Tag Archives: Somalia

AMISOM and U.S. Forces Kill Several High-Level Commanders in Al Shabaab

On Tuesday, April 5, 2016, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) reported it had killed several top commanders of the terrorist organization, Al Shabaab. The commanders killed include: Abdirashir Bugdube, Sheik Mohamed Ali, Aden Bale, a Yemeni bomb maker named “Abu Islam,” Mohamed Abribao, and Sheikh Mansur.

Al Shabaab has been experiencing increased resistance from African Union (AU) and U.S. forces in the new year. In February, the Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) targeted a training camp for Al Shabaab’s intelligence division, Amniyat, in an airstrike. The strike killed over 50 Al Shabaab members as well as the head of Amniyat, Mahad Mohammed Karatey. In March, the U.S. targeted another Al Shabaab training camp, reportedly killing 150.

Buqdube was listed as one of the top 12 most wanted Al Shabaab members by the Somali government. Buqdube was responsible for the attack on a Ugandan army base, last September. The attack killed 12 Ugandan soldiers, although Al Shabaab claimed they may have killed upwards of 70. After the attack he was promoted to commander of the Janaale region, where this past January another AMISOM base was attacked.

Buqdube was killed when AMISOM forces on patrol intercepted a vehicle carrying the commander.  Also killed in the Janaale region were Sheik Mohamed Ali and Mohammed Abribao. Mohamed Ali served as second in command of the Janaale region, while Abribao served as a judge.

Along with killing the commander of the Janaale region, AMISOM forces were able to kill the commander of the Lego region, Aden Bale. Last June, Al Shabaab raided a Burundi base in the Lego region killing 50 soldiers.

Al Shabaab also lost Sheik Mansour, a chief Al Shabaab trainer in the lower Shabelle region. By attacking Al Shabaab’s training capability, the AU and U.S. forces may be able to slow down major operations carried out by the group.

While the AMISOM forces had a series of successes against Al Shabaab, so has the U.S. IBTimes reported that the U.S. was able to kill Hassan Ali Dhoore, one of Amniyat’s head officials. It is believed that Dhoore was behind to attacks on the Somalia capital, Mogadishu. The Pentagon stated Dhoore’s death is “a significant blow to al-Shabaab’s operational planning and ability to conduct attacks against the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, its citizens, U.S. partners in the region, and against Americans abroad.”

Over the past year, Al Shabaab has been able to reclaim some of the territory it lost to AU forces in 2011. However, AU and U.S. forces may be beginning to push back against the group. Al Shabaab primarily operated in southern Somalia, but they have recently begun to increase attacks and their presence in the Puntland, the northern semi-autonomous region of Somalia.

In March, Al Shabaab took control of the port town of Garad, but soon after lost the city to Puntland forces. This poses complications to the AMISOM mission, as the Puntland lies outside their jurisdiction. Previous to the 2011 AMISOM offensive, Al Shabaab controlled several port cities along the Somali coast that were used to trade charcoal. Al Shabaab also assassinated a Puntland official last week after a suicide bomber who detonated his bomb after hugging the target.

Al Shabaab’s move into the Puntland may be an attempt to stretch AU forces thin. It would appear that AMISOM is once again pushing back against the group, and Al Shabaab is losing leadership quickly. By moving into the Puntland, Al Shabaab may be forcing AMISOM to no longer just focus on the south. If AMISOM leaves Al Shabaab alone in the north, it risks the group controlling a similar amount of territory it had at its height.

While AMISOM and U.S. forces have been able to inflict heavy losses against Al Shabaab’s leadership and ground forces, it is unclear if this will have any meaningful effect. Leadership targeting has been ineffective in the past, and it is too early to tell if the new strategy of targeting camps will be impactful.

Minnesota Imam Interfering with Suspects in Islamic State Court Cases

Hassan Mohamud, a Saint Paul Imam at Dawah Institute, is becoming heavily involved in the legal case of a suspected IS supporter.  Mohamud, who is a law clerk for a defense attorney, convinced the father of one of the suspects to remove his council and allow him to take over.

Hassan “Jaamici” Mohamud was born in Somalia and holds a law degree from William Mitchell College in Minnesota, but is not licensed to practice. Investigative report Patrick Poole has reported that Mahmud gained the attention of the FBI and media after holding a sermon in 2009 called, “The Hell of Living in America.” In 2007, in an interview with Minnesota Law and Politics Magazine about the use of suicide bombings, Mohamud cited Islamic scholars as saying while suicide was generally prohibited suicide bombing were permissible against Israelis.

In an interview with Somalitalk-Minnesota expressed sympathies for Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of Hamas who was killed on March 22, 2004 during an Israeli airstrike, and said Yassin will hopefully be martyred.

Has been openly critical of the Federal Government’s “Building Community Resiliency” program as it stereotypes Somali-Muslims.  Mahmoud has openly criticized Abdullahi Yusuf who last February for working with the government and pleading guilty for being an IS supporter.

Mohamud is clearly recognized as a potential security threat, given that he was barred by the Department of Homeland Security from taking part in a aviation passenger security screening tour with other Muslim leaders. Mohamud claimed was all about politics and that he did the same tour a year before.

Attorney P. Chinedu Nwaneri who was representing IS suspect Mohammad Farah left the case due to the Mohamud’s interference. With a just over a month to go before the five suspected IS supporters go on trial. Federal Prosecutors are concerned that Mohamud’s statements apparently in support of jihad may prejudice the jury and provide grounds of a mistrial. Mohamud has claimed that without him, his client will not have adequate representation in both American and Islamic law.

Mahmoud has been telling young men to plead not guilty to joining the IS and to allow him to take their case and go to trial.

John Hopeman, a defense attorney representing IS suspect Zacaria Abdurahman, noted how his client spent months in the Sheburne County jail with fellow IS suspects Hamza Ahmed and Adnan Farah. Ahmed and Farah adamant about pleading guilty and hopefully get a plea deal, but in the end only Abdurahman was the only one who pleaded guilty.

The night before the hearing Abdurahman’s father got a call from Mohaumd saying his son should not take the plea deal and should instead join Ahmed and Farah in being represented by him, and that all three defendants should go to trial together. Adburahman’s father refused the deal and his son pleaded guilty the following day.

Dan Scott, a lawyer who often represents suspected terrorists, noted that lawyers or members of a law team should not be influencing other defendants how to plead. He noted that Mahmoud’s intervention in this case is troubling and a potential violation of ethic rules that requires that each person receive legal advice from a person without a conflict of interest.

French Navy Seizes Second Large Cache of Weapons off the Coast of Somalia This Month

On March 20, 2016, the French navy seized a ship in the north of the Indian Ocean carrying several hundred AK 47 assault rifles, machines guns, and anti-tank weapons. A French helicopter spotted the vessel that was unregistered, and it was soon intercepted by the FS Providence.

After the French seized the vessel, the crew of 10 were brought in for questioning. There has been no mention of any information given by the crew, but they have since been released.

The French Navy has yet to reveal any further information about the origin or final destination of the ship, but the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the group of nations policing the Indian Ocean, stated the arms were meant for Somalia.

While the CMF reported the ship was destined for Somalia, a U.S. assessment believes the arms were in fact destined for Yemen, originating in Iran. The U.S. came to a similar conclusion after the Australians seized a arms cache from another ship earlier in the month. The Iranians have been accused of arming the Houthi rebels, which gives this assessment credence.

The CMF is made up of 31 nations that patrol vital shipping lanes from terrorism and piracy. Some of the notable nations involved are: the U.S., Australia, Canada, France, and the UK. The CMF’s mission in the Indian Ocean is the Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, which includes the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman.

Reuters reported in 2013 that the Somali terrorist organization Al Shabaab had been receiving weapon shipments from Yemen and Iran. The group receives weapons into the Puntland, the autonomous region of Northern Somalia, and further moves them south to their strongholds.

Al Shabaab is Al Qaeda’s Somalia branch, and the group has received support in the past from AQ’s Yemen branch, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yemen and Somalia are close in proximity, so it is possible to send weapons or personnel through shipping vessels.

Iran does not have any immediate ties to Al Shabaab or any terrorist organization in Somalia could have motivation to arm Al Shabaab. Turkey, who has been supporting Syrian opposition forces against Iran’s ally Syria, just made a deal with the Somali government to increase its investment in the country. In order to counter Turkish interference in Syria, Iran may be willing to aid Al Shabaab in disrupting rebuilding efforts. That said the Turkish-Iranian relationship is highly complex with Iran has previously worked with Turkey on gold sales in order to cheat sanctions.

While it is a possibility Iran could be aiding Al Shabaab, they do not have enough interest in Somalia to actively aid the terrorist organization opposed to the Houthis in Yemen. The Houthis have been fighting the Yemeni government and a Saudi-led coalition of Gulf States since last March. The two groups were able to recently agree on a ceasefire that will take place on April 10. However, this could just be a time for the Houthi rebels to rearm. Iran has reportedly been aiding the rebels, although they deny any of these claims. Iran would surely like to see Saudi influence decrease in Yemen, and backing the Houthis will aid this mission.

While it is unlikely the ship originated in Iran, it is still important that the shipment of arms was stopped. With the CMF forces continually releasing those who pilot the vessels filled with arms, they are likely to continue their trade.

U.S. Drone strike May Suggest New Strategy to Combat Terrorism

On Tuesday, March 22, 2016, a U.S. airstrike targeting an Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) training camp reportedly killed dozens of the groups fighters. The Pentagon has been cautious to reveal the exact location of the camp, but Yemeni security forces have mentioned the camp was situated near AQAP’s stronghold in Mukalla.

The U.S. looks to be instituting a new tactic of targeting large training camps of terrorist organizations. The U.S. in the past have been known to use targeted killings that resulted in the deaths of few terrorists, but these strikes are inflicting wider damage on our enemies.

In February the U.S. targeted an Islamic State (IS) camp in Libya, near the Tunisian border, that killed upwards of 40 IS fighters and Noureddine Chouchane, the organizer of two major attacks in Tunisia. Earlier this month the U.S. targeted an Al Shabaab graduation ceremony in Somalia, which reportedly killed 150 Al Shabaab fighters. In both of these strikes training camps were the primary targets, and this suggests a new effort by the U.S. to attack terrorist organizations’ ability to fight while also targeting their leadership.

 

The same day the U.S. struck the IS camp in Libya, February 19, 2016, the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) struck an Al Shabaab training camp killing Al Shabaab’s head of intelligence. It appears that the U.S. is not the only ones to begin this new tactic. It is likely that more nations will attempt to use this style of strike to inflict the most possible damage on their targets as groups like IS, AQAP, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) make significant gains in their regions.

According to the Long War Journal database, the U.S. has launched roughly 135 airstrikes in Yemen since 2002, and has launched 5 this year alone. A U.S. drone strike targeted and killed Jalal Baleedi, an AQAP senior field commander, earlier this year, but this did little to slow down AQAP’s movement in the country. Shortly after Baleedi’s death AQAP was able to take the town of Ahwar in Southern Yemen, further increasing their area of control over Southern Yemen.

AQAP has been able to take significant territory in Yemen due to the fighting between Houthi rebels and forces supporting the Yemeni government. Since the Houthis pushed out the Yemeni government, the Southern and Western portions of the country have been ungoverned territory and easily captured by groups like AQAP and IS.

The U.S. has attempted to do its part to combat AQAP while a Saudi-led coalition of Gulf States focuses on the Houthi rebels.

  • In April of 2015, Ibrahim al-Rubaish, AQAP’s top ideological leader and mufti, was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen.
  • That same month, a U.S. drone strike killed Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi, a senior AQAP leader and AQ’s global deputy manager.
  • In June 2015, the U.S. was able to target and kill AQAP leader, Nasir al Wuhayshi, also served as AQ’s second in command.

All of these strikes targeted major players in AQAP’s ranks, but they did little to stop the group from claiming important territory within Yemen. This trend was not unique to Yemen, however. In Somalia, the U.S. successfully targeted many high ranking officers within Al Shabaab, yet this did little to hinder the groups gains in the country.

While it is still too early to identify if this new strategy will have any significant impact against terrorist organizations, it is encouraging to see the U.S. and its allies move in a new direction. Targeting membership in depth may have a major effect on a group’s morale, and it will certainly force these organizations to rethink its strategies. It would be wise for the U.S. and other allied nations to get the most out of this new strategy before these organizations change their tactics.

AU and U.S. Forces Inflict Heavy Losses on Al Shabaab

A U.S. drone strike targeting a terrorist training camp killed 150 members of the Somali terrorist organization Al-Shabaab. The Pentagon reports that the fighters were preparing for a major attack on U.S. and African Union (AU) forces in the country.

The attack is the deadliest on Al Shabaab forces in the decade-long campaign. The attack also follows a successful airstrike by Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) on a graduation ceremony for Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing, Amniyat. That strikes killed 42 jihadists including the head of Amniyat, Mahad Mohammed Karatey.

The common theme between these two attacks is they targeted graduations and training facilities which may represent a new approach of AU and U.S. forces to combatting Al Shabaab. Targeted killings have been used in the past, but the casualty rate is usually low, while these strikes were timed to target a large number of fighters, killing close to two-hundred Al Shabaab fighters in the two strikes.

Limited targeted killings in the past have shown minimal impact on Al Shabaab. The group has been quick to regroup and retaliate with attacks on soft targets. By attacking training facilities, the U.S. and AU forces may be trying to hamper Al Shabaab’s ability to fight instead of just eliminating operational leadership.

With Al Shabaab currently dealing with internal divisions due to defections to the Islamic State (IS), it may be the perfect time to widen attacks on the group. Al Shabaab has been able to make up the majority of the territory it lost in 2011, and they’ve maintained the ability to inflict heavy losses on AU and Somali forces. If the forces fighting against Al Shabaab want to severely weaken the group, they should build on this most recent strike before Al Shabaab adapts.

It is possible the U.S. will increase their activity in Somalia over the next several months. The Obama Administration has been increasing U.S. military presence and activity in Africa in order to combat terrorist organizations. The U.S. just recently provided training to Senegalese Special Forces and is considering sending intelligence drones and military advisors to Nigeria. There are also reports that the U.S. has sent forces inside Libya to gain intelligence on friendly and hostile groups in the country.

While the U.S. drone strike likely stalled the next attack, AU and U.S. forces should expect Al Shabaab to plan to continue to pursue their efforts to reestablish their territory in Somalia, including targeting U.S. and AU forces where necessary to accomplish it.

AQAP Continues Their Push Through Weak Opposition in Yemen

Another town in Southern Yemen has fallen under control of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) over the weekend. Ahwar, a Southern city located in the Abyan Province, was seized by AQAP fighters after ousting the group of Popular Resistance Force fighters in the area.

The Popular Resistance Force (PRF) is group of militias that has aided the government in their fight against the Houthi rebels and AQAP. The group is made up of Southern militias, and have been able to provide adequate support to the national army when fighting the Houthis. However, when fighting AQAP their effect has been minimal.

The PRF lost both Zinjibar and Jaar to AQAP late last year. A PRF leader mentioned the lack of support the PRF receives from the government has allowed AQAP to be so effective in the region.

AQAP has taken significant territory within Yemen as the government and Saudi-led coalition of Gulf States continues to fight the Houthi rebels. By taking Ahwar, AQAP further solidifies its control of the Abyan province. The group also have predominant control over the Shabwa and Hadramount provinces.

Along with taking Ahwar, AQAP assassinated Sheikh Mazen al-Aqrab, gunned down in a drive-by in the capital of Aden. Al-Aqrab was one the PRF’s most senior commanders.

Ahwar serves as a strategic point between the cities of Zinjibar and Mukallah. By taking Ahwar, AQAP is creating a region of influence along the coast line. The government forces and Gulf Coalition are primarily focused on the Northwest portion of the country, and this leaves the rest of Yemen virtually ungoverned. AQAP, and to some degree the Islamic State (IS), has taken full advantage of this situation, and has quickly seized important cities in Yemen.

Soon after AQAP reclaimed the city of Azzan, AQAP senior field commander Jalal Baleedi was killed in a U.S. drone strike. While Baleedi was a high ranking officer, his death has had little impact on AQAP’s progress. The U.S. drone strike program continues to achieve tactical successes eliminating local AQ commanders, while not altering the strategic outcome, similar to the situation currently playing out in Somalia with Al-Shabaab, with whom AQAP has close ties.

AQAP’s push through the Southern coast of Yemen is drawing the group closer to the current capital, Aden. After the government forces were expelled from Sanaa, they soon moved to Aden where they are still in control. While the government has control over the majority of the city, AQAP has been able to seize several neighborhoods on the outskirts. By controlling the entire Southern coast, AQAP may be attempting to cut the government off from its allies in the South, primarily the PRF.

If AQAP successfully establishes control over the Southern coast of Yemen it gives the group the ability to threaten a sizeable shipping lane, along with access to support their fellow Al Qaeda ally in Somalia, Al Shabaab.

The situation in Yemen is unlikely to change and AQAP will continue to poses a threat to Aden as long as the Saudi-led coalition remains focused exclusively on the Iranian-backed Houthis and the PRF militias remain a relatively weak force.

Death of Al Shabaab Intel Chief Will Mean Nothing If AU Forces Remain Complacent

Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) reported their airstrike targeting Al Shabaab’s Nadaris camp killed Mahad Mohammed Karatey, the head of Al Shabaab’s intelligence wing, Amniyat. Along with Karatey, 10 mid-level officers and 42 Amniyat recruits were reportedly killed in the strike.

Karatey was presiding over the graduation of 80 Amniyat recruits, and Al Shabaab has since denied the claim that Karatey was killed in the strike.

Karatey was reportedly a major part of planning the Garissa University attack, the attack on the Ugandan African Union (AU) base in September 2015, and the most recent attack on the Kenyan AU base in El-Adde.

The death of Karatey is said to be a major blow to Al Shabaab, yet prominent leaders have been killed in the past and Al Shabaab remains just as lethal.

Amniyat is the most important, and effective branch of Al Shabaab which specializes in intelligence collection, assassinations, and the planning and staging of suicide missions in Somalia and its neighboring countries. Amniyat also acted as the personal guard of late Al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane.

Al Shabaab’s high-ranking Amniyat officials have been targeted in the past. In December 2014, a U.S. drone strike killed Amniyat chief Tahlil Abdishakur. The following March, another U.S. drone strike killed Amniyat senior official Adan Garaar.

Al Shabaab’s leadership is closely allied with Al Qaeda (AQ), as many of its leaders fought with AQ in Afghanistan. However, the recent defections to Islamic State (IS) illustrate a disconnect between the younger and older generation within Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab’s leadership has been actively hunting those who defected, and future infighting may be in store for organization.

Al Shabaab may not only be losing recruits at home, but also abroad. The group has historically received many recruits from America every year, especially from Minnesota where there is a large Somali-American community. However, Minnesota is now seeing an increase in IS recruits.

The Free Fire Blog reported on how Al Shabaab’s decentralized structure plays a role in minimizing the effect of targeted killings. Additionally, while targeted killing of Al-Shabaab leadership provides a tactical advantage, its not clear that the African Union forces and Somali government forces are able to take advantage. The recent expulsion of Al Shabaab forces from Marka with relative ease illustrate the potential effectiveness of AU forces, yet they have been unable to sustain liberated territory.

While AU and Somali forces are currently dealing with Al Shabaab, they may have to look out for a greater influence of IS in Somalia in the near future. While at the moment the group does not pose any major threat, they are likely to grow. This will leave a struggling AU and Somali force to deal with two terrorist organizations, and this will ruin any chance for peace.

Recent Explosion Raises Questions on Al Shabaab Targeting Airlines

On Tuesday, February 2, 2016 a Daallo Airlines commercial plane traveling from Mogadishu to Djibouti was forced to land just minutes after take off due to a breach in its hull. One of the passengers was killed after being sucked out of the plane, but the other 74 passengers were safely evacuated after landing.

It is currently unclear what caused the large hole, but most facts point towards an explosive. Black soot covered the area around the hole, which is typical for an explosive, and John Goglia, a former member of the US National Transportation Safety Board and aviation safety expert, believes all signs point to an explosive.

If it were an explosive, it could have been set to a timer, and detonated when the plane was not yet fully pressurized, which would have limited the overall damage. There has been no claim of responsibility.

If terrorism was involved, the obvious primary suspect is Al Shabaab, although the Somali terrorist organization does not have track record of utilizing on board explosives.

The group does have a history of conducting targeted killings of key Somali political figures however, and Somalia’s deputy ambassador to the UN Awale Kullane was onboard the flight.

Al Shabaab has been known to target Somali political figures and UN officials in the past.

 

  • July 25, 2015, Abdullahi Hussein Mohamud Bantu, a member of Somalia’s Parliament, was killed in a drive-by.
  • July 26, 2015, a suicide car bomb detonated outside the Jazeera hotel killing a Chinese embassy worker. The hotel was also known to be attended by foreign diplomats from all over the world.
  • February 2015, Al Shabaab detonated another suicide bomb at the Central Hotel killing the Somali deputy Prime Minister.
  • June 24, 2015, Al Shabaab targeted a convoy filled with UAE officials. The officials remained unharmed, but three Somalis were killed.
  • In December 2014, Al Shabaab targeted a UN convoy near the Mogadishu Airport that killed two people.

While it remains unclear that Kullane was an intended target, it seems likely that Al Shabaab has the intelligence capabilities to acquire the ambassador’s movement schedule in order to conduct such an attack.  Al Shabaab’s intelligence wing, known as the Aminiyaat, is known to have successfully placed assets in the Somali transitional government’s security and diplomatic branches, and utilized intelligence to coordinate rapid attacks.

In March of last year the FAA cited the greatest threat to U.S. aviation in Somalia as Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), which Al Shabaab is suspected to possess.

But in this case the evidence points to an onboard explosion. This would support the Transportation Security Agency’s (TSA) view that non-metallic IEDs remain the terrorist’s weapons of choice.

While Al Shabaab doesn’t have a history of creating such devices, it would be able to leverage its ties with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in order to acquire this expertise. AQAP has been responsible for several attempts to detonate explosives onto airplanes in the past, and stationed nearby in Yemen. In April of last year Fox News reported that AQAP was facilitating Al Shabaab’s training in conduct major plots.

It is not currently possible to determine with certainty who was responsible for the breach in the plane, and the Somali government’s rush to deny that terrorism played a role may cloud the future investigation.

However, if Al Shabaab was involved, it would suggest that while the organization may be willing to branch out into new tactics, its overall objective remains the aggressive targeting Somali government personnel.

Al Shabaab Continues Assault on AU Forces

Early Friday morning, January 15, 2015, the New York Times reported that Al Shabaab, an Al Qaeda affiliated group, forces had overrun an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base in El-Adde, Somalia, located in the Southwest region of the country. Somalia National Army (SNA) and Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) soldiers occupied the base.

Al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Abdulaziz Abu Musab, claimed dozens of AMISOM soldiers had been killed, but reports from AMISOM, claim these figures may be exaggerated.

The assault began when an Al Shabaab fighter detonated a suicide bomb at the gates of the African Union (AU) base. After the gates were destroyed, more Shabaab soldiers flooded into the complex starting a massive firefight. After hours of fighting the Shabaab fighters were repulsed.

According to VOA reporter Harun Maruf on Twitter, Al Shabaab was able to secure a large quantity of weapons and 13 military vehicles during the attack.

Mail & Guardian Africa news reported both Shabab and AMISOM have hid exact casualties figures in the past, so it unclear exactly how many soldiers each side lost. However, The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) for Somalia, Ambassador Francisco, stated there were casualties on both sides.

The AU established AMISOM in order to bring stability to a country that has been racked by civil conflict for almost three decades. However, AMISOM has struggled with battling Al Shabaab since its arrival in January 2007. To date 22,000 AMISOM soldiers occupy Somalia, which far surpasses its original mandate of roughly 1,600 troops.

This attack does not mark the first time Shabaab has infiltrated an AMISOM base. In June 2015, Shabab raided an AMISOM base in Lego, near the capital of Mogadishu. Witnesses claimed to have seen dozens of AMISOM soldiers laying dead on the ground, yet, once again, AU commanders denied the large number of troops killed. Shabaab launched another attack on an AMISOM base in Janale in early September 2015. The attack was characterized as a suicide assault as Shabaab fighters rushed the base strapped with suicide vests. 12 Ugandan soldiers were killed as a result to the attack.

Aside from attacking AMISOM bases, Al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the 2010 bombing in Uganda that left 74 dead, the 2013 bombing of a Somali UN office that killed 15, the 2014 attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya that killed 64, and, as of most recently, the attack on Garrisa University that killed 147.

BBC news and Somali President Yoweri Museveni both have claim that Al Shabaab is on its last leg. While the group may have just recently suffered a recent defection of a small group to the Islamic State (IS), there is no reason to believe they are defeated or even on the run.

Al Shabaab’s decentralized structure makes the organization one of the most difficult to combat. The ability for different clans to act independently makes targeting killings of leadership rather ineffective. The U.S. has targeted several key members of Shabaab recently, and the group has still seen growth. U.S. ground forces have entered the country, as well as continued its drone campaign in the region. Aside from providing military support the U.S. has donated billions to the Kenyan military to keep the pressure on Shabaab.

While Shabaab continues to move on the offensive, AMISOM forces continue to retreat from Somali territory. This gives Shabaab the ability to hold valuable territory in the region, and further exert its control.

Al Shabaab poses, and will likely continue to pose, a dangerous puzzle to Somalia for the foreseeable future.

Kenyan military accused of corruption and side business deals with al-Shabaab

A report published by Kenyan advocacy group Journalists for Justice alleges that corrupt elements in the Kenyan military forces deployed to Somalia as part of the AMISOM mission to defeat al-Shabaab are actually in business with the jihadists by enabling them to tax sugar and charcoal imports leaving the port of Kismayo in the southern part of the country, which is controlled by the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), along with making direct sales to the terrorist group and turning a blind eye to smuggling and piracy in exchange for a cut of the proceeds.

The scheme is described as follows:

“Sugar is offloaded in Kismayo along with other goods being smuggled into Kenya including vehicles, pasta, cooking oil, shoes, rice and some petroleum products. According to the workers at the port, on incoming sugar, the KDF levies a Sh 200 ($2) charge per sack… Once a truck leaves Kismayo, it is taxed by al-Shabaab five km outside the city and given a stamped receipt which is good for transit through al-Shabaab territory. Seven different businessmen involved in the trade interviewed for the report confirmed that the amount paid to al-Shabaab is Sh 102,500 ($1,025) per truck.”

After transiting through al-Shabaab territory and crossing the border, the sugar and other smuggled goods arrive at Somalian refugee camps in Kenya, where it is sold at a premium.  Even though the Kenyan government placed sanctions on prominent sugar traders, the businessmen bribe elements within the military to secure passage of their product.

The United Nations also placed sanctions on charcoal exports from Somalia in 2013, however a UN report reveals that Kenyan Navy commanders, who are in charge of the Kismayo port, also skirt around them by allowing al-Shabaab to collect taxes on charcoal as it is smuggled out and taking a share of the profits.  Both reports allege that the corruption transcends low-level soldiers and border guards, reaching up to the highest levels of command in the KDF.

By holding the port, al-Shabaab was able to generate millions of dollars which it then applied to procuring weapons, paying foreign fighters, and funding terrorist operations.  The fact that smuggling is rampant in Kismayo, which the KDF took from al-Shabaab in 2012 and is now under the command of Brigadier General Walter Koipaton Raira, undermines the gains made by the AMISOM in denying a major funding source for al-Shabaab.  The KDF is denying the accuracy of the JfJ report, calling it “absolute garbage” and reaffirming their commitment to defeating the jihadists in Somalia.

What is certain is that the pace of al-Shabaab operations has picked up in recent months, most likely helped by its smuggling proceeds, with attacks on AMISOM bases and holding much of the countryside in southern Somalia.  With the amount of money generated by the smuggling, which the report estimates to be between $ 200 and $ 400 million per year, the $ 25 million bounty offered by the State Department for the location of six al-Shabaab leaders may not be enough.