Tag Archives: Saudi Arabia

Saudi Women Gain the Right to Drive

Saudi Arabia announced on September 26th that they will soon permit women to drive. This announcement ends a longstanding policy within the Saudi kingdom. The change will be effective as June of 2018, for women to obtain driving licenses.

Before the royal decree in Saudi Arabia, for women to travel to work and other local areas would need a male driver such as a husband, father, son or a hired driver to get her to her destination. For years women had to rely on a male for assistance to get to work or school, which often put them at a disadvantage, since being able to drive promotes independence and women in the work place.

The effort to break the ban on women driving has been underway for sometime. The Women to Drive movement was a campaign by Saudi women who prompted demonstrations on women’s rights to drive. Beginning in the 1990’s, 47 Saudi women participated in the kingdoms first protest  against the ban to drive. These women drove around Riyadh, and were arrested, lost their passports and some their jobs.   In 2011, during the Arab Spring some women organized an intensive driving campaign in June where at least 70 women were documented and one woman was sentenced to 10 lashes  as punishment, which was later revoked. The #women2drive movement has been very vocal over the years to gain access to driving rights for women.

The decision was condemned by Saudi traditionalists on social media as well by some members of Saudi “ulema”, the group of recognized Islamic scholars. The decision to loosen the law on women driving is viewed as part of a larger effort by the current crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, to relax some of the country’s strict social laws.

On Saturday September 23rd, Saudi Arabia also allowed women into the national stadium  for the first time as it launched celebrations to make the 87th anniversary of its founding. Women had to sit in a separate area from men, as well as enter through a separate gate to the stadium but, hundreds of women attended the event in the capital Riyadh. A public event such as this one is normally forbidden under Sharia law due to the public segregation of sexes.

Two years ago the Saudi government launched its Vision 2030  program. Vision 2030 is a long-term blueprint program of economic and social reforms designed to modernize Saudi Arabia and wean off its reliance on oil revenue. Allowing for more relaxation on social reform programs in regards to women.

Women in the Saudi Arabia have very few rights. In 2015 for the first time, they were allowed to vote in local municipal elections. They also can campaign for public office, however, women were not allowed to speak to male voters and couldn’t have both men and women working in their campaign offices. In 2015, 17 women were elected to local municipal positions. Women can attain college. They can also play sports and compete in the Olympics, which in 2016 Saudi Arabia sent four women to play.

The list of restrictions on women in Saudi Arabia is extensive and includes the inability to marry, divorce, travel, open a bank account, get a job, or have specific surgeries without the permission of their male guardians. Guardianship laws  in Saudi Arabia govern nearly every aspect of a woman’s life.

Toward the end of 1979, the Great Mosque of Mecca was overrun by a group of jihadis under Juhayman al-Otaybi, who challenged the house of Saud’s legitimacy over its ties to the west. Following the attack the kingdom undertook stricter enforcement of sharia law, in part to pacify the criticism that led to the Grand Mosque siege. This led to the 1980 establishment of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,  known as the Mutawiyin, who were responsible for the enforcement of Sharia laws, including guardianship laws. In April of 2016, the Saudi government reigned in the influence of the Mutawiyin, by removing their authority to independently conduct arrests.

Several other laws that restrict women in Saudi society is that women cannot freely mix with members of the opposite sex, women also cannot go in public without wearing a full-length black abaya, they cannot start their own business, because she needs at least two male sponsors to testify to her character. They also, cannot retain custody of their children if they are divorced, after the age of seven for boys and nine for girls – the children then go to the father. They cannot apply for an ID or passport without permission of their male guardian. A woman cannot eat alone in a restaurant unless they have a separate designated family section with a divider. Finally, they cannot also get a fair hearing in court or receive an equal inheritance. All of these restrictions fall under Sharia law.

Although women have “won” the fight to gain access to driving, they are limited in most other disciplines of life. Saudi government lifting the ban noting that there was no religious justification for it. The council of senior religious scholars, Saudi’s top religious body said the decision to let women drive complies with Islamic law.

Women in Saudi Arabia still have a long way to go in terms of gaining liberties. While this is obviously a very important step for Saudi Arabia, the influence of guardianship laws continues to persist.

Saudi University Dismissing Muslim Brotherhood-Linked Academics

A university in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is dismissing academics who are believed to have ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The university reportedly found evidence that a number of Saudi and foreign academics were linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.  The removal of these academics is an attempt to protect The Saudi educational system from Brotherhood influence.

In the past two weeks, Saudi authorities have allegedly arrested over 30 clerics and intellectuals in an attempt to crack down on dissent. The State Security Presidency arrested these clerics and intellectuals after monitoring their activities in the belief that they were acting for the benefit of foreign parties against the kingdom.

Three prominent clerics who were arrested were Salman al-Ouda, Aidh al-Qarni, and Ali al-Omary. Al-Qarni has advocated jihad in the past and has been described as influential among al-Qaeda followers.

Salman al-Ouda was jailed in the 1990s in Saudi Arabia for radicalism and his association with Osama Bin Laden. Al-Ouda has been a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood and also a founding member of the Global Anti-Aggression Campaign which is a coalition of Salafi, Salafi-Jihadi, Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas leaders.

In the 1950s, Saudi Arabia was a shelter for thousands of Brotherhood activists facing repression in Egypt, Syria and other countries. The Brotherhood soon became engrained both in Saudi society and in the Saudi state.

When Brotherhood activists fled to Saudi Arabia, many were given positions in Saudi schools by Saudi leaders who were sympathetic to their cause. The Muslim Brotherhood’s doctrine of education focuses on indoctrinating activists whose manners, way of thinking and sense of duty were aligned with the Brotherhood’s objectives.

In 2015, Saudi schools removed about 80 religious books including books written by Muslim Brotherhood ideologues Hassan Al Banna, Yousuf Al Qaradawi and Sayyed Qutb. Hassan Al Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt and Sayyed Qutb was a leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s.

Saudi Islamist movements, specifically the Sahwa (Awakening), grew in Saudi Arabia. The relationship between the Sahwa and the regime was harmonious in the beginning until the 1980s when the Sahwa began criticizing the regime’s policies.

In the 1990s the Sahwa movement attempted a political reform campaign which led to a strain on the relationship, with the regime expelling several Brotherhood members. In the early 2000s, the relationship improved, allowing the Sahwa back into religious and social aspects in the country as long as they avoided criticism of the government. The Arab Spring encouraged the Sahwa to attempt political reform again but they were unsuccessful.

In February 2014, a royal decree was created to punish any person who was involved in, supported, or promoted a terrorist group. A month later, Saudi Arabia named the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. The Saudi kingdom fears the Brotherhood seeks to topple the Saudi regime and has tried to build support inside the kingdom since the Arab Spring.

In June, Saudi Arabia was one of 5 countries to cut ties with Qatar over alleged efforts to undermine the stability of the Gulf States through Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and a variety of designated terrorist groups.

Academics have the capacity to exert great influence over students and are also capable of recruiting some students to support the Brotherhood’s efforts across communities throughout the Middle East and Africa. It remains difficult to determine the full extent of the effort by Saudi authorities to expel Brotherhood-linked academics from institutions in Saudi Arabia because it is unclear how many academics were expelled, and how many may remain.

Qatari Deal for Military Jets as the Gulf Crisis Persists

The Qatari and British governments have signed a “statement of intent” for the sale of 24 Eurofighter Typhoon combat jets from British defense group BAE Systems, worth several billion dollars in an attempt to bolster the gulf state’s military during the gulf crisis with its four other Arab neighbors. The statement of intent was made on September 17th, and would be the first major defense contract between the UK and Qatar.

The British Ministry of Defense said in a statement that the deal with their “strategic partner” has taken several years to negotiate. The ministry also stated that this deal would hope to enhance security within the region across all their gulf allies. This deal also is expected to support 40,000 jobs in Britain.

The fighter jets deal is a joint project between BAE Systems, France’s Airbus, and Italy’s Finmeccanica. The statement did not give the cost of the combat jet deal. However, in 2014 BAE agreed to supply Saudi Arabia with 72 Typhoon jets for $6 billion dollars.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt broke off ties with Qatar on June 5th, accusing the state of supporting terrorist  organizations and attempting to destabilize the region. They have launched an economic boycott stopping Qatar airways fights from using their airspace, closing off the land border with Saudi Arabia, and blocking its shipments from their ports.

The four Arab nations set a list of 13 demands.  Some of these demands include limiting diplomatic ties to Iran, shutting down the state-funded Al-Jazeera news network, severing ties to all terrorist organization, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah, shutting down the Turkish military base, handing over terrorist figures, and aligning its foreign and defense policy with that of its fellow Gulf Cooperation Council member states.

Qatar has continued to deny its close relationship with Iran as well as funding terror organizations.

Qatar is a relatively small nation of about 2.3 million located on the Arabian Peninsula into the Persian Gulf. It has the highest per capita income in the world due to its extensive natural gas reserves. Qatar’s own military is relatively small for the region, the army is estimated to be around 12,000 troops.

Shortly after the Gulf crisis began, on June 14th the United States approved a $12 billion-dollar deal with Qatar  to sell F-15 fighter jets, even though President Trump has accused the nation of supporting terrorism and sided with the Saudi-led bloc. Earlier in November of 2016 under the Obama administration there was a $21.1 billion dollar deal  already in the works, and the current deal under the Trump administration added to the number of jets in production. The previous deal approved the possible sale of up to 72 F-15 aircrafts.

The Qatari air force is estimated to only contain 12 operational jets and their air force consists of 1,500 individuals. The number of jets under the deals of the British and Americans raise questions about Qatar’s intentions. Both deals have been under work for years, but the timing of the announcements are clearly intended to send a message regarding Qatar’s relationship with the western posters.

The Qatari government’s fighter jet buying spree is best understood in the context of Qatari efforts to bolster support from western powers during the blockade.

The gulf crisis between Qatar and its neighbors came to the fore beginning in 2011 during the Arab Spring, as Qatar and its neighbors found themselves on different sides of various Islamist-led uprisings in the region. In particular the UAE began to blame Qatar for backing the Muslim Brotherhood, which the UAE alleged was in engaged in subversive activities. In 2013 Qatar was accused of breaching the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) security agreement of failing to commit to promises of not interfering in the internal affairs of the fellow GCC states and of harboring hostile media, referring to Al-Jazeera.

In March of 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain suspended diplomatic ties with Qatar due to their support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Later in November of 2014, after 8 months of tension and frozen relations with Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain, agreed to return their ambassadors, ending the suspension of diplomatic ties.

The British have been attempting to mediate the crisis with Kuwait. Foreign Secretary of England, Boris Johnson, in a statement said that “the security of the gulf is our security” and that the British will remain deeply committed to the stability of the entire region.  The United States on the other hand is split with how to align.

President Trump has previously declared that the blockade “hard but necessary,”  and overtly criticized Qatar for its role in terror finance, but other Trump administration officials have sent mixed messages, including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. Tillerson is perceived as having sided with Qatar, a country with which he has a long history of cooperation during his time as CEO of ExxonMobil.

Although the crisis is unlikely to lead to an armed conflict, the United States needs to keep an eye on the increase in Qatar’s military deal making.

Another factor to consider is that Qatar is  home to the largest U.S. military base in the region. Qatar’s al-Udeid Air Base,  is a crucial staging ground for U.S. operations in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, and is one of several American military outposts across the Gulf that are intended to serve as a bulwark against Iran but now put Washington in a delicate balancing act.

The base is home to an estimated 11,000 U.S. Military personnel and was built in the 1990s. Qatar invested over $1 billion to construct the base, in an attempt to facilitate a deeper cooperation with U.S. military.

As the Qatar-Gulf crisis persists, it is unclear how the blockade will be resolved.

United States and the United Kingdom, have chosen to tread lightly with Qatar, largely due to Qatar’s role in the energy market and its perceived importance as a military staging ground for counterterrorism efforts.

Qatar’s arms deal diplomacy must not be allowed to distract from the central issue. Trump Administration officials need to stand behind the president’s decision that Qatar must alter its behavior. Both the U.S. and its Western allies, including Britain, ultimately cannot tolerate Qatar’s support for terrorism, and its intentional destabilization of the Middle East/North Africa region.

 

Did the Saudi embassy fund a “test run” for 9/11 hijackings?

The New York Post is reporting that new evidence suggests the Saudi embassy may have funded a “test run” for the 9/11 hijackings.

According to documents submitted in a lawsuit against the Saudi government by 9/11 family members, in 1999 the embassy paid for two Saudi nationals, Mohammed al-Qudhaeein and Hamdan al-Shalawi, to fly from Phoenix to Washington, D.C. The documents, drawn from FBI files, allege that the Saudis, who entered the United States as students, were members of “the Kingdom’s network of agents in the US,” and participated in the terrorist conspiracy. The two individuals both reportedly trained at al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and kept regular contacts with one of the hijacker pilots and a senior al-Qaeda leader.

During their test Qudhaeein and Shalawi attempted to gain access to the cockpit of the plane multiple times. Their actions resulted in the plane making an emergency landing in Ohio individuals were handcuffed and questioned by the FBI.

The FBI also confirmed that Qudhaeein’s and Shalawi’s airline tickets for the pre-9/11 dry run were paid for by the Saudi Embassy.

The current lawsuit against the Saudi government follows the passage of the  Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), which allows courts to waive claims of sovereign immunity for foreign government officials in cases involving acts of terrorism on U.S. soil.

The law was passed in 2016, partially in response to the 2015 decision of a U.S. Judge to dismiss claims against Saudi Arabia by families of victims  of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. who accused the country of providing material support to al Qaeda. U.S. District Judge George Daniels in Manhattan said Saudi Arabia had sovereign immunity from damage claims by the victims. Fifteen of the nineteen men who carried out the 2001 attacks were Saudi nationals.

On July 15th 2016, 28 pages of declassified material  from the “Congressional Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11”,  were released by Congress and show multiple links between associates of Saudi Arabian Prince Bandar, the former longtime ambassador to the United States, and 9/11 hijackers. The reports suggest possible conduits of money from the Saudi royal family to Saudis living in the United States and two of the hijackers in San Diego. The documents also indicate substantial support to California mosques with a high degree of jihadis sentiment. However, some of this information from the released pages are unconfirmed allegations.

While the 9/11 commission report which was published in 2004, found no direct evidence at the time that senior Saudi officials were involved in the 9/11 attack, the report did criticize the Saudi government for tolerating radical Islam by funding schools and mosques around the world that spread jihadist ideology. The report also noted that some rich Saudis gave money to charities with terrorist links.

The Saudi Arabian government continues to deny any ties to the terrorists who carried out the 9/11 attacks. On August 1st 2017, the Saudi government requested the dismissal of a $100 billion dollar lawsuit filed before the U.S. District Court in Manhattan for 25 pending 9/11 lawsuits.  A decision has not been made yet, however, with this new evidence linking the Saudi embassy to the dry run test for the hijackers, may allow for the victims claims to be upheld in court.

Arab States Sever Ties with Qatar

On Monday, several Arab states cut ties with Qatar over accusations that the small gulf states intervenes in their affairs and supports terrorism in the region. Bahrain was the first nation that cut its ties with Qatar, and then Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Maldives followed suit and cut all their diplomatic ties with Qatar.

According to Saudi State News Agency (SPA), Bahrain cut its ties due to their belief that Qatar has meddled in its domestic affairs, and has funded terrorists’ groups associated with Iran.

Saudi Arabia severed land, sea, and air contacts with Qatar due to the violation of agreements signed under the umbrella of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The Saudis allege Qatar violated agreements to cease instigating hostility against Saudi Arabia and stop support of terrorist groups. The official Saudi statement made an effort to clarify that Saudi Arabia supports the people of Qatar but not the authorities in Doha.

Similarly, UAE, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Maldives cut their diplomatic ties with Qatar to show their solidarity in fighting against terrorism and Qatar’s support of Islamist militias seeking to overthrow their regimes.

According to BBC, the most recent escalation came after reportedly Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, made a speech in late May 2017 criticizing the US, offering support for Iran and reaffirming their support of Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas.

In addition, the Qatar News Agency reported that Qatar was going to withdraw support from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Egypt due to “conspiracy” against Qatar. While Qatar officials refuted the news, it damaged the relations between Qatar and the aforementioned states.

According to Politico,  Secretary Tillerson predicts that these actions will not have any impact in their unified actions with Gulf states against terrorism.

While the US works with Qatar militarily, the US has had tense relations with this state because of Qatari support for terrorists’ organizations.

In addition, Al-Jazeera, which is a Qatar-owned news agency continually, provides slanted news coverage in the Middle East causing concern for the US. According to the National Interest, this news agency provides a platform for Anti-American and Anti-Semitic sentiments and uses words such as “victims” and “martyrs” to describe terrorist operatives.

The tensions are nothing new to some of the Gulf states. In 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar for several months protesting that Qatar was interfering in their affairs. According to BBC, wealthy individuals in Qatar have been known to provide donations to terrorism groups. Furthermore, the Qatar government has supported Islamist groups in Syria with money and weapons.

The move may impact petroleum markets, as Qatar is one of the world’s largest exporter of liquified gas. According to Qatar Tribune, Qatar can still access shipping routes to export its natural gas despite the severed relations with several Arab nations in the region. Qatar is the fourth largest producer of natural gas and oil, and it only has the following five Middle Eastern customers for its natural gas, which compromised 10% of the sales in 2016: Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, UAE, and Egypt.

The majority of its LGS is shipped to other parts of the world and this increased tension will not impact its exports significantly.

The cutting of ties by Arab states threatens to impact Qatar’s economy, food availability, cost of flights, and its construction plans for the World Cup in 2022. While Qatar is under fire from its neighboring Arab states, it has received the backing of Iran.

Qatar has been a supporter of Islamic groups such as Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas despite the opposition by other Arab states over the years. While these tensions are nothing new in the region, President Trump’s visit, two weeks ago, may have emboldened these Gulf states to take a stronger stance against Qatar by showing a united front to Qatar and the world.

President Trump expressed his support in one of his recent tweets by stating, “During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there can no longer be funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar – look!”

Kuwait has reportedly offered to mediate this tension, and Qatar is receptive to the offer. The plan is for Kuwait’s emir to go to Saudi Arabia on Tuesday and meet with Saudi’s officials. It remains to be seen the impact of Kuwait in this regional conflict and whether or not Kuwait can truly remain neutral.

The cutting of diplomatic ties with Qatar should be a warning signal for any state that harbors or sponsors terrorism. The concerted effort by the Arab states is a step in the right direction in aiding the US in its fight against terrorism and in stabilizing the Middle East.

 

Is Iran getting ready to choke oil supply lines?

On January 30th a boat piloted by a Houthi suicide bomber crashed into a frigate of the Saudi Royal Navy off the coast of Yemen. Due to the attacker yelling “Allahu Akbar, death to America, death to Israel” before crashing the Pentagon thinks the attack was meant for a U.S. Navy ship.

Basing this analysis on the attacker’s slogan is a mistake, since “Death to America…” is part of the Houthi rebel motto. This means that the Houthis probably use it when attacking troops and military installations that do not belong to the U.S.

The rebels have been engaged in a yearlong war with the Yemeni forces supporting of President Hadi and their Saudi allies.

Most of the support for President Hadi comes from a Saudi led coalition of Sunni states who have been bombing Houthi held cities and positions. The Saudi airstrikes and bombardments have caused a major humanitarian crisis in Yemen with aid workers being unable to penetrate Houthi held areas.

Since the Houthi Rebels are at war with Saudi Arabia it is entirely reasonable that they would launch an attack on Saudi ships.

Within two day of the attack Tehran announced that it has held another ballistic missile tests. The head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said that with these missiles Iran can hit moving objects such as ships.

So Houthi rebels are accused of conducting a suicide bombing of a Saudi frigate and within two day the head of IRGC proclaims that Iran has missiles that can strike warships. Since Iran has been supplying weapons and cash to the Houthi rebels, it’s reasonable to believe the two incidents might be connected.

In October Iran deployed battleships to the Gulf of Aden claiming that the purpose of the ships is to protect the Houthi rebels and “Iran’s interests on the high seas.” The Gulf is the main passage point for Saudi oil heading towards Europe.

If oil tankers could not pass through the Gulf then they would have to travel through the Horn of Africa. This rerouting would increase costs and travel time causing oil prices to rise.

Iranian battleships off the coast of Yemen, their new ballistic missile tests, and the Houthi boat attacks could be part of Tehran’s attempts to use the Rebels as proxies to force the Saudis to abandon the Gulf of Aden as a transit point.

With the use of ballistic missiles and suicide bombings the Houthis could force oil tankers to reroute and travel through the Horn of Africa. The rebels have already used boats to attack Saudi coalition forces in the past. The same tactics could be applied to oil tankers especially since they are not well armed like military ships.

Houthis have also used ballistic missiles to attack U.S. battleships. Last October Houthi missiles targeted USS Mason, but fortunately no American service members were hurt and the ship was not damaged. So using Iranian missiles against large and slow targets like oil tankers is possible.

Using Houthis as proxies would allow Iran to escape U.S. retaliation while at the same time hurting America’s Saudi and European allies. Tehran could avoid direct military confrontation while at the same time choking off one of the main point for oil shipments.

The Iranians might also use the Gulf of Aden to test U.S. resolve in case Tehran goes through its promise of blocking the Strait of Hormuz, which would effectively block most of the world’s oil supply.

If the Americans and the Saudis allow the Houthis to inflict enough damage on oil tankers that they would be forced to reroute their shipments it might convince Tehran that the U.S. is not serious about its commitments in the region. Emboldened by U.S. failure to defend the Gulf Iran could try to force a confrontation at Hormuz hoping that Washington would back away again.

Plus, the Gulf narrowest point is 18 miles compared to the Strait’s 21. Given how close both are in size, blockading the Gulf of Aden could be used as a practice round for choking the Strait of Hormuz.

By supplying the Houthi rebels and firing missiles Iran could be testing U.S. resolve. So far Washington has failed to stop either, which could push Tehran to further increase its influence in the region.

 

Houthi Attack on US Adds to Yemen Conflict

On Saturday October 8th an airstrike led by Saudi Arabia targeted a funeral being held in Houthi rebel occupied Sana’a, Yemen. The attack killed 140 and leaving more than 600 wounded.

The funeral was for Sheikh Ali al-Rawishan, the father of Galal al-Rawishan who is a Houthi ally. Galal al-Rawishan serves as the interior minister for the Houthi rebel government. Rawishan is a member of the Khawlan tribe, one of many tribes that surround Sana’a.

The coalition aimed to take out Houthi leaders and allies. Several senior military commanders and soldiers attended the funeral, and several were killed in the airstrikes. The mayor of Sana’a, Abdulqader Hilal, was also killed. Hilal was neutral in the war between the Yemen government and the Houthis and who sought to be a lead negotiator between the two sides.

Conflict in Yemen erupted in 2014 when the Shia Houthis, took over Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his government fled south to Aden. The Houthis are allied with the former president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh and backed by Iran. President Hadi is backed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies, most notably the United Arab Emirates. Both sides are fighting for control of Yemen.

This attack was the deadliest attack by Saudi Arabia against the Houthis since March 2015, when they started a campaign of airstrikes.

The United States has advised the Saudi Arabia-led coalition not to continue the air campaign and stressed that civilian casualties need to end. During the last 18 months several hospitals, schools and homes have been destroyed causing a public relations problem for the Saudi-coalition.

The US has historically backed Saudi Arabia, and has done so publicly in the Yemeni campaign. However the US has also been supplying air support to Iranian-linked Shia militias fighting the Islamic State in Iraq. The US preoccupation with first achieving, and then supporting the Iran Nuclear Deal, even in the wake of Iranian provocation, has confused and frustrated traditional regional allies.

One such provocation was the firing of two anti-ship missiles from Houthi positions targeting US warships in the Red Sea. Both appeared to have splashed harmlessly after U.S. Ships deployed countermeasures.

On October 13th 4 am local time, the US military launched missiles strikes in Houthi-occupied Yemen, striking 3 coastal radar sites. This is the first direct US attack against the Houthis in the Yemen conflict.

The attacks have since continued. Sunday, October 16th a missile was again fired at the USS Mason and one on the USS Ponce. The warships were not hit.

Iran responded by deploying two vessels to the Red Sea, calling it an anti-piracy action to protect critical trade routes.

Iran plays an important but not visible role in these attacks. The Iranians back the Houthis because they are Shiite and putting pressure on the Saudi government. If the Houthi forces successfully secured Yemen, they would be able to target shipping in the Red Sea, an important sea channel for Saudi oil. The Houthi missile attacks, while unsuccessful against modern U.S. warship, reflect the danger of permitting an Iranian-backed force controlling these strategic areas.

Since the Yemen war broke out, the United Nations has stated that more than 10,000 have been killed and 4,00 have been civilians.  The war has left 3 million people displaced causing a countrywide famine.  That number will most likely continue to increase as the Yemeni civil war resumes. Iran will not abandon it’s proxies in Yemen because they continue to seek to challenge Saudi Arabia and the gulf alliance in the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia cannot end it’s campaign without successfully ending the Houthi ability to successfully target it’s assets and trade routes, a threat which clearly still exists.

Center Assesses ‘28 Pages’ Insights Into Saudi Double-Game, Clinton Role In Exacerbating Threat

Press Release                                                                                                     

For Immediate Release        

9 August 2016                                                                  

Contact: Clare Lopez 202-719-2423

 

CENTER ASSESSES ‘28 PAGES’ INSIGHTS INTO SAUDI DOUBLE-GAME AMIDST REVELATIONS OF CLINTON ROLE IN EXACERBATING ITS THREAT HERE

Washington, D.C.: Investigative reporter Paul Sperry revealed yesterday at CounterJihad.com the extent to which Hillary Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State reversed many of the measures put into place after 9/11 to protect the United States from additional Saudi jihadist attacks.

The necessity for such measures was underscored by the contents of the so-called “28 Pages,” a portion of the original congressional investigation conducted in the wake of the death and destruction caused by 15 Saudi nationals and four other Islamic supremacists on September 11, 2001. These pages had, until recently, been withheld from the American people and only were released last month in a redacted form.

The Center for Security Policy released today a white paper entitled “What’s in the 28 Pages?” providing valuable background information about this report and key highlights of its findings and offering recommendations as to a variety of changes with respect to U.S. policy towards Saudi Arabia and other enablers of and participants in the Global Jihad Movement.

Upon releasing this report, Center President Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. observed:

At a moment when Hillary Clinton’s foreign policy judgment and experience are properly the subject of intense scrutiny and debate, her role in undoing sensible measures aimed at protecting this country and its people from further Saudi treachery must be carefully considered. Such an analysis must, in turn, be informed by the insights about a specific and devastating example of such treachery: the 9/11 jihadist attacks on the United States.

The Center’s newest white paper illuminates the 28 Pages’ findings about the extent to which Saudi officials – including long-time ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar – were implicated along with various other nationals of their country, including of course, fifteen out of nineteen of the hijackers. The unmistakable implication is that the status Saudi Arabia enjoyed as a trusted ally prior to September 11, 2001 contributed to the execution of this murderous act of jihad. Similarly, it was eminently sensible after those attacks occurred to reduce dramatically Saudi student visas and to monitor more closely those Saudis coming to and inside the United States.

In light of what’s in the 28 Pages, America needs urgently to revisit decisions taken on Hillary Clinton’s watch that undid such sensible measures – and vigorously question those responsible.

A PDF of “What’s in the 28 Pages” is embedded below.

28_pages

– 30 –

5 Troubling Takeaways From The Declassified 9/11 Pages

The infamous 28 previously classified pages from Congress’ joint inquiry into intelligence activities surrounding 9/11 represent far more than a symbolic reckoning with a politically controversial history of apparent Saudi duplicity that the U.S. government felt it imperative to suppress.

As we continue to be struck by jihadists at home and abroad under an at best rudderless and at worst suicidal national security and foreign policy, the report’s substance is live, relevant and beckons critical questions that ought to be demanded by our representatives and the public at large.

Why the federal government in general, and Bush and Obama administrations in particular, sought to keep such information from the public for 15 years is a worthy question, as is the question of why law enforcement did not move to arrest and prosecute or deport many of the individuals associated with the 9/11 attack that were under investigation.

Hindsight is 20/20, it is an open secret that diplomatic officials in foreign countries frequently are involved in pernicious activities like espionage and are provided with certain privileges and immunities if not legally than politically derived. Intelligence and law enforcement officials must use their discretion as to whether to move on suspects or continue monitoring them in the hopes of uncovering bigger networks and threats.

But the suspicious activities and associations of the individuals described in these 28 pages are well beyond the pale, as are many of the report’s other findings.

Here are five of the most consequential points from the 28 declassified pages, along with the critical questions we must be demanding of our government:

  1. America subordinated National Security to politicsThe first page of the report notes that “Prior to September 11th, the FBI apparently did not focus investigative resources on [redacted] Saudi nationals in the United States due to Saudi Arabia’s status as an American “ally.”

    Given the House of Saud’s longtime funding of and overall support for Islamic supremacist Wahhabism around the world, this admission is stunning.

    And it raises questions that we should be asking today.

    Does the intelligence community not focus investigative resources on Saudi nationals in America today? How about nationals from other Sunni nations in the Middle East that harbor jihadists? What about Iranian nationals, now that the Islamic Republic upon whom we have lavished over $100 billion and offered protection of their nuclear infrastructure has become a de facto ally against ISIS?

    Was the decision not to pursue Saudi nationals a conscious move to subordinate national security considerations to political ones? Is this still American policy?

    There are other revelations as well that merit grave concern and inquiry.

  2. Jihadi front group Proliferated on American soil (and they persist)

    Omar al-Bayoumi, a suspected Saudi intelligence officer who “provided substantial assistance” to two of the 9/11 hijackers was reportedly in contact with individuals under FBI investigation. He also communicated with others at the Holy Land Foundation, which had been under investigation for and ultimately would be charged with providing material support for Hamas as a fundraising front.The federal government today considers individuals from Muslim Brotherhood-tied groups to be legitimate law enforcement partners with whom to consult and to whom to outsource Countering Violent Extremism efforts. Glaringly, law enforcement continues to collaborate with The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)—an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation case—in spite of policies to the contrary.

    Does law enforcement work to identify and monitor the activities of such groups? What are the standards for shutting down such groups? Does law enforcement monitor the activities of those tied to such groups and pursue investigations when merited? What specific policies and practices in place today would prevent other Omar al-Bayoumis from operating on American soil?

  3. Islamic Supremacist Mosques Proliferated on American Soil (And They Persist)

    Several times the 28 pages’ authors make reference to a mosque “widely known for its anti-Western views” that was created in 1998 with funding from the late Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdulaziz. The Culver City, CA-based King Fahad Mosque, then led by among others jihadist-supporting imam Sheikh al-Thumairy—an accredited diplomat at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles—remains open today.This raises a number of questions.

    If the King Fahad Mosque has not been shut down in spite of the facts described above, on what grounds would the government shut down a mosque? What, if any policies, has the federal government considered in connection with the funding of mosques and other institutions in the U.S. from regimes with ties to jihad? Does law enforcement monitor mosques for anti-Western or other subversive views today? Given exemptions for religious experts, what immigration protections are there to stop Islamic supremacist imams from entering the U.S.?

    It bears noting that a survey of 100 mosques in America revealed that 84.5% of such mosques had an imam recommending studying violence-positive texts. 58% of mosques invited guest imams who had been known to promote violent jihad.

  4. Jihadists believed Islamic supremacist immigration had hit critical mass over a decade ago

    Another vital section of the report concerns Osama Bassnan, an individual with extensive ties to both two of the 9/11 hijackers and the Saudi government. Page 428 reads:

    Bassnan…stated to an FBI asset that he heard that the U.S. Government had stopped approving visas for foreign students. He considered such measures to be insufficient as there are already enough Muslims in the United States to destroy the United States and make it an Islamic state within ten to fifteen years.

    Juxtapose this statement with the fact that America has admitted approximately 1.6 million immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries between 2001 and 2013, among other critical data on Islamic immigration compiled by Conservative Review’s Daniel Horowitz.

    While Bassnan is just one man, whether our federal government recognizes it or not, immigration is a tenet of jihad known as “Al-Hijra.” While we fret over the potential for jihadist infiltration among refugees from the Middle East today, over a decade ago Islamic supremacists were already claiming that there was a critical mass of Islamic supremacists ready, willing and able to ultimately take down America.

    Should not all future immigration policies be formulated based upon an understanding of the jihadis’ goals, strategies and tactics? Should not current homeland security policies be focused upon isolating and removing the jihadist cancer already metastasizing within?

  5. Saudi self-interest trumped all, and America was (and is) willfully blind

    One of the most significant statements in the declassified pages comes courtesy of a veteran New York FBI agent. In light of Saudi recalcitrance when it came to Islamic terrorism investigations before and after 9/11, this agent “stated that, from his point of view, the Saudis have been useless and obstructionist for years. In this agent’s opinion, the Saudis will only act when it is in their self-interest.”The report goes on to cite several examples of Saudi non-cooperation.

    What is so critical here is that the FBI agent in question identified openly and honestly the nature of the House of Saud. His description could work for practically all other regimes not only in the Middle East but throughout the world.

    One wonders, does U.S. foreign policy start from the first principle of identifying the nature of such regimes, as well as non-state actors with whom they may or may not be allied?

I would submit that self-evidently our national security and foreign policies do not recognize the comprehensive nature of the jihadist threat, Sunni and Shia, state and non-state, violent and civilizational, as has been reflected in numerous examples from the revelations of the recent Senate Judiciary Committee “willful blindness” hearing, to the redaction of the Orlando jihadist transcript, to the purging of documents that identify the very nature of the jihadist threat on American soil from law enforcement offices.

Given the perilous state of America’s national security and foreign policy today with respect to a global jihadist enemy that we fail to even call by its name, it is readily apparent that while we may have identified failures in connection with 9/11, we have not adequately answered the question as to what we must do to prevent such failures in the future.

The declassified 28 pages provide another opportunity for us to ask the necessary questions and seek out answers that may mean the difference between life and death for our nation.

Prince Turki bin Faisal Al-Saud Drops Bombshell at Iranian Opposition Rally

At the annual gathering of Iranians outside of Paris, France on 9 July 2016, where some 100,000 showed up to express support for regime change in Tehran, one of the guest speakers dropped a bombshell announcement. Even before he took the podium, Prince Turki bin Faisal Al-Saud, appearing in the distinctive gold-edged dark cloak and white keffiyeh headdress of the Saudi royal family, of which he is a senior member, drew commentary and lots of second looks. The Prince is the founder of the King Faisal Foundation, and chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, and served from 1977-2001 as director general of Al-Mukhabarat Al-A’amah, Saudi Arabia’s intelligence agency, resigning the position on 1 September 2001, some ten days before the attacks of 9/11.

He took the podium late in the afternoon program on 9 July and, after a discourse on the shared Islamic history of the Middle East, launched into an attack on Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose 1979 revolution changed the course of history not just in Iran, but throughout the world. His next statement sent a shock wave through the assembly: Bin Faisal pledged support to the Iranian NCRI opposition and to its President-elect Maryam Rajavi personally. Given bin Faisal’s senior position in the Saudi royal family and his long career in positions of key responsibility in the Kingdom, it can only be understood that he spoke for the Riyadh government. The hall erupted in cheers and thunderous applause.

Iranians and others who packed the convention center in Bourget, Paris came for a day-long program attended by representatives from around the world. Organized by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the event featured a day filled with speeches and musical performances. A senior-level U.S. delegation included Linda Chavez, Chairwoman of the U.S. Center for Equal Opportunity; former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich; former Governor of Pennsylvania and Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge; Judge Michael Mukasey; former Governor of Vermont and Presidential candidate Howard Dean; and former national security advisor to President George W. Bush, Fran Townsend.

The NCRI and its key affiliate, the Mujahedeen-e Kahlq (MEK), were on the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list until 2012, having been placed there at the express request of Iranian president Khatami. Iranian university students formed the MEK in the 1960s to oppose the Shah’s rule. The MEK participated in the Khomeini Revolution but then was forced into exile when Khomeini turned on his own allies and obliterated any hopes for democratic reform. Granted protection by the U.S. under the 4th Geneva Convention in 2004, remnants of the MEK opposition have been stranded in Iraq, first at Camp Ashraf and now in Camp Liberty near Baghdad since U.S. forces left Iraq. Completely disarmed and defenseless, the 2,000 or so remaining residents of Camp Liberty, who are desperately seeking resettlement, come under periodic deadly attack by Iraqi forces under Iranian Qods Force direction. The most recent rocket attack on July 4th, 2016 set much of the camp ablaze and devastated the Iranians’ unprotected mobile homes. The MEK/NCRI fought their terrorist designations in the courts in both Europe and the U.S., finally winning removal in 2012. The NCRI’s national headquarters are now located in downtown Washington, DC, from where they work intensively with Congress, the media, and U.S. society to urge regime change and a genuinely liberal democratic platform for Iran.

Given the Obama administration’s close alignment with the Tehran regime, it is perhaps not surprising that the NCRI and Riyadh (both feeling marginalized by the U.S.) should find common cause to oppose the mullahs’ unceasing quest for deliverable nuclear weapons, aggressively expansionist regional agenda, and destabilizing involvement in multiple area conflicts, especially its extensive support for the murderous rule of Bashar al-Assad. Nevertheless, the implications of official Riyadh government support for the largest, most dedicated, and best-organized Iranian opposition movement will reverberate through the Middle East.

Although not openly stated by bin Faisal, the new NCRI-Riyadh alliance may be expected to involve funding, intelligence sharing, and possible collaboration in operations aimed at the shared goal of overthrowing the current Tehran regime. The alignment doubtless will change the course of events in the Middle East, and while Saudi Arabia can hardly be counted among the liberal democracies of the world, the woman-led NCRI movement declares a 10-point plan for Iran that does embrace the ideals of Western Civilization. The impact of the Saudi initiative will not be limited to Iran or the surrounding region but at least as importantly, surely will be felt internally as well, among a young and restless Saudi population that looks hopefully to the rule of King Salman and his 30-something son, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al-Saud.

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Clare M. Lopez is the Vice President for Research and Analysis at the Center for Security Policy