Tag Archives: North Korea

Bad deal: all carrots, no sticks

President George W. Bush Thursday formally abandoned the last vestiges of a once-robust policy towards a North Korean regime he had rightly said he “loathed.” Worse yet, he is doing so in the face of Pyongyang’s manifest contempt exhibited through, among other things, its serial refusal even to provide promised data about the status and disposition of its nuclear arsenal, let alone to eliminate it.

Consider the following egregious shortfalls in the “declaration” supplied by Kim Jong Il’s representatives to the United States via Communist China: 

The North Korean declaration was delivered six months late. As time dragged on without any submission, Amb. Hill began making excuses and signaling that the United States would be willing to accept less than the “complete and correct” submission Kim’s regime was obligated to provide. 

Not surprisingly, the declaration that was ultimately served up conformed to this advance billing. There is no indication that the North Koreans are dismantling their nuclear arsenal. In fact, it has not even declared the size or whereabouts of its stockpile of atomic weapons. It is hard to believe that the United States has been obliged by its incompetent diplomats to make concessions desperately sought by the North — namely, ending the application to North Korea of the Trading with the Enemy Act and removing it from the State Department list of terrorist-sponsoring nations — for so little in return.

Pyongyang has not disclosed the other countries to which it has proliferated nuclear technology. Such assistance to Syria was only prevented from translating into an indigenous source of bomb-ready plutonium for that state-sponsor of terror by an Israeli air force attack last September. Israel’s strike destroyed a North Korean-supplied nuclear reactor virtually identical to the weapons-related one in North Korea that Amb. Hill is taking such credit for dismantling.

Particularly worrisome are reports last week in the German publication, Der Speigel, that a further purpose of Pyongyang’s reactor project in Syria was to help yet another state-sponsor of terror — Iran — develop its nuclear program. It is hard to imagine how Pyongyang’s seeding of such states’ nuclear ambitions can be seen as anything other than state-sponsorship of terror.

What is more, in December 2007, the Congressional Research Service cited reputable sources in asserting that North Korea had provided arms and possibly training to the State Department-designated terrorist group Hezbollah in Lebanon. There is also abundant evidence of North Korean involvement in the shipment of ballistic missiles and other weaponry to despotic nations around the world. In fact, such arms are the North’s only real cash crop and are used to enhance the offensive potential of both officially designated and undesignated state-sponsors of terror.

Amb. Hill also allowed the North Koreans to get away with non-disclosure of any detailed data about North Korea’s separate program for developing nuclear weapons with enriched uranium. It was the discovery and acknowledgment by Pyongyang of that covert program early in the Bush administration that prompted this president to terminate his predecessor’s egregious act of appeasement of the North: the 1994 Agreed Framework.

In short, North Korea has done nothing that would justify lifting of U.S. sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act. To the contrary, it continues to deserve that designation. It is also utterly inaccurate to describe it as a country no longer engaging in acts of state sponsorship of terrorism in any commonsensical meaning of the term.

President Bush has evidently concluded that — despite the demeaning of the United States and discrediting of his presidency entailed in the appalling diplomatic malpractice of Special Envoy Hill and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice — the bad deal they have served up is better than none. Sadly, that is not the case.

The effect of making such U.S. concessions in the face of a manifestly incomplete and incorrect North Korean declaration will be to: encourage financial life-support to hemorrhage to that odious regime; assure that Pyongyang persists in an array of dangerous activities at home and abroad that it has promised (repeatedly) to forego; and embolden others around the world to pursue nuclear weapons, confident in the knowledge that they will be rewarded — not penalized — for doing so.

The good news is that Congress has 45 days to block the removal of North Korea from the U.S. state-sponsors-of-terrorism list. The bad news is that to do so, veto-proof majorities in both houses would have to be found for resolutions of disapproval — something seen as unlikely. We are told that too many Democrats will support this initiative as a splendid opportunity to embarrass George Bush for failing to get such a deal years ago. Too many Republicans are said to be reluctant to criticize a leader of their own party for engaging in behavior they rightly would excoriate any Democrat for perpetrating.

Nonetheless, it stands to reason — especially given North Korea’s serial and continuing breaches of past commitments — that the United States would also defer complete fulfillment of its part of the present bargain by tying any rewarding of Kim Jong Il to his fulfillment of his part. At stake is not just President Bush’s legacy, but that bequeathed in terms of the future security of all Americans.

Originally published in National Review. 

Christopher Holton, the Center’s vice president, contributed to this article.

 

China’s double-standard on debt

Communist China has done it again.   Desperate for new sources of energy, the Chinese are moving into an oil-rich nation eschewed by others. In this case, however, the country in question is not a state-sponsor of terror or other pariah state.   Rather, it is Iraq, a country the United States has gone to great lengths to make a member in good standing of the Free World – free, among other things, of the influence of those like PRC who had close ties to Saddam Hussein.

Yet now, according to the Financial Times, the Iraqi government last Friday "revived a contract signed by the Saddam Hussein administration allowing a state-owned Chinese oil company to develop an Iraqi oil field."  [More]The deal to develop the al-Ahdab field in Iraq was signed with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 1997 and was valued at the time to be worth $1.2 billion. What is more, the FT reported that Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani announced that "Baghdad welcomed Chinese oil company bids for any other contract in the country through a ‘fair and transparent bidding process’ to be laid out in the new oil law under discussion in Iraq’s parliament."

Part of the impetus behind the free Iraqi government embracing CNPC – the PRC’s largest state-owned oil company and an instrument for its partnerships with the world’s most odious regimes – is a harsh reality: China is one of all too few investors who appreciate the strategic opportunities inherent in securing a foothold in Iraq today and are able to accept, and mitigate, the risks associated with doing business there.

Euchring Iraqi Sovereign Debt

Another consideration, however, has to do with the matter of Iraqi sovereign debt to Communist China dating from Saddam Hussein’s time and estimated to be worth as much as $10 billion.   The PRC has insisted that the successor government in Baghdad is responsible for its predecessor’s liabilities.  

The Financial Times noted Friday that a seeming breakthrough occurred d uring a visit to China last month by Iraq’s president, Jalal Talabani. Beijing announced that "a ‘large margin’ of Iraqi debt would be canceled, although no specific figures were released." As the Communists are fond of observing, this is hardly a coincidence, comrade. China used the leverage of a promise to forgive what is, as a practical matter, uncollectable Iraqi debt to secure renewed access to Iraqi oil.

There is a special irony to China’s adamance on the subject that successor governments are responsible for their predecessors’ sovereign debts. After all, American and other investors are estimated to be holding Chinese sovereign bonds issued by pre-Communist regimes worth roughly $260 billion – bonds the PRC has, to date, refused to honor.   While British holders of such Chinese bonds were given a discriminatory settlement back in 1987, their American counterparts have been left holding the bag.

Congress Tackles the Issue

Now, though, U.S. legislators are considering a bill that could induce China to be more forthcoming.   House Concurrent Resolution 160, introduced last month by Rep. Lincoln Davis, Democrat of Tennessee, would deny the PRC access to the U.S. capital markets until such time as, among other things, Communist China "fully honors repayment of its outstanding defaulted public debts owed to United States citizens."

Such a penalty for China’s effective default would be a first.   Until now, there have been no material costs to China for reneging on these debts.   Its bond ratings were not affected.   Neither has there been any impediment to the PRC’s ability to bring to American and other international exchanges various "bad actors" – often state-owned companies, like CNPC, PetroChina and Sinopec, engaged in activities inimical to vital U.S. security, economic and/or humanitarian interests.

In the absence of any serious, let alone sustained, effort by the Executive Branch and the Congress to resolve this corrosive bilateral problem, is it any wonder that there has been no satisfactory resolution to other financial abuses by China?   These include: Beijing’s manipulation of its currency; its underwriting of the genocidal regime in Sudan; and China’s worrisome financial (and other) ties with Iran, Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela and North Korea, etc.  

The adoption by both houses of Congress of legislation like H. Con. Res. 160 should be but the first of several steps taken to induce the PRC to clean up its sovereign debt.   For example, as legislative and other measures are developed to counter China’s currency manipulation, provisions should be included requiring Beijing to make good on its defaulted sovereign bonds.

The Securities and Exchange Commission and other credit-rating agencies should be required to take into account China’s defaulted bonds in their ratings and disclosure requirements.   And targeted financial sanctions against the PRC should be promulgated in the event China continues to ignore its long-standing financial commitments.

Last, but not least, American and other vendors should be encouraged to settle accounts with China by using the legal tender of Chinese sovereign bonds.   In this fashion, Beijing can be held accountable for its debts, with minimal impact on trade and other relations.

The Bottom Line

If China can use sovereign debt owed it – even debt incurred by previous governments as despicable as that of Saddam Hussein – to euchre freedom-aspiring Iraqis into making strategically momentous concessions, the least the United States can do is ensure that the Communist Chinese are held to no lesser standard.   Sauce for the goose, after all, must be sauce for the Beijing duck.

The Bering Strait Tunnel Project

What do Russian President Vladimir Putin, spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, political activist Lyndon LaRouche and former U.S. Secretary of the Interior and Governor of Alaska Walter Hickel have in common? They are all supporters of the Bering Strait Tunnel (BST) Project, a US$65-70 billion project that would create a high-speed railway, energy and fiber optic cable network link from Yakutsk in Siberia through Anadyr in northeastern Russia beneath the Bering Strait to the western coast of Alaska.

First conceived nearly one-hundred years ago during the reign of Russian Tsar Nicolas II, the BST would be the longest tunnel in the world – over twice the length of Europe’s 30 mile long "Chunnel" linking Britain and France. Billed by its supporters as an unparalleled economic and energy conduit and a way to improve increasingly frigid U.S.-Russia bilateral relations, the project is certainly ambitious. [More]However, the project has gained attention in Russian political, economic and media circles over the past year, identified as an important part of the country’s infrastructure development plan for the first half of the 21st century. At a meeting chaired by Russian President Putin, Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov and high-level railroad officials in early April, the construction of a railroad stretching from the banks of Russia’s Lena River to the Bering Strait was discussed at length, adding further evidence that Moscow sees the BST project as not only feasible, but inevitable.

At approximately the same time as the Putin meeting, several hundred attendees from Japan, S. Korea, Russia and the U.S. gathered at a separate Moscow location to attend the Megaprojects of Russia’s East Conference, the first in a series of conferences organized by several Russian economic development agencies and regional governments to discuss efforts surrounding the project. In a statement released to the public, conference attendees urged the U.S., Russia, Japan, EU and China to raise the issue of the tunnel project at next week’s G-8 Summit to be held in Heiligendamm, Germany.

Proponents of the project argue construction of the tunnel will provide economic benefits for Russia by allowing the country to develop its resource-rich, remote Far East region, while providing the U.S. with a reliable source of long-term energy. In addition, representatives from Russia’s main electricity producer, Unified Energy Systems, say the project could save Russia and the U.S. a combined $20 billion in electricity costs a year. Proponents note that the overall cost of the project would be recouped within a few decades, as the volume of tunnel freight transport activity increased, reaching an estimated 3 percent of the world’s total physical cargo or 100 million tons annually. Russian specialists have pointed out that the tunnel could be completed in 10 years if efforts are accelerated, private-public investment is secured and U.S.–Russia cooperation increases.

Critics of the mega-project within Russia such as Sergei Grigoryev, vice-president of state controlled energy conglomerate Transneft, have been skeptical of the plan. "We need to first develop oil fields in East Siberia," he noted last month. Others have questioned the longevity of the project, saying North America already has plenty of energy resources, thus, eliminating a significant benefit of the project. As an alternative, opponents say Moscow should focus on providing energy to resource-starved countries in Asia, such as China and Japan.

In terms of sheer size and complexity, the Channel Tunnel or "Chunnel" connecting England and France is most frequently compared to the BST project. Completed in 1994 by 13,000 workers at a total cost of US$13 billion, the seven year project is still considered a technological marvel. But the Chunnel project has been besieged by lingering problems such as bankruptcy, cost overruns; lower than expected passenger and freight volumes, high operating and debt levels, and competitive pressures.

The BST project is likely to face similar – if not more severe – problems, namely, issues such as infrastructure development, project planning and construction will require the development of unique geopolitical synergies. Moreover, dual U.S. and Canadian approval, inhospitable terrain, environmental concerns, long-term financing and tunnel administration will need to be adequately addressed.

Given the current state of U.S.-Russia bilateral relations, recent discussions surrounding the BST project are somewhat surprising. President Putin has shown that he will use energy as a weapon against countries such as the Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia, displaying authoritarian tendencies that have complicated foreign relations with the EU and the U.S. He has called for the establishment of an anti-American energy block to counter perceived global U.S. hegemony, making moves to organize and lead a "gas cartel" in both Central Asia and the Middle East.

The idea of open competition and transparency in Russia’s energy markets has been an idea foreign to Putin, with the enigmatic leader consolidating his power by nationalizing key energy sectors, imprisoning energy executives opposed to his views and forbidding foreign access and investment in many of Russia’s "sensitive" industries.

Moreover, Putin has circumvented U.S. security efforts in the U.N., attempted to crush his country’s democracy movement, increased spying and espionage activities in the West and made statements this week that his country had successfully test-fired a new intercontinental ballistic missile capable of overcoming the U.S. missile defense shield. Over the past year, Putin has consolidated his country’s energy, defense and media sectors, all part of a larger strategic plan to increase Moscow’s control and global influence. With such a suspect record, why would Washington want to join forces with Moscow on the BST project, even if the economic and energy benefits were overwhelming?

One important difference to keep in mind as countries in Asia and North America explore the feasibility of the BST project is that the English Tunnel project involved two EU countries – France and England – with a history of economic, trade, security and energy cooperation. Will an economically independent and increasingly powerful Russia be a reliable friend or an emerging foe for America? For now, Washington would be wise to invest its money not in a 10-20 year construction project with a Cold War adversary; rather, it should support the development of alternative energy sources and support global markets that ensure free competition, transparency, human rights and Western ideals.

The real Axis of Evil

In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President George Bush used the term "Axis of Evil" to describe the regimes of Iraq, Iran and North Korea, saying that all three countries were sponsoring terror and pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Since that groundbreaking speech, a new and potentially more dangerous "Axis of Evil" has emerged – China, Russia and Iran – that increasingly pose not only a threat to U.S. national security interests, but world peace and global stability as well.

But don’t blame President Bush for missing this important geopolitical shift. The new Axis of Evil has taken shape rapidly and somewhat unexpectedly. This Axis of Evil has surfaced not only as a result of the Iraq War and perceived U.S. hegemony, rather, its foundation has been built on a number of other important common-interest issues such as energy security, political ideology and a need reassert regional influence based upon historical precedent dating back almost two thousand years. Taken collectively, the continuing disruptive actions of China, Russia and Iran not only merit Washington’s attention, but also an immediate, well fashioned and definitive response.

Let’s examine the facts.

China has quickly become the elephant in the room that everyone – from Capital Hill politicians to senior Pentagon policymakers – wants to ignore but can’t. A laundry list of issues from the revaluation of the yuan that continues to severely damage the U.S. economy – to Beijing’s ongoing military modernization program aimed at confronting the U.S. in Asia and beyond – are slowly being recognized and addressed by the Bush administration, senior Pentagon officials and the U.S. Treasury Department.

Complicating matters, China’s successful January test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon against one of its own antiquated weather satellites raised the stakes in the ongoing battle between the U.S. and China over space supremacy. Indeed, the test proves China has taken another step in its quest to become a military power in space. Joint military exercises with fellow Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states and military exercises designed to simulate assaults on U.S. forces are becoming more difficult for the Bush Administration to ignore.

China’s escalating espionage activities in North America are also a matter for concern. Comments made by Chinese defector Chen Yonglin to Australian authorities in Sydney in the summer of 2005 noted that China is engaged in large-scale intelligence activities in the U.S. that have resulted in the country securing large amounts of classified U.S. information. "The U.S. is considered by the Chinese Communist Party as the largest enemy, the major strategic rival. The U.S. occupies a unique place in China’s diplomacy," noted Yonglin. Two other recent Chinese defectors to Australia have corroborated Chen Yonglin’s story. In addition, China’s ruling communist party continues to pursue the mandatory transfer of highly sophisticated, defense-oriented technologies by foreign companies to Chinese companies as a precursor for access to lucrative domestic markets, posing an even greater danger to U.S. national security. 

Beijing’s increasing appetite for oil, natural gas, water and minerals, as well as its quest to secure a variety of strategically located foreign assets such as seaports, have complicated Washington’s approach to the China problem.

Russia continues to sell sophisticated weapons systems to both Iran and China. President Vladimir Putin’s recent trip to the Middle East to conclude arms contracts with a number of Middle East states, as well as his actions to establish a powerful "gas cartel" demonstrates his overt willingness to undermine Washington’s interests in the region. Under Putin, the nationalization of Russia’s energy, media outlets and mineral industries has continued unabated, military ties to Central Asia countries has accelerated,  assassinations of political adversaries have become commonplace and the modernization of the country’s military has been given priority status. This week, an assertive President Vladimir Putin threatened to halt Russia’s compliance with the 1990 Treaty for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), one of the key agreements that helped end the decades long Cold War stand-off between NATO and the Soviet bloc.

For his part, Iran’s nuclear-obsessed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has threatened Israel with annihilation several times over the past year and continues to fund Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria’s terrorist sympathizer President Bashar al-Assad. Ahmandinejad recently added the U.S. and Britain to his list of countries for destruction, saying both countries will be "imminently destroyed." Last month’s British hostage crisis and his inflammatory comments this week concerning the 1980 American hostage crisis where he stated God helped Iran "clobber Iran’s enemies" have only added to Ahmadinejad’s reputation as a confrontational and unstable leader.

What does it all mean?

The U.S. no longer finds itself in a bi-polar world with the Soviet Union as its primary enemy. No, today the U.S. finds itself in a world of multiple enemies. This means the prospect for a more devastating and widespread global conflict is greater than ever.

But instead of mustering the strength needed to confront this new Axis of Evil and a  growing number of subordinate countries, Washington has become fractured, demonstrating an unwillingness to "go the distance" in Iraq and showing an inability to respond with a clear foreign policy. Proposed negotiations with tyrants in Syria and Iran are viewed by Washington’s enemies not as a symbol of leadership or strength, but as a sign of weakness during a time of great geostrategic importance.

There is an underlying current of unrest today defined by new geopolitical realities which the new Axis of Evil embodies. Under this still developing paradigm, successful asymmetrical warfare, not a direct confrontation on the battlefield, is the immediate goal. But the gradual decline in power and influence of the world’s only legitimate superpower – the U.S. – has caught the attention of Tehran, Beijing and Moscow. As the U.S. becomes weakened by a barrage of coordinated, intense attacks on its economic, political and military infrastructure – and the Axis of Evil becomes stronger – the likelihood of a direct confrontation with one or more of these countries at some point in the future will grow.

Will America be prepared for its biggest challenge?

North Korea deal stumbles. Surprised?

When the U.S. inked a nuclear deal last month with Kim Jong-Il’s regime in Pyongyang, many critics and strategists were flabbergasted.  The accord marked a stunning climb-down from the Bush Administration’s earlier, principled position of multilateral pressure on the hermit tyranny.

The terms of the February deal were absurdly generous.  In return for shutting down its Yongbyon plutonium reactor with 60 days (the deadline is April 13th, less than three weeks away) and agreeing to "talks" on the status of its as-yet undocumented uranium enrichment program, the North is to receive 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, the release of illicit funds from Chinese banks, promises for future aid contingent upon good behavior.

Yesterday however, the North walked away from the 4-day-old talks.  Their envoy, Kim Kye-Gwan, left Beijing for Pyongyang without such much as a word to reporters, who had to content themselves with a few waves from the man as he boarded his plane.

Responding to the new development, news outlets like the Washington Post reported that negotiations "broke down abruptly," implying a degree of surprise at the latest turn of events.

How could this have come as a surprise to anyone?  Given the history of the North’s nuclear perfidy, it was almost a given that the talks would "break down."   Indeed, as the Center reported last month, the new deal was a loser from the start.

Going nowhere, fast

The North’s provocative, seemingly incongruous behavior is actually part and parcel of its negotiating strategy.  They blackmail gullible Westerners into a deal, encourage them to believe that "progress" is possible, and then, once negotiations are underway, threaten to leave the talks unless fresh concessions are made.  It works like a charm.

In this case, the "concession" at issue is the final release of $25 million in funds from Banco Delta Asia in Macao, China.  The North demands the return of its money – earned during the course of its dealings in international crime – before it will sit down again at the table.  

In fact, the U.S. has already ended its investigation into Banco Delta Asia (BDA), the Macao bank which harbors the North Korean accounts.  It is actually the Chinese who are holding up the transfer, not Washington.  North Korea’s demand could not be more flippant.

Reports on the Chinese fund seizure differ wildly – some indicate that BDA and the Chinese government are having technical problems with the transfer, others state that Beijing is hesitant to release such large amounts of dirty money to Pyongyang.  

This is not to mention those, like the Russian envoy Alexander Losyukov, who brazenly (and falsely) stated that "the whole problem came from the American side."  His rationale was that the Chinese are afraid of a "negative response" from the U.S.  He seems to forget that the U.S. has already signed off on the deal.

None of this really matters, though.  Diplomatic "sturm und drang" over North’s Korea’s tantrums is old news.  What really matters is that the U.S use Pyongyang’s dramatic exit as an excuse to do the same.

A U.S. departure from the six-party talks would be a firm signal this country is still committed to countering Pyongyang’s aggressive behavior, not rewarding it.  In so doing, we would send a firm signal to our Japanese allies that we won’t abandon our mutual strategic interests in favor of chasing a hopeless dream.  

Because, let’s face it, the North is not going to disarm.

This point was made bluntly and effectively by former UN Ambassador John Bolton, who labeled our involvement with Pyongyang (and their Chinese facilitators) "a mistake," stating "It’s a terrible signal to Iran and other would-be proliferators, and it’s a further example of letting North Korea out of the corner that they put themselves in through the nuclear test in October."

What to do

In place of appeasement, the U.S. has several options with which to counter Pyongyang-Beijing axis of aggression.  

First, encourage divestment the North Korean regime.   This would mean re-freezing the accounts in Macao and discouraging other businesses and financial institutions from doing business with Kim.  The Center has long been advocating an effort called Divest Terror, which encourages divestment from companies that do business with state sponsors of terror, like North Korea.  Doing so would in short order deprive the North of the resources it needs to intimidate and harass its neighbors.

Second, maintain our position in South Korea.   The U.S. commitment to Seoul is one of the cornerstones of our strategy in Asia, and needs to be secured so as to maintain the safety of the region.  By re-stigmatizing North Korea, we encourage Seoul to cease its "sunshine policy" of appeasement, which only encourages Pyongyang’s intransigence

Third, fight the War of Ideas.  Chinese and North Korean propaganda has for years alleged that U.S. is to blame for all that is wrong in East Asia.  Nothing could be further from the truth.   Washington should work with and through its allies to make sure the world knows that Pyongyang’s nuclear malfeasance is decades-old and unprovoked, and that Chinese support for it is a cold, ruthless calculation that endangers the lives of millions, if not billions of people.

All of these strategies bound together amount to regime change.  It is the only way to permanently fix the North Korean problem.  U.S. leaders need to have the vision, patience, and strength to make it happen.

2007: A Chinese space odyssey

Reports last month that China had successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon against one of its own antiquated weather satellites using a kinetic kill vehicle launched on board a ballistic missile raised the stakes in the ongoing battle between the U.S. and China over space supremacy. Indeed, the test proves China has taken another step in its quest to become a military power in space.

Testing space weapons is nothing new. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union tested anti-satellite technology in the 1980’s, and the U.S. even shot down one of its orbiting satellites in 1985. But since that time, both countries have stopped testing altogether, believing that such actions jeopardize the commercial and scientific uses of space. In the recent Chinese test, experts noted that thousands of multiple-sized fragments were created from the satellite’s destruction, placing billions of dollars worth of sophisticated equipment at serious risk.

As expected, international condemnation of the ASAT weapons test was both firm and swift, as India, Russia and Great Britain voiced their immediate disproval. Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) spokesman G. Madhavan Nair called the test "unethical." Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov said his country was against the "weaponization of space," while the British raised the issue with Chinese officials almost immediately.

In the U.S. Senate, the reaction was equally critical. Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, told a gathering at Washington’s Heritage Foundation that China’s destruction of an aging satellite with a ground-based ballistic missile was a "wake-up call" that should make the U.S. get serious about threats in space. "China’s military doctrine and numerous writings make it clear the country does not believe space can or should be free of military capabilities," Kyl said.

Making China’s anti-satellite test even more surprising was the fact that it directly contradicts previous statements made by the country’s leaders concerning the weaponization of space. In September 2005, Beijing warned that urgent attention was needed to protect against the weaponization of space, saying, "The international community should take effective preventive measures to negotiate and conclude relevant international legal instruments to prohibit deployment of weapons in outer space." In May 2005, China’s foreign ministry spokesman Kong Quan told an audience, "Space is our shared treasure which should be used for the benefit of all mankind."

But even as Beijing has called for the de-militarization of space, its defense community has continually included national security as one of the purposes served by its expanding space program. The country’s latest defense paper sets ambitious goals for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and focuses on the need for "technological modernization."

The U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report on the "Military Power of the People’s Republic of China" released in 2005 recognized China’s militaristic space policy, noting, "China will eventually deploy advanced imagery, reconnaissance, and Earth resource systems with military applications." The report went on to say, "China is working on, and plans to field, anti-satellite systems, including conducting research to develop ground-based laser anti-satellite weapons."

As recently as November, an independent panel, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, encouraged the Bush administration to initiate discussions with Beijing designed to curtail space militarization. This, only two months after reports surfaced in September of laser attacks by China against U.S. intelligence gathering satellites. Other intelligence reports claimed that the U.S. had detected "mini-Chinese satellites" placed in orbit near U.S. military communications and imaging satellites.

In response to China’s latest ASAT weapons test, the Bush administration announced this month that it had suspended plans to develop space ventures with China. NASA spokesman Jason Sharp, said, "We believe China’s development and testing of such [ASAT] weapons is inconsistent with the constructive relationship that our presidents [Bush and Hu] have outlined, including civil space cooperation." In the past, Washington has avoided sharing certain technical knowledge with Beijing and has objected to China’s growing role in the International Space Station (ISS), due to concerns that the communist regime would use the information to bolster its long-range ballistic missile forces.

Prior to China’s laser and ASAT weapons tests, the Bush administration was preparing to introduce revisions to the existing National Space Policy to address increasing threats to the country’s critical satellite system. According to Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. State Department, the new policy which was released in the fall, will, "Ensure that our space capabilities are protected in a time of increasing challenges and threats, due to the vital part they play in our national security and to our economic well-being."

Some experts have speculated that Chinese President Hu Jintao and his advisors did not fully understand the repercussions of their ASAT weapons test. "The decision process is still so opaque that maybe they didn’t know who to talk to. Maybe there was a disconnect between the engineers and policy makers," noted Geoffrey Forden, an arms expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. But others disagree, noting Beijing was well aware of the dangers, but decided to ignore them instead. "The Chinese are telling the Pentagon that they don’t own space. We can play this game too, and we can play it dirtier than you," noted Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center.

Beijing plans to make the game even "dirtier" in the future. The country’s leadership has announced that approximately 30 satellites will be launched in the coming years – 10 in 2007 alone – to create a Chinese Global Positioning System (GPS) called the Compass Navigation System. Since its inception, the system has been shrouded in secrecy. The new system, which will become fully operational next year for much of China, is expected to use the same radio frequency as Europe’s Galileo system and the U.S. GPS, making Western attempts to jam communications much more difficult. Ultimately, the Compass Navigation System could be used worldwide to provide precise positioning data for the Chinese military similar to information already produced by the U.S. GPS for military field commanders.

China’s recent provocative activities will likely spur debate about putting U.S. interceptor missiles in space, the head of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency, Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, said earlier this month. "We think it’s prudent, especially in light of the Chinese anti-satellite activities, to start that debate right now," he said. Obering went on to say that the U.S. would be investing in a "good experimental foundation" that would add to the country’s existing sea and ground-based missile defenses.

President Bush’s fiscal 2008 budget seeks an additional $10 million, slashed from an original $45 million, for studies on what could be the first space-based interceptor missiles, taking an important step toward making former President Ronald Reagan’s "Strategic Defense Initiative" or "Star Wars" a reality. Overall, President Bush has asked Congress for $8.9 billion in fiscal 2008 for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, down $500 million from last year, the likely result of budgetary constraints associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the cost of its own military modernization program.

Evaluating America’s recent conflict in Iraq, China’s communist leadership believes that a weaker military can defeat a superior force by attacking its space-based communications and surveillance systems, using powerful "lightning strikes" as a prerequisite for victory. A January 22, 2007 New York Times article noted that China has "extensively studied how the U.S. has used satellite imagery in the Persian Gulf War, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in tracking North Korea’s nuclear program."

Not since the October 4, 1957 launch of Russia’s Sputnik has the U.S. felt as threatened by another country’s space activities. At that time, America answered the challenge, developing the greatest space program on Earth. Now, China has thrown down the gauntlet. With advances in other areas such as submarine, aircraft and warship design, China has improved its extra-regional capabilities allowing it to extend its influence beyond the Taiwan Strait. Adding a space-based military capability will only make the country more dangerous to potential future adversaries such as the U.S.  

There is a storm gathering on the horizon. Russia admitted last year it had developed a revolutionary new missile that could evade any existing U.S. missile defense system. This month, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has threatened to strike the U.S. and its global interests with ballistic missiles. North Korea continues to sell sophisticated missile technology to the highest bidder and has its own domestic ballistic missile program. This week, India announced it will soon fire a new missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads across much of Asia and the Middle East.

America’s enemies, as well as some of its perceived allies, are positioning themselves to attack the country’s Achilles heel – its reliance on space-based systems. Successful asymmetrical warfare, not necessarily a frontal confrontation on the battlefield, will be the immediate goal of America’s growing list of enemies. However, as the U.S. becomes weakened by well-coordinated, intense and frequent attacks on its satellite and computer infrastructure, the likelihood of a direct military confrontation with one or more of our enemies will grow.

Nuclear nonsense in North Korea








By getting back on the nuclear merry-go-round with North Korea, the U.S. has given Kim Jong-Il plenty to smile about.


By Bryan Hill


For six years, the Bush Administration took a firm stance on North Korea and its nuclear program.   It resisted being drawn in to the endless rounds of bait and switch by which Pyongyang had ensnared the previous administration.   It even labeled the North as a player in the tripartite “Axis of Evil.”


And, after Kim Jong-Il’s October explosion of a nuclear device, the President threatened “serious repercussions” for Kim and stated that such provocation “would not be tolerated.”


Last week, that all changed.   The Bush Administration stunningly reversed its earlier policy and inked a deal that will give the North $400 million dollars in aid including contingent promises for 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil.   The U.S. also pledged to end its sanctions on Banco Delta Asia, which was found to be laundering $100 “supernotes” to help finance Kim’s tottering tyranny.


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In return, the North has agreed to suspend enrichment within 60 days, allow for an as-yet unspecified program of inspections, and to make provisions for future “discussions” about the state of its nuclear program.   Alarmingly, the accord does not even specifically address Pyongyang’s uranium-based weapons program which is at the root of the current contretemps.


This hardly seems like a fair deal.


It’s Been Tried Before


As John Podhoretz points out in the New York Post, this new agreement is but the latest in a long line of settlements that have purported to “solve” the North Korean problem, but have brought only failure.   Podhoretz details two telling examples:



  • In 1985, the Soviet Union offered Kim Il-Sung a civilian nuclear reactor if he would but obey the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.   Kim accepted the reactor, and then thumbed his nose at both the treaty requirements and the leaders in Moscow.



  • Undaunted by Soviet failures, in 1994 the Clinton Administration upped the ante and offered Pyongyang not one, but two reactors in return for pledges of good behavior.   Kim signaled his thanks by test-firing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in 1998.

This admittedly brief history should be discouraging those who believe that last week’s deal is, to quote Secretary Rice, “the first quarter” of a game that will bring about the denuclearization of North Korea.  


The Ripples of Failure


The ramifications of this deal extend beyond the state of the North’s nuclear reactors.  By signing with Pyongyang, The Bush Administration has negotiated away its leverage over Kim’s regime.  What’s more, it has weakened the foundations of its strategic posture in the Pacific:



  • This new deal undermines Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who seeks to revitalize Japan’s defense establishment to hedge against both North Korea and China.   American acceptance of putative North Korean disarmament will likely spur leftist Japanese politicians to call for a cessation of the Abe’s rearmament plan.



  • In South Korea, President Roh Myu-hoon and his leftist Uri Party seemed to be heading toward electoral defeat. The nuclear deal serves to put wind into Roh’s flagging sails and makes it more likely that South Korea will continue to draw closer to both China and North Korea.



  • The Chinese have reaped a diplomatic bonanza from this new deal, which was negotiated in Beijing under the auspices of the Six-Party Talks.   Last week’s agreement has absolved them of responsibility for their facilitation of the North’s intransigence, and strengthens their position in any future crises in Northeast Asia.

The Administration’s new policy stance also serves to further acclimatize U.S. citizens to this sort of strategic frivolity, and makes it that much hard for future administrations to right the ship and set America on an effective policy path.


“Madman” Kim Playing Us for Fools


For years, Kim has labored to convince the West that he is an irrational maniac, a man with whom one ought not to trifle.  In doing creating this image of unpredictability, he inculcates in us a fear of provoking him, which in turn leads us to make concession after concession in the vain hope of appeasing the unappeasable.  


In reality, Kim is a cold, ruthless political strategist, cut from the mold of Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin.   His bluster and bombast are part of a grand extortion racket, and we fall for it every time.   Indeed, we can expect him obfuscate and dissimulate about his nuclear program, delaying and diverting inspectors while he uses his new-found financial resources to shore up his rule and prepare for yet another episode of nuclear blackmail.


There is, to be sure, no easy fix to the North Korean nuclear conundrum.   If it is unwilling to take the risky step of collapsing Kim’s government, the Bush Administration would have been well advised to maintain its policy of multilateral pressure on the North, coupled with a campaign to spotlight the destabilizing effects of China’s support for Kim.


Unfortunately, the President’s team has committed America to walk the well-trodden path of rash Clintonian conciliation.   As a result, Kim’s regime has a fresh transfusion of vital cash and resources, and we have only the promises of a lying regime to show for it.

The nexus of evil

By Robert T. McLean

Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, many remain surprised that a coalition of states has not formed to balance the power of the United States.  Authors such as Randall L. Schweller of Ohio State University continue to offer theories towards explaining the supposed state of affairs and attribute much of the unbalance to domestic political factors that discourage the necessary efforts to ultimately challenge American primacy.  But the last decade has witnessed something quite different as two powerful states have emerged to present the first post-Cold War challenge to a United States centered unipolar world.

Both Russia and China have exceedingly different foreign policy aims than the United States, and domestic complexities inevitably have distanced Moscow and Beijing from Washington on a series of pressing international matters.  The common aspiration to produce a multipolar world has driven Russia and China to effectively align against the United States incorporating a skilled approach of realpolitik that often results in support for actors that undermine the global security environment.  

One must look no further than the present crisis with Iran to come to terms with the fact that Moscow and Beijing have been rather unhelpful in pressuring the world’s most nefarious regimes to behave in a more responsible manner.  The unwillingness to apply sanctions or even mention the use of force only emboldens Tehran, giving the impression that serious negotiations are unnecessary because serious consequences will likely be avoided.  Likewise, North Korea’s nuclear threats may have never materialized had the Russians and, to a greater extent, the Chinese not provided economic aid and diplomatic protection to this communist holdover.  Unfortunately, the contemporary struggles in reaching a consensus on Iran and North Korea are neither new nor unusual.  In fact, from the time of its inception, the Sino-Russian alliance has been the facilitator of not only rogue regimes, but also the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations.

The Origins of the Nexus

In 1996 Russia saw a fundamental shift in its foreign policy.  Yevgeny Primakov assumed the reign of the Foreign Ministry, and Boris Yeltsin wrestled with a Russian Federation weakened by the war in Chechnya.  Apprehensions over territorial integrity and the eastward march of NATO provided an impetus for the Kremlin to refocus its energies on promoting its national interests in more assertive tones.   

At the same time Beijing was experiencing a heightening of tensions in the Taiwan Strait resulting in President Clinton’s eventual deployment of two carrier battle groups in an effort to clearly warn the mainland against any escalation of military provocations toward Taipei.  Having observed the advances of the United States in missile technology during the Gulf War, the Chinese were also becoming desperate to obtain the advanced weapons and technology needed to modernize their military forces.  

While Russia resumed selling arms to China in 1990 as a product of improved relations derived from an altered Soviet foreign policy towards the end of the Cold War, it was not until 1996 that mutual suspicions began to seriously thaw.   This was essentially reflected in the transfers of Russian arms and technology to China.  According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), in the seven years from 1990 through 1996 Moscow exported $3.8 billion in arms to Beijing, with $2.5 billion of that occurring in 1996 alone.  This trend has largely continued as China currently accounts for about forty-five percent of Russian arms sales.  

The event that likely contributed more than any other to the strengthening of ties between Russia and China, however, was the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.  Moscow and Beijing maintained a position that is rather consistent with how they have approached recent international exigencies.  An emphasis on diplomacy and consensus was the order of the day, and any action taken without a UN Security Council resolution was deemed illegal.  However, such denunciations of the use of force appear rather hollow when analyzing the rapid deployment of Russian forces to Chechnya just several months later.    

Yet the motivations for the Russians and Chinese were palpable.  Besides Moscow’s close relations with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, both the Kremlin and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) feared ethnic separatist movements in their own respective countries and neither had the desire to set a precedent for uninvited foreign intervention.  The rapid escalation of ethnic conflict and the subsequent intervention by foreign powers provided a paradigmatic illustration of the fate that could fall on their own respective countries should such a likely scenario emerge.

If not the decisive turning point, it is clear that Kosovo represented a catalyst for pushing the leaders in Beijing and Moscow toward the conclusion that mutual cooperation to counter the West would be needed in the future.  Dr. Sergei Troush, a NATO Democratic Institute Fellow, stated at the time: "If earlier, foreign policy elites in both Russia and China had serious reservations to the thesis of ‘strategic partnership’ and different understanding of this partnership, now, the necessity to develop such partnership for countering ‘hegemonism’ and ‘military dictate’ of NATO outweighs all other arguments." Thus, the alliance was solidified, as was the policy of ending the American-led international order.  

This is a point that has largely been missed by both security policy practitioners and their observers in the media and academia.  Whereas a resurgence of proclamations reminiscent of those following the collapse of the Soviet Union labeling the United States an unchallenged superpower of the sheer dominance not seen since the Roman Empire occurred after September 11, 2001, it has become increasingly popular in the last several years to declare that America’s reign as the leader of a unipolar world will inevitably come to an end in the not-too-distant future.  

In fact, Coral Bell, a widely respected authority on power politics in the international arena, made the case in the Winter 2006 issue of The American Interest that we have indeed reached the "twilight of the unipolar world."   However, while Bell accurately stated that a foreign policy based on balance of power is both dangerous and likely to produce informal alliances against the United States, while acknowledging that such a scenario "would be the worst possible outcome for Washington’s diplomacy," she – reminiscent of countless other analysts – fails to recognize that this is precisely what has been taking place for the last several years.  This, along with the prevalence of colliding national interests, has inevitably provided the basis for the diplomatic difficulties experienced by both the Clinton and Bush Administrations when dealing with Moscow and Beijing.  

Guardians of the Rogues

Perhaps the most recognized element of Russia and China’s disturbing behavior has been their support for rogue regimes.  However, most references of the inability to get the Russians and the Chinese to side with the United States in the Security Council fail to include the dynamics behind the deadlock.  Rarely are the motivations of Beijing and Moscow articulated, and even less frequent have been any offerings of the dramatic impact that these nations’ policies have on the world. 

While the vast majority of publicized differences between the permanent members of the West and our eastern counterparts in Security Council relate to the weapons programs of both Iran and North Korea, the problem runs much deeper than that.   In an extensive list of rogue regimes that either or both Russia and China support it is apparent that many of these would certainly have their days numbered without the political and economic support of Moscow and Beijing.  The unfortunate fact is that these two powers have used their vast resources to sustain some of the world’s worst regimes in an effort to both serve their interests and to ensure that the United States is undermined wherever possible.  The scope of these relationships is far too vast to copiously encompass in this essay; nevertheless, it is worth examining just a few of the more noteworthy examples.

In Latin America Hugo Chavez has used his oil wealth and anti-American rhetoric to establish rather concrete partnerships with Russia and China.  Besides for an arms supplier in Russia and an alternative energy market to the "American fascists" provided by China, Chavez’s anti-American positions and anti-imperialist rhetoric made him the favorite in both Beijing and Moscow to a assume Latin America’s de facto designated seat on the UN Security Council.  The well documented sale of Russian arms to Caracas and Chinese investment in Venezuela’s hydrocarbon infrastructure only partially explain the motivations behind Moscow and Beijing’s expanding ties with Hugo Chavez’s regime.  

Commenting on the PRC’s view of its involvement in the Western Hemisphere, Chinese senior legislator Cheng Siwei told Xinhua in early October: "All being developing countries, China shares many common ground with Latin American countries."  He then clarified with a rather palpable reference to the United States: "We have all experienced the fight against imperialism and colonialism and the struggle for independence. All of these have forged the political basis for bilateral cooperation."  Just months prior, while referring to Chavez’s late July visit to Russia, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Kamynin expressed similar sentiments emanating from the Kremlin as he told the Moscow-based news agency Interfax that the "two countries’ positions on most international issues are similar or identical."  Considering the exhaustive list of outrageous public pronouncements by the Venezuelan leader, such a claim by a Russian spokesperson should be ample evidence that Moscow shares few of the same interests as the United States and envisions a quite different international order.

Beyond North Korea in Asia, the dictatorships in Burma and Uzbekistan have maintained their firm grip on power as a result of powerful relationships with both Beijing and Moscow.  After Uzbek President Islam Karimov had demonstrators massacred in Andijon in May 2005, the United States decisively responded and condemned the government’s actions.  This turn of events presented Russia and China with the opportunity to consolidate their relations with Karimov and have United States forces expelled from Uzbekistan.  However, the human rights situation in Burma is far more severe, and Washington has had sanctions on the military junta for the most of nineteen years to virtually no avail.  On January 12, the United States and its allies were finally able to put the issue to a vote at the UN Security Council. The failed draft resolution called for the Burmese regime to restore fundamental freedoms and engage in political reforms.  It is of little surprise, however, that it was both Russia and China that joined to veto the resolution.  

In Africa, the regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe continue to receive political, economic, and military support from Beijing and Moscow.  The sense of vulnerability without Russian and Chinese support was illustrated when Zimbabwe’s president Robert Mugabe thanked the two countries in last year’s Heroes’ Day ceremony "for standing by us in the Security Council and fending off the threats from the West."  China, likewise, currently maintains that no United Nations peacekeeping forces should enter Sudan until the genocidal regime extends an invitation. Meanwhile, Mugabe continues to be propped up by Beijing’s financial assistance despite a disastrous economic policy that has resulted in the confiscation of land from both the country’s poor urban and white farming communities, thus resulting in inflation rates soaring above 1,000 percent.  

In Sudan hundreds of thousands are raped, murdered, and forced from their villages as the West’s efforts to improve the situation are undermined by unconditional support for the regime in Khartoum from Beijing and Moscow.  While Russia has refused to abandon its aid to the Sudanese military, China continually matches this effort with political and diplomatic endeavors of its own.  In fact, just as outgoing UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for a hearing on the human rights abuses in Darfur in late November, the PRC had officials stationed in Khartoum for a meeting of the Sino-Arab Friendship Association celebrating the shared policy of "no interfering in internal affairs of other countries."  

Further north, despite the political assassinations in Lebanon likely conceived in Damascus, the Kremlin has maintained its traditionally strong relations with Syria and continues to provide them with various weapons systems and their components.  The sale of advanced SA-18 surface-to-air missiles in late 2005 is just one example.  Similarly, prior to Libya’s late 2003 disclosure and abandonment of its weapons of mass destruction programs, China and Russia fostered strong political and economic ties with the distinguished terror master Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.  As a consequence of its continued defiance of international norms, Libya fell under harsh penalties in the mid 1990’s with Congress and the Bush Administration deciding to renew the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act in the summer of 2001.  This drew sharp criticism from Russia, whose companies faced penalties for continued cooperation with Tehran and Tripoli.  A source in the Russian Foreign Ministry told Interfax at the time that Washington was "once again trying to give its internal legislation an extra-territorial character and put pressure on the other countries on an invented pretext."  The official also accurately claimed that these sanctions would not stop cooperation with either regime.  

Indeed, both Beijing and Moscow continue to maintain extensive economic ties with Iran.  Hard currency, natural resources, arms, and diplomatic support are the basis for this strategic triangle.  In 2005, Russia ran an approximate $1.8 billion trade surplus with Iran through the export of primarily arms, technology, heavy machinery, and steel.  While bilateral trade decreased in the first quarter of 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has gone on the record to state that any possible placement of sanctions on Iran will fail to dissuade Moscow from continuing its military cooperation with Tehran.

To provide a glimpse into the military assistance the Iranians are receiving from Moscow, it is worth offering just a few examples in this vast arena of advanced weapons that have been, and continue to be, transferred to the increasingly problematic regime in Tehran.  In November 2005, Russia agreed to sell Iran 29 Tor-M1 air defense systems capable of destroying both aircraft and cruise missiles.  These were only one part of a reported $1 billion package that also included MIG fighter jets and patrol boats.  Moscow has also recently engaged in negotiations with Tehran regarding the S-300PMU1 long range air defense systems, radar stations, and T-90S tanks.  The British defense journal Jane’s Intelligence Digest reported in the spring that the Russian sale of highly advanced S-300PS surface-to-air missiles to Belarus may windup being secretly transferred to Iran as part of a trilateral agreement between Moscow, Minsk, and Tehran.  

But what is it that drives Moscow and Beijing to provide such substantial assistance to regimes such as that in the Islamic Republic of Iran?  The CCP Central Committee in a subsidiary publication of the People’s Daily published an article on in late August that makes all too clear the position held in Beijing on a series of international issues.  The newspaper, Huanqiu Shibao, has strong ties to the Chinese military, and lucidly makes the case that the United States is on the decline.  Commenting on the current difficulties with Iran, the publication celebrates that "Iran has seen through the US strategic situation and her pragmatic nature of ‘bullying the weak’ and ‘fearing the strong."  Such conclusions by Beijing are not only worrisome because they demonstrate a sense of solidarity with Tehran, but they also could be dangerous for the fact that a display of impotence with Iran on Washington’s part could well lead the PRC to the conclusion that the United States may be little more than a paper tiger.  

Again, it is worth emphasizing that the Russians and Chinese are not driven purely by national interests irrespective of the United States.  In fact, as was noted above, the interests of the nexus not only happen to differ from those of the United States on myriad international issues, but those interests are often centered upon the goal of weakening the United States’ relative power.  The bipartisan U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission presented similar conclusions in November with the release of its annual report to congress when it noted the following:

China’s regional activities in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East and around East Asia are beginning to assume the character of a counterbalancing strategy vis-à-vis the United States.  That is, China’s support for rogue regimes and anti-American governments and groups in vital regions serves an international purpose: to balance American power, create an alternative model of governance, and frustrate the ability of the international community to uphold its norms.

What the report fails to mention, however, is that Beijing’s regional initiatives are all the more potent and ominous with Moscow acting as co-chair of this global enterprise.  This has not only been demonstrated in both bilateral and trilateral relationships, but also in well established multilateral institutions.  The Russian and Chinese led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the most alarming example of these as this expanding alliance has both in its stated objectives and in practice demonstrated its desire to create a new world order based on multipolarity.  While one of the stated central objectives of the SCO is to counter regional terrorism, Iran has not only become an observer nation in the organization, but the alliance is contemplating offering Tehran full-member status despite its widely held reputation as the world’s leading state sponsor of terror.  The contradictory nature of Iran’s association with the SCO is just one of the many illustrations of Russian and Chinese complicity with both rogue regimes, and even more critically, terrorists and their supporters.

Terrorism and Realpolitik

The basic presumption for most in the West is that while Beijing and Moscow may not be the most helpful partners, they at least share the common goal with the United States of eradicating terrorism.  Sadly, this is not true.

Hamas, Hezbollah, and even al Qaeda have benefited from actions out of the Kremlin and the Chinese security establishment.  It is no secret that Yaser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization were heavily supported by the Soviet Union in the seventies and eighties, and Moscow’s healthy relationship with Palestinian leadership is one of the many elements that survived the death of the Soviet Union.  The Kremlin’s rapid recognition of the Hamas dominated government in the Palestinian territories drew sharp criticism in various circles in the West, but it was the diplomatic support of Hezbollah in its recent standoff with Israel that all too clearly demonstrated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to work with terrorists if it improves Russia’s position in the Middle East and helps undermine the United States and its allies.

In fact, Hezbollah’s use of the Russian made Kornet-E anti-tank laser-guided missiles against Israeli forces in Lebanon displays that Moscow’s promiscuity in its arms export’s to rogue regimes has a direct impact on the forces terrorist organizations can employ.  Russia is know to have sold Syria these weapons and claimed to be shocked when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) provided substantial evidence that Hezbollah used them in the July and August fighting in Southern Lebanon.  As noted above, Moscow also provides Tehran with advanced weapons despite the fact that Iran is a major supporter of Hezbollah.  The Russian foreign ministry has defended such weapons sales by stating: "Russia always limits its exports to Iran to arms used only for defense and [they are] not capable of destabilizing the situation in the region."  As we have seen, this explanation is rather unconvincing as many of these rogue states simply act as intermediaries in forwarding those weapons to third parties, not excluding terrorist organizations.  

Regrettably, Beijing has been an even greater enabler of terrorism than Moscow.   This was most clearly established after the United States fired cruise missiles into Afghanistan and Sudan following the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.  A significant number of the missiles that landed in Afghanistan never exploded and Osama bin Laden and his cohorts were left with valuable technology that they had little capability of capitalizing on themselves.   Fortunately for al Qaeda, a buyer quickly emerged.   

Although Beijing denies the claims, European intelligence sources believe that the Chinese purchased several Tomahawk missiles from bin Laden to reverse engineer soon after the unexploded missiles landed in Afghanistan.  Both the Washington Post and The Guardian reported in October 2001 that Italian counter-terrorism officers essentially confirmed earlier reports through the bugging of an apartment of a local al Qaeda cell.  The papers obtained a transcript of the secretly recorded conversation in which the al Qaeda operative revealed that several "Chinese businessmen" paid as much as $10 million for the missiles.  

While the CIA has revealed little publicly on this matter, after the stories broke in the fall of 2001 a spokesman for the agency admitted that unsubstantiated evidence about this transaction had circulated since 1998, but it was unlikely that bin Laden received $10 million.  This explanation is far from comforting.  Beijing’s desire to obtain state-of-the-art missile technology coupled with their support of the Taliban at the United Nations – on December 19, 2000, China elected to abstain from UNSC Resolution 1333 which called on states to end their assistance to the Taliban – provide a solid foundation for the plausibility that the intelligence was accurate.  If indeed true, such a wanton act of providing Osama bin Laden with millions of dollars to further fund his terror campaign certainly needs to be addressed more thoroughly when examining who are Washington’s real partners in the War on Terror.   Considering the 9/11 Commission Report’s assessment that the operations that led to that fateful day cost about $400,000 to $500,000, it is not inconceivable that some of the money that may have been provided by Beijing could well have later helped finance the planning and execution of al Qaeda operations since 1998.  

It is also worth bearing in mind that bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other wanted terrorists are believed to be hiding in northwest Pakistan.  While the regime of Pervez Musharraf has consistently refused to permit American military operations in the region or take strong actions themselves, it is also true that the Chinese have more influence than anyone in Islamabad.  Were Beijing to apply pressure on Musharraf to cooperate to a greater degree with the United States and join Washington in its criticisms of the placating peace treaty with the Taliban in Waziristan, the Pakistani leader might become a little more accommodating to plans to capture or kill bin Laden and his associates rather than claiming that such wanted terrorists persist in hiding out in Afghanistan.  It is more likely, in fact, that Beijing has been obstructive in this regard as they neither want a United States military presence in neighboring Pakistan, nor do they want offensive operations in Waziristan to lead toward instability throughout the country.  As long as Beijing can keep its approximate ten million Muslims in Xinjiang relatively isolated from extremist groups – as is the case with Moscow, the fear of ethnic separatism remains prevalent – the Chinese will have little concern with appeasing America’s enemies in Pakistan.  

While the United States is winning the War on Terror, things could be going considerably more smoothly had Russia and China truly been on our side.  Weapons, foreign terrorists, and Iranian agents have obstructed coalition efforts in Iraq – an integral part of the War on Terror – facilitated by Moscow and Beijing’s continued support of Tehran and Damascus.  

Neither Russia nor China desires to see a United States defeat in Iraq and for that country to descend into chaos and civil war.  Such a scenario would destabilize the entire region and provide a launching ground for future terrorist attacks throughout the region and the world.  However, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao are cautiously satisfied as the United States has been drawn into a counterinsurgency that challenges the vary foundations of an internationally assertive United States, let alone one that seeks to transform the Middle East through the promotion of democracy.  As Fyodor Lukyanov stated in The Moscow Times in mid-September, "Moscow bases its modus operandi exclusively on national interests and a balance of power more appropriate to the classical geopolitics of the 19th century," and thus, "[h]umanitarian and ideological motivations behind the actions of others are interpreted as an attempt to conceal the genuine intent."  This is as true in Iraq as it is in Russia’s near-abroad.  Whether Beijing’s suspicions are as real as Moscow’s in this regard is somewhat hard to determine, but the CCP’s one-party rule inevitably puts it at odds with a Washington that supports human freedom and democracy.

IT HAS NOW BECOME UNMISTAKABLE that from the last dictatorship in Europe to the first major foreign attacks on the continental United States since the War of 1812, both rogue regimes and terrorist entities have witnessed the benefits of a Sino-Russian effort to create a multipolar world.  While Moscow and Beijing rarely actively encourage rogue states and their terrorist counterparts to initiate regional or global confrontations, their failure to join responsible nations in efforts to confront and curb dangerous behavior provides encouragement enough.  When measured by historical standards, Russia, and even China, fall nowhere near the level of others that could truly be classifieds as evil states.  Thus, it would certainly be inappropriate to label them as such.  Yet, it must be kept in mind that every regime that has earned itself that distinction has the support of at least one, if not both, of the members of the nexus.  

The aforementioned August commentary published by the CCP Central Committee eerily warned when referring to a perceived relative deterioration of American power: "The mantis stalks the cicada, unaware of the oriole behind.   And the hunter is even targeting the oriole.  A new ‘hunter’ has shown up."  Regrettably, a majority of those in the West remain unaware of the predators that seek to destroy the current American-led international order.  The United States will not hypothetically be faced with competition for primacy at some uncertain time in the future; rather, it is being challenged at the current moment led by both Russia and China.  As long as this remains the case, Washington will continue to experience immeasurable difficulties in implementing a largely successful foreign policy.  The first step in meeting these challenges will be realizing that other major powers often have conflicting interests with the United States and some, regrettably, actively labor towards assisting its decline.  Democrats by and large fail to recognize that foreign policy difficulties reach beyond the current White House, while the Bush Administration, for its part, has failed to formulate creative policies for dealing with these complex dynamics.  It is in America’s interests that both parties come to fully understand that this nexus knows few limitations in the means in which they will employ to advance their interests and recreate a multipolar world.  

This essay by CSP Research Associate Robert T. McLean appeared on January 31, 2007 in Global Politician.

Why North Korea’s nukes?

The ongoing nuclear goings-on in North Korean have been greeted with a mixture of incredulity, outrage, confusion, and even downright panic. Despite such widely variant reactions, it is a commonplace that the Pyongyang’s nuclear program is aimed squarely at the United States and its allies.   This is undoubtedly true.  Pyongyang certainly seeks by its threats to engender a fresh round of concessions, such as occurred in 1998.   However, this is not the full story – there is a rather more unusual answer to be had if one commits oneself to fully answering the question: Why?

The solution to this most important of queries is found when one considers the nature of Kim Jong-Il’s regime.  Kim is a communist dictator of a particularly odious stripe – he is the political first cousin of tyrants like Lenin, Stalin and Mao.  Illegitimate, Marxist-Leninist governments like Kim’s are extremely fragile, and they signal their awareness of this fact by the manner in which they ruthlessly quash all domestic dissent.   This preoccupation with internal security also extends to foreign affairs.  "Counterintelligence states" states like North Korea make it a matter of first resort to eliminate or mitigate any foreign threats to their continued rule.  Day after day, Pyongyang’s propaganda apparatus avers that the greatest such threat to the Kim Dynasty is the U.S., the hulking capitalist power that is "the enemy of the North Korean people."

Such an assertion does not stand up to logic for two critical reasons.  First, distance and force structures inhibit the U.S. from making any immediate moves against Kim’s regime.  While we could undoubtedly do great damage to the North through air strikes, this author doubts whether our South Korean garrisons are powerful enough to overrun and occupy the North, no matter what Kim says.  A second reason is political will.  The brand-new 109th Congress is in no mood to support further military endeavors anywhere in the world, and will likely work to undercut any aggressive administration moves.  Thus lacking both the way and the will to wage the war that Kim Jong-Il allegedly fears, is seems highly unlikely that this country poses a proximate mortal threat to North Korea.

There is, however, a country that surely has Kim shaking in his shoes.  It shares a long border with the North; it has hundreds of thousands of troops readily available, and it is the only country that possesses economic leverage over Pyongyang.  This country is the People’s Republic of China.

The evidence for this assertion speaks for itself:

  • For several years, the PRC has had at least 130,000 soldiers on its 300-mile North Korean border. The stated purpose of these troops is to stem the flow of refugees, but their underlying purpose is undoubtedly to remind Kim that he rules only with the good graces of China’s leaders.    
  • Beijing supplies Pyongyang with more than 90% of its oil – about 12,300 barrels a day.  Shipped alongside the fuel is a substantial quantity of food, necessary to help keep the North Korean starvation economy from imploding. Also, several news sources have recently noted that the PRC has purchased controlling stakes in much of the North’s mining industry, which is crucial to the North’s access to foreign exchange.    
  • Chinese banks in Macau facilitate Kim’s illicit engagement in forging U.S. banknotes, which in turn affords the latter the income he needs to purchase both weapons technology and the luxury goods needed to placate restive officials.  

By these measures, Kim Jong-Il depends heavily upon China for his continuance as the North’s tyrant.   Put differently, the PRC has massive leverage on Kim and thus poses a grave threat to his rule, and possibly even his life.  His nuclear capabilities can thus be viewed mainly as an effort to ensure his sovereignty and to level the political playing field across the Yalu River, and only secondarily as an effort to intimidate the U.S.  For Kim, possession of such weapons diminishes the power Beijing has over his regime.  If for example, in a secret meeting between the two Communist governments, the Chinese threaten, as they reportedly have done, to withhold the vital aid as a form of punishment or compellance, the North can respond by menacing the PRC with the possibility of a nuclear attack upon China’s Manchurian industrial base, or even Beijing.   Such a threat, if believed, would work to bind China irrevocably to its North Korean brethren.

The supreme in Beijing, Hu Jintao, is aware of the danger Kim poses to China.  His continued support for the North then, is not a reflection of a close fraternal bond between Communists.  More likely is the fact that the PLA Political Department bears most of the responsibility for relations between Beijing and Pyongyang, and feels that the risks involved for themselves are outweighed the benefits they derive from Kim’s continued existence as a thorn in the side of the American adversary.  That, or they are arrogant enough to think that they have Kim under their thumb.

However, cognizant that this situation could become untenable, some leaders in Beijing have been doing worst-case-scenario planning on how best to deal with the North.   After Kim’s July 4th missile launch, Chinese leader Hu instructed his government’s leading foreign policy-making body, the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, to begin formulating a strategy to minimize the deleterious effects that a North Korean collapse might have upon China.  Also, recent Sino-Russian military exercises have, in obvious reference to Kim, focused on the elimination of "extremism" and "common threats."  Indeed, several American analysts have commented that the exercises seemed to be a rehearsal for a possible joint incursion into the Korean peninsula.  

From this tenuous geostrategic position, China has played a subtle hand.  First, it has allowed the North’s propaganda to distract world attention from the realities detailed above, focusing it instead on Washington’s supposedly "hostile" behavior.  Second, while claiming that relations between the two countries are closer than "lips and teeth," China has simultaneously and mendaciously denied that it can do anything about Kim.  The PRC has thus been able to draw the U.S. into yet another round of fruitless six-way talks, which only serve to (a) increase Beijing’s diplomatic clout, (b) give the North more time for weapons development, and (c) cause Washington to expend time and energy on what, given China’ steadfast non-cooperation, is surely a worthless endeavor.

Navigating the geopolitical minefield in Northeast Asia is undoubtedly a tricky task. However, leaders in Washington can draw comfort in the fact that the two communist regimes are, despite pretenses, fully aware of the grave threat each poses to the other.  Our best policy option is to continue erecting the Theater Missile Defense system in the region, for it is only this capability that protects us and our allies for the two communist states.  We should also work to bat down the fusillades of lies that emerge daily in the form of Chinese and North Korean propaganda.  The Japanese, justifiably alarmed by recent events, would no doubt be of great service in a campaign of truth-telling.  By so doing, this country can work to shift the international debate on North Korea onto terms less favorable to China, and maybe, just maybe, force Beijing into a little bit of accountability.

Divest North Korea

Decision Brief                            No. 06-D 54                                          2006-10-23


(Washington, D.C.): North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il has reportedly told Chinese interlocutors that he is “sorry” about testing a nuclear weapon and that he is willing to resume his country’s participation in the so-called Six-Party Talks. It is predictable that diplomats in this country and elsewhere will seek to parlay this “breakthrough” into new negotiations. If past practice is any guide, however, these talks will translate into additional strategic, financial and political concessions for the North, even as it continues to build its nuclear weapon stockpile and perfect its long-range ballistic missile programs – the very actions such concessions are meant to foreclose.


Rather than fall for this gambit yet again, the United States needs to adopt a wholly different strategy – one that is aimed at bringing down Kim’s regime, not propping it up . Only by so doing, is there a chance of avoiding the cataclysm that will result as the despot of Pyongyang aggressively brandishes, and perhaps uses, his weapons of mass destruction and/or makes them available to willing buyers.


Two Hurdles


To be sure, there are two major impediments to such a U.S. policy. The first is Communist China ‘s determination to perpetuate this danger, rather than reverse it . It should be clear by now that Beijing will not be a helpmate to the cause of freedom, no matter how often Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and others contend it is.


The second – and possibly more tractable – one is posed by our nominal ally, South Korea . Seoul is guided by its left-wing, appeasement-minded president, Roh Moo Hyun, and the vested interests of roughly ten publicly traded South Korean firms led by Hyundai. The latter are determined to extend the misery Kim has inflicted on his people by simultaneously exploiting them for what amounts to slave labor, while enriching the North Korean despot. This is the effect of a variety of the North’s “Social Overhead Capital” (SOC) projects underwritten by the South.


The leading edge of these projects is an industrial park at Kaesong and a major tourist resort at Mt. Kumgang . Editorializing on the odious nature of these ventures last Thursday, the Wall Street Journal observed:


“The Kaesong industrial park and Mt. Kumgang resort are the centerpieces of the South’s misbegotten ‘Sunshine Policy’ of engagement with the North. They are also money machines for Kim Jong-Il, contributing to the record $1 billion North-South trade last year….Now that U.S.-led financial sanctions have reduced the North’s cash-flow from counterfeiting and drug-smuggling, money from the two sites is even more critical to the survival of Kim’s regime.”


Enter Hyundai


The Journal noted that the South Koreans responded to the unanimous UN Security Council resolution imposing additional sanctions on North Korea by immediately announcing that the two sites would be exempt from their strictures.


The reason is not hard to fathom: According to a website maintained by one of Hyundai’s subsidiaries [http://www.hyundai-asan.com], South Korea expects to invest nearly $15 billion in these SOC projects in the North, including: the construction of new power utilities ($2.3 billion); the development of telecommunications networks ($6 billion); the establishment and maintenance of railroads ($4.7 billion); supplying water to Mt. Kumgang ($770 million); and creation of a new dam on the Imjin River ($660 million). All other things being equal, the hope is to grow the number of North Korean laborers slaving away for roughly $1.10 per day from 8,200 to 730,000 by 2012.


Hyundai’s role in all of this is a central one. According to the Hyundai Asan website, in 2000 Hyundai obtained “exclusive business rights” for all such SOC projects. These rights are “for a period of 30 years” and extend to “the concrete development, construction, blue-print, maintenance and management regarding infrastructure projects and core industries projects and related trade and others that are being financed single-handedly by Hyundai in North Korean territory or financed by a third-party nation, group, specific fund or international organization.” (Emphasis added.)


This sweetheart deal was reaffirmed in March 2003. The North Korean news agency reported at that time that “all business rights regarding the Mt. Kumgang tourism business, Kaesong Industrial complex and other SOC projects have been handed over to Hyundai.”


The generous terms of this arrangement seem unlikely to have been a coincidence. In February 2003, the Washington Post reported that South Korean auditors had discovered that Hyundai Asan had arranged a $186 million loan from a government-owned bank in Seoul immediately before the “Sunshine Summit” in June 2000 – giving rise to the widespread belief that the money was used to lubricate that meeting and the very favorable deal Hyundai received shortly thereafter.


Rewarding Hyundai?


Astonishingly, even as Hyundai is working at cross-purposes with U.S. vital interests – including in Iran and Sudan , several of the company’s subsidiaries were as of 2005 suppliers to the Pentagon. Another DoD vendor is Samsung, which is also doing business with Kim Jong-Il. The Defense Department’s reliance on such double-dealing vendors should be ended at once and the extent of the practice with respect to other companies that partner with terrorist-sponsoring regimes should be the subject of urgent congressional hearings.


At the same time, American citizens should immediately review their portfolios, including their pension funds (both public ones such as the Federal Thrift Savings Plan and private ones like mutual funds). Hyundai, Samsung and others companies helping our enemies should be forced to chose: Do business with American investors or do business with our enemies.


The Bottom Line


The time has come to privatize management of the North Korean crisis. Rather than rely on the Communist Chinese – the putative “honest-broker” in the Six-Party Talks – or our deeply conflicted allies in South Korea voluntarily to bring an end to the danger we face from Pyongyang , we must call on the American people to create incentives for ending this danger by divesting North Korea.