WHAT’S IN THE ‘28 PAGES’?

Executive Summary

The United States has long had a complicated relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, thanks to the double-game played by that nation’s Islamic supremacist government and its population deeply imbued with Islam’s totalitarian ideology known as Sharia. Valuable insights into the Saudis’ two-faced approach to this country are contained in a newly released document universally known as the “28 Pages.”

On the one hand, these pages, which contain some of the findings of a 2002 congressional investigation into the 9/11 attacks, reveal considerable Saudi complicity in that murderous act of jihad. On the other, the fact that these insights were suppressed until July 2016 suggests the extent of the Saudis’ influence in official Washington and the status they continue to enjoy as trusted allies.

The Center for Security Policy presents this precis of the history and findings of the 28 Pages together with its recommendations for long-overdue correctives to the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia as a contribution particularly to the national security debate America needs this Fall.

Background

In December 2002, Congress finalized the report on its Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.1 Withheld from that report were what turned out to be 29 pages (nonetheless, usually referred to – including hereafter – as the “28 Pages”) of substantive material, entitled “Part Four: Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters,” pp. 415-443 of the original report.

After the decision to seal these 28 Pages, a bipartisan group of 46 U.S. Senators appealed to President Bush to release them, saying, “Saudi Arabia’s banks and charities have been used to funnel money to Al-Qaeda, its madrassah schools spew hateful anti-American rhetoric to would-be suicide bombers across the Middle East, and fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudis.”2

In 2012, former U.S. Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla. stated flatly that he was “convinced that there was a direct line between at least some of the terrorists who carried out the September 11 attacks and the government of Saudi Arabia.”3 In 2014, Sen. Graham charged that the 28 Pages contained information on the financing of the 9/11 attacks, and that refusing to release them amounted to a “cover-up”.4
In February 2015, claims reportedly made by the alleged 20th hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui, before his arrest became public. These included:

- He had “met with high-ranking members of the Saudi Royal family, including the current King.”
- “[H]e was dispatched by Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s to keep tabs on who donated to al Qaeda.”
- “That list, he said, included Prince Turki al-Faisal, then-Saudi Arabia’s intelligence chief[,] and Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, the former Saudi ambassador to the U.S. who was in Washington at the time of the attacks.”

In April, 2016, an activist “revealed that the flight certificate of al-Qaeda bomb-maker Ghassan Al-Sharbi was discovered hidden in an envelope from the Saudi embassy in Washington when they arrested him in 2002,” saying, “The envelope points to the fundamental question hanging over us today: to what extent was the 9/11 plot facilitated by individuals at the highest levels of the Saudi government?”

On April 27, 2016 former Gov. Tom Kean, R-N.J., and former Rep. Lee Hamilton, R-Ind., the co-chairs of the full 9/11 Commission who oversaw the creation of the final 9/11 Commission report, wrote that:

- “What often gets lost in those theories is that the 28 pages were based almost entirely on raw, unvetted material that came to the FBI.”
- “That material was written up as possible leads for further investigation, and the 28 pages were a summary of some of those reports and leads as of the end of 2002 — all of them uninvestigated.”
- However, they acknowledged that, “For years, the Saudi government tolerated and in some cases fanned the diffusion of an extreme form of Islam, funding schools and mosques across the globe that spread it.”

The 28 Pages was finally released on Friday, July 16, 2016.

**Highlights**

The 28 Pages include, among others, the following revelations:

- Before 9/11, the Saudis refused to cooperate on Al Qaeda head Osama Bin Laden.
- The CIA and FBI complained of a lack of Saudi cooperation before and after 9/11, with one FBI agent calling them “useless and obstructionist.”
- Some saw “incontrovertible evidence” the Saudis supported 9/11 hijackers.
• The Saudi government and/or Royal Family had financial ties to the 9/11 hijackers and/or Al Qaeda.  

• Then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdulaziz funded an “extremist” mosque in U.S. attended by the 9/11 hijackers.  

• The Saudis “bought off” Jordan to free Bin Laden’s brother-in-law.  

• Bin Laden’s half-brother claimed to work at the Saudi Embassy.  

• A Saudi Interior official stayed at hijackers’ hotel as 9/11 approached, then faked a seizure to end an FBI interview and escape the country.  

• Saudis tied to the Royal Family and Embassy conducted a “Dry Run” of 9/11 and checked the security of the southwest U.S. Border.  

• Al Qaeda sources yielded phone numbers indirectly tied to then-Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar.  

• Potential Saudi spies paid by an Al Qaeda front company and Prince Bandar’s wife aided the 9/11 hijackers.  

• The Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA), then a counterterrorism investigation target, was funded by Saudis and solicited Prince Bandar.  

• The potential Saudi agents helping the 9/11 hijackers met with representatives of a Muslim Brotherhood front group, including an individual with direct ties to al Qaeda and Hamas who was a prolific fundraiser for the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR).  

• The U.S. Government had not identified the Saudis as a potential threat before 9/11 and so were simply not tracking their movements at all.  

**Key Center for Security Policy Recommendations**

• Congress should launch a public inquiry into Saudi Arabia’s role in the Global Jihad Movement following up on the findings contained in the 28 Pages.  

• Congress should pass and the President should sign:
  o The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (S. 2040), which allows 9/11 victims and their families to sue Saudi Arabia for its role in the attacks; and
  o The Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2015 (S. 2230), which would require the administration to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as an Foreign Terrorist Organization or explain why it has not.
The President and, as appropriate, Congress should:

- Immediately suspend immigration from any nation that has been compromised by the Global Jihad Movement, including Saudi Arabia, as well as Syria and Iraq and potentially other Special Interest Countries, until such time as proven vetting mechanisms have been put in place.
- Make certain that non-citizens who wish to enter the country or remain here share America’s values, including that they:
  - Oppose death sentences for homosexuality, so-called “honor killings,” slavery, sexual assault, and physical domestic abuse as defined in U.S. law;
  - Respect religious freedom, including the right of all Americans to change religions or hold no religion as their conscience dictates;
  - Support freedom of speech, including the right to question the teachings of any religion; and
  - Accept the U.S. Constitution as the supreme law of the land.
- Approaching al Qaeda, Islamic State, Boko Haram, the Muslim Brotherhood and other individual terrorists and Islamic supremacist organizations as manifestations of the same toxic Sharia ideology lavishly funded by the Saudis and others worldwide. Such entities must all be regarded as our enemies and defeated.
- Reorient our counterterror strategy from the Obama Administration’s failed “Countering Violent Extremism” approach, which focuses on whitewashing Islamic supremacism, to achieving Victory over Jihad, including:
  - Approaching al Qaeda, Islamic State, Boko Haram, the Muslim Brotherhood and other individual terrorist and Islamic supremacist organizations as agents of the same poisonous ideology lavishly funded by the Saudis and others worldwide, and pivoting to destroy them, not just “degrade” them;
  - Tearing up the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, a decisive victory for the Global Jihad Movement;
  - Reversing the Obama administration’s decision to allow in certain refugees and asylum-seekers who have provided “limited material support” to terror;
  - Mandating that all Federal agencies that deal with counterterror reinstate training that imparts a full and complete understanding of Islam, Jihad and the totalitarian doctrine of Sharia that underlies both and incorporate such insights into their investigations
  - Reinstating the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) program the Obama Administration discontinued in 2011; and
  - Blocking organizations from receiving federal funds if they have ties to domestic terrorism or have been designated as unindicted co-conspirators in a federal terror trial;
- Reinstitute post 9/11 restrictions on Saudi nationals’ access to American student visas; and
- Terminate Saudi Arabia’s participation in the U.S. “trusted traveler” Global Entry program.
WHAT’S IN THE ‘28 PAGES’?

This document provides background information concerning and a summary of the contents of what is known as the “28 Pages,” the materials withheld for nearly 14 years from the Report of on Congress’ Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001. In addition, an accompanying appendix notes some of the reaction to the release of what proved to be 29 pages-worth of materials from the congressional report.

It also contains recommendations for actions made more necessary than ever in light of the contents of the 28 Pages.

Background Information

On September 11, 2001, four teams of Jihadis hijacked planes and used them as missiles against both towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, slaughtering nearly 3,000 Americans in a single day. Even more would have died – and the White House or Capitol may have been destroyed – were it not for the heroism of the passengers of one of those four planes.

According to media reports, two days after 9/11, then-Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan:

- successfully petitioned the White House to evacuate dozens of Saudi citizens from the U.S., including members of Osama bin Laden’s family. According to the journalists Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, Bandar met with his old friend [George W.] Bush that evening. The two men smoked cigars on a White House balcony as they chatted with Vice President Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice, who was National Security Adviser at the time. The rapid evacuation of relatives of bin Laden and other Saudi nationals reflected the special relationship between the governments in Riyadh and DC.

On January 29, 2003, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence submitted the report from Congress’ Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 to then-Director of the CIA George Tenet.

Withheld from that report were what turned out to 29 pages of substantive material, entitled “Part Four: Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters,”
pp. 415-443 of the original report. Those materials have come to be known as the “28 Pages” and will be described as such in this paper.

The decision to classify those materials prompted a public outcry. On August 1, 2003, a bipartisan group of 46 U.S. Senators appealed to the Bush White House to release the 28 Pages to the public. The letter argued that:

Saudi Arabia’s banks and charities have been used to funnel money to Al-Qaeda, its madrassah schools spew hateful anti-American rhetoric to would-be suicide bombers across the Middle East, and fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudis.

Therefore, the letter contended, “protecting the Saudi regime by eliminating any public penalty for the support given to terrorists from within its borders would be a mistake.” The White House declined to release the documents.

The 28 Pages remained classified for nearly 14 years despite repeated calls for their release.

The issue began to simmer again when, in a 2012 affidavit in the 9/11 families’ case against the Saudi government, retired U.S. Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla. – who had chaired the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and co-chaired the bipartisan joint congressional inquiry that prepared the full Congressional report on 9/11 – stated flatly that he was “convinced that there was a direct line between at least some of the terrorists who carried out the September 11 attacks and the government of Saudi Arabia.” Sen. Graham charged that the 28 Pages contained information on the financing of the 9/11 attacks, and that refusing to release them amounted to a “cover-up.”

The issue of the 28 Pages arose again in December 2013, when U.S. Reps. Walter Jones (R-NC) and Stephen Lynch (D-MA) introduced a resolution calling on President Obama to release them. At the time, 9/11 family members claimed that Obama promised to do so, according to media accounts.

Then in February, 2015 the possible 20th hijacker’s claims became public that, according to media reports, before his arrest he had “met with high-ranking members of the Saudi Royal family, including the current King.” The story the al-Qaida operative, French-born Zacarias Moussaoui, told was that:

He was dispatched by Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s to keep tabs on who donated to al Qaeda. That list, he said, included Prince Turki al-Faisal, then Saudi Arabia’s intelligence chief[,] and Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, the former Saudi ambassador to the U.S. who was in Washington at the time of the attacks.

Moreover, Moussaoui claimed to have met with Prince Salman, the half-brother of then-King Abdullah, giving him and other royals correspondence from Bin Laden, again according to contemporaneous media accounts.
Last and worst, Moussaoui alleged that in Afghanistan, he met with an “official from the Saudi Embassy in Washington” and discussed “the feasibility of shooting Air Force One,” the U.S. presidential plane, with a Stinger missile.”

Though Moussaoui’s own lawyers had presented evidence that he was mentally unstable, his testimony was “further reason to declassify the 28 pages of the Joint Inquiry report,” Rep. Jones pointed out. “The contents of the pages do not pose a threat to national security, but deal with relations the Bush administration had before 9/11,” he said.

Another shoe dropped in April, 2016, when an activist named Brian McGlinchy reviewing previously unexamined documents “revealed that the flight certificate of al-Qaeda bomb-maker Ghassan Al-Sharbi was discovered hidden in an envelope from the Saudi embassy in Washington when they arrested him in 2002.” McGlinchy remarked at the time, “The envelope points to the fundamental question hanging over us today: To what extent was the 9/11 plot facilitated by individuals at the highest levels of the Saudi government?”

The pressure to release the 28 Pages ratcheted up on April 10, 2016, when CBS News’ “60 Minutes” aired a story on them in which former Sen. Graham said that he “believed the hijackers had connections and support from the Saudi government, as well as wealthy individuals and charities.”

On April 27, 2016, former New Jersey Gov. Tom Kean and former Rep. Lee Hamilton, the co-chairs of the full 9/11 Commission who oversaw the creation of the final 9/11 Commission report, wrote that:

What often gets lost in those theories is that the 28 pages were based almost entirely on raw, unvetted material that came to the FBI. That material was written up as possible leads for further investigation, and the 28 pages were a summary of some of those reports and leads as of the end of 2002 — all of them uninvestigated.

In addition, Gov. Kean and Rep. Hamilton noted that:

In 2015, another independent panel, the 9/11 Review Commission created by Congress, reviewed evidence gathered in recent years. That panel also reviewed the 28 pages, and reaffirmed the conclusions of the 9/11 Commission. It also concluded that there was no new evidence against the Saudi government.

The Kean-Hamilton op.ed. nonetheless acknowledged that:

Individual Saudis were culpable of heinous crimes: Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals. For years, the Saudi government tolerated and in some cases fanned the diffusion of an extreme form of Islam, funding schools and mosques across the globe that spread it. Wealthy Saudis contributed to Islamic charities, some of which had links to terrorism.
Finally, according to a CNN report, “Under pressure from the victims’ families and lawmakers, President Barack Obama said in April his administration would declassify the 28 pages.”

In addition, this past June, the CIA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reportedly released a summary of its own internal investigation, concluded in 2005, which was “said to be inconclusive and found no evidence the Saudi government knowingly and willingly supported Al Qaeda terrorists.”

Supporting that view on June 12, 2016, CIA Director John Brennan “dismissed” concerns about Saudi involvement in 9/11, saying:

The Sep. 11 commission looked very thoroughly at these allegations of Saudi involvement, Saudi government involvement and their findings. Their conclusion was that there was no evidence to indicate that the Saudi government as an institution or Saudi senior officials individually had supported the Sep. 11 attacks.

It bears mentioning that Brennan has been dubbed “CIA’s Captain Unreality” for: saying “we don’t steal secrets”; refusing to use the terms “jihadist” and “Islamist”; disputing ties between al-Qaida and ISIS; saying “jihad is holy struggle, a legitimate tenet of Islam meaning to purify oneself of one’s community”; playing a role in reading Miranda rights to the so-called “Underwear Bomber,” falsely claiming that doing so was merely a continuation of George W. Bush administration policy; and putting diversity above national security by basing CIA recruitment and promotions on race, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, religion, socio-economic status, and other quotas.

One expert has speculated that the last straw for the Obama administration, which precipitated its decision to release the 28 pages, was when Prince Turki al-Faisal, the Saudi Intelligence Director from 1977-2001 and whom Moussaoui claimed was on the list of those who donated to al Qaeda, appeared in Paris on July 9, 2016. There, at the huge annual rally of the Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Turki pledged to support them – a direct repudiation of Team Obama’s effort to cultivate improved relations with the government of Iran.

The now-famous 28 Pages were released, along with the original transmittal letter and cover page, one week later, on Friday, July 16, 2016.

Key Highlights of the 28 Pages

The first line of this newly released material reads, “While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government,” including two individuals alleged to be Saudi intelligence officers.

In addition, the report charges at its outset, “the Intelligence Community also has information much of which remains speculative and yet to be independently verified, indicating that Saudi
Government officials in the United States may have other ties to al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups.”

Further sections include:
- “Possible Saudi Government Connections to Terrorists and Terrorist Groups”
- “Possible Connections Between the September 11 Hijackers and Saudi Government Officials in the United States”; and
- “Status of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Investigations into Connections Between Terrorism and Saudi Government Officials.”

The most noteworthy findings of the 28 Pages are as follows:

**The Saudis Refused to Cooperate on Bin Laden Before 9/11**

The 28 Pages quote from a May 1996 CIA memo that charges that “the Saudis had stopped providing background information or other assistance on Bin Laden because Bin Laden ‘had too much information about official Saudi dealings with Islamic extremists in the 1980s for Riyadh to deliver him into U.S. hands.’”

Likewise, a June 1997 memo from the CIA’s Osama bin Laden unit, codenamed “Alec Station,” reemphasized the lack of Saudi cooperation and stated that there was little prospect of future cooperation on Bin Laden.” Finally, the former head of Alec Station felt “the U.S. Government’s hope of eventually obtaining Saudi cooperation was unrealistic because [it] was contrary to Saudi national interests.”

The 28 Pages relate that Abu Zubaydah, a Saudi citizen that according to a formerly Top Secret document placed on Wikileaks was “identified as one of the highest ranking members of the al Qaeda terrorist organization.”

CIA and FBI Complain of Saudi Intransigence: “Useless and Obstructionist”

The 28 Pages state that, “A number of FBI agents and CIA officers complained to the Joint Inquiry about a lack of Saudi cooperation in terrorism investigations both before and after the September 11 attacks,” citing one New York FBI agent who said “the Saudis have been useless and obstructionist for years.” For instance, according to a media report, an FBI official described an instance after the September 11 attacks “in which he provided the Saudis with
copies of individuals’ passports and they responded\textsuperscript{86} that “they had no record of the subjects.”\textsuperscript{87}

\textit{“Incontrovertible Evidence” that Saudi Government Supported 9/11 Hijackers?}

The 28 Pages cite one document dated July 2, 2002, whose source was redacted. It “stated unequivocally that the connections found between the hijackers, the Saudi embassy in Washington and Saudi consulate in Los Angeles”\textsuperscript{88} are “incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists within the Saudi government.”\textsuperscript{89} However, the report hedged that, “On the other hand, it is also possible that further investigation of these allegations could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations.”\textsuperscript{90}

According to the 28 Pages, “Both the FBI and the CIA recognized the possibility that individuals connected to the Saudi government may be providing support to terrorists.”\textsuperscript{91} In particular, the report quotes one source as saying, “…there is a good, good chance that there are sympathizers or extremists, sympathizers possibly for al-Qa’ida within the [Saudi] security services.”\textsuperscript{92}

Some of the release remains redacted, especially with respect to the status of the U.S. intelligence community’s then-newly launched investigations into connections between terrorism and Saudi government officials.\textsuperscript{93}

\textit{Financial Ties Between the Saudi Government/Royal Family and Hijackers/Al Qaeda}

Likewise, the 28 Pages express the Joint Inquiry’s particular concern about “the serious nature of allegations contained” in a CIA memo found in FBI files “which discusses alleged financial connections between the September 11 hijackers, Saudi government officials, and members of the Saudi Royal Family.” However, the report also notes that “neither the CIA nor the FBI was able to definitively identify…the extent of Saudi support for terrorist activity globally or within the United States and the extent such support, if it exists, is intentional or innocent in nature.”\textsuperscript{94}

For instance, the 28 Pages contain allegations of at least $330,000 flowing from Saudi Embassies to an al Qaeda linked nonprofit. Specifically, the report relates, a May 2002 Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary (DITS) had flagged the non-profit, Saudi-based Umm al-Qura Islamic Charitable Foundation (UQ), for “suspicious money transfers, document forgery, providing jobs to wanted terrorist suspects, and financing travel for youths to attend jihad training.” That DITS also relayed that from September 2001 until its publication, “UQ couriers have transported over $330,000 in cash, most of which they received from Saudi Embassies in the Far East,” including those in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.\textsuperscript{95}

Likewise, the 28 Pages cite another source as expressing that the concern about “Saudi money…is that it fits sort of a pattern that we’ve seen about longstanding support for very fundamentalist Wahhabi and Salafi charities and movements around the world…and would be very surprised if it if some of it doesn’t bleed over into terrorist support.”\textsuperscript{96}
The report also documents that the FBI had come to believe that apparently innocuous financial transfers from the Somali community in San Diego to various Somali non-profits were, in fact, laundering money from sources including Saudi Arabia through the “Ibn Tamiyah Mosque” (which may be a reference to the King Fahad Mosque, which houses the Islamic Foundation of Shaikh Ibn Taymiyah) in Culver City outside of Los Angeles and the Islamic Center of San Diego to an al Qaeda front company. According to the report, the FBI agent involved in the investigation speculated that “this scheme may allow the Saudi Government to provide al-Qa’ida with funding through cover or indirect means.”

**Saudi Crown Prince Funded an “Extremist” Mosque in U.S. Attended by Hijackers**

The King Fahad Mosque, which the CIA and FBI had identified as a “site of extremist activity” and which according to the report was “widely recognized for its anti-Western views,” was built in 1998 with funding from then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdulaziz, apparently a reference to Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud, who at the time was the “effective ruler of the country,” and who in 2005 became king upon the death of King Fahad. (King Abdullah was succeeded by current King Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud when the former died last year.)

At the time, the Mosque’s imam was an accredited diplomat at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles. He may also have had a “physical or financial connection” to the 9/11 hijackers, two of whom also attended the King Fahad Mosque, according to the report.

**Saudis “Bought Off” Jordan to Free Bin Laden’s Brother-in-Law**

The 28 Pages also detail how the Saudi government rescued a top al Qaeda figure who was under a Jordanian death sentence. It quotes the former chief of Alec Station who “cited the example of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law and an important figure in al Qaeda,” according to the report. Sentenced to death in absentia by Jordan for a bombing and then arrested by the U.S. in 1994, Khalifa was extradited to Jordan, only to be returned to the Saudis. “In the opinion of the CIA officer, the Saudis ‘bought off’ the Jordanians for the return of Khalifa,” who was met by at least one important government official upon his return to the Kingdom, the CIA source said. According to the report, Khalifa subsequently was openly based in Riyadh, running a non-profit, traveling and operating freely.

**Bin Laden’s Half-Brother Claimed to Work at the Saudi Embassy**

Another potential, but inconclusive, link between the Saudis and the 9/11 attacks, according to the 28 Pages: Abdullah bin Laden, Osama’s half-brother, claimed to work at the Saudi embassy in Washington. The report also identifies him as “a close friend” of a “possible associate” of two of the 9/11 hijackers.
Saudi Interior Official Stayed at Hijackers’ Hotel on Eve of 9/11

As 9/11 approached, a Saudi Interior official stayed at the same hotel in Herndon, Va. where one of the 9/11 hijackers was staying. While the Saudi official, Saleb al-Hussayen, “claimed after September 11 not to know the hijackers, FBI agents believed he was being deceptive.” Specifically, during the interview, al-Hussayen “either passed out or feigned a seizure requiring medical treatment. He was released from the hospital several days later and managed to depart” the country “despite law enforcement efforts to locate and re-interview him.”

Saudis Tied to Royal Family and Embassy Conducted “Dry Run” and Checked Border

The 28 Pages also record how a Saudi national “with close ties to the Saudi Royal Family,” whose name is suppressed, checked the U.S. southwest border for vulnerabilities in 1999 and discussed “infiltrating individuals into the United States.”

It also relates an incident the same year in which two individuals the FBI had discovered had “connections to terrorism” conducted what in retrospect appeared to be a “dry run” to test airline security. On board an America West Flight, Mohammed al-Qudhaeein, whom the FBI suspected of being something redacted from the document, and his associate “asked the flight attendants a variety of suspicious questions” and then “attempted to enter the cockpit on two occasions.” Al-Qudhaeein and his associate “were flying to Washington, D.C. to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy, and both claimed that their tickets were paid for by the Saudi Embassy.”

Al Qaeda Sources Yield Phone Numbers Tied to Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar

Another indirect link to Prince Bandar surfaced when the U.S. Government found a Virginia phone number at a Pakistani al Qaeda safe house. The individual to whom the number was registered could not explain why it would be there, but indicated that “he regularly provides services to a couple who are personal assistants to Prince Bandar.”

In the same way, the report relates that numbers in the phone book of Abu Zubaida (aka Abu Zubaydah), recovered when he was captured in Pakistan in March 2002, “could be linked, potentially indirectly” to numbers in the U.S., including that of the ASPCOL Corporation in Aspen, Colo., which manages the Colorado residence of Prince Bandar. That said, another FBI response to the Joint Inquiry stated that “CIA traces have revealed no direct links between numbers found in Zubaida’s phone book and” U.S. numbers. Finally, an FBI document also implies that “the telephone number of a bodyguard at the Saudi Embassy in Washington D.C.” was found among Zubaida’s other possessions.

Potential Saudi Spies Paid by Al Qaeda Front and Prince Bandar’s Wife Aided 9/11 Hijackers

The 28 Pages name names, including especially Omar Al-Bayoumi, a suspected Saudi agent who allegedly aided 9/11 hijackers. The 9/11 Commission report found him to be an “unlikely candidate for clandestine involvement” with Islamic extremists. By contrast, these new materials charge he had “extensive contact with Saudi government establishments in the United
States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi Ministry of Defense....That company reportedly had ties to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida,” which orchestrated the attacks.115

According to a law enforcement official interviewed by the Joint Inquiry, Al-Bayoumi “acted like a Saudi intelligence officer, in my opinion. And if he was involved with the hijackers, which it looks like he was...then I would say that there’s a clear possibility that there might be a connection between Saudi intelligence and [Osama Bin Laden].”116 Likewise, the potential Saudi intelligence officer who aided the 9/11 hijackers was “providing guidance to young Muslims and some of his writings can be interpreted as jihadist.”117 Prior to 9/11, the agent, Al-Bayoumi, received $400,000 from Saudi Arabia to fund a new mosque in San Diego.118 The FBI had conducted counterterror investigations of Al-Bayoumi in 1998 and 1999, but closed them at that point.119

Finally, leading up to the attacks, the potential agent received an increase in his “allowances” from a company linked to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda from about $465/mo. to $3700/mo. in March 2000, the month after two 9/11 hijackers arrived in his area.120 Those allowances dropped upon the departure of one of the highjackers. Al-Bayoumi departed the U.S. approximately one month before 9/11.121

The materials also name Osama Bassnan, “who lived across the street from two of the hijackers in California.”122 According to the FBI, the report states, “Bassnan told another individual that he met the hijackers through al-Bayoumi” and told an FBI asset “he did more than al-Bayoumi did for the hijackers.”123

For instance, the report notes that Prince Bandar’s wife, Princess Haifa bin Sultan, sent $75,000 to Basnan, “allegedly for medical treatment for Basnan’s wife.”124 Some of that money passed to al-Bayoumi, who, according to a media report, “threw the two hijackers a welcome party, co-signed their apartment lease, and “tasked” another Saudi, Modhar Abdullah, with helping them find flight schools.”125

Curiously, the subsequent, full 9/11 Commission report stated that, “Contrary to highly publicized allegations, we have found no evidence that” 9/11 hijackers “received money from” Basnan.126 And the same day the 28 Pages were released, the office of the Obama administration’s Director of National Intelligence (DNI) also released part of a 2005 FBI-CIA memo that said, “There is no information to indicate that either (Bayoumi) or (Bassnan) materially supported the hijackers wittingly, were intelligence officers of the Saudi government or provided material support for the 11 September attacks, contrary to media speculation.”127

However, given the facts included in the 28 Pages, these assertions sound not only false but intentionally misleading, and raise troubling questions about both the rigor, as well as the provenance, of the 2005 memo and its emergence at this juncture.
**Counterterrorism Investigation Target Solicited Prince Bandar**

The 28 Pages also reveal that the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA), was “the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation.” Though IANA portrays itself as “a non-profit organization based in Michigan that is dedicated to the spread of Islam worldwide,” the FBI held that “IANA’s mission is actually to spread Islamic fundamentalism and Salafist doctrine throughout the United States and the world at large.” The organization “solicits funds from wealthy Saudi benefactors” including former Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin-Sultan, but “the documents are unclear as to whether Bandar actually contributed money”.

**Potential Saudi Agents Helping 9/11 Hijackers Met with Muslim Brotherhood Front Group**

Al-Bayoumi also had contact with the Holy Land Foundation (HLF), the largest Muslim charity in the U.S., which in 2008 was shut down as a front group for the designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) Hamas. According to its charter, Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the largest and oldest Islamic fundamentalist organizations in the world.

It is not clear from the 28 Pages what the potential Saudi agent discussed with the HLF in the lead up to 9/11. However, according to a media report, “federal investigative sources” say:

One of the Holy Land Foundation contacts was Mohammad el-Mezain, who in 2009 was convicted of providing material support to Hamas suicide bombers and other terrorists in the Holy Land Foundation trial, the largest terrorist-financing case in US history. Bayoumi met with El-Mezain in San Diego, where he was handling two of the Saudi hijackers who went on to attack the Pentagon…

El-Mezain, a hardcore Muslim Brother now serving out a 15-year federal prison sentence on Terminal Island in Los Angeles, was also in contact at the time with al-Qaida cleric Anwar Awlaki. Awlaki, later killed in a US drone strike, privately counseled the hijackers on martyrdom and jihad at a small, non-descript Saudi-funded mosque in San Diego, and later at a Saudi-built mosque in Falls Church, Va., where the hijackers followed him.

El-Mezain also happens to have been a major fundraiser for the Council on American-Islamic Relations [CAIR], the Washington-based Hamas front group that claims to be a “civil-rights organization.” The Justice Department implicated CAIR and its founder in the Holy Land Foundation case as unindicted co-conspirators, while identifying CAIR as a US front for the Muslim Brotherhood and its Palestinian branch Hamas…

[Sources say] that a still-redacted section of the Joint Inquiry report reveals that El-Mezain was also linked to 20th hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui “through a member of the Muslim Brotherhood,” who attempted to post bond for Moussaoui’s roommate…

[T]he former head of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood’s shura council was one of al-Qaida’s top fundraisers in America, according to the U.S. Treasury Department. Abdurahman
Alamoudi, who infiltrated both the Clinton and Bush administrations, is now serving 23 years in federal prison for plotting terrorism.

In 1996, Alamoudi — who founded the Boston Marathon bombers’ mosque — told a Muslim audience in Illinois: “Either we do it now or we do it after a hundred years, but this country will become a Muslim country.”

_U.S. Government Had Not Identified Saudis as a Threat Before 9/11_

The FBI’s former Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego noted that the U.S State Department did not identify Saudi Arabia as state sponsor of terrorism. He also stated that the _modus operandi_ of his office at the time he served was to assume that the objective of a redacted category of individuals – with context strongly suggesting that category was Saudi spies – was to “monitor dissidents in the interest of protecting the Saudi royal family,” instead of being “an inimical threat to national security.”

Likewise, the 28 Pages report relates, “Prior to September 11th, the FBI apparently did not focus investigative resources on [redacted] Saudi nationals in the United States due to Saudi Arabia’s status as an American ‘ally.’”

Potentially as a result, then-Director of the FBI Robert Mueller “acknowledged that he became aware of some of the facts regarding the Saudi issue only as a result of the investigative work of the Joint Inquiry Staff.”

134

135

136

137
Congress should immediately launch a public inquiry into Saudi Arabia’s role in the 9/11 attacks, including but not limited to:

- The contributions made to the 9/11 attack by Saudi officials and nationals, including Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan.
- Whether it is true that possible 20th hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui:
  - “[M]et with high-ranking members of the Saudi Royal family, including the current King.”¹³⁸
  - “[W]as dispatched by Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s to keep tabs on who donated to al Qaeda, including Prince Turki al-Faisal…and Prince Bandar Bin Sultan.”¹³⁹
- The implications of “the flight certificate of al-Qaeda bomb maker Ghassan Al-Sharbi” being “discovered hidden in an envelope from the Saudi embassy in Washington when they arrested him in 2002.”¹⁴⁰
- Why before 9/11, the Saudis refused to cooperate on Al Qaeda head Osama Bin Laden.¹⁴¹
- Whether the Saudis “bought off” Jordan to free Bin Laden’s brother-in-law.¹⁴²,¹⁴³,¹⁴⁴
- Whether Bin Laden’s half-brother did in fact work at the Saudi Embassy.¹⁴⁵
- The whereabouts and subsequent activities of:
  - The Saudi Interior official who stayed at hijackers’ hotel as 9/11 approached then faked a seizure to end an FBI interview and escape the country.¹⁴⁶
  - The Saudis tied to the Royal Family and Embassy who conducted a “Dry Run” of 9/11 and checked the security of the Southwest U.S. Border.¹⁴⁷
  - The potential Saudi spies paid by an Al Qaeda front company and Prince Bandar’s wife who aided the 9/11 hijackers.¹⁴⁸,¹⁴⁹
- What became of the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA), then a counterterrorism investigation target, and who funded it including whether Prince Bandar was among them.¹⁵⁰,¹⁵¹
- The links between the potential Saudi agents helping the 9/11 hijackers and the Holy Land Foundation on one hand and other, Muslim Brotherhood front groups, including especially the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR).¹⁵²

Congress should launch a public inquiry into Saudi Arabia’s role in the Global Jihad Movement, including but not limited to:

- The Kingdom’s funding – either directly or through Saudi royals, businesses and/or charities – of Islamic supremacist groups, whether designated as terrorist organizations or not (including, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, al-Shabab, Tabligi Jamaat).
The use made of Saudi sovereign wealth funds and other Sharia-Compliant Financial operations to generate funding for zakat (mandatory Islamic charitable contributions) and, therefore, for jihadist causes.

The advisability of allowing Saudi nationals easy access to U.S. student and other visas and “trusted traveler” status involving less scrutiny than that given to citizens of allied nations like France and Germany.

Whether the U.S. Government has now identified the Saudis as a potential threat and are now tracking their movements within the United States.\textsuperscript{154,155}

- Congress should pass and the President should sign:
  - The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (S. 2040), which allows 9/11 victims and their families to sue Saudi Arabia for its role in the attacks; and
  - The Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2015 (S. 2230), which would require the administration to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization or explain why it has not.

- The President and, as appropriate, Congress should:
  - Immediately suspend immigration from any nation that has been compromised by the global Jihad movement, including Saudi Arabia, as well as Syria and Iraq and potentially other Special Interest Countries, until such time as proven vetting mechanisms have been put in place.
  - Make certain that non-citizens who wish to enter the country or remain here share America’s values, including that they:
    - Oppose death sentences for homosexuality, so-called “honor killings,” slavery, sexual assault, and physical domestic abuse as defined in U.S. law;
    - Respect religious freedom, including the right of all Americans to change religions or hold no religion as their conscience dictates;
    - Support freedom of speech, including the right to question the teachings of any religion; and
    - Accept the U.S. Constitution as the supreme law of the land.
  - Reorient our counterterror strategy from the Obama administration’s failed “Countering Violent Extremism” approach, which focuses on whitewashing Islam out of the problem, to achieving Victory over Jihad, including:
    - Approaching al Qaeda, Islamic State, Boko Haram, the Muslim Brotherhood and other individual terrorist and Islamic supremacist organizations as manifestations of the same toxic Sharia ideology lavishly funded by the Saudis and others worldwide. Such entities must all be regarded as our enemies and defeated.
    - Tearing up the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran which was a decisive victory for the Global Jihad Movement.
    - Reversing the Obama Administration’s decision to allow in certain refugees and asylum-seekers who have provided “limited material support” to terror.
    - Mandating that all Federal agencies that deal with counterterror reinstate a full and complete understanding of Islam, Jihad and the totalitarian doctrine of Sharia that underlies both in their training and investigations.
- Reinstating the NSEERS program the Obama Administration discontinued in 2011;
- Blocking organizations from receiving Federal, state or local funds if they have ties to domestic terrorism or have been deemed unindicted co-conspirators in a federal terror trial;
- Reinstitute post 9/11 restrictions on Saudi nationals’ access to American student visas; and
- Terminate Saudi Arabia’s participation in the U.S. “trusted traveler” Global Entry program.
APPENDIX

Reactions

White House spokesman Josh Earnest said that the release of the 28 Pages “does not change the assessment of the U.S. government that there’s no evidence the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials funded Al Qaeda.”

Likewise, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) also released a statement on the release, asserting that it did not constitute a national security risk, and cautioning that the decision to authorize the release “does not indicate the Intelligence Community’s agreement” with the report’s “accuracy or concurrence with any information it contains.”

As noted above the DNI also released part of a 2005 FBI-CIA memo that said “there is no information to indicate that either (Bayoumi) or (Bassnan) materially supported the hijackers wittingly, were intelligence officers of the Saudi government or provided material support for the 11 September attacks, contrary to media speculation,” an assertion that in the light of the facts covered up in the 28 Pages appears to be not only false but intentionally misleading, and raises troubling questions about its provenance and its release at this particular time.

According to CNN, “Saudi Ambassador to the United States Abdullah Al-Saud put out a statement after the document’s release Friday welcoming its publication, though he didn’t address the details it contains.” That statement read in part:

> Several government agencies, including the CIA and the FBI, have investigated the contents of the ‘28 Pages’ and have confirmed that neither the Saudi government, nor senior Saudi officials, nor any person acting on behalf of the Saudi government provided any support or encouragement for these attacks…

> We hope the release of these pages will clear up, once and for all, any lingering questions or suspicions about Saudi Arabia’s actions, intentions, or long-term friendship with the United States.

The chairman and ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee likewise issued a joint statement that backed the declassification of the pages, but Chairman Devin Nunes, R-Calif., added that “it’s important to note that this section does not put forward vetted conclusions, but rather unverified leads that were later fully investigated by the Intelligence Community.”

Likewise, Chairman Nunes’ Ranking Member Adam Schiff, D-Calif., applauded the disclosure but hedged that “I know that the release of these pages will not end debate over the issue, but it will quiet rumors over their contents – as is often the case, the reality is less damaging than the uncertainty.”

Similarly, Sens. Richard Burr (R-N.C.) and Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), the chair and top Democrat of the Senate Intelligence Committee, issued a joint statement agreeing with the
decision to declassify the report but noting emphatically that, “These pages include unconfirmed allegations and raw reporting and have been the subject of conspiracy theories for years.” The two called for a review of related documents from the director of national intelligence that
debunk many of the allegations contained in the declassified section of the report….We need to put an end to conspiracy theories and idle speculation that do nothing to shed light on the 9/11 attacks.”

According to a news report after the 28 Pages’ release, Former Gov. Thomas Kean, R-N.J., who chaired the full 9/11 Commission that followed the Joint Inquiry, “said there is still much material gathered in the course of the commission’s investigation that remains hidden from the public.” Gov. Kean told reporters that his Commission had had access to the full Joint Inquiry report, on which he commented, “It was a first draft. We obviously went into full detail and expanded on it….I don’t think it says anything new.”

However, the report went on, Gov. Kean “added that there still remains a great deal of material gathered as part of the commission’s own work that has been kept secret, including transcripts of interviews with President Bill Clinton and other documents that were kept out of the commission’s final report.” Kean was quoted as saying, “There’s a lot that hasn’t been released yet. The federal government keeps a lot of things secret from our report….At this point, there are very, very few things that should be kept secret and that the public has a right to know.”

New York Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), who has co-sponsored a bill that opens the door for families of 9/11 victims to sue foreign states and financial partners of terrorism, concluded that:

Preliminary readings show that there may well have been Saudi involvement in the terror of 9/11 both in the Saudi government and within the Saudi country, within Saudi Arabia.

The families who I have fought for long and hard now will be able to go to court, and soon, and if the Saudi government was complicit in 9/11 they should pay the price to the families who deserve justice,” he continued. “And they should pay the price so no other government will think of playing footsie with terrorists the way the Saudi government may well have done in 2001.”

Another critic was former Sen. Graham, who as related above has long called for the documents to be made public:

The information in the 28 pages reinforces the belief that the 19 hijackers – most of whom spoke little English, had limited education and had never before visited the United States – did not act alone in perpetrating the sophisticated 9/11 plot...

It suggests a strong linkage between those terrorists and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi charities, and other Saudi stakeholders. The American people should be concerned about these links.”
In response, Andrew Bowen, a senior fellow and the Director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest, charges after a review of the materials that the “conspiracy theory peddled by former Sen. Bob Graham that Saudi Arabia ran a network of intelligence agents in the United States who were central to the 9/11 plot and to the hijackers’ ability to carry out the attacks is bust.”

Bowen points out that on the same day the do documents were released:

[T]he Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the director of the CIA, the White House, the House Intelligence Committee’s ranking Democrat, and the 9/11 Commission chairs all noted that the unvetted information in the missing pages provided absolutely no credible intelligence that the kingdom was linked to the 9/11 plot.

While that is a true statement, it is also a remarkable one considering what the pages actually contain.

---

8 Lydia Willgress for MailOnline and Associated Press, “How can Obama break bread with them? President meets with Saudi ruler in Riyadh as row rages over secret report ‘linking the Arab kingdom with 9/11 attacks’”, The Daily Mail.com, April 20, 2016.
15 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report on Congress’ “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” submitted to then-Director of the CIA George Tenet January 29, 2003, p. 438 of original Report (p. 29 of the newly released materials).
21 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 441 (32).
22 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 442 (33).
23 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 420 (11).
24 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 417 (8).
25 Joint Inquiry Report
28 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 418 (9).
30 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 418 (9).
32 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 419 (10).
33 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 439 (30).
34 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 418-19 (9-10).
35 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 419 (10).
38 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 424 (15).
41 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 443 (34).
42 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 420 (11).
49 Jim Sciutto, Ryan Browne and Deirdre Walsh, "Congress releases secret ‘28 pages’ on alleged Saudi 9/11 tie,” CNN.com, July 15, 2016, which includes the embedded documents.
60 Lydia Willgress for MailOnline and Associated Press, “How can Obama break bread with them? President meets with Saudi ruler in Riyadh as row rages over secret report ‘linking the Arab kingdom with 9/11 attacks’”, The Daily Mail.com, April 20, 2016.


72 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report on Congress’ “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” submitted to then-Director of the CIA George Tenet January 29, 2003, p. 415 of original Report (p. 6 of the released materials).

73 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report on Congress’ “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” submitted to then-Director of the CIA George Tenet January 29, 2003, p. 415 of original Report (p. 6 of the released materials).

74 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 420 (11).

75 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 432 (23).

76 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 440 (31).

77 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 438 (29).


88 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 421 (12).

89 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 421 (12).

90 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 441 (32).

91 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 441 (32).


93 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 420 (11).

94 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 435 (26).

95 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 442 (33).

96 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 435 (26).

97 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 435 (26).

98 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 417 (8).


100 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 430 (21).


103 Joint Inquiry Report, p. 418 (9).


Jim Sciutto, Ryan Browne and Deirdre Walsh, "Congress releases secret ‘28 pages’ on alleged Saudi 9/11 tie,” CNN.com, July 15, 2016, which includes the embedded documents.

Jim Sciutto, Ryan Browne and Deirdre Walsh, "Congress releases secret ‘28 pages’ on alleged Saudi 9/11 tie,” CNN.com, July 15, 2016, which includes the embedded documents.


Jim Sciutto, Ryan Browne and Deirdre Walsh, "Congress releases secret ‘28 pages’ on alleged Saudi 9/11 tie,” CNN.com, July 15, 2016, which includes the embedded documents.

Jim Sciutto, Ryan Browne and Deirdre Walsh, "Congress releases secret ‘28 pages’ on alleged Saudi 9/11 tie,” CNN.com, July 15, 2016, which includes the embedded documents.
