Tag Archives: Russia

Jihad in East Africa, Russia in the Middle East, Refugees Everywhere

Kenya thwarts terror plot

A routine security screening at the Garden City mall, one of the largest in Nairobi, resulted in the arrest of three Kenyan suspects after an IED was found in one of their bags.  With Kenyan security and the public on high alert since the atrocity at the Westgate mall in 2013, Inspector General Joseph Boinnet, Kenya’s police chief, was quick to downplay the incident. It seems that this easy catch was more than likely a probing of the security posture at shopping centers.

In light of the fact that al-Shabaab has threatened Kenya as retribution for its sending troops to Somalia as part of the AMISOM force, terror operations are expected to follow.  For now, al-Shabaab is on the offensive, attacking AMISOM bases and continuing to operate at will in southern Somalia, despite the presence of a coalition of six African nation forces.  While al-Shabaab has retreated into the countryside after losing territory it previously controlled, the AMISOM forces lack the decisive means to defeat them, due in part to not deploying air power.  Deficient intelligence also plays a role, as al-Shabaab employs the element of surprise to attack bases and capture AMISOM personnel.  It is crucial for AMISOM to adapt in order to counter the asymmetric warfare techniques al-Shabaab is using.

Must read: AMISOM must change tactics against al-Shabaab

Syria and Russia contradict each other in public, closely align in private

Seeking diplomatic cover as well as saving face in light of the loss of the Idlib airbase after a two-year siege by JAN and the Islamic Front, Syrian Information Minister Omran al-Zoubi denied reports that Russia was expanding its role in the war in the form of aircraft and troop deployments.  Meanwhile, Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova confirmed that Russian military experts are in country in an advisory role, which is usually the first step in expanding a military presence.

This all comes amidst reports of a Russian nuclear submarine deployment to the Mediterranean and troops being transported to Syria, preparing for escalation as the rebel factions and IS continue making gains against Assad.  Meanwhile, the US is warning Russia over the escalation, as the air operations against IS are now hampered by Russian flights over northern Iraq, following Greece and Bulgaria’s accepting Washington’s request to deny overflight rights to Russia over their airspace.

The loss of the Idlib airbase to al-Nusra is significant, as the payoff for the investment by the Saudi and Qatari regimes into the Islamic Front bears dividends.

Multiple countries engaging against IS, refugee issue haunts efforts

As Russia gets its Syrian operation underway, Australia is the latest country to announce air strikes against IS, as well as accepting 12,000 Syrian refugees.  Joining the US-led coalition and Russia, it seems that each country is going their own way in its response to the Caliphate as well as the refugee crisis.

As Europe struggles to cope with the humanitarian disaster, the question that must be asked is: where are the wealthy Persian Gulf countries? By leaving the issue to the West, they abdicate their responsibility to fellow Arabs and Muslims, while paying lip service and donating to refugee camps.  Clearly, countries such as Qatar and the UAE have the money and resources to resettle those fleeing both Assad and IS, yet their silence speaks volumes.

Now that Australia, a secular country far away from the conflict zone, has offered to accept some refugees, it is important to step back and realize that this is the manifestation of the globalization trend coming full circle.  While championed in the 90’s as a method of opening borders and increasing trade leading to greater cooperation, it is now also used by refugees who find the doors closed by their neighbors where they should be open.

Venezuela offers to accept 20,000 Syrian refugees in spite of food shortages and rampant violence

As Venezuela continues its conflict with Colombia over what its terms “economic war,” President Nicolas Maduro has offered to resettle 20,000 Syrian refugees in what it calls a goodwill gesture to Bashar al-Assad, a long-time ally.  On the heels of the expulsion of hundreds of Colombians from the border region, this move must be seen with caution, as the ties between Venezuela, Iran, and Hezbollah are strong.

The refugees fleeing a warzone should be mindful of the fact that Venezuela currently boasts of having the world’s highest inflation rate, one of the highest murder rates, and chronic food and medicine shortages.  They should also look to the Colombian example: while the late Hugo Chavez accepted refugees from the Colombian conflict, giving them housing and citizenship in order to boost his popularity and electoral votes, Maduro is now expelling Colombians, accusing them of undermining the Venezuelan economy.

Russia in the Middle East, Greek Airspace, Iran Naval Surveillance

Russia expands its role in Syria, Greece (NATO member) considers US request to deny airspace

As the effects of the Syrian civil war spill over into Europe and Latin America, Vladimir Putin has publically confirmed that the Russian military is active on the side of Bashar al-Assad against the rebels and IS.  Making strange bedfellows with the US and Iran, Russian air strikes have been confirmed as taking place in IS-controlled territory in eastern Syria.  Meanwhile, France is preparing to launch air strikes against IS at the same time that Greece is considering the US request to deny Russia airspace and landing rights to launch air strikes from its territory.

Secretary of State John Kerry is warning Russia that its increased involvement risks obstructing the anti-
IS coalition efforts, due to the fact that Russia is conducting its operations without coordination with other forces.  However, observers in Moscow speculate that Putin may be trying to curry favor by launching strikes against IS, seeking a reprieve of sanctions that have crippled the Russian economy.  For its part, Russia defends its involvement in Syria as one in the same in the fight against terrorism.

Developments on the field may have forced Russia’s hand: reports state that IS and Syrian Army forces are engaged in a battle for control of the Jazal oil field, which is the last remaining facility under Assad’s control.  While both sides have claimed victory, the pattern of attacks by IS on Assad strongholds points to a greater boldness on the part of IS to gain momentum as they inch closer to Damascus.

Iran deal after effects continue

As the nuclear deal continues to work its way through Congress, the Iranian leadership is now active in offering peace negotiations with the US and other powers over the Syrian war.  While remaining a steadfast supporter of Assad along with Russia, the remarks were offered during a press conference with Austrian President Heinz Fischer, who is currently visiting Tehran in an apparent bid to line up business and trade deals as the sanctions on Iran are lifted in the wake of the nuclear deal.

As previously noted, Russia is now actively involved in the war, while Iran continues its support of Assad behind the scenes and through its Hezbollah proxy.  This apparent about-face may be a tactic to divert attention as IS continues its advance and plots to break through to Damascus.

Must read: Iranian Warships Confront U.S. Navy On ‘Daily Basis’

Routinely photographed by Iranians for intelligence purposes

“U.S. naval forces operating in and around the Strait of Hormuz, a critical shipping lane, are “routinely approached by Iranian warships and aircraft” on a “nearly daily basis,” according to a Pentagon official familiar with operations in the region.”

But What About Bushehr?

Even as more Senators and Representatives are coming out either for, or against, the Iran deal, we continue learn more about just what wasn’t covered. First was the revelation of two “secret side deals,” which covered how the Iranian regime would be permitted to literally provide their own samples at the Parchin facility, and regarding how the IAEA would (or wouldn’t) be allowed to address the Possible Military Dimensions (PMDs) of Iran’s nuclear program.

Now there’s concern that there may yet be a third “secret deal”, this one between Russia and Iran. The writers at IranTruth.org note that, like Parchin,  Iran’s pressurized water reactor at Bushehr is also not addressed in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a fact noticed early on by a sharp-eyed Bill Gertz in the Washington Free Beacon.

If there is a deal covering Bushehr, then it would likely be a bilateral agreement  through Russia, not the IAEA. That would be logical because Russia is already in an agreement to provide Iran with 8 light water reactors at the Iranian site, and because Russian engineers played the lead role in building the facility, which the two countries own jointly.

The disposition of Bushehr is highly significant because as a pressurized water reactor, it is able to produce Plutonium-239, a key ingredient in the Plutonium path to a nuclear weapon. Stopping the Plutonium pathway to the bomb was one of nine red lines the Center for Security Policy warned any good Iran deal would need to adequately address.

If there is a bilateral deal between Russia and Iran regarding Bushehr, the United States could easily find itself cut off from any method of inspecting how Bushehr is being run, as Russia could invoke its security council vote to prohibit inspections, and the Iranians have already adamantly asserted that no U.S. inspectors will be permitted to visit any nuclear sites.

Are legislators voting for the Iran Deal prepared for the possibility that Vladmir Putin may be the only man standing between Iran and the Plutonium path to a nuclear bomb? Are they willing to trust that if a deal was cut between Russia and Iran it adequately addresses their concerns?

More Proof Of Russian Involvement In Ukraine

A document published by the Ukrainian Security Service back on June 16th claims that there are 15 Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) active in eastern Ukraine, and that the rebel forces are led by five Russian generals and a colonel present in Ukrainian borders. If true, this certainly corroborates past reports of Russian action in eastern Ukraine. However, the document goes even further by naming the Russian military officers and intelligence agents responsible.

The military officers named include Major-General Oleg Mussovich Tsekov, currently the commander of two brigades of the Luhansk People’s Militia, Major-General Valeriy Nikolaevich Solodchuk, the commander of Donetsk’s 1st Army Corps, Major-General Sergey Yurievich Kuzovlev, the coordinator of Russian military in eastern Ukraine along with Major-General Aleksey Vladimirovich Zavizion, Major-General Roman Aleksandrovich Shadrin, deputy minister of state security of the Luhansk People’s Republic, and Colonel Anatoliy Konstantinovich Barankevich, adviser for combat readiness in Luhansk. Colonel Barankevich was formerly the minister of defense for South Ossetia, the Georgian province that attempted to break away from Georgia back in 1991 and was the impetus for the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. If such high ranking Russian officers are present in Ukraine then it signals that Russia is extending more permanent military control over the separatist provinces in eastern Ukraine.

The document also provides photo evidence of Russian weapons being supplied to separatist forces as well as being used by Russian soldiers, and accuses Russia of carrying out terrorist attacks on civilians by means of GRU agents and Russian intelligence trained guerrilla operatives.  A map is provided in the document claiming locations of 108 listed GRU and FSB run terrorist training camps within Russia, Abkhazia, Moldova, and separatist-held Ukraine. Exact locations of the camps in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea are given in additional maps provided in the document.

All this comes at a time when footage taken by a Ukranian drone shows the construction of a Russian forward operating base just south of the village of Sontsevo in Donetsk, whilst attacks on the front-lines at Granitnoye increase in frequency. This FOB is only 12 kilometers away from the Ukrainian front lines at Granitnoye and Novolaspa, and would play a major role in any offense on the strategic port city of Mariupol. The base is next to the highway linking Mariupol to the loyalist north and could cut off reinforcements heading to relieve loyalist troops in the city. With Crimea in Russian hands, Ukrainian reinforcements to Mariupol via the sea are unlikely. With the recent buildup of new bases in Donetsk and the ever increasing attacks on the Ukrainian loyalist positions in the area, a new Russian/separatist offensive seems increasingly likely.

Cut Russia’s Power Line

Over the past several months, Russia has been escalating its belligerent behavior towards its European neighbors. Russian-backed separatists have been shelling Ukrainian military positions, Russian bombers have increased their encroachment within the airspace over numerous European countries, and Russian hackers have even breached the White House’s computers and read the president’s emails.

As tensions continue to rise, Western powers are getting ready to impose a new round of sanctions to target Russia’s energy and financial sectors should Russian-backed insurgents seize more Ukrainian territory. However, the Russian economy is starting to show signs of equilibrium while the Ukrainian economy is suffering more and more.

Western sanctions along with sliding oil prices helped, for a while, to slow investment in Russia and slide its economy into a recession. In 2014, Russia suffered $150 billion in net capital outflow and Russia’s central bank is forecasting a loss of $100 billion this year. While Russia’s central bank sees sanctions staying well into 2018, Russian officials are not worried over new sanction threats, stating that the worst of Russia’s economic worries is over.

Are they right? Most likely.

Even though Russia’s central bank expects a 3.2 percent contraction of the Russian economy, Russia’s inflation rate has dropped by 1.1 percent from its April high of 16.9 percent. The central bank recently reduced its main interest rate and the ruble’s exchange rate has risen to approximately 54 to the dollar.

In contrast, the conflict between the Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists has wreaked havoc on Ukraine’s economy. The International Monetary Fund recently predicted that the Ukrainian economy would shrink by 9 percent and inflation will likely hit 46 percent. Industrial output has been slashed and their gross domestic product has been exponentially diminished. The production of steel, which is one of Ukraine’s largest exports, has dropped by 28 percent since the beginning of the year due to threats of rebel attacks, despite a ceasefire deal.

While the Ukrainian government is begging creditors to accept cuts in the value of their bond holdings, Russia is announcing a new strategic alliance between its state-owned gas company, Gazprom, and Royal Dutch Shell. This recent alliance is another in a long line of deals designed to increase Russia’s energy monopoly throughout Europe. The deal will include asset swaps, expansion into new European markets, and the establishment of a third process line at the liquefied natural gas plant on Sakhalin island.

This deal was also a crushing blow to the Ukrainian government considering Shell’s decision, last year, to suspend talks over shale gas exploration in eastern Ukraine. Additionally, Russia is planning to build a pipeline under the Black Sea to bypass Ukraine, which is a key export route for European gas.

Gazprom is under United States sanctions due to Russia’s actions in the Ukraine, but the European Union does not have similar sanctions against the energy giant. Furthermore, the continued growth of Russia’s energy influence throughout Europe will make it unlikely that we will ever see European sanctions over their belligerent behaviors.

Russia has utilized the manipulation of gas supplies to get its way in Europe several times in the past. In 2006, Russia reduced supplies to Ukraine leading to shortages in countries throughout Europe, including Italy and France. In 2009, Russia cut off gas flow through the Ukraine, which led to a complete shutdown of gas supplies to Southeastern Europe.

Western sanctions have shown their effects on the Russian economy, so a greater commitment is required by European nations. In addition to providing greater assistance to Ukraine, the U.S. needs to institute harsher energy sanctions. It is time for the EU to start engaging in energy sanctions and stop providing Russia control over the energy needs of the continent. Staving off further Russian aggression will only work if European powers stop providing them with continued means of control.

Cui Bono From the OPM Hack?

December’s hack of the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) personnel files reportedly also reached other branches of the American government, affecting up to 4 million former and current US government employees. The information stolen by the hackers included Social Security numbers, job assignments, performance ratings and training information. Of course, this also includes current and former employees of intelligence organizations, as it was recently revealed that the hackers managed to access Pentagon employees’ personal and security information. A foreign actor could use the information taken from the OPM hack to identify spies or other sensitive personnel active in foreign nations, blackmail US government employees, or use email phishing from personal accounts to gain access to US government computers.

A Chinese government organization, such as their Ministry of State Security (MSS), is generally deemed as the most likely culprit, but it is safe to assume that North Korea’s Bureau 121, Russia’s FSB signals intelligence bureau, or Iran’s Cyber Defense Command could have either been a contributor to the effort or the main perpetrator of the data theft. Countries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have a fundamentally different view on the employment of cyberwarfare than the United States.

China has long been suspected to have a dedicated cyberwarfare division, but the existence of such an organization was only officially confirmed in May 2011. The “online blue army” is based in the Guangzhou military region and has access to a $1.54 million dollar yearly budget. Although ostensibly for defensive purposes (and for keeping tabs on Chinese citizens online), China has repeatedly been accused of employing cyberwarfare and espionage against other countries. The Chinese government also makes use of semi-official civilian hackers & proxies that allows the Chinese government to deny knowledge of their own actions to foreign governments searching for the origin of cyberwarfare attacks. China has also been implicated in the 2010 theft of intellectual property from Google’s  (and many other software developers) network systems, as well as a Senate Armed Services Committee probe that found that Chinese hackers had subverted the computer systems of several US airlines, technology companies, and several contractors for the US military involved in the transportation of troops and equipment overseas. It is quite likely that the Chinese are banking on cyberwarfare as a possible counterweight to US conventional military superiority. Should a conflict arise in Taiwan or the South China Sea, the Chinese could be relying on cyber attacks to disable the US’ SIGINT network and prevent the United States from aiding allies in the region.

Russia has their own cyber warfare program as well. Soviet-style media manipulation is alive and well, and especially on the internet, where the Russian government employs “professional trolls” to spread disinformation in the Kremlin’s favor. During the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russian hackers conducted a major DDoS attack on Georgian government websites, paralleling a similar attack on Estonian government websites the previous year. In Ukraine, Russia has employed a more sophisticated program referred to as “Ouroboros” to subvert Ukrainian government computer systems. It is also likely that Russian agents have an interest in collecting information to use as blackmail material or to foil US covert operations directed against Russia.

North Korea’s cyber warfare agency, Bureau 121, is part of the General Bureau of Reconnaissance, North Korea’s intelligence agency. Bureau 121 is said to comprise of the country’s elite computer experts, recruited at age 17 and trained at the University of Automation, North Korea’s military run school for computer science. Consisting of around 1,800 specialists, Bureau 121 is considered to be an elite unit of North Korea’s intelligence bureau. Despite North Korea’s perceived weaknesses, Bureau 121 is suspected to be the culprits behind the infamous hacking of Sony back in December. North Korean hackers also managed to attack South Korean banks and broadcasting companies, as well as deface South Korean government websites, using simple malware dubbed “DarkSeoul.” The DarkSeoul attack was noted to be very similar to the cyber attack carried out by the “Guardians of Peace” on Sony Pictures.

The Iranians also have a notable cyber warfare agency, dubbed the Cyber Defense Command. However, the bulk of Iran’s offensive cyber capabilities are relegated to the “Iranian Cyber Army,” an unofficial group of hackers who have pledged loyalty to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Allegedly created by the Revolutionary Guard Corps in 2005, the Iranian Cyber Army has been able to hack into Twitter and Baidu in the past. Members are recruited from Iranian hackers, offered employment in the Cyber Army instead of imprisonment. The Iranian Cyber Army is allegedly overseen by many of the same officers who run the IRGC’s cyber defense division. It is notable that the ICA became more effective and public on the internet in the wake of the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s network infrastructure, indicating that the Iranians may have learned from the cyber attack. Some analysts believe that the attacks on Twitter and Baidu were trial runs for the ICA, who wish to launch a “Stuxnet” style attack on the United States and Israel. USAF General William Shelton, head of the Air Force’s Space Command and overseer of the USAF’s cyber operations, has stated that Iran is potentially a serious threat on the cyber warfare front. Hacking the OPM personnel files won’t help Iran much with that endeavor, but the OPM personnel files would no doubt be useful to Iran for counter intelligence reasons.

Most troubling is the very likely possibility that no matter which nation managed to carry out the hack, any one of them could sell or otherwise share the information with other hostile states, making an already bad situation worse. If so, any of these four nations could possibly collaborate on cyber warfare programs and share expertise on hacking and virus creation.

Russian Sanctions Upheld

At the G7 summit in Germany this weekend, the participating nations agreed to continue economic sanctions against Russia for their aggression in Ukraine. The failure of Russia to respect the cease fire terms was cited as the main reason for extending sanctions. As President Obama stated during the G7 meeting;

“Does [Russian President Vladmir Putin] continue to wreck his country’s economy and continue Russia’s isolation in pursuit of a wrong-headed desire to recreate the glories of the Soviet empire or does he recognize that Russia’s greatness does not depend on violating” other countries’ territory?”

However, China’s Foreign Ministry criticized the sanctions on Russia and called for further dialogue between Russia and the European Union in order to resolve the conflict.

Meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin recently made the proposal that Donetsk and Luhansk remain under Ukrainian control. Russia simply cannot afford to annex and control the two breakaway regions of Ukraine as they did with Crimea earlier, especially not with the economic costs incurred by the sanctions. Putin also stated a desire to adhere to the Minsk accords by having both sides putting an end to hostilities in the region. Be that as it may, reports from the front lines state that the separatists have recently employed heavy weapons banned by the Minsk terms such as 122mm Grad artillery rockets and 120mm mortars. Many recent reports indicate that the Russians are moving more heavy weapons, particularly artillery, into the area to aid the separatists.

It is debatable whether sanctions can put a complete end to hostilities. It is safe to assume that President Putin does not wish to let Donetsk and Luhansk escape from his grasp, either. More likely, Putin sees continued negotiations as a chance to consolidate gains in Crimea and to continue to foster low-level unrest in Donetsk and Luhansk, all the while trying to get sanctions withdrawn in order to help restore Russia’s economy. There is every reason to believe, should the situation be advantageous for Russia in the future, that we can expect another push for the rest of eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainian Cease Fire In Jeopardy

Over the past few days, Ukrainian forces repelled an attack by approximately a thousand pro-Russian separatist fighters in the town of Maryinka, outside of Donetsk. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe claims that separatist rebels initiated the battle, while separatist officials and Kremlin spokesmen state that the rebels defended themselves from a government offensive. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko reports that around twelve separatists were captured, including one Russian citizen. Fighting in Ukraine has resumed lately due to failure to fulfill political components of the Minsk cease-fire agreement signed in February, as well as extant cease fire violations. Ukraine’s government demanded that the separatists withdraw all fighters and weapons from Donetsk and Luhansk, and that control of the eastern borders be put back under Kiev’s control in order to prevent the flow of fighters and weapons from Russia. Russia has been supplying the separatist forces with weapons and “volunteers” for quite some time, despite official denials from the Russian government. The separatists made counter demands for the promise of local elections and political autonomy.

Amid reports of a Russian military buildup on the border of Ukraine, President Poroshenko warned of the threat of a Russian invasion during a televised news conference June 5th, and promised the return of Crimea to Ukraine. Poroshenko also stated his plan to continue to work with Western nations to uphold economic sanctions on Russia, referring to the upcoming G7 summit on June 7-8, and discussions in the EU over whether to extend sanctions against Russia. The current EU sanctions are planned to expire in July. Meanwhile, the Kremlin states that the Ukrainians attacked rebel positions at Maryinka to deliberately sabotage the cease fire before the G7 meeting in order to increase sanctions on Russia.

President Obama will encourage the other G7 leaders to maintain sanctions on Russia at the meeting in Germany next week, as well as discuss aid to Iraq in their conflict against Islamic State. Even so, the sanctions have done little to stop Russia from fomenting separatism in the ethnically Russian eastern part of Ukraine and President Obama continues to refuse to send weaponry to the Ukrainian government. In the meantime, observers at Maryinka report that the separatists moved heavy weapons such as tanks and mobile artillery to the region before combat broke out. The terms of the Minsk cease fire restrict the presence of such weaponry in eastern Ukraine.

British think tank Chatham House recently released a report arguing that Russian expansionism presents a clear and existential threat to the European Union. The report states that the Russian government is fully aware that the EU is unwillingness to use force to stop them from creating a buffer state in the Ukraine and is even going so far as to consider the possibility of limited use of nuclear weapons as an instrument of foreign policy. To effectively counter Russia, European nations must be willing to present a strong military deterrent, to defend the Ukraine as a sovereign state, remove Russian leverage in the energy market, and to be able to communicate to the Russian people that they would be better served as allies to a “rules-based” Europe.

Is Russia About To Abandon Assad? Probably Not.

A report from the London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat citing “anonymous Western diplomatic sources” states that Russia has been changing their stance on supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime of Syria over the past three months. These sources noted that a Russian representative of a diplomatic delegation evaded directly answering a question over whether or not Russia was planning for a Syria without Assad. Allegedly, the representative said that “what concerns Russia is to safeguard its strategic interests and secure the future of minorities” in Syria, the first time Russia had hinted at anything other than full support for the Assad regime. The Asharq Al-Awsat article also cited Syrian rebel sources stating that 100 Russian diplomatic and technical personnel had left Syria and returned to Russia. Most of the Russian technical personnel were reportedly working alongside Iranian and Hezbollah agents active in Syria. The same sources also stated that the Russians had not sent supply aircraft to deliver equipment to the Syrian army in three months.

Gulf sources stated that the change in policy happened after meetings between the Gulf states and Russia. Russia apparently seeks to boost economic ties with the Gulf nations in the wake of the sanctions against Russia and the oil price collapse. Given that the Gulf states are extremely hostile to Assad and Iran, it can be inferred that any such negotiations would have limits to Russian support to Iran and Syria as a condition set by the Gulf states. However, experts doubt that Russia is about to abandon Assad. To have Islamic State control Syria, robbing Russia and Iran of an ally in the Middle East and further denying Russia the port at Tartus would be a foreign policy disaster for Russia. If Russia is indeed abandoning support for the Syrian government, then it would spell ill for al-Assad’s future.

On Tuesday however, Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov encouraged NATO to join in the Syrian civil war by conducting air strikes on the behalf of the Syrian government. Lavrov condemned the United States and allies for not aiding Assad in the battle against Islamic State, blaming them as well for the collapses in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. This seems to indicate that the Russians are indeed still for aiding Assad, but are showing signs of desperation, whether it be from economic problems preventing them from giving aid to the Syrian government, or the Assad regime faltering in the civil war.

Interestingly enough, all these events happen to coincide with Russia giving support to Iraq. Sergej Lavrov and his Iraqi counterpart, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, met in Moscow on March 19th where Russia pledged to give aid to Iraq in their struggle against Islamic State. Last June, Russia had sold Su-25 attack jets to Iraq. Just as Russia has been making investments in Afghanistan, so too have Russian businesses been active in Iraq lately. LUKoil and Gazprom, two Russian energy companies, have been buying shares in Iraq’s oil fields. And as of May 21st, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi met with Russian Prime Minister Dimitrij Medvedev to discuss further cooperation in defense, economics, and the energy sector. Of particular interest to the Iraqis was the sale of more aircraft to bolster the Iraqi Air Force. The United States had previously agreed to sell the Iraqi Air Force advanced combat aircraft such as F-16 Viper fighter jets and AH-64 Apache Longbow attack helicopters, but the sales have been put on hold due to concerns of the Iraqi government using them against their own citizens. With Iraq currently cut off from purchasing combat aircraft from the United States, they are forced to rely on Russian and Iranian suppliers.

A potential Russian turn away from the current Baathist regime in Syria is unlikely given their strong support for allied Shia regimes in the Middle East. A strong Sunni government in Syria would likely prove uncontrollable, though Russia is clearly attempting to take advantage of the US’ ineffectualness towards Iraq to improve relations with the troubled nation. Regarding Syria and the current events in the civil war there, Russia is most likely preparing for the possibility of a post-Assad Syria, and is opening the door to working with a successor government in order to preserve their interests in the region.

Jihad In Post-Soviet Central Asia

Recently on the Free Fire blog, there was a report on the defection of Colonel Gulmurod Halimov, the head of Tajikistan’s elite OMON counter-terrorist unit, trained by both American Special Forces and Russian Specnaz, to Islamic State. Shortly after the news broke of Halimov’s defection, Tajikistan declared Islamic State a terrorist organization by means of a suit from the Prosecutor-General’s Office. Halimov’s change of allegiance also coincided with a meeting of CIS nations to discuss counter-terrorism starting on May 26th. Of particular importance was the discussion of “color revolutions” and the threat posed by Islamic State; reports on the meeting note that a goal of the meeting was to “prevent spread of religious extremism and terrorist ideology.”

Central Asian countries have good reason to be concerned about Islamic State moving in to the region. Tajikistan in particular fought a brutal civil war in the 1990s between the post-Soviet communist strongmen and a strange alliance between Islamists and democratic reformers. Since then, the Tajik government has engaged in a campaign of countering growing Middle Eastern cultural influence in the heavily Muslim country, fearing a resurgence of jihadist activity. With Islamic State making an appearance in Afghanistan, the Tajik government has good reason to fear jihadist infiltration of the country.

As of January, Islamic State has formed the Khorasan province, which includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and several other states in Central Asia. In the letter announcing the creation of the Khorasan province, Islamic State spokesman Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani urged jihadists in Central Asia to abandon factionalism and join with the new Caliphate.

Before discussing the more militant jihadist organizations, we must first bring attention to Hizb ut-Tahrir. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir prefers to use “pre-violent jihad” to achieve their goals of creating a unified Islamic state. Hizb ut-Tahrir spread widely throughout post-Soviet Central Asia, despite being made illegal by all of the nations in the region. One reason for Hizb ut-Tahrir’s successful spread among disaffected Central Asian Muslims is its resemblance to Soviet Communism in economic issues. The economic policies of Hizb ut-Tahrir include guaranteed employment, nationalization of industries, free health care, and criminalization of usury. It is from Hizb ut-Tahrir from which the more militant groups in the area sprung, albeit Hizb ut-Tahrir tends to oppose such groups due to their use of violent jihad against fellow Muslims.

In addition to the Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement have been the other major Central Asian jihadist organizations. Though Islamist politics in post-Soviet Central Asia has been less popular than in the Middle East, the lack of political freedoms and corruption in the former Soviet republics have created fertile ground for jihadist organizations. Central Asian leaders such as Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov have repeatedly cited “jihadism” as the greatest threat to stability and security to their nations, and as a result secularism has been aggressively pursued throughout the region.

Currently based in northern Pakistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was created by Tahir Yuldash and Juman Namangani during the conflict in the early 1990s between Islamist clerics and the Islam Karimov government, backed by Uzbekistan’s quietist Hanafi clerics and scholars. The Islamist clerics, referred to as mujadidiya(reformers), demanded a rollback of the Soviet-era secularism, adherence to the salafist view (thus rejecting the Hanafi school which is popular in Central Asia), and the establishment of “Muslimonabad” an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law in Central Asia. The mujadidiya were made more confident by success of the Iranian revolution and the efforts and success of the mujahideen in Afghanistan, but ironically enough, were aided in their conflict against the Hanafis by the Soviet government. Both the atheistic Soviets and the mujadidiya saw the Hanafists as common enemies; the Soviets feared the Hanafists, being more numerous and influential in Uzbekistan, undermining their authority and saw the mujadidiya as an effective tool to turn religious Uzbeks against mainstream Islam. Thus, the USSR allowed for Wahhabist and Muslim Brotherhood texts to be distributed in Central Asia. However, the end of the USSR saw pro-mujadidiya scholars become politically active, and Islamist militias became more prominent in the hinterlands where the Soviet retreat left a power vacuum.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was one of those militias, the organization initially referred to as “Adolat.” Adolat became known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan by 1998, and would attempt to assassinate President Islam Karimov in 1999 and conduct bombings of the US and Israeli embassies in 2004. IMU was initially prevalent in the Ferghana Valley of eastern Uzbekistan, but would later flee for northern Afghanistan where they were protected by the Taliban while they continued activity against the Uzbek government. During the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, the IMU would retreat to northern Pakistan, where the group would grow, becoming integrated with Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, and would incorporate jihadists from around the world.

IMU would become a significant threat in the tribal areas of Pakistan, launching several attacks against Pakistani government officials, pro-government tribal leaders, and Pakistani military forces since 2007. With Yuldash’s death in a drone strike in 2009, the IMU’s new leaders had little, if any, connection to Uzbekistan. The IMU’s new mufti, Abu Zar al-Burmi, a Pakistani of Burmese Rohingya ancestry, has moved the IMU towards closer affiliation with the Pakistani Taliban and incorporated anti-Chinese and anti-Burmese government grievances into the IMU’s propaganda; prior to al-Burmi’s rise to power the IMU had never been interested in South Asian issues. Al-Burmi has also urged jihadists to target China, a major power with a history of oppressing Muslims and a major backer of the Pakistani government. Other major figures in the IMU include Moroccan German national Abu Ibrahim al-Almani, Abdul Hakim, a Russian national, and Adnan Rashid, a Pakistani and former commander of the Taliban.

Lately, the IMU have begun targeting NATO and Afghan troops in northern Afghanistan, moving the focus of its operation to the northern part of Afghanistan where their Taliban allies have little control over. With northern Afghanistan’s ethnic makeup of Hazara, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen, the IMU has a closer background to northern Afghanistan than does the heavily Pashtun Taliban, and the IMU is once more close to Uzbekistan’s borders. As of March 2015, IMU has officially pledged allegiance to Islamic State, stating in a beheading video that they were no longer allied with Mullah Omar and the Taliban.

The other domestic jihadist organization of note in Central Asia is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the Turkestan Islamic Party. Just like in Central Asia, the government of the People’s Republic of China is aggressively secular and politically repressive; China’s hostile stance towards religion is especially an element unpopular among the Muslim population in western China. There is also the added component of ethnic chauvinism from China’s Han majority towards the Turkic Uighurs and Kazakhs of the westernmost Xinjiang Autonomous Region.

Politically marginalized Uighurs have attempted to foster separatism and defend their rights by means of forming (explicitly Islamic) organizations such as Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan since the 1940s. After the Sino-Soviet split, the USSR deliberately fomented Uighur nationalism to weaken the Chinese hold on the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. In turn, China felt threatened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and began to support the Afghan mujahideen, opening training camps for the mujahideen in Pakistan and western China and supplying them with weapons. The Chinese also began to broadcast anti-Soviet messages in Russian and local Turkic languages into Soviet Central Asia.

The ETIM was reportedly founded by Hasan Mahsum and Memetuhut Memetrozi in 1997; Memetrozi was allegedly educated at a madrassa in Pakistan, according to reports from Chinese media. If true, this would be a clear case of the dog biting the hand that feeds it. The Chinese have long considered ETIM as a terrorist group, fearing further regional separatist movements should ETIM become successful, and warned the United States that ETIM had ties to bin Laden and Al-Qaeda after September 11.

China’s crackdown on ETIM has led it to flee to Pakistan, where like the IMU, it became internationalized, albeit retaining its primary goal of freeing Xinjiang from Chinese control. Recently, around 300 Uighurs have travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight for Islamic State. Chinese intelligence blames elements in the Turkish government, as the Uighurs generally enter Islamic State territory through Turkey by means of Turkish passports. Turkey’s complicity in aiding Islamic State has been covered by Center for Security Policy before. Turkey’s support for Uighur rights is well known, President Erdogan having described ethnic violence in Xinjiang as “genocide.”

Whatever the case, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement is a growing threat to China. Chinese Muslims have paid close attention to the Arab Spring and the rise of Islamic State, feeling wronged due to China’s anti-religious policies and ethnic chauvinism. Over the past few years, jihadist terrorism has been on a severe upswing in China, including bombings and ethnic violence and rioting in Xinjiang. The most prominent attacks so far was an car attack (suspected to be a failed bombing) in Beijing on October 2013, and a car bombing in Urumqi last May.

As mentioned earlier, several Uighur terrorists have gone west to fight with Islamic State, and even before then the ETIM was closely affiliated with al-Qaeda. The former leader of ETIM, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, was appointed a member of al-Qaeda’s Shura Majlis in 2005. Just like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, ETIM has been “internationalized” due to its ties to al-Qaeda and IMU, and has joined with IMU in its struggle against the Chinese and their Pakistani allies. Haq also was able to raise funds and purchase weaponry and explosive materials throughout the Middle East in order to facilitate attacks against Chinese targets outside of China. Though China’s size and lack of significant Muslim populations in the wealthy east make it a difficult target for ETIM, Chinese assets and personnel in Central and South Asia are open targets for the jihadist organization.

Chinese security officials are greatly concerned about Uighur jihadists returning from Syria with experience and further training in how to carry out terrorist attacks. Certainly, leaders such as the Turkestan Islamic Party’s Abdullah Mansour have explicitly requested aid from Muslims worldwide to help in defeating the Chinese infidels. In response, Chinese security forces have enacted a dramatic crackdown on Uighur nationalists over the past year. Last year, in the wake of the Xinjiang attacks, Chinese police conducted 27,164 criminal arrests in Xinjiang, nearly double that of last year.

Russia has also been concerned over Islamic State operating so closely to their own borders. One of the major reasons for the USSR’s entrance into the Afghan war back in the 1980s was to prevent the establishment of a Islamist state on the USSR’s backyard, and to prevent Afghan heroin from flooding into the USSR. Since then, the Russians have attempted to keep the Taliban busy and away from instigating jihad in Russia, from supplying the Northern Alliance with weaponry to tacitly approving of US bases in Central Asia, at least until recently.

Lately, Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov has stated that Islamic State is Russia’s most dangerous enemy. Lavrov noted that Russia was concerned over jihadists from the Caucasus or elsewhere returning home and establishing their own terror cells affiliated with Islamic State within Russia. He also stressed the claim that Russia was aiding the Assad regime in Syria to prevent Islamic State from getting a foothold in the Middle East. However, Russia has lately decided to greatly reduce their aid for the troubled Syrian dictator.

To counteract Islamic State influence in Central Asia, Russia has donated $1.2 billion worth of surplus arms to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, not only the two poorest former Soviet Central Asian states, but also the two former subject states that still have Russian military bases in their borders. Russia continues to sell arms to the relatively wealthier states such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. A secondary condition on the donation was that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan cease their attempts to purchase arms from the United States, doubtlessly to keep the poor nations reliant on Russian aid. Doubtless these arms are intended to help keep the local strongmen dictators in power and deter jihadists.

With the threat of Islamic State spreading to Central Asia, China and Russia are finding themselves forced to improve their counter-terrorist strategies and bolster their allies in the region. In this troubling time, the United States should not abandon Afghanistan as it has Iraq, especially as reports of Islamic State militants operating in the country have appeared.