at the man. One day before the constitutional referendum he published an article in the New York Times where he expressed his opposition to those reforms. He opposes a socialist state because "it has absolute control over the people it governs". In this well-written article Baduel criticized the traditional political parties for seeing "the Venezuelan people as clients who can be bought off" and for using oil money to dispense "favors, subsidies and alms".   Under Chavez, Baduel believes the situation is even worse because of "exorbitant public expenditures, the recurrence of government deficits even at times of record-high oil prices, the extreme vulnerability of foreign investments, exceedingly high import tariffs, and our increased domestic consumption of fuel at laughably low prices".   Baduel predicts that the economy will crash and along with it, Chavez’s neo-populist policies. He suggests that a strong office of the President under the leadership of Chavez can only accelerate this national deterioration. [1]

Thus, Baduel has tried to bring Venezuelans into a debate on national issues of importance such as oil policy and how to use oil resources and oil income. Baduel, as a military man has made declarations that are atypical of traditional Latin American generals. Curiously enough, Baduel is the man known for having intervened to save the Chavez’s regime during a coup d’etat against him in April, 2002.   This has legitimately raised some eyebrows. However, Baduel in a declaration a month later explained that he was committed to the constitutional order and the rule of law. This may explain Baduel’s opposition to the coup d’etat [2].

These views were ratified later in 2006 in a different context. In reaction to Chavez’s assertion that the Venezuelan armed forces as well as the national oil company were "red" (communist), Baduel pointed out that the "constitution establishes that the armed forces are strictly professional ¼ . (Therefore) I understand that there should not be any relation between political and military power". [3] In April, 2007 Baduel again reaffirmed this principle [4]. In July, 2007 at the time of his retirement as Secretary of Defense he warned that socialism cannot be part of a marxist orthodoxy but has to be deeply democratic and respectful of the division of powers. [5] Judging by his words and actions, Baduel does not fit the profile of an opportunist. Opportunists abound in the world of politics but Baduel has defended a number of principles that typical opportunists cannot even articulate. Baduel is still commited to socialism (which explains his previous association with Chavez) but at the same time has issued a convincing affirmation of   democracy and constituionalism as a supreme principle of governance. He has criticized Chavez in a timely manner on very specific points without the typical generalization of a demagogue. He criticized the Chavez oil policies, his aggression against Colombia, and his support for the FARC.   He not only helped to bring about Chavez’s defeat in the December 2nd Referendum but has made his influence felt among army officers who rejected Chavez’s complicity with the FARC and his anti-Colombian aggression.

Baduel seems to be, by virtue of his actions, the natural leader of a peaceful and democratic social movement whose de-facto goal seems to be to to put an end to Chavez’s irresponsible and aggressive domestic and international practices. He seems to have the potential to seriously weaken the current Bolivarian Project. If Baduel’s voice continues to be heard it may bring about another Chavez defeat in the October, 2008 regional and municipal elections. There are a number of candidates from oppositionat parties that will be running. This does not mean that there is no room for other parties in a post-Chavez era but Baduel may well be the man most capable of triggering the transition. For his actions Baduel has taken a big risk. His own life is at the mercy of the unscrupolous Chavez’ regime which may try to harm him.

In relation to US policy, we can say that every decision involves a risk. Not making a decision also involves a risk. In considering our policy options, the United States should provide encouragement and support to people like General Baduel.  


[1] Raul Baduel "Why I Parted Ways with Chavez", New York Times, December 1, 2007

[2] Marianella Rodriguez "General Raul Baduel Exige un Civil en el Despacho de la Defensa", El Universal, May 4, 2002

[3] " La Fuerza Armada Es Esencialmente Professional", El Universal, November 8, 2006

[4] El Universal, April 16, 2007

[5] El Nacional, July 19, 2007

Democracy in Latin America

Throughout the numerous articles written on the pages of the Americas Report, we have stated our vision of the current Latin American problem: Hugo Chavez is the leader of a new plan that goes beyond Venezuela. He advocates not merely socialism but also a totalitarian project and this totalitarian vision is not only aimed at Venezuela but also towards as many Latin American countries as possible. Therefore, in the name of regional peace in Latin America and geo-political security, it is crucial that the United States government as well as other governments in the Western Hemisphere help those who can be effective in counterbalancing these developments. To read more, please open the attachment.

Main News:

  • Colombia: Uribe has proof that Ecuadorian killed during raid was FARC member. Colombia says FARC continues attacks from Ecuador.
  • Chávez: Colombian Santos is "a minister for war." Venezuela’s Chavez wary of McCain, says he seems ‘man of war.’ Chávez expects to improve relations with the US. London court: Pdvsa failed to meet agreements with Exxon Mobil. Pdvsa to face Netherlands court. Exports to Colombia still frozen, say Venezuelan exporters.
  • Peru Says Chavez Funding Overthrow of Their Government. Peru steps up border patrol with Colombia. Peru government slams independence moves by Puno.
  • Correa warns Ecuador-Colombia tension could worsen.
  • Argentina: Farmers continue strikes.
  • IAPA to assess press freedom in Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia.
  • Bomb blast rips through Chilean bank building, no one hurt.
  • Venezuela’s Chavez Visits Brazil.

View the full version of the Americas Report (PDF)

For any questions, comments, or those interested in receiving this report in the future or seeking to have their email removed from our list please contact Nicole M. Ferrand at our new e-mail address: themengesproject@centerforsecuritypolicy.org or to themengesproject@gmail.com. If you have news stories that you think might be useful for future editions of this report please send them, with a link to the original website, to the same e-mail address. If you wish to contribute with an article, please send it to the same address, with your name and place of work or study.

Chavez’s early ties with the FARC and ELN

Hugo Chavez recently proposed a humanitarian plan to free several people kidnapped by the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), a Colombian narco-guerrilla terrorist organization. Although Chavez has always denied supporting the FARC, we now know he was not telling the truth. In fact, information found in the computer of the FARC’s second-in-command, Raul Reyes, reveals that Chavez openly assists the guerillas. This is not surprising, as the relationship between them goes back to the 1970s.

Venezuelan democracy started in 1958 with a broad political agreement among the country’s main democratic forces called the Pact of Punto Fijo. The first years of democracy were difficult. Marxist organizations, with the support of Cuba and the USSR, opted for armed struggle in order to install a communist regimen. The guerrillas placed bombs, destroyed pipelines, and kidnapped and murdered people as a means of terrorizing the civilian population.

[More]In 1966, a Cuban expedition led by General Arnaldo Ochoa invaded Venezuela from the coast of Machurucuto. The invasion failed and by 1967 the guerrillas had been defeated. During the early 1970s, the Venezuelan Government decreed a general amnesty in order to pacify the country. However, some small Marxist groups continued to operate clandestinely, in an attempt to revive the guerrilla war. Those groups were Red Flag, Socialist League and the Party of the Venezuela Revolution (PRV). Some of the most important and active members of the PRV were its leader Douglas Bravo, as well as Rafael Ramirez, and Adam Chavez, the brother of Hugo Chavez.

Hugo Chavez’s closest advisors

The overwhelming defeat suffered by the guerrilla groups made them rethink their strategy. They decided the best way to achieve their goals was to infiltrate the armed forces. In 1970, their first contact was established between former Lieutenant William Izarra and Douglas Bravo. Then in 1971, Hugo Chavez entered the Military School and immediately established contacts with the PRV through his brother, Adam, and began organizing the clandestine Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement (MBR) to recruit other military personnel for the revolution. The failed coup that Hugo Chavez led in 1992 was organized in cooperation with the clandestine organizations MBR, PRV, Red Flag and the Socialist League.  

Adam not only introduced his brother, Hugo, to Marxism but also provided him with the necessary contacts to the Venezuelan guerrillas as well as to their Colombian counterparts, with whom their Venezuelan mates had had a long-standing relationship. The first contact between Hugo Chavez and the Colombian guerrillas was made through two members of the Colombian Army, Majors German Cadena Montenegro and Mario Alberto Galeano, who collaborated with the now dissolved guerrilla group M-19 since they were in the Colombian military school. Those contacts and activities did not represent a major threat until the 1992 coup changed the political situation in Venezuela, and the difficult economic situation made Venezuelans look for unconventional alternatives that made Chavez popular.

When Hugo Chavez left prison in 1994, he visited Colombia, where Majors Cadena and Galeano, by that time already retired, received him. Chavez then stayed in Colombia for six months, adopting the nickname of Commander Centeno, while establishing contacts with the Colombian Marxist narco-guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN). At this time Chavez proposed to the ELN that they organize a joint Colombian-Venezuelan guerrilla force in order to fight a "true independence war." That same year, Chavez established contacts with the other major Colombian guerrilla group, the FARC. This contact was made by Ramon Rodriguez Chacin. It is now well-documented that the FARC gave money to Chavez when he was in jail, and most likely, in 1998, during his first electoral campaign.

From Colombia, Chavez traveled to Cuba where he established contacts with Fidel Castro. Later, in 1999 when Chavez began his first presidential term, the retired Colombian Majors Cadena and Galeano join his Bolivarian Movement 2000 with the mission of winning adherents within the Colombian Armed Forces, as a means of destabilizing democracy inside Colombia. Since then, Chavez has repeatedly tried to establish direct contacts with the Colombian Armed Forces and did so again by talking directly with the chief of the Colombian Armed Forces, General Mario Montoya, against the wishes of the President of Colombia. That is why President Uribe decided to remove Chavez as a mediator in trying to free some of the hostages from the Colombian guerrillas. Once fired, Chavez became so mad that he insulted President Uribe, and stated that Venezuela does not have borders with Colombia but with the FARC’s territory.

Yet, recent events indicate that the exact position of the FARC’s second in command was detected from a direct phone call from Chavez to Raul Reyes, and among the documents found was one listing a 300 million dollar "donation" that Chavez gave to the Colombian guerrillas. Currently, the FARC operates freely in Venezuela in seven different areas and receives protection from the government. Chavez’s closest collaborators are his brother, Adam, his minister of Interior, Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, Jose Vicente Rangel (former presidential candidate of the communist party), Jorge Rodriguez (Socialist League), Minister of Energy Rafael Ramirez (PRV), Minister of Propaganda William Izarra (PRV) and the foreign Affairs Minister, Nicola s Maduro (Socialist League). Now the former Venezuelan guerrillas, the long standing close friends of their Colombian counterparts, are the individuals who now govern Venezuela.

Jose Noguera obtained a Ph.D. degree from State University of New York at Buffalo. He currently teaches and conducts research on macroeconomics, political economy and development with the rank of Associate Professor at the Whittemore School of the University of New Hampshire. He has also been appointed at Michigan State University, CERGE-EI (Prague, Czech Republic), the University of Warsaw, Central University of Venezuela and Mohila Academy University of Kiev.

Chavez’s early ties with the FARC and ELN

Hugo Chavez recently proposed a humanitarian plan to free several people kidnapped by the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), a Colombian narco-guerrilla terrorist organization. Although Chavez has always denied supporting the FARC, we now know he was not telling the truth. In fact, information found in the computer of the FARC’s second-in-command, Raul Reyes, reveals that Chavez openly assists the guerillas. This is not surprising, as the relationship between them goes back to the 1970s.

Venezuelan democracy started in 1958 with a broad political agreement among the country’s main democratic forces called the Pact of Punto Fijo. The first years of democracy were difficult. Marxist organizations, with the support of Cuba and the USSR, opted for armed struggle in order to install a communist regimen. The guerrillas placed bombs, destroyed pipelines, and kidnapped and murdered people as a means of terrorizing the civilian population. In 1966, a Cuban expedition led by General Arnaldo Ochoa invaded Venezuela from the coast of Machurucuto. The invasion failed and by 1967 the guerrillas had been defeated. During the early 1970s, the Venezuelan Government decreed a general amnesty in order to pacify the country. However, some small Marxist groups continued to operate clandestinely, in an attempt to revive the guerrilla war. Those groups were Red Flag, Socialist League and the Party of the Venezuela Revolution (PRV). Some of the most important and active members of the PRV were its leader Douglas Bravo, as well as Rafael Ramirez, and Adam Chavez, the brother of Hugo Chavez.

The overwhelming defeat suffered by the guerrilla groups made them rethink their strategy. They decided the best way to achieve their goals was to infiltrate the armed forces. In 1970, their first contact was established between former Lieutenant William Izarra and Douglas Bravo. Then in 1971, Hugo Chavez entered the Military School and immediately established contacts with the PRV through his brother, Adam, and began organizing the clandestine Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement (MBR) to recruit other military personnel for the revolution. The failed coup that Hugo Chavez led in 1992 was organized in cooperation with the clandestine organizations MBR, PRV, Red Flag and the Socialist League. 

Adam not only introduced his brother, Hugo, to Marxism but also provided him with the necessary contacts to the Venezuelan guerrillas as well as to their Colombian counterparts, with whom their Venezuelan mates had had a long-standing relationship. The first contact between Hugo Chavez and the Colombian guerrillas was made through two members of the Colombian Army, Majors German Cadena Montenegro and Mario Alberto Galeano, who collaborated with the now dissolved guerrilla group M-19 since they were in the Colombian military school. Those contacts and activities did not represent a major threat until the 1992 coup changed the political situation in Venezuela, and the difficult economic situation made Venezuelans look for unconventional alternatives that made Chavez popular. 

When Hugo Chavez left prison in 1994, he visited Colombia, where Majors Cadena and Galeano, by that time already retired, received him. Chavez then stayed in Colombia for six months, adopting the nickname of Commander Centeno, while establishing contacts with the Colombian Marxist narco-guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN). At this time Chavez proposed to the ELN that they organize a joint Colombian-Venezuelan guerrilla force in order to fight a “true independence war.” That same year, Chavez established contacts with the other major Colombian guerrilla group, the FARC. This contact was made by Ramon Rodriguez Chacin. It is now well-documented that the FARC gave money to Chavez when he was in jail, and most likely, in 1998, during his first electoral campaign. 

From Colombia, Chavez traveled to Cuba where he established contacts with Fidel Castro. Later, in 1999 when Chavez began his first presidential term, the retired Colombian Majors Cadena and Galeano join his Bolivarian Movement 2000 with the mission of winning adherents within the Colombian Armed Forces, as a means of destabilizing democracy inside Colombia. Since then, Chavez has repeatedly tried to establish direct contacts with the Colombian Armed Forces and did so again by talking directly with the chief of the Colombian Armed Forces, General Mario Montoya, against the wishes of the President of Colombia. That is why President Uribe decided to remove Chavez as a mediator in trying to free some of the hostages from the Colombian guerrillas. Once fired, Chavez became so mad that he insulted President Uribe, and stated that Venezuela does not have borders with Colombia but with the FARC’s territory.

Yet, recent events indicate that the exact position of the FARC’s second in command was detected from a direct phone call from Chavez to Raul Reyes, and among the documents found was one listing a 300 million dollar “donation” that Chavez gave to the Colombian guerrillas. Currently, the FARC operates freely in Venezuela in seven different areas and receives protection from the government. Chavez’s closest collaborators are his brother, Adam, his minister of Interior, Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, Jose Vicente Rangel (former presidential candidate of the communist party), Jorge Rodriguez (Socialist League), Minister of Energy Rafael Ramirez (PRV), Minister of Propaganda William Izarra (PRV) and the foreign Affairs Minister, Nicolas Maduro (Socialist League). Now the former Venezuelan guerrillas, the long standing close friends of their Colombian counterparts, are the individuals who now govern Venezuela.

Jose Noguera obtained a Ph.D. degree from State University of New York at Buffalo. He currently teaches and conducts research on macroeconomics, political economy and development with the rank of Associate Professor at the Whittemore School of the University of New Hampshire. He has also been appointed at Michigan State University, CERGE-EI (Prague, Czech Republic), the University of Warsaw, Central University of Venezuela and Mohila Academy University of Kiev.

 

Representatives Mack and Ros-Lehtinen introduce congressional resolution calling for Venezuela to be named a state sponsor of terrorism.

Citing Venezuela’s continued support of and ties to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), an internationally-recognized terrorist organization, Congressman Connie Mack (FL-14) and House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL-18) introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives today that calls on the Administration to add Venezuela to the state sponsors of terrorism list.

Their resolution also condemns the Venezuelan government for its support of terrorist organizations and urges the Venezuelan government to immediately cease all support and ties to the FARC. The resolution is cosponsored by Reps. Michael McCaul (TX-10), Lynn Westmoreland (GA-03), Mike Pence (IN-06), Mario Diaz-Balart (FL-25), Doug Lamborn (CO-05), Patrick McHenry (NC-10), Lincoln Diaz-Balart (FL-21) and Mary Bono Mack (CA-45). Mack, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and one of Congress’ sharpest critics of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez, said: “For decades, the FARC has terrorized Colombians and foreign citizens through kidnappings, bombings, killings, and drug trafficking. The evidence that Hugo Chavez is assisting a recognized terrorist organization is overwhelming. He has supported these terrorists by giving them fuel, money, a safe haven within Venezuelan borders, and public support. “Chavez has not only befriended and supported the FARC, he has developed strong relationships with the leaders of Iran and Cuba – both state sponsors of terrorism – and has used those relationships to systematically disrupt stability in Latin America and the rest of the Western Hemisphere.” “Naming Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism and passing the Colombia Free Trade Agreement in Congress will strengthen the stability of the Andean region and help in the effort to preserve freedom, security and prosperity for the Latin American people. I urge my colleagues to support this important resolution.” The resolution was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee where it awaits further action.

Full resolution: http://mack.house.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.View&ContentRecord_id=549

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The implications of Cuba’s leadership change

Due to his illness, Fidel Castro appointed his brother, Raul Castro acting president of Cuba in July, 2006. On February 24, 2008, Cuba’s highest governing body, The Council of State, made this appointment permanent. Though characterized as a better and more pragmatic manager, Raul, who has been Defense Minister for the past forty nine years, has been a life long communist and remains ideologically close to his brother.

Therefore, many believe that thoughthere may be some minor changes that he will not deviate significantly from the last almost half century of Castro rule. From his hospital bed, Fidel remains an important presence and continues in his post as the head of the Cuban Communist Party.

Since becoming president, Raul has promised "structural changes" and said "we have to make our government’s management more efficient." According to recent news reports, he has acknowledged that the average Cuban salary of twelve to seventeen dollars a month is too little to live on. While Raul talks of increasing salaries and lessening government control over the economy, his actions have only been reflected in minor changes in policy. For example, the Cuban government has decentralized the production and distribution of milk and has ordered new buses from China to ease major transportation problems.

However, in terms of how the majority of the Cuban population still lives, very little has changed. Food continues to be rationed by neighborhood block committees, goods such as eggs and chicken are in short supply, the monthly ration reportedly only lasts for one or two weeks, housing is limited and overcrowded, and in spite of people’s efforts to get ahead, the government taxes income earned from private initiatives or refuses to grant licenses to "businesses on the side."

What is interesting is that after the fall of the Soviet Union and the halt in their economic support, Cuba’s economy (according to a February 23, 2008 report in the Economist) shrank by 35 percent. As a result, Castro declared a "special period" and opened the economy to tourism, foreign investment in certain sectors, farmers markets, small privately owned businesses, and legalized the use of the dollar which opened the way to hard currency via remittances from one million plus Cuban Americans.[1] This special period lasted from 1989 to 1996 and was reversed even though the economy was beginning to stabilize. The reasons why it was reversed perhaps have implications for how the current leadership may react. Apparently, the reforms were stopped because Castro believed that some people in society were benefiting more than others and that "it was a threat to the regime as it undermined party control."[2] In terms of current financial support, Cuba now relies on Chinese credit and three to four billion dollars worth of free oil from Hugo Chavez as well as an additional one and a half billion dollars of additional aid from the Venezuelan president. While there has been a change in leadership in Cuba, there has not been a transition to any significant change in ideology, in governance, in the abysmal living conditions of most Cubans, nor in the area of human freedoms. As reported by various human rights organizations, there are approximately two hundred political prisoners incarcerated in Cuban jails. It is also important to keep in mind that the Castro brothers remain hostile to American values and principles, especially democratic governance, capitalism and free markets and that they have spent their entire adult lives fighting against our way of life. In addition, it was not that long ago that Castro met with Ahmendinejad of Iran and proclaimed, "Together, we will bring the U.S. to its knees."

The Embargo

The United States embargo against Cuba is an economic, commercial and financial instrument enacted on February 7, 1962 after Cuba expropriated the properties of U.S. citizens and corporations. The embargo was tightened in 1963 after the Cuban Missile Crisis and was reinforced in October 1992 by the Cuban Democracy Act and in 1996 by the Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity Act (known as the Helms-Burton Act). This latter measure applies to foreign companies trading with Cuba and is meant to penalize those companies that allegedly traffic in property formerly owned by US citizens but expropriated by Cuba after the revolution. In October 2000, the embargo was further altered by the Trade Sanctions, Reform and Export Enhancement Act that relaxed the sale of agricultural goods and medicines to Cuba for humanitarian reasons.

Contrary to critics’ claims, lifting of the embargo and the travel ban without meaningful changes in Cuba will have several negative repercussions. First, it will send a poor message about U.S. toleration both of Cuba’s patterns of unsavory behavior and its totalitarian system. Second, a cessation of the embargo will strengthen state enterprises since most Cuban businesses are run by the state and since the Cuban government retains a partnership interest in all foreign investment. Third, it will lead to greater domestic repression and control because the leadership fears the "subversive" effects of U.S. influence upon the Cuban people. A transition to democracy on the island will thus be delayed.

The economic impact of tourism, while providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, would be limited. Dollars will flow in small quantities to the Cuban poor; state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. We have to keep in mind that no foreign trade that is independent from the state is permitted in Cuba and workers are paid below comparable wages. Cuban leaders, in any event, would allow only enough commerce to maintain their regime. Investments will be directed and approved by the Cuban government. The Cuban government is unlikely to create a level plain field for American companies, allowing some to invest while discriminating capriciously against others. It is illegal for foreign companies to hire or fire Cuban workers directly and hiring is done by the Ministry of Labor. Foreign companies must pay the wages owed to their employees directly to the Cuban government in hard currency. The Cuban government then pays out to the Cuban workers in Cuban pesos, which are worth 1/20 of a U.S. dollar, pocketing 90 percent of every dollar it receives.[3]

The lifting of the embargo would allow the Castro’s to borrow from international organizations: such as the IMF, the World Bank, etc. Since Cuba owes billions of dollars to the former Soviet Union, to the Club of Paris, and to others, and has refused in the past to acknowledge or pay these debts, new loans will be wasted by Castro’s inefficient and wasteful system, and will be uncollectible. The reason Castro has been unable to pay back loans is not because of the U.S. embargo, but because his economic system stifles productivity and he continues to spend on the military, on adventures abroad, and on supporting a bankrupt welfare system on the island.[4]

Opponents to the embargo cite US trade with China as a reason for ending the Cuban embargo; but this example merely illustrates that American policy has been inconsistent. Trade with China, if it shows anything, demonstrates that there is little correlation between commerce and political liberalization, at least over the short term. After all, the Chinese Communist Party has, in the last two decades, managed to increase both trade and political repression. So far, commerce has strengthened the hands of communists in China.[5] The embargo should only be lifted when Cuba changes its current system and develops a democratic society. U.S. policy towards Cuba is not anachronistic but is rather aimed at the legitimate goal of a free Cuba; the lifting of the embargo now will be an important psychological victory for Castro and would be interpreted as a defeat for U.S. policy. There is also no indication that negotiation and incentives can influence Cuba, which has ignored such "carrot and stick" approaches in the past. Without major internal reforms in Cuba, the Castro government – not the Cuban people – will be the main beneficiary of the lifting of the embargo, since it will use this newly-acquired wealth to strengthen its hold on the Cuban people, to rebuild its military apparatus, and to engage again in supporting anti-American terrorist and violent groups in Latin America and elsewhere.[6] The reason for Cuba’s economic suffering is a Marxist system that discourages incentives. As in Eastern Europe under Communism, the failed Communist system is the cause of the economic suffering of the Cubans, not the U.S. embargo.[7] The embargo was never established to overthrow the Castro government. The embargo was established to punish the Castro government for the confiscation of American properties and to pressure it to slow down its move into the Communist camp. The embargo has been maintained to show that Marxist-Leninism does not work as an economic or political system and to use it as a tool to extract human rights, economic and political concessions from the current or future Cuban government.

Hugo Chavez plays a crucial role in providing life-oxygen to the Cuban regime. In this time of history it is Hugo Chavez who represents the main threat to regional stability and geo-political security in the western hemisphere and perhaps beyond.

—————————————————

[1] The Economist, Feb 23, 2008. The Commandante’s Last Move.

[2] The Economist, Feb 23, 2008. The Commandante’s Last Move

[3] Cuban Communism. By Irving Louis Horowitz, Jaime Suchlicki.

[4] What lifting embargo on Cuba would really mean. By Georgie Ann Geyer. July 20, 2000.

[5] In Defense of the Cuban Embargo. Gordon G. Chang. February 20, 2008.

[6] In Defense of the Cuban Embargo. Gordon G. Chang. February 20, 2008.

[7] Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained. November 10, 1994. The Heritage Foundation.

 

The implications of Cuba’s leadership change

Due to his illness, Fidel Castro appointed his brother, Raul Castro acting president of Cuba in July, 2006. On February 24, 2008, Cuba’s highest governing body, The Council of State, made this appointment permanent. Though characterized as a better and more pragmatic manager, Raul, who has been Defense Minister for the past forty nine years, has been a life long communist and remains ideologically close to his brother.

Therefore, many believe that thoughthere may be some minor changes that he will not deviate significantly from the last almost half century of Castro rule. From his hospital bed, Fidel remains an important presence and continues in his post as the head of the Cuban Communist Party.

Since becoming president, Raul has promised "structural changes" and said "we have to make our government’s management more efficient." According to recent news reports, he has acknowledged that the average Cuban salary of twelve to seventeen dollars a month is too little to live on. While Raul talks of increasing salaries and lessening government control over the economy, his actions have only been reflected in minor changes in policy. For example, the Cuban government has decentralized the production and distribution of milk and has ordered new buses from China to ease major transportation problems.

However, in terms of how the majority of the Cuban population still lives, very little has changed. Food continues to be rationed by neighborhood block committees, goods such as eggs and chicken are in short supply, the monthly ration reportedly only lasts for one or two weeks, housing is limited and overcrowded, and in spite of people’s efforts to get ahead, the government taxes income earned from private initiatives or refuses to grant licenses to "businesses on the side."

What is interesting is that after the fall of the Soviet Union and the halt in their economic support, Cuba’s economy (according to a February 23, 2008 report in the Economist) shrank by 35 percent. As a result, Castro declared a "special period" and opened the economy to tourism, foreign investment in certain sectors, farmers markets, small privately owned businesses, and legalized the use of the dollar which opened the way to hard currency via remittances from one million plus Cuban Americans.[1] This special period lasted from 1989 to 1996 and was reversed even though the economy was beginning to stabilize. The reasons why it was reversed perhaps have implications for how the current leadership may react. Apparently, the reforms were stopped because Castro believed that some people in society were benefiting more than others and that "it was a threat to the regime as it undermined party control."[2] In terms of current financial support, Cuba now relies on Chinese credit and three to four billion dollars worth of free oil from Hugo Chavez as well as an additional one and a half billion dollars of additional aid from the Venezuelan president. While there has been a change in leadership in Cuba, there has not been a transition to any significant change in ideology, in governance, in the abysmal living conditions of most Cubans, nor in the area of human freedoms. As reported by various human rights organizations, there are approximately two hundred political prisoners incarcerated in Cuban jails. It is also important to keep in mind that the Castro brothers remain hostile to American values and principles, especially democratic governance, capitalism and free markets and that they have spent their entire adult lives fighting against our way of life. In addition, it was not that long ago that Castro met with Ahmendinejad of Iran and proclaimed, "Together, we will bring the U.S. to its knees."

The Embargo

The United States embargo against Cuba is an economic, commercial and financial instrument enacted on February 7, 1962 after Cuba expropriated the properties of U.S. citizens and corporations. The embargo was tightened in 1963 after the Cuban Missile Crisis and was reinforced in October 1992 by the Cuban Democracy Act and in 1996 by the Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity Act (known as the Helms-Burton Act). This latter measure applies to foreign companies trading with Cuba and is meant to penalize those companies that allegedly traffic in property formerly owned by US citizens but expropriated by Cuba after the revolution. In October 2000, the embargo was further altered by the Trade Sanctions, Reform and Export Enhancement Act that relaxed the sale of agricultural goods and medicines to Cuba for humanitarian reasons.

Contrary to critics’ claims, lifting of the embargo and the travel ban without meaningful changes in Cuba will have several negative repercussions. First, it will send a poor message about U.S. toleration both of Cuba’s patterns of unsavory behavior and its totalitarian system. Second, a cessation of the embargo will strengthen state enterprises since most Cuban businesses are run by the state and since the Cuban government retains a partnership interest in all foreign investment. Third, it will lead to greater domestic repression and control because the leadership fears the "subversive" effects of U.S. influence upon the Cuban people. A transition to democracy on the island will thus be delayed.

The economic impact of tourism, while providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, would be limited. Dollars will flow in small quantities to the Cuban poor; state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. We have to keep in mind that no foreign trade that is independent from the state is permitted in Cuba and workers are paid below comparable wages. Cuban leaders, in any event, would allow only enough commerce to maintain their regime. Investments will be directed and approved by the Cuban government. The Cuban government is unlikely to create a level plain field for American companies, allowing some to invest while discriminating capriciously against others. It is illegal for foreign companies to hire or fire Cuban workers directly and hiring is done by the Ministry of Labor. Foreign companies must pay the wages owed to their employees directly to the Cuban government in hard currency. The Cuban government then pays out to the Cuban workers in Cuban pesos, which are worth 1/20 of a U.S. dollar, pocketing 90 percent of every dollar it receives.[3]

The lifting of the embargo would allow the Castro’s to borrow from international organizations: such as the IMF, the World Bank, etc. Since Cuba owes billions of dollars to the former Soviet Union, to the Club of Paris, and to others, and has refused in the past to acknowledge or pay these debts, new loans will be wasted by Castro’s inefficient and wasteful system, and will be uncollectible. The reason Castro has been unable to pay back loans is not because of the U.S. embargo, but because his economic system stifles productivity and he continues to spend on the military, on adventures abroad, and on supporting a bankrupt welfare system on the island.[4]

Opponents to the embargo cite US trade with China as a reason for ending the Cuban embargo; but this example merely illustrates that American policy has been inconsistent. Trade with China, if it shows anything, demonstrates that there is little correlation between commerce and political liberalization, at least over the short term. After all, the Chinese Communist Party has, in the last two decades, managed to increase both trade and political repression. So far, commerce has strengthened the hands of communists in China.[5] The embargo should only be lifted when Cuba changes its current system and develops a democratic society. U.S. policy towards Cuba is not anachronistic but is rather aimed at the legitimate goal of a free Cuba; the lifting of the embargo now will be an important psychological victory for Castro and would be interpreted as a defeat for U.S. policy. There is also no indication that negotiation and incentives can influence Cuba, which has ignored such "carrot and stick" approaches in the past. Without major internal reforms in Cuba, the Castro government – not the Cuban people – will be the main beneficiary of the lifting of the embargo, since it will use this newly-acquired wealth to strengthen its hold on the Cuban people, to rebuild its military apparatus, and to engage again in supporting anti-American terrorist and violent groups in Latin America and elsewhere.[6] The reason for Cuba’s economic suffering is a Marxist system that discourages incentives. As in Eastern Europe under Communism, the failed Communist system is the cause of the economic suffering of the Cubans, not the U.S. embargo.[7] The embargo was never established to overthrow the Castro government. The embargo was established to punish the Castro government for the confiscation of American properties and to pressure it to slow down its move into the Communist camp. The embargo has been maintained to show that Marxist-Leninism does not work as an economic or political system and to use it as a tool to extract human rights, economic and political concessions from the current or future Cuban government.

Hugo Chavez plays a crucial role in providing life-oxygen to the Cuban regime. In this time of history it is Hugo Chavez who represents the main threat to regional stability and geo-political security in the western hemisphere and perhaps beyond.

—————————————————

[1] The Economist, Feb 23, 2008. The Commandante’s Last Move.

[2] The Economist, Feb 23, 2008. The Commandante’s Last Move

[3] Cuban Communism. By Irving Louis Horowitz, Jaime Suchlicki.

[4] What lifting embargo on Cuba would really mean. By Georgie Ann Geyer. July 20, 2000.

[5] In Defense of the Cuban Embargo. Gordon G. Chang. February 20, 2008.

[6] In Defense of the Cuban Embargo. Gordon G. Chang. February 20, 2008.

[7] Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained. November 10, 1994. The Heritage Foundation.

 

The implications of Cuba’s leadership change

Due to his illness, Fidel Castro appointed his brother, Raul Castro acting president of Cuba in July, 2006. On February 24, 2008, Cuba’s highest governing body, The Council of State, made this appointment permanent. Though characterized as a better and more pragmatic manager, Raul, who has been Defense Minister for the past forty nine years, has been a life long communist and remains ideologically close to his brother.

Therefore, many believe that thoughthere may be some minor changes that he will not deviate significantly from the last almost half century of Castro rule. From his hospital bed, Fidel remains an important presence and continues in his post as the head of the Cuban Communist Party.

Since becoming president, Raul has promised "structural changes" and said "we have to make our government’s management more efficient." According to recent news reports, he has acknowledged that the average Cuban salary of twelve to seventeen dollars a month is too little to live on. While Raul talks of increasing salaries and lessening government control over the economy, his actions have only been reflected in minor changes in policy. For example, the Cuban government has decentralized the production and distribution of milk and has ordered new buses from China to ease major transportation problems.

However, in terms of how the majority of the Cuban population still lives, very little has changed. Food continues to be rationed by neighborhood block committees, goods such as eggs and chicken are in short supply, the monthly ration reportedly only lasts for one or two weeks, housing is limited and overcrowded, and in spite of people’s efforts to get ahead, the government taxes income earned from private initiatives or refuses to grant licenses to "businesses on the side."

What is interesting is that after the fall of the Soviet Union and the halt in their economic support, Cuba’s economy (according to a February 23, 2008 report in the Economist) shrank by 35 percent. As a result, Castro declared a "special period" and opened the economy to tourism, foreign investment in certain sectors, farmers markets, small privately owned businesses, and legalized the use of the dollar which opened the way to hard currency via remittances from one million plus Cuban Americans.[1] This special period lasted from 1989 to 1996 and was reversed even though the economy was beginning to stabilize. The reasons why it was reversed perhaps have implications for how the current leadership may react. Apparently, the reforms were stopped because Castro believed that some people in society were benefiting more than others and that "it was a threat to the regime as it undermined party control."[2] In terms of current financial support, Cuba now relies on Chinese credit and three to four billion dollars worth of free oil from Hugo Chavez as well as an additional one and a half billion dollars of additional aid from the Venezuelan president. While there has been a change in leadership in Cuba, there has not been a transition to any significant change in ideology, in governance, in the abysmal living conditions of most Cubans, nor in the area of human freedoms. As reported by various human rights organizations, there are approximately two hundred political prisoners incarcerated in Cuban jails. It is also important to keep in mind that the Castro brothers remain hostile to American values and principles, especially democratic governance, capitalism and free markets and that they have spent their entire adult lives fighting against our way of life. In addition, it was not that long ago that Castro met with Ahmendinejad of Iran and proclaimed, "Together, we will bring the U.S. to its knees."

The Embargo

The United States embargo against Cuba is an economic, commercial and financial instrument enacted on February 7, 1962 after Cuba expropriated the properties of U.S. citizens and corporations. The embargo was tightened in 1963 after the Cuban Missile Crisis and was reinforced in October 1992 by the Cuban Democracy Act and in 1996 by the Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity Act (known as the Helms-Burton Act). This latter measure applies to foreign companies trading with Cuba and is meant to penalize those companies that allegedly traffic in property formerly owned by US citizens but expropriated by Cuba after the revolution. In October 2000, the embargo was further altered by the Trade Sanctions, Reform and Export Enhancement Act that relaxed the sale of agricultural goods and medicines to Cuba for humanitarian reasons.

Contrary to critics’ claims, lifting of the embargo and the travel ban without meaningful changes in Cuba will have several negative repercussions. First, it will send a poor message about U.S. toleration both of Cuba’s patterns of unsavory behavior and its totalitarian system. Second, a cessation of the embargo will strengthen state enterprises since most Cuban businesses are run by the state and since the Cuban government retains a partnership interest in all foreign investment. Third, it will lead to greater domestic repression and control because the leadership fears the "subversive" effects of U.S. influence upon the Cuban people. A transition to democracy on the island will thus be delayed.

The economic impact of tourism, while providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, would be limited. Dollars will flow in small quantities to the Cuban poor; state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. We have to keep in mind that no foreign trade that is independent from the state is permitted in Cuba and workers are paid below comparable wages. Cuban leaders, in any event, would allow only enough commerce to maintain their regime. Investments will be directed and approved by the Cuban government. The Cuban government is unlikely to create a level plain field for American companies, allowing some to invest while discriminating capriciously against others. It is illegal for foreign companies to hire or fire Cuban workers directly and hiring is done by the Ministry of Labor. Foreign companies must pay the wages owed to their employees directly to the Cuban government in hard currency. The Cuban government then pays out to the Cuban workers in Cuban pesos, which are worth 1/20 of a U.S. dollar, pocketing 90 percent of every dollar it receives.[3]

The lifting of the embargo would allow the Castro’s to borrow from international organizations: such as the IMF, the World Bank, etc. Since Cuba owes billions of dollars to the former Soviet Union, to the Club of Paris, and to others, and has refused in the past to acknowledge or pay these debts, new loans will be wasted by Castro’s inefficient and wasteful system, and will be uncollectible. The reason Castro has been unable to pay back loans is not because of the U.S. embargo, but because his economic system stifles productivity and he continues to spend on the military, on adventures abroad, and on supporting a bankrupt welfare system on the island.[4]

Opponents to the embargo cite US trade with China as a reason for ending the Cuban embargo; but this example merely illustrates that American policy has been inconsistent. Trade with China, if it shows anything, demonstrates that there is little correlation between commerce and political liberalization, at least over the short term. After all, the Chinese Communist Party has, in the last two decades, managed to increase both trade and political repression. So far, commerce has strengthened the hands of communists in China.[5] The embargo should only be lifted when Cuba changes its current system and develops a democratic society. U.S. policy towards Cuba is not anachronistic but is rather aimed at the legitimate goal of a free Cuba; the lifting of the embargo now will be an important psychological victory for Castro and would be interpreted as a defeat for U.S. policy. There is also no indication that negotiation and incentives can influence Cuba, which has ignored such "carrot and stick" approaches in the past. Without major internal reforms in Cuba, the Castro government – not the Cuban people – will be the main beneficiary of the lifting of the embargo, since it will use this newly-acquired wealth to strengthen its hold on the Cuban people, to rebuild its military apparatus, and to engage again in supporting anti-American terrorist and violent groups in Latin America and elsewhere.[6] The reason for Cuba’s economic suffering is a Marxist system that discourages incentives. As in Eastern Europe under Communism, the failed Communist system is the cause of the economic suffering of the Cubans, not the U.S. embargo.[7] The embargo was never established to overthrow the Castro government. The embargo was established to punish the Castro government for the confiscation of American properties and to pressure it to slow down its move into the Communist camp. The embargo has been maintained to show that Marxist-Leninism does not work as an economic or political system and to use it as a tool to extract human rights, economic and political concessions from the current or future Cuban government.

Hugo Chavez plays a crucial role in providing life-oxygen to the Cuban regime. In this time of history it is Hugo Chavez who represents the main threat to regional stability and geo-political security in the western hemisphere and perhaps beyond.

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[1] The Economist, Feb 23, 2008. The Commandante’s Last Move.

[2] The Economist, Feb 23, 2008. The Commandante’s Last Move

[3] Cuban Communism. By Irving Louis Horowitz, Jaime Suchlicki.

[4] What lifting embargo on Cuba would really mean. By Georgie Ann Geyer. July 20, 2000.

[5] In Defense of the Cuban Embargo. Gordon G. Chang. February 20, 2008.

[6] In Defense of the Cuban Embargo. Gordon G. Chang. February 20, 2008.

[7] Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained. November 10, 1994. The Heritage Foundation.