Tag Archives: North Korea

Testing, testing

Decision Brief                             No. 06-D 51                               2006-10-03


(Washington, D.C.): In the wake of the panicky response to North Korea’s announcement today that it intended soon to conduct a nuclear test, it is worth pausing to consider fully the source and implications of Kim Jong-Il’s latest eruption – and the measures that must be adopted to protect the Nation from the likely consequences of his regime’s continued belligerence.


Pyongyang ‘s Posturing


It is certainly no secret that planning for this test has been in the works for some time. Taken together with Kim Jong Il’s history of aggressive behavior, these preparations suggest that today’s announcement is yet another in a line of North Korean shakedowns aimed at extracting from the West economic, political and strategic concessions needed to prop up Kim’s failing autocracy.


Unfortunately, official Washington seems to be buying in to this gambit yet again. Republican and Democratic politicians alike – with the notable exception of those such as members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence responsible for the release of a report today outlining the strategic threat posed by the regime – have joined the Bush Administration in issuing still further, unconvincing warnings to the effect that such a North Korean nuclear test posed an “unacceptable threat.” One NSC spokesman actually cautioned that such an event would “severely undermine” U.S. confidence in Kim’s commitment to a negotiated settlement.


Never mind that Kim Jong Il knows full well – as should any American diplomat, military officer or politician worth his salt – that there has long been no basis for confidence in the North Korean despot’s commitment to a negotiated settlement. Holding out the hope that Pyongyang can, with encouragement from the South Koreans and Communist Chinese, be bribed into cooperating is a snare and delusion.


Enabling Iran


Another upshot of the expected North Korean test is that it will likely prove a boon not just to Pyongyang ‘s nuclear program but to that of Islamofascist Iran . After all, cash-strapped North Korea has made no secret of its readiness to sell military hardware and know-how to willing buyers, giving rise to active technology-sharing and joint development projects with Iran , among others.


Given their history of collaboration, Tehran will likely have its own nuclear engineers and scientists on hand to witness North Korea ?s nuclear test – knowledge of which will immeasurably aid an already advanced Iranian weapons program. It may even be an Iranian-manufactured nuclear device that is to be tested. Either way, the prospect that the Islamic Republic of Iran will also benefit means that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will be one step closer to having the capability to act on his stated goals of wiping Israel off the map and bringing about “a world without America.”


Defending America


The good news is that President Bush has taken steps to end the insane policy of assured vulnerability that he inherited – one that would have left the United States absolutely incapable of preventing the sorts of nuclear attacks that Iran and North Korea will soon be able to deliver. During his time in office, the United States has moved steadily toward the deployment of a shield against ballistic missile attack. This latest North Korean provocation should cause critics of Mr. Bush’s missile defense initiatives to recognize that we must now as a matter of the utmost urgency develop and deploy missile defenses in the places where they can do the most good at the least cost – namely, at sea and in space.


The bad news is that the Bush Administration has thus far failed to take another step essential if America is to be able to counter the threats of aggression increasingly emanating from Pyongyang and Tehran: We have yet to address the block-obsolescence to which the U.S. nuclear arsenal is effectively condemned in the absence of our own program of periodic, safe underground nuclear testing.


It is now unmistakably clear. Our restraint since 1992 in conducting such tests has not prevented other nations from engaging in such experimentation. (In addition to the incipient North Korean test, one must add those conducted by Pakistan and India a few years back). We can no longer safely defer the tests required to ensure that our present, aging nuclear weapons will work when they are supposed to and are as safe as we can make them so that they won’t work when they are not supposed to.


No less importantly, we must also conduct tests necessary to ensure that we can hold at risk such targets as our nuclear-armed enemies hold dear. This will also require a resumption of underground testing in order to design new nuclear forces to meet current and future challenges.


The Bottom Line


America ‘s elected representatives must recognize that our past restraint and misplaced reliance on diplomacy has only enabled the nuclear ambitions of states such as North Korea and Iran . Rather than continuing down the path of accommodation and appeasement, the United States must now take steps to contain and eventually to bring down the despotic regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran that threaten their own people and ours.


 

Contain and Transcend: A Strategy for Regime Change in North Korea

By Eric Sayers

Since its creation in 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has simultaneously pursued a confrontational policy towards the international community and a repressive policy towards its own citizens. Internationally, the DPRK maintains a high-tension position. In the past this lead to adventurous foreign policy decisions, most notably the 1950 surprise attack against South Korea. More recently, the DPRK’s uncompromising pursuit of nuclear weapons has become a serious concern with regard to international security. Domestically, the regime has maintained its totalitarian posture, using any means necessary to consolidate its power over the populace. This has led to the institutionalization of both terror and brutality as state tactics. As a result, the plight of the North Korean people constitutes one of the worst human rights situations of modern day history.

Although both the North Korean regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and the treatment of its own people present troubling security problems, they are not single issues that can be approached individually. Instead, these issues are the byproducts of a much larger problem: the nature of the totalitarian regime. Therefore, in order to address the security problems emanating from the DPRK, we must first address their roots. This paper will outline a strategy to accomplish this goal. It will begin by providing a set of brief suggestions for deterring the regime in the short term, and then continue with a detailed approach for changing (transcending) the regime in the long-term.

 

Short-Term Containment

When dealing with a volatile security issue, such as that presented by the DPRK, any successful long-term strategy must be supported by a tactically sound short-term plan. If our ultimate goal is to bring down the regime, then a short-term plan must effectively deter and contain the DPRK over the next several years. Such a plan should have two primary objectives: prevent the DPRK from taking aggressive military action; and deploy a fully functional ballistic missile defense shield so as to guarantee both our safety and that ofEastern Asia.

Since the Korean War (1953), the US has maintained a military presence on the Korean peninsula. Currently a force of about 29,000 is maintained – these troops provide reinforcement to the 600,000 man South Korean military.[i] This continuous defensive line has ensured that the North Korean army cannot take aggressive action. In the past several years the number of US forces has decreased (37,000-29,000), this draw down will continue over the next three years. This course of action is a correct one because – as will be discussed in full below – it is increasingly important to help make the DPRK issue a “Korean” issue and not the sole responsibility of theUS. By forcing the South Koreans to embrace their own security dilemma, the nature of the threat will become more evident and, in turn, afford us a better diplomatic position through which to apply pressure in the near future.

 

 

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Eric Sayers is a graduate student at the University of Western Ontario, and a former research intern at the Center for Security Policy.

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Regime Change in North Korea

By Eric Sayers.  Mr. Sayers is a graduate student at the University of Western Ontario, and a former researcher at the Center for Security Policy.


Since its creation in 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has simultaneously pursued a confrontational policy towards the international community and a repressive policy towards its own citizens. Internationally, the DPRK maintains a high-tension position. In the past this lead to adventurous foreign policy decisions, most notably the 1950 surprise attack against South Korea. More recently, the DPRK’s uncompromising pursuit of nuclear weapons has become a serious concern with regard to international security.


Domestically, the regime has maintained its totalitarian posture, using any means necessary to consolidate its power over the populace. This has led to the institutionalization of both terror and brutality as state tactics. As a result, the plight of the North Korean people constitutes one of the worst human rights situations of modern day history.


Although both the North Korean regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and the treatment of its own people present troubling security problems, they are not single issues that can be approached individually. Instead, these issues are the byproducts of a much larger problem: the nature of the totalitarian regime. Therefore, in order to address the security problems emanating from the DPRK, we must first address their roots. This paper will outline a strategy to accomplish this goal. It will begin by providing a set of brief suggestions for deterring the regime in the short term, and then continue with a detailed approach for changing (transcending) the regime in the long-term.

 

View full paper (Web)

View full paper (PDF)

Get real about China

This week, President Bush will be visiting the People’s Republic of China. As with all such high-level diplomatic missions, he will doubtless be tempted to accentuate the few, putatively positive aspects of the Sino-American relationship, and gloss over the increasing number of negative ones. Should that happen, history may record this as a moment when the failure to speak truth to the Chinese Communists in power in Beijing condemned the two nations to conflict down the road.

That grim prospect might just be avoided if Mr. Bush reads in the course of his visit to the Far East the report on this important bilateral relationship issued last week by the congressionally mandated, blue-ribbon US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Its bipartisan conclusion is that "over the past year, on balance, the trends in the US-China relationship have negative implications for our long-term economic and security interests."

The Commission backs up this finding with nearly 170 pages of analysis based on fourteen hearings. It represents the only "second opinion" on China that is both informed by full access to classified information and available to the American people, as well as their elected representatives. This panel performs a real public service and its conclusions deserve careful scrutiny – by President Bush, as well as the rest of us.

Such a review is made all the more necessary insofar as the US-China Commission notes the United States lacks a "coherent strategic framework…grounded in a clear-eyed understanding of how the Chinese military and political leadership leads the country, how decisions are made and how their economy works….China is an authoritarian regime and a non-market command economy still controlled by the Communist Party. The central goal of its leadership is maintaining its own power, at all costs."

It flows from this basic insight that we must be concerned about such developments as:

-The persistent assertion by the Chinese leadership to their political cadre and military officers that America is the "main enemy" and that war with the United States is "inevitable."

-The Chinese government is working not only to secure energy resources from all over the world to meet its yawning needs (notably for oil, coal and natural gas). It is doing so in a way that seems intent on denying such resources to the United States and other global competitors.

-The PRC’s predatory trade practices and intellectual property theft continue in violation of past commitments and World Trade Organization obligations. In part, the result is a bilateral trade deficit that has increased "over 140 percent in only four years." The wealth thus garnered by China is being used – among other things – to fuel the plundering of America’s remaining high technology industrial base and the utter liquidation of our manufacturing sector.

-Wealth transfers from the United States are underwriting Beijing’s ominous build-up of its armed forces, as well. The Commission puts it this way: "China is engaged in a major military modernization program, the motives of which are opaque and unexplained. It is building a modern navy and air force, upgrading its nuclear-armed ICBM force and beginning to operate in a power-projection mode. It has markedly expanded its information warfare operations to a level that is clearly designed to disrupt American systems."

-The Commission has also helpfully warned about the PRC’s increasing practice of bringing economic dinosaurs – its biggest "banks" and other state-owned enterprises – to the U.S. capital markets. By so doing, it is offloading the financing of what are otherwise unsustainable entities onto American investors. As a result, the latter are unwittingly helping to underwrite the unsavory activities of such enterprises – including: China’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms build-up, environmental depradation, technology theft (including the Navy’s Aegis fleet air defense system and nuclear warhead designs), espionage and slave-labor manufacturing operations, etc.

-Finally, China is engaged in activities that pose a more immediate danger. Two of its nationals were recently arrested trying to sell Chinese-made QW-2 man-portable surface-to-air missiles in this country. Had they succeeded, the result could have given rise to a potentially grave threat to American airliners. And Chinese micro-satellites are being readied to attack our space assets as another, potentially devastating manifestation of Beijing’s pursuit of what the Pentagon calls "asymmetric warfare" capabilities against the United States.

-The argument will be made that President Bush should refrain from expressing too much concern about these developments, lest he aggravate relations with the PRC and jeopardize the help they are giving us on denuclearizing North Korea and fighting terror. The truth is that we are getting precious little help from Beijing on either of these fronts. The Chinese could bring intolerable pressure to bear on Pyongyang if they wanted to, and have not. Their $70 billion energy deal with Iran is hardly supportive of our efforts to counter one of the most dangerous state-sponsors of terror.

In fact, few things would be more dangerous than to continue to give Communist China a pass as it becomes ever more brazen about its strategic goal: to displace this country as the world’s leading economic power and to defeat us militarily, if necessary. Mr. Bush must use the occasion of his visit to China to disabuse its leaders of the notion that we are indifferent to that agenda, or unwilling to resist it. The valuable US-China Commission has laid out in its fifty-seven recommendations things we should be doing now. The President should make clear that we are fully prepared to go farther, if need be, by helping the Chinese people liberate themselves from a regime that oppresses them and increasingly threatens us.

 

The House of Kim







Who is next in line at the House of Kim? (Photo: Paramount Pictures)
by Patrick Devenny


October 10th marked the 60th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party, an event celebrated by the massive military parades and the synchronized demonstrations so often associated with the Stalinist state of North Korea. The event drew additional outside interest due to the North Korean leadership’s habit of announcing major new policy initiatives during the state-sponsored revelry. Perhaps, reasoned observers, Kim Jong-Il would choose the momentous occasion to finally announce a successor, much as his father had done during the birthday events of 1980. Others pointed out that Kim — now 64 years old — is around the same age as Kim Il-Sung was when he made the vital, if predictable, announcement. A flurry of news reports and rumors quickly bolstered expectations. Contrary to such hopes, however, the anniversary passed without an announcement, leaving the mystery of North Korea’s next leader temporarily unresolved.

Predicting the identity of North Korea’s new leader is extremely problematical, even for the most experienced Pyongyang watchers. The leadership structure, already Byzantine, is made even more intractable because so many of its members are simply unknown or unheard of due to the closed nature of North Korean society. Further complicating prognostication is the fact that the identity of North Korea’s next leader is incumbent solely on the whim of Kim himself. Therefore, the observer is resigned to wading through cryptic propaganda and often inconsequential government appointments, hoping to find some pattern that would indicate who the current favorite is.

The issue of succession in Pyongyang is somewhat immediate due to the fact that Kim himself is thought to have suffered serious health problems over the past decade, no doubt worsened by his affinity for hard liquor and a probable past drug habit. Aiding his campaign for longevity is a special medical institute which concentrates solely on extending his life, just as it did for his father. The institute’s remedies include, reportedly, the cooked genitalia of dogs and blood transfusions from unusually healthy youth.

Much like his father before him, Kim Jong-Il does seem dedicated to the idea of maintaining the dynastic bloodline that will assume the mantle of leadership upon his death. Indeed, in many ways, Kim the younger was the progenitor of this theory, which wedded Confucian provisions on dynasty with Marxist conjecture. In the mid-1970s, as part of his offensive to solidify his position as successor, Kim engineered an extensive propaganda campaign aimed at elevating his father to the status of deity while simultaneously justifying a blatantly anti-Marxist monarchical form of power transferal. Those who objected to the development as an affront to their Marxist scruples were quickly purged by forces under the direct control of Kim Jong-Il. Considering the leading role he played in constructing the ruling dynasty, there is little reason to doubt he will seek its continuation.


The Kim bloodline is a heathy and vibrant one, owing to the Supreme Leader’s voracious appetite for young women. His massive support apparatus, which includes thousands of servants, bodyguards, and chefs, comes replete with a harem — known as the “satisfaction corps” — made up of dozens of women who have been specially trained to administer to the needs of Kim. While he has only acknowledged the existence of four children — 3 boys, 1 girl — persistent rumors that have reached the outside world indicate that other, undeclared sons of Kim exist. Often, their mothers — former actresses or harem recruits– are married off by Kim to other leading members of the North Korean leadership, their families kept within the orbit of the Supreme Leader. Whether these arrangements may later emerge to create friction among various leading factions is unknown. It is far more likely, however, that only the “respectable” progeny of Kim has any hope of assuming power, due to the extensive work required to position a suitable heir.

The eligible offspring includes Kim Jong-nam, Kim’s eldest son, who was long thought to have the inside track in this race for power. Now 34 years old, Jong-nam is the result of an adulterous relationship between Kim and Song Hye-rim, the leading lady of North Korean cinema and the woman who was recognized as a favorite among Kim’s many paramours. Like the other favored sons of North Korea, Kim Jong-nam has led a luxurious lifestyle, with private schooling in North Korea and Switzerland. After studying computer science, Kim Jong-nam was put in charge of North Korea’s non-existent IT industry, while also assuming a leadership position inside the security agencies. Taken in conjunction with his diplomatic trips to China, his appointment as successor seemed assured.

Kim Jong-nam’s path to power was derailed in May 2001, when he was arrested at Narita International Airport in Tokyo for traveling on a forged Dominican passport. The decidedly un-Dominican Kim Jong-nam explained his travels by stating his intention to visit Tokyo Disneyland. This erratic behavior apparently bolstered the positions of anti-Kim Jong-nam forces inside North Korea, especially in the military leadership, who managed to engineer his effective exile to China, where he reportedly still lives.

Kim Jong-nam’s fall from favor leaves his younger half-brother, Kim Jong-Chul, as the front-runner. He is 24 years old and has the standard background of a member of the North Korean elite: private school in Switzerland and France, cushy party positions, and unimaginable luxury. His tastes in entertainment lean towards basketball, as he is purported to be a fan of the NBA and has overseen the construction of courts throughout the country. Due to the self-destruction of Kim Jong-nam, his ascension would appear to be a virtual uncertainty. However, there have been reports, notably from Kim Jong-Il’s former cook, that Kim feels his son is too weak, often calling him “a little girl.”

The only other option for Kim Jong-Il would be his youngest, Kim Jong-Un. Currently 18 years old, his existence was only revealed to the rest of the world in 2001. Consequently, little is known about him, other than he is known by Kim as the “Morning Star King,” and is apparently his father’s favorite. His young age would complicate his rise to power immensely, due to the years of preparatory work needed to construct a powerful support system for the leadership candidate, such as the one that smoothed Kim Jong-Il’s transition in 1994.

The prospects for the two younger sons of Kim were considerably strengthened by the lofty status of their mother. Koh Yong Hee, a former dancer, was considered Kim’s closest confidant. Her elevation to the status of “respected mother” was seen by many as the first step in the transfer of power to her sons. However, Koh’s death by cancer in 2004 may have altered this dynamic, possibly allowing the disgraced Kim Jong-nam to reestablish his primacy in the chain of candidates.

Mysteriously, little has been done that would indicate that Kim has singled out any one of his sons for the position of Supreme Leader. In the mid-1970s, the favorable trend towards Kim Jong-Il was explicit and unavoidable: rushed biographies celebrating his “natural brilliance” were published while his visage became a fixture in many public squares. He was rapidly promoted, assuming the critically important positions within the defense and security hierarchy, while his father repaid his son’s lavish attention with frequent public mentions of Kim Jong-Il’s prowess.

Although there is nothing to indicate that Kim has settled on a successor, there are some signs that the regime may be laying the groundwork for the ascension of a Kim family member. In January of this year, an “astonishing” new historical discovery was announced by North Korean government television. Drawing on recently “discovered” evidence, researchers found a new quote of Kim Il-Sung, in which he states: “If I cannot achieve this sacred task [the revolution] in my lifetime, my son will do it. If my son cannot, my grandson will.” Of course, this history — along with almost all of Kim Il-Sung’s official biography — is purely the invention of North Korean propagandists. However, its promotion does point to the possibility that the regime seeks to strengthen the idea of dynastic transfer of power, while not yet ready to promote an actual successor.


While Kim’s power within North Korea is thought to be absolute, there have been significant challenges in the recent past, further complicating any effort at dynastic transition. While these small uprisings are cloaked in official secrecy, some information concerning their scope and intent can be gleaned from the testimony of defectors. One such disturbance arose in the early 1990s, involving more than a dozen generals who had trained together in the Soviet Union. The group of officers evidently planned to execute the Kims and their allies and institute a national policy of crash modernization. However, the plot was discovered before it could progress, and the offending generals were burned at the stake in front of a large military audience. In 1995, the officers of the 6th Army Corps — the unit in charge of the worst famine areas — hatched a plan to storm Pyongyang in conjunction with the neighboring 7th Corps. The plot was sabotaged by informers, who were then promoted to top positions within the units. Apparently, the difficulty of organizing an effective plot against Kim Jong-Il has led many North Korea generals — possibly as many as 130 — to abandon their nation and seek refuge in China.

The willingness of some army officers to challenge Kim Jong-Il can be traced to the central fact that most North Koreans — including, apparently, some in the armed forces — have little respect for him. Kim Il-Sung’s manufactured history of anti-colonialist resistance stirs admiration among nationalistic Koreans on both sides of the DMZ, many of whom still espouse an incomprehensible level of devotion to the deceased mass murderer. No such reverence is ever displayed on behalf of Kim, especially following the famine of the mid-1990s, which was blamed erroneously by many North Koreans solely on his leadership, rather than the unworkable economic infrastructure foisted upon the North by the “great leader,” Kim Il-Sung. His portentous life of comfort and lack of military experience serve as a catalyst for additional, if subtle, derision. While the reputation of Kim Il-Sung remains above reproach, his pampered heir is afforded no such deference by the martial fanatics in the KPA. This purported schism has led some to believe that Kim must take into consideration the opinion of the army to some extent before choosing the KPA’s next commander in chief.

To limit the power of the armed forces, Kim has worked assiduously to co-opt the military leadership, empowering family acolytes while punishing those who exhibit latent signs of disobedience. As Chairman of the National Defense Commission and the Korean People’s Army, Kim has overseen a system-wide reorganization of the military leadership over the past five years, an effort that has left him in unmodifiable control of the armed forces. Critical appointments include the installment of Vice Marshal Jang Song-u, a Kim relative by marriage, to command of all forces around the capital of Pyongyang. Other Kim family members control the capital’s defense system and the assorted front-line units stationed near the DMZ.

This effort at consolidation has extended into North Korea’s extensive internal security services as well. Maintaining their loyalty has always been of the utmost concern to Kim and his father, both of whom were reported to have been traumatized by the 1989 execution of Romanian dictator Ceausescu by trusted officers. In reaction, Kim Jong-Il has only allowed his closest family members to control the massive internal security structure inside North Korea, going so far as to execute and purge his father’s loyalists for insufficient personal allegiance.

There is almost no chance that, barring some sort of unexpected rebellion, a member of the Kim family will not be chosen as the next leader of North Korea. The system of absolutist tyranny cannot afford the uncertainty of a genuine search for an effective leader, nor can it withstand the inter-regime fissures sure to result from such a process. The Kims are well aware of the hatred their rule imbues among the populace, cementing their closely held belief that any deviation from the path of consistent and harsh leadership spells the end for them and their closely guarded privilege. They are true adherents to Benjamin Franklin’s truism “we must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.” The next leader of North Korea, whatever Kim it may be, will assuredly follow this policy of perpetual brutality, leading to nothing but disaster for the over 20 million serfs that currently serve at the pleasure of the House of Kim.

Amnesty: For North Korea

By Patrick Devenny

The far-Left is nothing if not tenacious. Not only has Amnesty International condemned the United States in the harshest possible terms — in the middle of a war when international image is vital — but its most recent report spends more time criticizing the rogue pranks at Gitmo more harshly than the death camps run by the North Koreans.

Rather than apologizing after referring to the American detention center in Guantanamo Bay as a gulag, Amnesty International has attempted a unique maneuver to break out of its public relations death spiral. The "non-partisan" advocacy group has taken to calling actual gulag survivors and begging for their endorsement of Amnesty’s statement. In an editorial published in The Washington Post on June 18th, Soviet gulag veteran Pavel Litvinov recounted how a senior Amnesty staffer called him asking for his public support. When Litvinov suggested there was quite a difference between his own experiences and those of the terrorists imprisoned in Guantanamo, the staffer responded "Sure, but after all, it attracts attention to the problem of Guantanamo detainees."

This kind of shocking disregard for the facts in the name of anti-American agitprop is hardly surprising to long time critics of Amnesty. When Amnesty International’s executive director, Irene Khan, made her reckless gulag assertion, it was the latest in a string of grating hyperbole. If Amnesty can turn the detention facility in Guantanamo into a gulag, imagine how they would judge a truly brutal prison system. Imagine what Amnesty would say, what they would write, about a hypothetical country with actual death camps, reeducation centers, and government sponsored murder on a scale rarely seen in history.  

Of course, such a country does exist: it’s North Korea. You would hardly know about Pyongyang’s cruelty, however, if you were limited to reading Amnesty International annual reports.   As originally pointed out by CSP Senoir Fellow Lt. Colonel Gordon Cucullu , Amnesty cannot be bothered with the testimony of those escaping from Kim Jong-Il’s prison state. The group is more than willing to deem the testimony from violent jihadists "troubling" and "credible," but North Korean citizens are considered "untrustworthy." So what exactly does Amnesty say about North Korea in its latest report?  

Not much. The first thing you will notice when reading Amnesty’s 2005 report on human rights in North Korea is the length of the article, or rather, lack of same. Amnesty writers have managed to fit the abject brutality of North Korea into an article shorter than the one you are reading now. Amnesty, amazingly, takes only 1,351 words to describe the most brutal and despotic regime on the face of the earth. In comparison, Israel, or in Amnesty parlance "Israel/Occupied Territory," needs 2,592 words. The U.S, not surprisingly, rates three times the North Korean word count. North Korea’s 200,000 slave laborers, its dozens of political prison camps, its mass interrogation and torture facilities near the Chinese border, all in 1,351 words.

In actuality, the Amnesty International report on North Korea barely mentions any of these horrors. It is 1,351 words of avoidance and oversight, of misdirection and outright ignorance. Whether this is intentional or simply shoddy research (either is certainly possible when Amnesty is involved) is, in the end, irrelevant. While Amnesty takes great strides to attack the Bush administration, it barely scratches the surface of the North Korean nightmare. What does Amnesty miss? Let us start with its treatment of the prison camps, or, as Amnesty calls them, "detention centers." Amnesty criticizes the detention centers for being overcrowded and being run by cruel guards who often beat prisoners. Of course, Amnesty’s description of North Korean prisons is fairly similar to their nightmarish portrayal of the American penal system.

Leftist critics of President Bush’s "aggressive" policy towards North Korea blanched when he had the temerity to declare that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il operated concentration camps. If anything, the president’s rhetoric was excessively restrained. The communist government of North Korea operates nothing less than a nightmarish prison camp system analogous to the murderous designs of Hitler and Stalin. An estimated 12 camps, or kwan-li-sos, are currently run by the government, which hold between 150,000-200,000 total prisoners. In the camps, those imprisoned are often forced to labor until they die, either by starvation or exhaustion. The camps themselves are massive, with some larger than American counties and one, Camp Huaong, larger than the city of Washington D.C. In other camps, it is estimated that 20 to 25 percent of the total prison population dies every year, leading to a staggering amount of death. These prisoners are often arrested by authorities with no explanation or formal procedure. In some instances, three generations are jailed together, with children being imprisoned for the imagined crimes of their grandparents. In other smaller prison camps, run by the North Korean security apparatus, prisoners are routinely tortured and politically "re-educated." These camps are not hidden, one can easily view satellite photos of them, along with descriptions from the many North Koreans who have escaped. Amnesty, apparently, has not found such evidence compelling enough to include this in their report.

Another aspect of Amnesty’s human rights analysis is North Korea’s treatment of women. If you listen to Amnesty, female prisoners in North Korea have it rough, but nothing extraordinary. Apparently, women are "humiliated" before their trials by being strip searched. Prisons also lacked women’s restrooms and female inmates were routinely "degraded" by authorities. All of this is fairly loathsome, but as Amnesty so readily reminds us, North Korea is, after all, a signatory to the UN’s Women’s Convention.

North Korea ‘s ratification of the Women’s Convention certainly does not help women who become pregnant in the country’s camp system. Amnesty fails to even mention the horrific practice of forced abortion and infanticide that regularly takes place inside the kwan-li-so. Escaped detainees report numerous instances of prison guards carrying out forced abortions on multiple women at a time. In other scenarios, the babies are delivered, only to be immediately slaughtered by security police. Amnesty apparently forgets to tell the story of one female inmate, a school teacher caught trying to escape to Mongolia, who had been captured and was almost beaten to death at the Onsong In-min-bo-an-seong punishment camp in November 1999. Another female inmate imprisoned in a security facility recalled seeing an elderly woman made to do repetitive exercises until she passed out and died on the floor. These testimonies represent just the tip of the iceberg concerning the horrific fate awaiting imprisoned women in North Korea, who are also subject to mass rape by prison guards. Again, Amnesty fails to mention these atrocities, featuring absolutely zero testimonies or inmate interviews in their latest report.  

One of Amnesty’s main complaints and criticisms concerning the United States is its preservation of the death penalty. Amnesty’s report breathlessly recounts the 59 executions carried out in the United States during the 2004, which supposedly represents the United States’ continued abuse of "international law." Amnesty also makes reckless accusations that various American crime labs produce faulty results in death row convictions. The American government is deemed "retentionist" in its refusal to sign various anti-death penalty conventions sponsored by the United Nations.

Regarding the North Korean "death penalty," if arbitrary and public executions can be described by such a judicial designation, Amnesty is considerably more subdued. Instead of the lengthy examination given to the American death penalty, Amnesty delivers a cursory criticism of the North Korean penchant for "secret executions," although no cases are cited. The truth is far more disturbing than Amnesty’s four sentence description imparts. Executions are a part of every day life in North Korea, where "class enemies" are regularly hanged in public squares, with hundreds of school children forced to watch. Execution-worthy crimes include petty theft, Christian worship, or attempting to escape North Korea (many escapees have been forcibly returned by China, demonstrating their complicity in this cycle). Those who have fled North Korea have described the construction of several mass execution facilities that can be mobilized quickly were the United States to attack. A recent video smuggled out of North Korea showed three prisoners, charged with fleeing the country, tied up to poles and shot by firing squads. Yet Amnesty fails to mention this case which is actually captured on video, unlike the claims of imprisoned Islamic extremists on Guantanamo. Indeed, citing no supporting evidence, Amnesty declares that executions in North Korea have actually decreased.     

Defenders of Amnesty may claim, as Amnesty itself does throughout its report, that North Korea is so isolated that it would be nearly impossible to compile a comprehensive and lengthy report on their human rights abuses.

The red continent?

By Fred Stakelbeck

China’s rapid ascension as an influential economic and political force in Africa is raising complex questions concerning the security of the African continent and the future of its people. China’s involvement on the continent has increased dramatically over the past several years, fueled by Africa’s growing demand for cheap Chinese products and the need for greater infrastructure investment in the African energy and transportation sectors.

Africa possesses two key attributes which makes it an attractive investment for an expansionist China. First, it is a continent rich in the high-value, natural resources necessary to propel China’s maturing economy. Second, it offers a virtual sanctuary from American democratic ideology.

To many Africans, the prospect of increased cooperation with China is an exciting development laden with enormous opportunities for growth and prosperity. Many older Africans vividly recall how their homeland was exploited by Western interests who failed to empower local populations, leading to widespread human suffering that still exists today.

But will China, with visions of global influence and economic growth, act in a more constructive manner toward Africa, avoiding the mistakes made by its Western predecessors?

Unfortunately for many Africans, China’s record of resource exploitation and global obstructionism point to an uncertain future. China’s long record of human rights violations in Hong Kong and Tibet; suppression of religious and political freedoms; history of weapons proliferation; support of brutal regimes in North Korea and Iran; and its disregard for indigenous markets, raise legitimate questions regarding its long-term intentions on the continent and its commitment to the African people.

Recently, the London-based Africa Confidential Newsletter, a publication devoted to African issues, noted that it feared African countries would "become more corrupt by doing business with China." Gal Luft of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) noted in November 2004, "The Chinese are much more prone to doing business in a way that today Europeans and Americans do not accept – paying bribes and all kinds of bonuses under the table, particularly in Nigeria, Angola, Chad, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea."

China’s emerging relationship with all of Africa is extremely important, however, it has taken on particular significance in two countries — Nigeria and Sudan.

Nigeria

Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo’s visit to China in April, his third since being elected in 1999, further solidified relations between the two countries with agreements signed in the areas of political cooperation, telecommunications, bilateral trade and two-way investment.

Chinese President Hu Jiabao expressed his hope that the two countries would improve cooperation in the areas of gas exploration, manufacturing and infrastructure to promote a "fair and reasonable new international political and economic order." The players involved in Jiabao’s new "order" and its purpose remain a mystery to Western analysts; however, it almost certainly does not include the United States and the spread of democracy on the African continent.

President Jiabao also expressed his deep appreciation for Nigeria’s consistent adherence to China policy and its support of China’s Anti-Secession Law, adding to the unsettling nature of the growing bilateral relationship.

Nigeria’s economy is heavily dependant on oil, with 80 percent of government revenues coming from its sale. Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the eleventh largest in the world. It continues to be a major oil supplier to both Western Europe and the United States.

The January 2005 edition of Oil and Gas Journal reported that Nigeria produced 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2004 and was expected to increase production to 3 million bpd in 2006 and 4 million bpd by 2010. Obviously, this has pleased the Chinese who continue to invest boatloads of cash into the country’s energy sector.

In November 2004, China’s Funsho Kupolokum announced a joint agreement with Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to develop two oil blocks in the Chad Basin and construct a pipeline and refinery. In addition, Chinese oil giant Sinopec reached a joint agreement with NNPC in December 2004 to develop and explore two more oil blocks in 2005.

But not all agreements between the two countries have been energy related. In April, Nigeria reached an agreement with China to become the first African nation to purchase a Chinese communications satellite. The Dongfanghong IV will be launched in 2007 from the Xichang Space Launch Centre in Southwest China’s Sichuan Province.

This agreement merits close attention and in many ways is extremely troubling, since it clearly sets the stage for future exchanges of Chinese intelligence and technology between the two countries. Two other customers, Iran and North Korea, have used advanced technology supplied by Chinese firms in the development of nuclear programs. Could Chinese technicians one day work in tandem with a radical, Islamic-led Nigerian government on a plutonium reactor? Let’s hope not.

Adding to fears of a growing Chinese presence in Africa is a recent U.N. investigation which uncovered al Qaeda training and recruiting bases in western Nigeria. The West-hating, Saudi-sponsored Wahabbi strain of Islam has already moved into parts of Nigeria with the hope of establishing a Taliban sanctuary in Africa. Taken together, Chinese instigation and Islamic terrorism pose a serious security threat for the entire continent.

Sudan

The current Sudanese government consists of an alliance between the military and the National Congress Party (NCP) which promotes an Islamist platform. Recently, Islamic Sharia law was forcibly applied to all northern Sudanese states. "The current government is now a very pragmatic police state," said Ghazi Suleiman, a Sudanese human rights lawyer.

Like Nigeria, Sudan has enormous natural resources making it attractive to foreign investors like China, the European Union and the United States. An improved currency and sustained GDP growth of 6 percent have been encouraging, but Sudan remains crippled by $24 billion in external debt. This has forced the country to look to foreign investors for the development of its domestic industries, in particular, its oil and natural gas sectors.

In 1993, the U.S. designated Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism. In response, Sudan fostered a close relationship with China using oil revenues to buy Chinese tanks, planes and guns. These weapons were then used to suppress the country’s southern, non-Muslim minority. The military relationship between the two countries has gradually evolved to include economic issues, namely, energy exploration and production.

In August 2005, Sudan is expected to begin exporting oil from the Melut Basin as a result of cooperative work with Petrodar, a consortium of companies dominated by China’s state-run Sinopec. Sudanese Energy Ministry officials estimate proven reserves in the Melut Basin at 700 million barrels and total reserves at five billion barrels. Petrodar also helped build the Sudanese owned Khartoum Oil Refinery, recently investing $340 million to expand the facility.

Construction of the 2,500 megawatt Merone facility scheduled for completion in 2008 has been funded by China’s Harbin Power and several Arab interests. In addition, the Chinese government is financing 75 percent of the $200 million Kajbar Dam construction project which has received stinging criticism from environmental groups noting that the project is damaging the Nile ecosystem.

But Chinese involvement in the Sudanese energy sector has not come without a price. A 2003 Human Rights Watch report examining human rights abuses by the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), a majority owned Chinese energy concern noted, "GNPOC did not hire local southern Sudanese laborers [non-Muslim], even for the most menial work. Instead, Chinese and northern [Muslim] Sudanese workers were hired. Furthermore, such construction often entailed the violent displacement of local agro-pastoral people from their land, so that the necessary infrastructure could be put in place to develop the oil fields."

China’s deliberate support of the Sudanese government in the face of continued human rights violations in Darfur is disturbing not only to the Sudanese, but also to Africans and the international community. The country’s twenty-one year civil war between its northern Sunni Muslim population and southern non-Muslim population has taken the lives of more than 2 million people.

In early April, Harvard University responded to the ongoing genocide in the Darfur region and Chinese support of the Sudanese government by divesting from PetroChina, a subsidiary of Chinese Natural Petroleum Company (CNPC). "Oil is a critical source of revenue and an asset of paramount strategic importance to the Sudanese government and PetroChina is a leading partner of the Sudanese government," the university noted.

Christian Aid, a United Kingdom-based human rights organization, recently noted, "CNPC’s oil roads and airstrips were used to conduct bombing raids on southern Sudanese villages and hospitals." The organization also accused the Chinese company, through its continued investment in Sudan’s oil industry, of being "complicit in some of the worst scorched earth policies."

In the end, African leaders must assess their relationship with China very carefully, balancing the challenges of accelerated resource extraction with the future needs of the African people. It will also be important for Africans to hold China accountable for its actions on the continent. To ensure the fair treatment of all Africans, solidarity should be pursued through the African Union (AU) or the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

By taking this cautious approach, a destabilizing "re-colonization" of the continent will be avoided.

This article originally appeared in FrontPageMagazine.com.

Deterring a Chinese attack against Taiwan: 16 steps

By Richard D. Fisher, Jr. Asian Security Fellow, Center for Security Policy

(Washington, D.C.): With the reelection of President Chen Shui Bian and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led government, Taiwan takes a significant step toward consolidating its democracy, but Chen’s victory is also likely to cause Communist China to intensify its preparations for war. To avoid what could be a very hot war on the Taiwan Strait, President George Bush should focus greater and more urgent attention on what is required to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. As the U.S. Department of Defense has noted in its annual reports on Chinese military modernization, the main goal of this effort is to build a capability needed to wage war against Taiwan, and if needed, the United States. It is possible that such an attack may come as early as one to three years from now barring either an unforeseen diplomatic breakthrough or a radical change in priorities for the Communist government in Beijing.

For Beijing, the reelection of Chen heralds a decisive shift in Taiwan public sentiment against “reunification,” the fulfillment of which is a key pillar of legitimacy for the Beijing regime. Beijing has given its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a decisive role to play in fulfilling the goal of “reunification.” Thwarting Beijing’s plans are essential for U.S. national security interests. These interests are reflected in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and remain valid today: the future of Taiwan should not be settled by armed force but by peaceful means. If the PRC succeeds in militarily conquering Taiwan then the U.S. would quickly lose its power position in Asia. Starting late in the Clinton Administration, the U.S. began to understand the looming PLA threat to Taiwan and began a process of closer engagement with Taipei. In 2001 this process was accelerated by the Bush Administration, especially to promote sorely needed military reforms by Taiwan.

But in Taiwan since 2001, military reform has been fraught with political and financial issues, but Chen’s reelection now brings more urgency to this task. The Chen Administration, with quiet advice from Washington, has sought to consolidate new Air Force and Navy capabilities. However, a looming PLA threat makes it essential that the U.S. work with Taiwan to increase Taiwan Army and local defense capabilities as well. In addition, the U.S. should also seek to sell Taiwan very new but promising military technologies that could give Taiwan some key asymmetrical advantages that would strengthen deterrence in the next two years. Finally, Washington must revisit the unfulfilled 2001 Quadrennial Review and significantly improve the U.S. force posture in Asia to deter a PRC attack on Taiwan. Ten steps that Taipei and Washington can do to increase Taiwan’s ability to deter a Chinese attack are as follows:

    1. Washington should suggest strongly to Taipei that it implement achievable and affordable reforms that serve to strengthen confidence in their military forces to survive initial attack: build better leadership survival capabilities; new survivable C4ISR system; new and many shelters for weapons; strengthen existing shelters; strengthen the NCO corps and greatly increase attractiveness of military service.

    2. The U.S. also should suggest to Taipei that it strengthen its civil defense capabilities and defense-in-depth capabilities. This will require strengthening its Reserve forces and their ability to mobilize and join regular army units, or to defend local municipalities. Reserve force weapon stockpiles should also be updated to better enable conduct anti-armor and anti-air operations. Taipei should institute national high school level rudimentary military and emergency medical training.

    3. Washington should urge Taiwan to implement as soon as possible new national security laws that protect secret information and allow for proper security screening for all personnel with access to classified information.

    4. The U.S. should sell Taiwan either a limited number of ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, or technology to make them. These are needed to build an effective “offensive” capability that can pre-empt an imminent Chinese offensive strike. Sales options should include a 300km range version of the JASSM cruise missile or the ATACMS SRBM. A total “defensive” doctrine for Taiwan is no longer able to sustain deterrence.

    5. Urge Taiwan to follow thru quickly on intentions to purchase Patriot PAC 3 anti-missile missiles. But in addition, the U.S. should encourage Taiwan to invest in specific energy-defense weapon development in the U.S. that can later be sold to Taiwan.

    6. Urge Taiwan to invest in a series of unmanned aircraft for several purposes, to include high-altitude surveillance and communication nodes, and medium range precision attack. These UAVs should have the main task of finding and attacking PLA SAM sites that will severely restrict Taiwan Air Force defense operations.

    7. Taiwan Army modernization is now as essential a component of deterrence as is Air Force and Navy modernization. The U.S. should sell Taiwan a small number of 120mm gun-armed M1A2 main battle tanks. These are needed to deter new and very capable PLA tanks equipped with Russian 125mm guns and Russian gun-launched anti-tank missiles. But more important, the U.S. should sell Taiwan modern 105mm guns to arm a new series of more mobile indigenous wheeled armored infantry fighting vehicles. The U.S. should also suggest that Taiwan also accelerate the purchase of additional attack helicopters.

    8. Suggest that Taiwan work with Washington to investigate the purchase of some a new Russian series of very small but capable submarines that should offer significant life-time savings over current conventional submarines. In addition, Taiwan should be urged to rapidly purchase used Lockheed P-3 Orion or S-3 Viking anti-submarine patrol aircraft.

    9. Sell Taiwan the AIM-9X helmet display sighted air-to-air missile to confer a balance with the Russian R-73 helmet-sighted AAMs that arm PLAAF Su-27 and Su-30 fighters.

    10. Create a new private firm that can facilitate “virtual” training for the Taiwan armed forces with experienced foreign military personnel. Such personnel should be hired to perform in globally distributed combat simulators linked to similar simulators in Taiwan.

STRENGTHENING THE U.S. DETERRENT POSTURE IN ASIA

In September 2001 the new Pentagon leadership under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued a Quadrennial Defense Review that made recommendations to increase the deterrent posture of U.S. forces in Asia. Soon overtaken by the requirements of the War on Terrorism, and then the War in Iraq, the Bush Administration has been unable to fulfill these requirements, which included: increasing the presence of U.S. carrier battle groups; strengthening U.S. Air Force air support units; and increasing East Asian area training for Marine forces. The Bush Administration has increased U.S. forces stationed at Guam to three nuclear attack submarines and 12 B-52 bombers. The requirements to support possible military action in support of Taiwan, or against North Korea, however, now mean that it is time to devote new military resources to Asia. Six steps that the U.S. can take would include:

    1. Increase the number of in-region combat strike forces that can be used over a Taiwan theater within 12 hours of a clear warning of imminent PLA attack. This will require that the U.S. increase the number of cruise missile-armed SSNs patrolling the Western Pacific and that it make this region the first deployment priority for new Trident SSGNs. The U.S. should also increase the number of F-15C squadrons deployed to Okinawa from two to four, and deploy B-1 bombers, E-2 AWACS, KC-135 refueling and C-17 transport aircraft to Guam. In addition, the U.S. should deploy new F/A-22 air superiority fighters to Guam as soon as possible. These are especially needed to put in theater a U.S. fighter that will be decisively superior to the 300+ Russian Sukhoi Su-27/Su-30 fighters the PLA Air Force may have by 2005. It is also critical to significantly increase the production of all cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions.

    2. Washington should also increase U.S. military assets designed to protect its forces in Asia. It is imperative that the U.S. deploy THAAD missiles to Okinawa and Guam to protect against the PLA’s highly accurate DF-21C and DF-15 Mod 1 medium-range missiles. If THAAD cannot be made available quickly, then the U.S. should consider the purchase of Israeli ARROW missile interceptors. The U.S. must also redouble security around all its forces based in Asia to protect against 5th column or PLA Special Forces attacks. There should be heightened protective measures for U.S. forces in Hawaii, Alaska and the U.S. West Coast that may also be used in the event of a Taiwan conflict.

    3. The looming possibility of a war to preserve freedom on Taiwan also means that the U.S. will have to rapidly increase the number of missiles devoted to the mission of National Missile Defense (NMD). China is now increasing the number of long-range missiles, and could have at least 60 new ICBMS and 64 SLBMs in service by 2010. The PLA is also increasing the penetration capability of these missiles, precisely to counter U.S. NMD, and thus, to sustain its ability to threaten the U.S. with nuclear attack if it decides to help defend freedom on Taiwan. An effective National Missile Defense for the United States capable of defeating PLA ICBMs is therefore, a major requirement for the U.S. to come to Taiwan’s defense with confidence.

    4. The U.S. should consider immediate investments that would increase the ability of the U.S. Navy to defend against a rapidly growing number of effective PLA nuclear and non-nuclear attack submarines. The PLA could have 50 modern and near-modern submarines by 2010, to include three new SSNs, 27 new SSKs plus about 18 older SSKs and three older SSNs. The U.S. Navy should consider the rapid improvement of its anti-submarine capabilities, to include re-activating 5-10 retired Spruance class destroyers to improve its deep-ocean ASW capability. The Navy should also consider re-activating the anti-submarine warfare capability on 4 squadrons of Lockheed S-3 Viking carrier-based ASW aircraft-a capability that was removed in 1999.

    5. The U.S. should mount a concerted diplomatic campaign to convince allies like Japan and the Philippines that a PRC attack on Taiwan poses a direct threat to their national security, and thus, should work with the U.S. to deter China. Japan should be asked to provide air and naval combat support for U.S. forces and the Philippines should be asked to provide basing, in the event of an emergency. In addition, the U.S. and the Philippines should begin extensive cooperation in the training of Airborne forces, to include major bi-lateral exercises in the Philippines and the U.S.

    6. Finally, the U.S. should begin a public education campaign in Asia and Europe to highlight China’s threat to democratic Taiwan, making clear that if China chooses to wage war on Taiwan, it will also be declaring its long-term hostility to every other civilized democratic society. The U.S. should make clear that China does not have the right to settle its differences with Taiwan by war. The U.S. should mount a far louder campaign to convince Europe not lift its Tiananmen-related arms embargo against China-which it may do before this summer. And Washington should begin now to plan to lead a total global economic embargo against China whether it wins or loses a war against Taiwan.

The threat we’re ignoring now

The televised hearings convened last week by the 9/11 Commission proved to be one of the most interesting and valuable civics lessons of all time. In particular, they made a point Americans cannot hear too often: The world is generally a dangerous place for the United States, its people and its interests – whether we think so or not, and most especially when we don’t. After all, at such times, we frequently squander opportunities to bring to bear the leadership and popular attention, military might and other national resources that could nip in the bud problems that will prove very costly to address later on.

In particular, the hearings illuminated that the international situation bequeathed by Bill Clinton to George Bush was considerably more threatening than was widely perceived at the time. Understandably, given the mandate of the Commission, its members and their witnesses focused on one of those threats – the Islamist al Qaeda organization – and how it flourished largely unchecked during the eight years of the Clinton presidency and the eight months Mr. Bush was in office prior to September 11th, despite this network’s repeated, murderous acts of terror.

China Rising

Unfortunately, there is another danger that grew inexorably over the pre-9/11 years: a Communist China bent on becoming not just the dominant nation in Asia, but a superpower and "peer competitor" to the United States. If the Bush 43 team was, as Richard Clarke contends, giving too little attention to Osama bin Laden and his followers, one reason might have been that it was reckoning – both before and after Beijing’s April 1, 2001 take-down of an unarmed American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft – with the near- and longer-term strategic implications of an increasingly formidable and aggressive China. All that changed after September 11th, when the PRC was supposedly transformed into an ally on terror and North Korea.

Yet, such critical thinking is, if anything, even more warranted today in light of the following:

  • China is crushing freedom in Hong Kong. Ever since Britain surrendered the Crown Colony to the PRC in 1997, Beijing has, like a boa constrictor, inexorably tightened its grip on the people of Hong Kong. After briefly backing away from anti-democratic legislation in the face of massive public protests, the Communists are now shredding what remains of the assurances it gave the UK about respecting liberty. Party organs are brazenly trying to intimidate courageous, freely elected legislators like Martin Lee and their followers by branding them "traitors."

    On Monday, the Wall Street Journal quoted Liu Kin-ming, who runs the editorial page of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy Apple Daily: "[At the time of the Chinese takeover], some said the city would be a ‘freedom virus’ that would infect the rest of China. Nearly seven years later, that thesis is tough to support, Mr. Liu says. Also increasingly tough to support is speculation that Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, who took power more than a year ago, would promote substantive political change in China. ‘If Hong Kong isn’t going to have democracy, then forget about the rest of China,’ Mr. Liu says."

     

  • Communist China is no-less-actively threatening and otherwise trying to stifle the other Chinese experiment in democracy: Taiwan. In the wake of still-contested Taiwanese presidential polling that Beijing sought to influence – through intimidation (some 500 PRC ballistic missiles are now aimed at the Taiwanese people), pressure on the island’s businessmen who are investing in or trading with the mainland and perhaps other, more covert means – the Communists have declared: "We will not sit back and look on unconcerned should the post-election situation in Taiwan get out of control, leading to social turmoil, endangering the lives and property of Taiwan compatriots and affecting stability across the Taiwan Strait."

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  • The missiles pointed at Taiwan are not the only manifestation of China’s interest in being able to project power decisively in its region and emerge as the arbiter of Asian affairs. Center for Security Policy Asia Fellow Richard Fisher has noted that, with considerable help from the former Soviet military-industrial complex and cash supplied by Western consumers, the People’s Liberation Army could have by the end of this decade as many as three new nuclear submarines, 27 new Kilo-class conventional subs plus about 18 older, but still potentially lethal, diesel submarines. Such an underwater force could, particularly when taken together with comparable improvements in its missile-equipped surface fleet and aviation arms, present a serious challenge to American efforts to defend Taiwan or other U.S. interests in the Western Pacific.

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  • Communist China is taking other steps with worrisome strategic implications. Testimony Dr. Peter Leitner and Center for Security Policy President Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. presented before Senator James Inhofe’s Environment and Public Works Committee last week noted Beijing’s use of the controversial Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST): a) to install fortified bastions on reefs, allowing it to lay claim to ever greater swathes of the South China Sea and b) to try to thwart President Bush’s new Proliferation Security Initiative. The latter is essential to U.S. efforts to prevent the transfer of weapons of mass destruction-related materials on the high seas.

    Were the United States unwisely to become party to this misbegotten treaty, it is a safe bet that the Chinese will also try to employ LOST as a precedent for no-less-cynical efforts in the future to advance its determination to make military use of space, while constraining this country’s ability to do so.

The Bottom Line

The good news is that the Communist Chinese threat is being subjected to intense, if less publicized, scrutiny by another congressionally mandated, bipartisan panel: the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ably chaired by CSP Distinguished Fellow, Roger Robinson. Given the stakes — and the current, virtually complete lack of official and public attention to the menace posed by the PRC today and in the future — the critical policy review provided by the China Commission may prove, if anything, even more needed than the findings of its more celebrated 9/11 counterpart.

Reykjavic redux?

The United States and four other nations will soon sit down in Beijing with representatives of Kim Jong-ils Stalinist North Korea. They will thus resume the so-called six-party negotiations that currently pass for a U.S. strategy for contending with the yawning danger of a North Korean regime armed with and prepared to sell nuclear weapons.

Dealing with Pyongyang

The best that can be hoped for is that this new round of diplomacy will go the way of the last one with Pyongyangs delegation behaving badly and refusing to disarm. That will, of course, do nothing to prevent the Norths nuclear ambitions. But neither will the other possible outcome: a new deal with Pyongyang pursuant to which the latter will falsely promise to curb that threat.

This was the lesson of Bill Clintons 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea. Many including some in high office, who certainly should have known better were induced to believe that, thanks to that accords swap of Western funds, fuel, technology and food for North Koreas disarmament pledges, a grievous security threat had been eliminated.

We now know that, shortly after (if not actually before) the Framework was signed, North Korea made an utter mockery of that accord by covertly launching a new, uranium enrichment-based effort to continue its nuclear arms program. Evidently benefitting from the same Nukes r Us pipeline that supplied Chinese weapons designs and Pakistani centrifuges to countries like Iran and Libya, Pyongyang used the last decade to dangerous effect: The North can now threaten neighboring nations and the United States with its own, small nuclear arsenal and with the possibility that it would make such weapons available to other rogue states, or perhaps to terrorists, with the requisite cash.

Legitimating the Odious

The talks now in the offing risk having the Bush Administration compounding one other mistake made by its predecessor. By doing yet another deal with North Koreas dictator, the United States cannot help but confer legitimacy on what is, arguably, the worlds most odious regime.

A recently aired BBC documentary validated this dubious distinction. It featured eye-witness accounts of the use of poison gas to liquidate political prisoners and their families in the Norths vast gulag a reminder of a Nazi-inflicted low-point in human history that the civilized world has promised would never be allowed to reoccur.

Unfortunately, those North Koreans not yet incarcerated in or exterminated by their countrys monstrous penal system fare scarcely better. By some credible estimates, two million of them have been allowed to starve to death. This has occurred even though large quantities of emergency food assistance have been provided by the United States taxpayer and others only to be ripped off for the benefit of the Communist Party elite and the Norths military. It is a dangerous delusion to believe that any government that treats its own people in such a systematically barbaric way can be relied upon to treat those of other nations any better.

The Reagan Alternative: Roll-back

Fortunately, as Ronald Reagan demonstrated two decades ago, there is an alternative to appeasement or open warfare with such a monstrous regime. Shortly after he came to office, President Reagan mapped out and ordered the implementation of a comprehensive strategy for destroying what was at the time the planets most brutally repressive and threatening dictatorship, that of the Soviet Union.

This strategy involved the coordinated application of military strength, economic and financial coercion, export controls and various forms of strategic pressure (notably, via information operations such as freedom radios beaming into Soviet territory and that of its client states). At its core was an essential ingredient: the truth.

In particular, President Reagan made a personal point of describing the USSR as what it was: the Evil Empire. He challenged Soviet leaders to end their repressive behavior, notably by tearing down the Berlin Wall and allowing free emigration.

Another Reykjavic?

Of special relevance to the present moment, Mr. Reagan refused to accept a deal offered him by Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavic, Iceland in 1986. Gorbachevs proposal like that on offer from North Korea at the moment would have given the appearance of a lessening of the threat to U.S. interests and security, but at an unacceptable cost. Even though international and media elites, domestic critics and State Department bureaucrats were horrified, Mr. Reagan refused to legitimate the Soviet regime by acceding to its demand that the United States forever foreswear missile defenses.

President Bush seems to be under no illusion about the nature of Kim Jong-il and his regime. In fact, he has been quoted as saying he loathes Kim and his ilk. Yet, he is being set up for another seductive Reykjavic-like deal, trading tangible Western aid and non-aggression pacts for more, phony North Korean non-proliferation commitments.

State Department Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage has been running a diplomatic backchannel to the North Korean regime, evidently through its mission to the United Nations. So secretive have these contacts been that even President Bush has reportedly been kept largely in the dark about them. The object seems to be to arrange for Mr. Bush to be made an offer in Beijing that he cant or at least wont refuse.

The Bottom Line

Like President Reagan a generation ago, President Bush must reject new deals with the todays most evil regime. The strategy should once again be one of roll-back, aimed at containing and ending this blight, not signing agreements that will permit it to persist and become still more dangerous in the future.